The impact of International Monetary Fund programmes on the socio-economic status of women by O’Donnell Keating, Michelle
i 
 
DUBLIN CITY UNIVERSITY 
 
 
 
 
The Impact of International Monetary Fund 
Programmes on the Socio-Economic Status 
of Women 
_____________________________________ 
 
Michelle O’Donnell Keating 
Supervisor: Dr Michael Breen, School of Law and Government 
 
This thesis is submitted to Dublin City University in fulfilment of the 
requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.  
 
September 2018 
  
ii 
 
Declaration  
 
I hereby certify that this material, which I now submit for assessment on the programme of 
study leading to the award of Doctor of Philosophy International Relations is entirely my own 
work, and that I have exercised reasonable care to ensure that the work is original, and does 
not to the best of my knowledge breach any law of copyright, and has not been taken from 
the work of others save and to the extent that such work has been cited and acknowledged 
within the text of my work.  
 
 
 
 
Signed: _______________ ID No.:_________________ Date: _____________ 
  
iii 
 
Acknowledements 
I would like to extend thanks to the many people, who generously gave their time and support 
to me throughout my PhD. My time in DCU has been amazing and I am so very grateful to 
have spent these past years learning with, and from, so many wonderful people.  
 
Firstly, a very special gratitude to my supervisor Dr. Michael Breen. Thank you for your 
tremendous support, your encouragement and your boundless patience over these past 
years. Thank you for lifting me out of deep confusion again and again! Thank you for the great 
chats which I miss very much. Right from my very first International Political Economy class I 
was inspired by you and it has be a real privilege to work with you over these past years.  
 
Thank you, Professor Gary Murphy. You have been a fantastic mentor and supporter, 
presenting me with a multitude of opportunities throughout my time in DCU and always had 
time for an uplifting conversation as I passed your office. Your have a great passion for the 
School of Law and Government, its staff and students, and all things politics, and I have 
learned so much from your stewardship.  
 
Special mention to Professor Iain McMenamin, both entertaining and insightful in superior 
measures. I remember being so despondent in my first year as a PhD student when you said 
we would no longer have time for reading now that we were doing a PhD. I understand your 
point now! Thanks to Professor Maura Conway for navigating me through my Viva and your 
amazing International Relations Theory seminars. Thanks to Professor Eileen Connolly for 
helping me deconstruct and reconstruct thoughts and theories. Thanks to Dr. Karen Devine 
for mind mapping my thesis with me and brain storming gender relations. Thanks to Dr Eoin 
O’Malley for introducing me to econometrics, which both broke, and reset my brain 
(numerous times!). 
 
A very special mention goes to Rachmaninov. Odd I know! But, in the many times where my 
brain stopped working, the Rach 3 leapt in and I thought, if he can write such incredible music, 
then I can write one more meaningful paragraph. I listened to the Rach 3 a lot! 
  
Finally, but by no means least, thanks to my family. To my mother Christine, my cheerleader, 
my constant encouragement, the person who always believes in me. To my father Sean, 
whose pragmatic approach and wonderful humour always makes my life shine no matter how 
difficult things might be. To my son Isaac, you make me want to change the world for you. 
You are my heart. Finally, thanks to my amazing husband Adam. It has not been an easy 
journey for either of us and without your unbelievable support and love I could never have 
achieved this milestone. Thank you. 
 
I am eternally grateful to you all.   
iv 
 
Contents  
List of Tables and Figures ...................................................................................................................... xii 
List of Abbreviations .............................................................................................................................xiv 
Abstract ................................................................................................................................................. xv 
1. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................... 1 
1.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................................. 1 
1.2 The IMF in a changing economic order ......................................................................................... 2 
1.3 Why the IMF and women matters ................................................................................................ 4 
1.4 Theoretical argument ................................................................................................................... 5 
1.5 Roadmap of thesis ........................................................................................................................ 7 
1.6 Summary ....................................................................................................................................... 7 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW ........................................................................................................................... 9 
2.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................................. 9 
2.2 Political Economy gains a feminist lens ...................................................................................... 10 
2.3 The IMF and gender .................................................................................................................... 16 
2.3.1 Early analysis of IMF programmes and gender .................................................................... 16 
2.3.2 Recent analysis of IMF programmes and gender ................................................................ 18 
2.4 IMF conditionality ....................................................................................................................... 24 
2.4.1 A brief background to IMF conditionality ............................................................................ 24 
2.4.2 The impact of IMF programmes on economic and fiscal factors ......................................... 27 
2.3 The IMF and regime type ............................................................................................................ 29 
2.6 Summary ..................................................................................................................................... 31 
3 GENDER POLICY AND THE IMF ........................................................................................................... 32 
3.1 The remit of the IMF ................................................................................................................... 32 
3.2 A potential policy pivot in the IMF .............................................................................................. 34 
3.2 Early signs that gender was becoming important ...................................................................... 34 
3.3 Recent progress around gender in the IMF ................................................................................ 38 
3.3.1 IMF leadership and gender .................................................................................................. 39 
3.3.2 IMF research on gender ....................................................................................................... 41 
3.3.3 Making gender diversity Real within the IMF ...................................................................... 46 
3.4 Summary ..................................................................................................................................... 47 
4. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ............................................................................................................. 49 
4.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 49 
4.2 Dependent Variable .................................................................................................................... 51 
v 
 
4.2.1 The socio-economic status of women ................................................................................. 51 
4.2.2 Illustrating inequality ........................................................................................................... 52 
4.2.3 Gendered governance.......................................................................................................... 54 
4.2.3 Labour force participation and the socio-economic status of women ................................ 58 
4.2.4 Education and the socio-economic status of women .......................................................... 59 
4.2.5 Maternal health and the socio-economic status of women ................................................ 62 
4.3 Independent Variable: IMF programmes .................................................................................... 64 
4.3.1 Why do states enter an IMF agreement? ............................................................................ 64 
4.3.2 What are the different types of IMF programmes? ............................................................. 66 
4.3.3 IMF programme design ........................................................................................................ 68 
4.3.4 Specific types of IMF conditionality: spending reforms ....................................................... 69 
4.3.5 Specific types of IMF conditionality: structural reforms ...................................................... 72 
4.3.6 What influences conditions in IMF programmes? ............................................................... 78 
4.3.7 IMF programme implementation ........................................................................................ 79 
4.3.8 Do states complete IMF programmes? ................................................................................ 80 
4.3.9 Factors that influence programme implementation ........................................................... 80 
4.3.10 What happens when states do not complete IMF programmes? ..................................... 82 
4.4 Control Variable: regime type ..................................................................................................... 83 
4.4.1 Understanding regime characteristics ................................................................................. 83 
4.3.2 Political institutions and democratic regime preferences ................................................... 85 
4.4.3 Political institutions and autocratic regime preferences ..................................................... 86 
4.3.4 Economic institutions and democratic regime preferences ................................................ 89 
4.3.5 Economic institutions and autocratic regime preferences .................................................. 91 
4.3.6 Regime preferences and IMF programmes ......................................................................... 92 
4.4 Hypotheses and summary .......................................................................................................... 93 
5.0 METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN ....................................................................................... 95 
5.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 95 
5.2 Data ............................................................................................................................................. 95 
5.2.1 Case selection ...................................................................................................................... 95 
5.2.2 Data sources ......................................................................................................................... 96 
5.3 Dependent variable data: socio-economic status of women ..................................................... 96 
5.3.1 Health ................................................................................................................................... 99 
5.3.2 Education ........................................................................................................................... 100 
5.3.3 Labour force participation ................................................................................................. 104 
vi 
 
5.4 Independent variable data: IMF programme participation ...................................................... 105 
5.4.1 IMF programme design ...................................................................................................... 106 
5.4.2 Implementation of an IMF agreement .............................................................................. 112 
5.5 Control Variables ....................................................................................................................... 116 
5.5.1 HDI: Human Development Index ....................................................................................... 116 
5.5.2 Health expenditure per capita ........................................................................................... 116 
5.5.3 Education expenditure per capita ...................................................................................... 117 
5.5.4 Log of GDP .......................................................................................................................... 118 
5.5.5 GNI ..................................................................................................................................... 118 
5.5.6 Regime type ....................................................................................................................... 118 
5.5.7 Country fixed effects and year effects ............................................................................... 119 
5.5.8 IMF agreement types ......................................................................................................... 120 
5.6 Dataset ...................................................................................................................................... 120 
5.7 Summary ................................................................................................................................... 120 
6.0 DATA ANALYSIS ............................................................................................................................. 122 
6.1 Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 122 
6.2 Considerations for model design .............................................................................................. 123 
6.3 Model design ............................................................................................................................. 124 
6.4 Model specification ................................................................................................................... 125 
6.4.1 Probability of participation in IMF agreement .................................................................. 127 
6.4.2 Robustness checks of probit model ................................................................................... 130 
6.4.3 Results of probit testing and probability of IMF participation .......................................... 132 
6.5 Impact of IMF programmes on the socio-economic status of women ..................................... 133 
6.5.1 Maternal health ................................................................................................................. 134 
6.5.2 Female education ............................................................................................................... 145 
6.5.3 Female labour force participation ..................................................................................... 157 
6.6 Summary ................................................................................................................................... 169 
7.0 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS ..................................................................................... 170 
7.1 Recapitulation of purpose and findings .................................................................................... 170 
7.1.1 Programme design ............................................................................................................. 170 
7.1.2 Programme implementation ............................................................................................. 171 
7.1.3 Maternal health ................................................................................................................. 172 
7.1.4 Female education ............................................................................................................... 173 
7.1.5 Female labour force participation ..................................................................................... 175 
vii 
 
7.1.6 The IMF and gender ........................................................................................................... 176 
7.2 Limitations of research ............................................................................................................. 177 
7.3 Implications ............................................................................................................................... 178 
7.4 Contribution and Future Research ............................................................................................ 180 
8. REFERENCES .................................................................................................................................... 183 
9.0 APPENDICES .................................................................................................................................. 213 
9.1 Appendix 1: The impact of IMF programme participation on maternal health index .............. 213 
9.2 Appendix 2: The impact of IMF programme implementation on maternal health Index ........ 214 
9.3 Appendix 3: The impact of IMF programme design on maternal health index ........................ 215 
9.4 Appendix 4: The impact of IMF programmes participation on births attended by a health 
professional ..................................................................................................................................... 216 
9.5 Appendix 5: The impact of IMF programme implementation on births attended by a health 
professional ..................................................................................................................................... 217 
9.6 Appendix 6: The impact of IMF programme design on births attended by a health professional
 ........................................................................................................................................................ 218 
9.7 Appendix 7: The impact of IMF programme participation on contraceptive prevalence among 
married women aged 19-49............................................................................................................ 219 
9.8 Appendix 8: The impact of IMF programme implementation on contraceptive prevalence 
among married women aged 19-49 ............................................................................................... 220 
9.9 Appendix 9: The impact of IMF programme design on contraceptive prevalence among 
married women aged 19-40............................................................................................................ 220 
9.10 Appendix 10: The impact of IMF programme participation on female fertility rates ............ 221 
9.11 Appendix 11: The impact of IMF programme implementation on female fertility rates ....... 222 
9.12 Appendix 12: The impact of IMF programme design on female fertility rates ...................... 223 
9.13 Appendix 13: The impact of IMF programme participation on lifetime risk of maternal death
 ........................................................................................................................................................ 224 
9.14 Appendix 14: The impact of IMF programme implementation on lifetime risk of maternal 
death ............................................................................................................................................... 225 
9.15 Appendix 15: The impact of IMF programme design on lifetime risk of maternal death ...... 226 
9.16 Appendix 16: The impact of IMF programme participation on maternal mortality rates ...... 227 
9.17 Appendix 17: The Impact of IMF programmes implementation on maternal mortality rates
 ........................................................................................................................................................ 228 
9.18 Appendix 18: The Impact of IMF programme design on maternal mortality rates ................ 229 
9.19 Appendix 19: The Impact of IMF programme participation on pregnant women receiving 
prenatal care ................................................................................................................................... 230 
9.20 Appendix 20: The Impact of IMF programme implementation on pregnant women receiving 
prenatal care ................................................................................................................................... 231 
viii 
 
9.21 Appendix 21: The Impact of IMF programme design on pregnant women receiving prenatal 
care ................................................................................................................................................. 232 
9.22 Appendix 22: The Impact of IMF programme participation on teenage mothers aged 15-19
 ........................................................................................................................................................ 233 
9.23 Appendix 23: The Impact of IMF programme implementation on teenage mothers aged 15-19
 ........................................................................................................................................................ 234 
9.24 Appendix 24: The Impact of IMF programme design on teenage mothers aged 15-19 ......... 235 
9.25 Appendix 25: The Impact of IMF programme participation on female education index ....... 236 
9.26 Appendix 26: The Impact of IMF programme implementation on female education Index .. 237 
9.27 Appendix 27: The Impact of IMF programme design on female education index ................. 238 
9.28 Appendix 28 The Impact of IMF programme participation on expected years of schooling - 
Female ............................................................................................................................................. 239 
9.29 Appendix 29: The Impact of IMF programme Implementation on expected years of schooling 
- female ........................................................................................................................................... 240 
9.30 Appendix 30: The Impact of IMF programme design on expected years of schooling - female
 ........................................................................................................................................................ 241 
9.31 Appendix 31: The Impact of IMF programme participation on expected years of schooling - 
male ................................................................................................................................................ 242 
9.32 Appendix 32: The Impact of IMF programme implementation on expected years of schooling 
- male .............................................................................................................................................. 243 
9.33 Appendix 33: The Impact of IMF programme design on expected years of schooling - male 244 
9.34 Appendix 34: The Impact of IMF programme participation on the male / female ratio for 
primary enrolment .......................................................................................................................... 245 
9.35 Appendix 35: The Impact of IMF programme implementation on the male / female ratio for 
primary enrolment .......................................................................................................................... 246 
9.36 Appendix 36: The Impact of IMF programme design on the male / female ratio for primary 
enrolment ....................................................................................................................................... 247 
9.37 Appendix 37: The Impact of IMF programme participation on the male / female ratio for 
secondary enrolment ...................................................................................................................... 248 
9.38 Appendix 38: The Impact of IMF programme implementation on the male / female ratio for 
secondary enrolment ...................................................................................................................... 249 
9.39 Appendix 39: The Impact of IMF programme design on the male / female Ratio for secondary 
enrolment ....................................................................................................................................... 250 
9.40 Appendix 40: The Impact of IMF programme participation on the male / female ratio for 
tertiary enrolment .......................................................................................................................... 251 
9.41 Appendix 41: The Impact of IMF programme implementation on the male / female ratio for 
tertiary enrolment .......................................................................................................................... 252 
ix 
 
9.42 Appendix 42: The Impact of IMF programme design on the male / female ratio for tertiary 
enrolment ....................................................................................................................................... 253 
9.43 Appendix 43: The Impact of IMF programme participation on primary school completion 
rates - female .................................................................................................................................. 254 
9.44 Appendix 44: The impact of IMF programme implementation on female rates of primary 
school completion ........................................................................................................................... 255 
9.45 Appendix 45: The impact of IMF programme design on female rates of primary school 
completion ...................................................................................................................................... 256 
9.46 Appendix 46: The impact of IMF programme participation on male rates of primary school 
completion ...................................................................................................................................... 257 
9.47 Appendix 47: The impact of IMF programme implementation on male rates of primary school 
completion ...................................................................................................................................... 258 
9.48 Appendix 48: The impact of IMF programme design on male rates of primary school 
completion ...................................................................................................................................... 259 
9.49 Appendix 49: The impact of IMF programme participation on progression to secondary 
education - Female ......................................................................................................................... 260 
9.50 Appendix 50: The impact of IMF programme implementation on progression to secondary 
education - Female ......................................................................................................................... 261 
9.51 Appendix 51: The impact of IMF programme design on progression to secondary education - 
Female ............................................................................................................................................. 262 
9.52 Appendix 52: The impact of IMF programme participation on progression to secondary 
education - male ............................................................................................................................. 263 
9.53 Appendix 53: The impact of IMF programme implementation on progression to secondary 
education - male ............................................................................................................................. 264 
9.54 Appendix 54: The impact of IMF programme design on progression to secondary education - 
male ................................................................................................................................................ 265 
9.55 Appendix 55: The impact of IMF programme participation on literacy rates - female .......... 266 
9.56 Appendix 56: The impact of IMF programme implementation on literacy rates - female ..... 267 
9.57 Appendix 57: The impact of IMF programme design on literacy rates - female .................... 268 
9.58 Appendix 58: The impact of IMF programme participation on literacy rates - male ............. 269 
9.59 Appendix 59: The impact of IMF programme implementation on literacy rates - male ........ 270 
9.60 Appendix 60: The impact of IMF programme design on literacy rates - male ....................... 271 
9.61 Appendix 61: The impact of IMF programme participation on female labour force 
participation index .......................................................................................................................... 272 
9.62 Appendix 62: The impact of IMF programme implementation on female labour force 
participation index .......................................................................................................................... 273 
9.63 Appendix 63: The impact of IMF programme design on female labour force participation 
index ................................................................................................................................................ 274 
x 
 
9.64 Appendix 64: The impact of IMF programme participation on male labour force participation 
index ................................................................................................................................................ 275 
9.65 Appendix 65: The impact of IMF programme implementation on male labour force 
participation index .......................................................................................................................... 276 
9.66 Appendix 66: The impact of IMF programme design on male labour force participation index
 ........................................................................................................................................................ 277 
9.67 Appendix 67: The impact of IMF programme participation on female agricultural employment
 ........................................................................................................................................................ 278 
9.68 Appendix 68: The impact of IMF programme implementation on female agricultural 
employment .................................................................................................................................... 279 
9.69 Appendix 69: The impact of IMF programme design on female agricultural employment ... 280 
9.70 Appendix 70: The impact of IMF programme participation on male agricultural employment
 ........................................................................................................................................................ 281 
9.71 Appendix 71: The impact of IMF programme implementation on male agricultural 
employment .................................................................................................................................... 282 
9.72 Appendix 72: The impact of IMF programme design on male agricultural employment....... 283 
9.73 Appendix 73: The impact of IMF programme participation on female industrial employment
 ........................................................................................................................................................ 284 
9.74 Appendix 74: The impact of IMF programme implementation on female industrial 
employment .................................................................................................................................... 285 
9.75 Appendix 75: The impact of IMF programme design on female industrial employment....... 286 
9.76 Appendix 76: The impact of IMF programme participation on male industrial employment 287 
9.77 Appendix 77: The impact of IMF programme implementation on male industrial employment
 ........................................................................................................................................................ 288 
9.78 Appendix 78: The impact of IMF programme design on male industrial employment .......... 289 
9.79 Appendix 79: The impact of IMF programme participation on female service employment 290 
9.80 Appendix 80: The impact of IMF programme implementation on female service employment
 ........................................................................................................................................................ 291 
9.81 Appendix 81: The impact of IMF programme design on female service employment .......... 292 
9.82 Appendix 82: The impact of IMF programme participation on male service employment ... 293 
9.83 Appendix 83: The impact of IMF programme implementation on male service employment
 ........................................................................................................................................................ 294 
9.84 Appendix 84: The impact of IMF programme design on male industrial employment .......... 295 
9.85 Appendix 85: The impact of IMF programme participation on female employment age 15-24
 ........................................................................................................................................................ 296 
9.86 Appendix 86: The impact of IMF programme implementation on female employment age 15-
24 .................................................................................................................................................... 297 
xi 
 
9.87 Appendix 87: The impact of IMF programme design on female employment age 15-24 ...... 298 
9.88 Appendix 88: The impact of IMF programme participation on female employment age 15-64
 ........................................................................................................................................................ 299 
9.89 Appendix 89: The impact of IMF programme implementation on female employment age 15 - 
64 .................................................................................................................................................... 300 
9.90 Appendix 90: The impact of IMF programme design on female employment age 15 - 64 .... 301 
9.91 Appendix 91: The impact of IMF programme participation on male employment age 15 - 24
 ........................................................................................................................................................ 302 
9.92 Appendix 92: The impact of IMF programme implementation on male employment age 15 - 
24 .................................................................................................................................................... 303 
9.93 Appendix 93: The impact of IMF programme design on male employment age 15 - 24 ....... 304 
9.94 Appendix 94: The impact of IMF programme participation on male employment age 15 - 64
 ........................................................................................................................................................ 305 
9.95 Appendix 95: The impact of IMF programme implementation on male employment age 15 - 
64 .................................................................................................................................................... 306 
9.96 Appendix 96: The impact of IMF programme design on male employment age 15 - 64 ....... 307 
9.97 Appendix 97: The impact of IMF programme participation on female labour force 
participation aged 15 plus .............................................................................................................. 308 
9.98 Appendix 98: The impact of IMF programme implementation on female labour force 
participation aged 15 plus .............................................................................................................. 309 
9.99 Appendix 99: The impact of IMF programme design on female labour force participation aged 
15 plus ............................................................................................................................................. 310 
9.100 Appendix 100: The impact of IMF programme participation on male labour force 
participation aged 15 plus .............................................................................................................. 311 
9.101 Appendix 101: The impact of IMF programme implementation on male labour force 
participation aged 15 plus .............................................................................................................. 312 
9.102 Appendix 102: The impact of IMF programme design on male labour force participation 
aged 15 plus .................................................................................................................................... 313 
9.103 Appendix 103: List of countries in dataset............................................................................ 314 
9.104 Appendix 104 Full List of 529 IMF programmes analysed with programme design ratio and 
implementation levels .................................................................................................................... 315 
 
  
xii 
 
List of Tables and Figures 
4.1 Relationship between regime type and women’s political rights 56 
4.2 Relationship between regime type and women’s economic rights 57 
4.3 Relationship between regime type and women’s social rights 57 
4.4 IMF Credit Agreements 67 
5.5 Summary of MDG’s 99 
5.6 Descriptive Statistics of Maternal Health Indicators      100 
5.7 List of Education Indicators 102 
5.8 Descriptive Statistics of female and male education Indicators      103 
5.9 List of Labour Force Participation Indicators 105 
5.10 Descriptive Statistics of labour force participation indicators      105 
5.11 IMF Programme Type by regime      107 
5.12 Descriptive statistics of Ratio of QPC SPC conditions      108 
5.13 Ratio of fiscal to structural conditions by regime type 108 
5.14 Regional view of IMF programme design 109 
5.15 Regional view of IMF programme design 111 
5.16 Descriptive Statistics of Implementation levels in IMF programmes     112 
5.17 Implementation levels of IMF programmes by regime type 113 
5.18 Regional variations in implementation levels      114 
5.19 Regional variations in implementation levels 115 
5.20 IMF Programme types with regime split 119 
6.21 Markov Transition 125 
6.22 Summary of lagged variables of interest for independent variable – IMF 
participation 
126 
6.23 Treatment effects regression model 126 
6.24 Probit model determining participation in an IMF programme 127 
6.25 Results of Probit Model determining participation in an IMF 
programme 
129 
6.26 Results of Goodness of Fit Tests 131 
6.27 Maternal Health Index Composition 134 
6.28 The impact of IMF participation on Maternal Health index 137 
6.29 The effect of IMF Programme Implementation on Maternal Health 
index 
138 
6.30 The effect of IMF Programme Design on Maternal Health index 139 
6.31 Regional view of the impact of IMF programme participation on the 
maternal health index 
140 
6.32 Regional view of the impact of IMF programmes implementation on the 
maternal health index 
141 
6.33 Regional view of the impact of IMF programme design levels on the 
maternal health index 
142 
xiii 
 
6.34 Full list of results exploring impact of IMF programmes on maternal 
health 
144 
6.35 Female education index composition 145 
6.36 The impact of IMF programme participation on female education index 146 
6.37 The effect of IMF Programme Implementation on female education 
index, treatment effect model with Markov transition 
147 
6.38 The effect of IMF Programme Design on female education index 148 
6.39 The effect of IMF Programme participation on female education index, 
Regional View 
150 
6.40 The effect of IMF Programme Implementation on female education 
index, Regional View 
151 
6.41 The effect of IMF Programme Design on female education index, 
Regional View 
152 
6.42 List of tables presenting results of Impact of IMF programmes on 
education 
153 
6.43 The effect of IMF participation on Female Labour Force Participation 
index 
159 
6.44 The effect of IMF Programme Implementation on Female Labour Force 
Participation index 
160 
6.45 The effect of IMF Programme Design on Female Labour Force 
Participation index 
161 
6.46 The effect of IMF Programme participation on female labour force 
index, Regional View 
163 
6.47 The effect of IMF Programme Implementation on female labour force 
index, Regional View 
164 
6.48 The effect of IMF Programme Design on female labour force index, 
Regional View 
165 
6.49 List of tables presenting results of Impact of IMF programmes on 
education 
166 
 
  
xiv 
 
List of Abbreviations 
 
Abbreviation Explanation 
EFF Extended Facility Fund 
ESAF Extended Structural Adjustment Facility  
G10 Group of Ten 
G20 Group of 20 
G5 Group of Five 
G7 Group of Seven 
GPE Global Political Economy 
IEO Independent Evaluation Office 
IFI International Financial Institutions 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
IMFC International Monetary Fund Committee  
IO International Organisation 
IPE International Political Economy 
IR International Relations 
LIEO Liberal International Economic Order 
LOI Letter of Intent 
MD Managing Director of the IMF 
MDG’s Millennium Development Goals  
PA Prior Action or Principle Agent  
PC Performance Criteria 
PRGF Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility 
QPC Quantitative Performance Criteria 
SAF Structural Adjustment Fund 
SB Structural Benchmark 
SBA Stand-by Arrangement 
SDG’s Sustainable Development Goals 
SDN Staff Discussion Notes 
SDR Special Drawing Rights 
SES Socio-Economic Status 
SPC Structural Performance Criteria 
 
 
 
xv 
 
Abstract 
 
Michelle O’Donnell Keating 
 
The Impact of International Monetary Fund Programmes on the 
Socio-Economic Status of Women 
 
 
Through its mechanism of conditionality, the IMF can tie funding to economic policy changes, 
encouraging states to implement different economic models. While several papers find that 
IMF programmes negatively impact the health or education of women, little is known about 
the impact of IMF programmes upon the SES (socio-economic status) of women. The SES of 
women considers maternal health care, female education and female labour force 
participation. In this thesis, I argue that while participation in an IMF programme has the 
potential to impact the SES of women, it is the factors of programme design and programme 
implementation levels that are crucial.  I argue that programme design is critical, as spending 
reforms which focus upon budgetary contraction and increasing the tax base have the 
capacity to negatively and disproportionately impact the SES of women, while certain 
structural reforms for economic growth have the capacity to positively impact the SES of 
women.  
I argue additionally that the programme implementation levels are critical to the impact the 
IMF can have on the SES of women. While a state may sign an IMF agreement with varying 
conditions, it is the level of implementation which will determine whether changes in the SES 
of women can be attributed to the IMF programme. To substantiate these theoretical 
arguments, I combine data on IMF programmes with data on the SES of women for 173 
countries between 1990 and 2011 and use a treatment effects model with a Markov transition 
in the treatment equation to interrogate the data.  
This thesis finds evidence that participation in an IMF programme has a mixed impact upon 
the SES of women. There is evidence of some positive and statistically significant impact on 
the maternal health of women, female primary enrollment and completion levels, and a 
negative and statistically significant impact on female labour force participation. However, 
importantly this impact is eroded when the model controls for implementation levels or 
programme design, implying that the programme design or programme implementation fails 
to capitalise on potential gains from participation in an IMF agreement. 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
As the 2008 economic crisis took hold, cracks in the global financial order widened, and the 
world quickly headed towards a global economic recession. This global economic crisis was 
particularly harsh on countries which had fundamental flaws in their economic structures. 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF), a familiar organisation to countries in Asia, Latin 
American and Africa, now saw itself become a lender of last resort countries such as Iceland, 
Ireland, Greece, Portugal and Cyprus, previously considered economically and politically 
successful and stable. Following the global recession, austerity economics focusing on 
reducing structural deficits have become more commonplace. The IMF has long faced 
criticism for binding such policies to its funding, in particular, from academics, economists 
and activists who argue that they have a disproportionately negative impact on the poorest 
in society, many of whom are women. Karamessini (2014) highlights how ‘Severe austerity 
has been devastating for women’s labour market position’ in Greece and how female 
unemployment rates have risen from 16.5 percent to 31.5 percent. Such a statement 
highlights several important questions. Firstly, a state’s ability to design and implement 
economic and social policy is somewhat dependent upon the international system. If the IMF 
supplies the funding and stipulates the economic policy preferences without considering any 
disproportionate and negative gendered impacts, are its policy recommendations flawed and 
contributing towards greater economic instability? Secondly, if the IMF fails to consider 
gender in its policy, is it losing opportunities for potential economic growth? Thirdly, if the 
IMF does not consider the gendered impacts of economic policy choice then why would we 
expect a state to be able to either implement a gendered sensitive economic policy or even 
care about gendered sensitive economic policies? These are the questions this dissertation 
wishes to explore, and it is this substantive issue which this dissertation aims to address. 
 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF), is one of the world’s most influential international 
organisations. With 189 members, it has developed into a powerful voice in the establishment 
of economic norms, and also a lender of last resort to economically troubled states. The IMF 
has strongly influenced national and international economic policy, particularly in the past 
four decades. As states enter an IMF credit agreement, the IMF can tie funding to economic 
policy changes through its mechanism of conditionality. These conditions encourage states to 
implement different economic models. The impact of these conditions on various socio-
economic factors is keenly researched, and the IMF is often accused of having very negative 
impacts upon the weakest in society (ActionAid, 2009, Stucker and Basu, 2009). 
 
In this thesis, I explore the impact IMF programmes have on the socio-economic status (SES) 
of women. I argue that while participation in an IMF programme has the potential to impact 
the SES of women, it is the factors of programme design and programme implementation 
levels that are crucial.  I argue that programme design is critical, as spending reforms which 
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focus budgetary contraction and increasing the tax base have a strong capacity to negatively 
and disproportionately impact the SES of women, while certain structural reforms focusing 
on economic growth have the capacity to positively impact the SES of women. I additionally 
argue that the programme implementation levels are critical to the impact the IMF will have 
on the SES of women. A state may sign an IMF agreement with varying conditions, but, if they 
do not implement these conditions, then in truth, the impact the IMF has upon the SES of 
women in that state is negligible. The opposite holds true in that, should a state fully or mostly 
complete the specified IMF conditions, then I argue that it is possible that changes in the SES 
of women, whether positive or negative, can be attributed to the IMF programme.  
 
Firstly, following a brief introduction, this chapter seeks to introduce my thesis and presents 
a background to set this thesis in context. While the literature review will provide an excellent 
opportunity to highlight the many contributions in this area, this first chapter will highlight 
known gaps in existing literature around the IMF and women and how I intend to bridge these 
gaps. Although there is an increasing body of literature on this topic, the area remains poorly 
understood. I will explain how my thesis and research will move towards closing some of the 
existing gaps. This chapter will then outline why exploring the impact of IMF programmes 
upon the SES of women is important and relevant. This is significant, as it is my hope that my 
research and findings will have implications on an international level, providing guidance and 
suggestions for national and international policy improvements. Following that, I will outline 
how I intend on approaching my research, and I will present a roadmap for how my thesis will 
proceed. Importantly I emphasise why my approach is both valuable and necessary. Finally, I 
will conclude this chapter with a brief summary.  
 
1.2 The IMF in a changing economic order 
During the 1970’s, the developed world saw a rejection of the established Keynesian 
economic policies amongst economists and academics and a move towards ‘new classical 
economics’ (Blinder, 1988:278). The ‘widespread adoption’ of these new economic policies in 
the 1980’s became known as the ‘Washington Consensus’ (Gore, 2000:789) and this 
represented a paradigm shift and a transition from ‘state-led dirigisme to market-oriented 
policies’. Williamson (1993:1334), who coined the phrase ‘Washington Consensus’, stresses 
the importance of this new paradigm and how its ideals became the common wisdom of all 
serious economists. These policies saw expanded application in economies across developed 
and developing economies (Palley, Filho and Johnston, 2005:25) and it was during this period, 
that International Financial Institutions (IFI’s) became (and remain) essential for the 
deployment of such policies globally. The importance of mechanisms such as the IMF and 
World Bank in propagating the norms of the ‘Washington Consensus’ or what has become 
known as the ‘liberal international economic order’ (LIEO) (Gore, 2000), is continually stressed 
as is how these norms have played a crucial role in defining development practice over the 
past three decades (Gore, 2000, Lapavitas, Filho and Johnston, 2005 and Saad-Filho and 
Johnston, 2005). 
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Substantial research confirms the practical implementation by IMF of economic liberalisation 
policies such as capital market liberalisation (Stiglitz, 2004) economic and political 
liberalisation within Middle East North Africa (MENA) (Harrigan, Wang and El-Siad, 2006) and 
Latin America (Biglaiser and Brown, 2005). The IMF itself has often affirmed the benefits of 
liberalisation stating that ‘Policies that make an economy open to trade and investment with 
the rest of the world are needed for sustained economic growth’ (The IMF, 2001).  
 
There is a connection between this path to neoliberalism, heavily sponsored by the Reagan 
and Thatcher administrations, and the implementation of neoliberal policies through the 
process of IMF conditionality (Buria, 2003:30). In the 1970’s and 1980’s, the power and 
position of the IMF were changing. With the decline of Bretton Woods and the final closing 
of the Gold Standard in 1971, the IMF was faced with a Darwinian challenge, that of change 
in order to survive. Boughton (2009:45) highlights the difficulties facing the IMF, the G10 
(Group of 10) and the G20 (Group of 20) as they sought to find and implement a solution to 
the collapse of convertibility of the Dollar, the world's reserve currency, to Gold.  The IMF 
chronology1 of the years following the collapse of Bretton Woods illustrates a series of actions 
to which attempted to manage both a newly evolving monetary system, while also countering 
the oil crises. In 1974, the newly established G20 worked on evolving the monetary system 
while, in parallel, an Oil Facility and an Extended Fund Facility was founded to provide 
financial assistance to members coping with structural economic problems. Following these, 
we see the formation of the Trust Fund, a Supplementary Financing Facility, a series of quota 
enlargements and also substantial increases in the IMF resources. It is clear that by 1981 when 
the IMF expanded access to its resources, a shift in its purpose had occurred. The IMF had 
evolved from being a ‘global entity’ ensuring ‘exchange rate stability’, encouraging member 
countries to liberalise trade progressing to a ‘global entity’ with significantly more influence, 
capacity, resources and scope.  
 
This evolution and expansion of the IMF reach interestingly coincided with what Gore 
(2000:789) referred to as the paradigm shift transitioning ‘from state-led dirigisme to market-
oriented policies’. This evolved IMF proved to be an effective framework to deploy such 
policies, as it already possessed a globally integrated funding mechanism for states struggling 
with nascent symptoms of globalisation, states challenged with managing debt or states 
considered to be under-developed or developing countries. Buria (2003:30) highlights that 
the Reagan and Thatcher views of neo-liberal economics were ‘to be translated into a new 
type of structured conditionality’, replacing existing traditional conditionalities. The 
Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) Structural Conditionality Report (IEO, 2007) points out 
how conditionality was re-focused in the mid-1980’s to concentrate upon structural reforms 
                                                          
1 http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/chron/chron.asp The IMF website documents the chronological 
development of the IMF 
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and Michel Camdessus, the longest serving IMF Managing Director (1987 – 2004), stated the 
new IMF goals to be: 
 
‘financial market operations organised around objective financial criteria, 
transparency in industrial conglomerates and in government business relations more 
generally, the dismantling of monopolies, and the elimination of government–directed 
lending and procurement programs.' 
 
Buria (2000:30) sees this as the implementation of the ‘vision of a global market system’ 
which had been requested by the US business sectors and government since the 1970’s. 
Leaping forward to today, and per its very own website, we see that the IMF, with its 
increased budget of over $1tr, and new programmes, has developed into one of the most 
important international institutions in the world. However, while the Global Recession of 
2008 and the years following might have seen an increase in the importance of the IMF as 
countries avail of its support and credit to overcome economic crises the IMF faces many 
challenges to its future role.  These challenges include maintaining its relevance to countries 
like China, India, Brazil who are growing in economic dominance yet only hold minor influence 
in the IMF when compared to the US or Europe. With such an unfavourable level of influence 
for emerging economies within the IMF, it is hardly surprising to see the establishment of the 
New Development Bank, or the BRICS Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 
(AIIB). These new structures provide alternative models for investment and financial 
cooperation for emerging economies. As a result, these states achieve a level of influence and 
decision making not possible as members of the IMF, which allows them to directly address 
their financial, economic and monetary issues, on their own terms.  
 
1.3 Why the IMF and women matters 
While the policies and remit of the IMF emphasise the macro nature of their work, it would 
be remiss of the research community to fail to explore whether the impact of IMF 
programmes goes beyond macro issues. These issues include Foreign Direct Investment, debt 
management, international trade or economic growth. The IMF encourages states to explore 
and implement policies of economic liberalisation. However, the outcomes from such policies 
do not sit solely within an economic vacuum. For example, research highlights that economic 
liberalisation and economic growth have yielded positive outcomes for the SES of women in 
advanced industrialised democracies over the last one hundred years (Weiss, Ramerez and 
Tracy 1976, Clark, Ramsbey and Adler, 1991, World Bank 1995).  
Economic growth theory and research suggest that liberalisation has reduced gender 
inequalities. Examples such as Agenor and Montiel (1996), Aghion and Howitt (1998) and 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004) strongly highlight these findings. This is echoed by Stotsky 
(2006b) who points out that stronger economic growth leads to reduced gender disparities 
and the simultaneous relationship between economic growth and gender equality.  
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Most recently, Eastin and Prakash (2013) explore the relationship between economic 
development and gender equality. They find a highly complex three-phased non-monotonic 
relationship and that ‘gender advancement does not necessarily always increase or decrease 
as economies develop’ (Eastin and Prakash: 2013:158). They paint a picture cognizant of the 
intricate cultural practices that establish and maintain institutional biases and social norms 
which, after a period of progression on gender equality, contribute to a facilitation of a 
plateau. Eastin and Prakash (2013:159) highlight how limited education and ‘stigmatising 
social customs depress female labour participation’, or how institutions roll back on equality 
measures where reactionary groups hold influence and wish to see equality progression 
halted. This plateau or regression is not permanent, however, and Eastin and Prakash 
(2013:166) find that ‘continued economic development should again encourage gains in 
gender equality’. The following phases of economic development are matched with higher 
levels of female education, workforce participation, decision-making influence in the home 
and economic power. Essentially, a ‘shift in social value systems towards gender equality’ is 
facilitated. Using an extensive dataset of 146 countries, over an extended period (1980 – 
2005), with systematically-tested hypotheses, Eastin and Prakash (2013) have indeed 
complemented the existing literature and provided the community with an opportunity for a 
truer reflection on the impacts of economic development upon gender. This finding is highly 
important as it allows researchers to take a broader view and situate their findings in a context 
of timeline progression, regression or plateauing of gender equality. 
An alternative argument exists which is that IMF programmes are, for the most part, 
ineffective and possibly damaging. Several critics argue that IMF conditionality, the main 
causal mechanism in my thesis - IMF Conditionality – is designed incorrectly and applied 
hastily, without regard to local circumstances, cultural practices, or social norms in developing 
countries (Goldstein, 2000, Khor, 2001, Dreher, 2004, 2009). Consequently, there is a strong 
alternative argument that IMF programmes have no effect, or are possibly damaging to 
women. Considering the very latest research from Eastin and Prakash (2013), it may be time 
to revisit some of these earlier findings. The literature review will explore extensively these 
various arguments.  
 
1.4 Theoretical argument 
In exploring the impact that IMF programmes can have upon women, I have found it to be 
insufficient to simply explore a binary circumstance where a state is under an IMF programme 
or not. Many factors contribute to how an IMF programme impact a whole selection of 
outcomes. An example would be how the programme is designed and what will be the focus 
of the conditions. Also, to what level a state completes its agreed programme or whether a 
state was already under and IMF programme? IMF programmes are also ‘mediated by 
domestic politics’ (Pop-Eleches, 2013) and this raises a political reality question as to what 
influence a state’s regime type plays in the participation and deployment of an IMF 
programme. As such, in this thesis, I seek to develop and test a theory to explain how IMF 
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programmes can impact the SES of women, and, to what extent. I specifically argue that the 
design of IMF programme and the programme implementation levels are crucial to 
understanding the impact IMF programmes have upon the SES of women. It is simply 
insufficient to consider participation in an IMF programme alone when trying to identify any 
impact that the IMF programme may have upon the socio-economic status of women. 
Additionally, I also argue that there is the potential for regime differentiated impacts of IMF 
programmes upon the SES of women due to domestic policy preferences at play in the specific 
state.  
 
IMF programme design is critical. The design incorporates conditions which require a state to 
make either fiscal or structural changes or, in many cases, both. Fiscal reforms often focus 
upon budgetary contraction, public sector reform or the increase of taxation, whereas 
structural reforms may focus upon increased liberalisation of capital flows, tariff reductions 
or privatisation. In this thesis, I argue that fiscal reforms which focus on public sector 
budgetary contraction while increasing the tax base only have the capacity to negatively and 
disproportionately impact the SES of women, while certain structural economic growth 
reforms have the capacity to positively impact SES of women.  
 
Additionally, I also argue that it is necessary to consider to what level a state completes its 
IMF Programme. While a state may enter an IMF agreement which stipulates several 
conditions, if the state fails to implement these conditions, then any calculated impact that 
the IMF programme has had upon the SES of women needs to be cognizant of the 
implementation level. The opposite holds true, in that, should a state fully or mostly complete 
the conditions specified within an IMF agreement, then it is possible that changes in the SES 
of women, whether positive or negative, can be attributed to the IMF programme. As such, I 
argue that implementation levels are an essential consideration when assessing any impact 
that IMF programmes have upon the socio-economic status of women. 
 
 
An additional complexity is also presented in my thesis, as I explore to what extent, ‘regime 
type’ influences the design and implementation and impact that IMF programmes have upon 
the SES of women. Domestic institutions affect policy preferences (Pop-Eleches, 2013, Pop-
Eleches, 2009, Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006, Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003, McGuire and 
Olson, 1996, Olson, 1993, Wintrobe, R., 1990, 1998, 1999 and 2002). Existing research also 
points towards a correlation between political systems and political gender equality and this 
is an important point (Kenworth and Malami, 1999, Ingelhart, Norris and Welzel 2004 and 
Brown 2004). Democracies, with greater political equality and political access for women, 
have the potential to provide for greater redistribution of resources across genders than,  
autocracies which favour the elite and privileged which in many cases are male dominated. 
Any links between authoritarianism and a gender bias in governance are important 
considerations as they may impact the policy preferences of a state negotiating with the IMF. 
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As such it is essential that I explore whether there are regime differentiated differences in the 
impact that IMF programmes have upon the SES of women.  
 
1.5 Roadmap of thesis 
In this thesis, I follow a relatively conventional approach to structure. Following this 
introduction, which contextualises my subject matter, and illustrates the importance of 
considering the impact of IMF Programmes on the SES of women, in chapter two I move to 
consider the existing literature which has gone before my research. Significant research has 
been undertaken in the past decades in this area, but gaps remain. I explore these, proposing 
that my research can contribute to bridging these gaps.  
Chapter three presents an opportunity to review the IMF and how it relates to gender. I 
explore the traditional view that gender sits outside the remit of the IMF, while I also consider 
the most recent developments under Christine Lagarde, which seem to intimate a refocusing 
of the IMF towards a gender policy.  
In chapter four I present my theoretical framework and propose several hypotheses.  
In chapter five, I outline my methodological approach, chosen to maximise the potential for 
analysis but also to narrow gaps in the existing literature. The existing literature (and 
associated research) is heavily qualitative or takes the form of a case study. My approach has 
been different and focused on developing a cross-country macro understanding of the impact 
of IMF programmes upon the SES of women primarily utilising quantitative methods.  
Chapter six presents my data analysis, my model design and specification, and the results of 
my hypotheses testing.  
Chapter seven facilitates my concluding thoughts and recommendations for future actions at 
a national and international policy level. This is important, as it is clear we are in a time of 
deep and painful economic and social change. The ability to draw learnings from past policy 
choices will provide opportunities for future policy choices and facilitate better national and 
international policy design.  
It is my hope that with this thesis, I may influence both the IMF and national governments, in 
their negotiations with each other, to construct credit agreements which will prevent, or at 
the very least minimise disproportionately negative effects on the SES of women. Ultimately, 
my hope would be to argue for the IMF and states to pro-actively choose policies which 
stimulate economic growth opportunities, but not at the expense of society’s most 
vulnerable.        
1.6 Summary 
Exploring the impact which IMF Programmes have upon the SES of women set in this 
theoretical context is important from several perspectives. Firstly, The IMF has enormous 
influence on national and global economic policy. Understanding whether the impact of its 
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programmes upon the SES of women is negative or positive, will enable policy makers at both 
the IMF and states to design and enter an agreement with greater clarity as to potential 
impacts of the programme.  
 
Secondly, such knowledge will enable both the IMF and states to prioritise policies which 
minimise negative impacts on vulnerable populations such as women or children or the poor.  
 
Thirdly, it will contribute to the existing body of knowledge in the areas of gender, political 
economy and development and complement existing literature, bridging an important gap in 
the literature.   
 
Fourthly, and most importantly, is that that this thesis, its findings and recommendations will 
be operationally relevant. Fritz, Levy and Ort (2014) highlight how problem driven analysis in 
political economy can hold considerable promise’. It is with this mindset that I have 
approached this thesis.  
 
A major problem with regards to the IMF and gender is that it lacks a comprehensive analysis, 
there are far too may gaps in the understanding of this relationship. As such, IMF-related 
policy choice which has the potential to impact women operates with a blindness that is 
dangerous and has far reaching consequences. It is my goal with this thesis to, contribute to 
the existing body literature and increase the understanding of how IMF programmes impact 
the SES of women. Additionally, it is my goal to develop research which has the potential to 
be operationalised and brings some sight to the interaction between IMF-led policy and 
gender. Ultimately, I wish to see that political and economic policy ensures the protection of 
women and also, an improvement to their socio-economic status.   
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
As one of the world’s most influential organisations, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
has enormous capacity for influencing the policy direction of countries participating in its 
programmes. As countries enter an IMF agreement, the implementation of certain economic 
policies may become a condition of funding. It is this mechanism of conditionality which 
allows the IMF to influence national policy. The impact of these conditions on various socio-
economic factors is the subject of considerable research and critics argue that the IMF 
negatively affects the weakest in society (ActionAid 2009, Stuckler and Basu, 2009, Ooms and 
Schrecker, 2005). 
 
In this thesis, I explore the impact IMF programmes have upon the socio-economic status 
(SES) of women. I argue that while participation in an IMF programme has indeed the 
potential to affect the SES of women, its impact is mediated through programme design and 
implementation. This chapter reviews the literature on the effect of the IMF on women. This 
chapter is structured as follows. Firstly, I move to consider existing research that has defined 
conversations around political economy and gender, and then more specifically, around the 
interaction between the IMF and women. Secondly, as IMF conditionality plays an extensive 
role in how impactful IMF programmes are, I explore the relevant literature around IMF 
conditionality, with relevance to gender. Thirdly, though the literature is extensive and 
comprehensive, this chapter also wishes to highlight any gaps. Indeed, there are several gaps 
which result in an incomplete understanding of the relationship between IMF programmes 
and women.  
 
While there has been an increase in focus upon gender and the IMF there remains a number 
of gaps. Firstly, the existing literature is mainly qualitative in nature, and while this research 
has provided valuable insights, there is also value in taking a more systematic approach using 
statistical methods to explore the gender-differentiated effects of IMF programmes. 
Secondly, much of the existing research is case study focused. This has been useful to 
understand the interaction between IMF programmes and women in specific countries, but 
there is very limited ability to make generalisations. As such, the literature would also benefit 
from a macro study which would provide greater ability to draw generalities. IMF 
programmes differ widely, and while case studies can interrogate their impact on a single 
country or small n-set, it does not allow for these conclusions to be applied more widely. 
Thirdly, a large portion of the existing research focuses on the impact of the IMF Structural 
Adjustment Programmes (SAP’s) which were prevalent in the 1980’s. This was insightful 
research and contributed to the literature in many ways including developing an 
understanding of the design and focus of the SAPs’, the gendered differentiated impacts of 
SAPs on women in specific countries, and called out to the IMF to consider more specifically 
designed mechanisms tailored to a state’s need. However, this focus upon the 1980’s SAP’s 
and their impact on women highlight several gaps in our understanding of the impacts upon 
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women of IMF programmes deployed post-1990 up to recent times. It is essential that we 
develop an understanding of the impact of the IMF upon women which incorporates a more 
recent time period and more recent credit mechanisms used by the IMF. Fourthly, existing 
literature has explored numerous topics such as women’s health (Ooms and Schrecker, 2005, 
Stuckler and Basu, 2009) female education (ActionAid, 2009, Marphatia, 2010), human rights 
(Cheru, 1999) and respect for women’s economic and political rights (Detraz and Peksen, 
2016). There is currently no study that explores the impact of IMF programmes upon the 
socio-economic status of women, a measure encompassing female education, female labour 
force participation and maternal health. These gaps present an opportunity for this 
dissertation to make a positive and meaningful contribution to this area of literature and 
widen our knowledge as to how IMF programmes impact upon women.  
 
Finally, I conclude by summarising my main arguments, their theoretical setting and their 
value to the fields of international political economy and gender studies. 
 
2.2 Political Economy gains a feminist lens 
The interaction between political economy and women first came to the fore of research in 
the 1980’s. This was appropriately timed as the impact of the IMF programmes began to be 
visible, particularly in Africa and Latin America, where countries entered agreements with the 
IMF to rescue them from the negative effects of the 1970’s Oil Crises and the follow on 1980’s 
debt crises. In parallel to these political economy issues, feminist theorising saw a 
breakthrough in the 1980’s and issues of women’s lives and the interaction between women 
and a variety of socio-political decisions were brought to the fore by several feminist theorists.  
 
Through the work of Christine Sylvester, political economy research began to see questions 
with a new ontological approach, one who adopted a very different level-of-analysis position, 
one which had a feminist lens. This is an important juncture between political economy and 
gender, and Sylvester (1989, 2002) highlights that numerous issues within international 
relations and political economy are important to gender, and thus met the criteria for 
exploration. Sylvester (1989; 2002, 166) was keen to point out how women were being 
structured out of the international system and men structured in, and how the levels-of-
analysis of states, non-state actors, processes and systems somehow facilitated this 
structuring out of women through a ‘sleight-of-hand’. Recognising, and bringing to the fore 
this bias against women was foundational for academic research to move forward and explore 
potential policy implications. Also significant is Cynthia Enloe. Enloe was revolutionary in her 
analysis of International Relations as she brought a voice to the previously unseen - women. 
Enloe (1990) challenged dominant conceptions of society and politics by exploring how 
understandings would change should women be central to the analysis. Enloe (1990) 
discusses many areas where women’s contribution goes unvalued such wives creating a 
diplomatic relationship at a political level, women’s contribution to the economy as workers 
and consumers, women’s part within colonising processes where they are seen as ‘civilising’ 
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through their roles as teachers and nurses.  Enloe keenly studies the relationships between 
women and war and asks: ‘Where are the women?’. She looks at the gendered implications 
of the Cold War and post-Cold War era (1993) and the lives of vulnerable women in the middle 
east during the Gulf War (1993) and the militarization of women (2004 and 2005). Her critical 
theory approach has ‘unsettled the dominant paradigms’ (Griffiths, Roach and Solomon, 
2009) and has brought clarity to how the existing power structure in international relations is 
gendered. Judith Tickner’s work is situated in ‘identity politics’, and Feminist Standpoint 
Theory initially brought to prominence by Nancy Hartsock (1983, 1997), Tickner stresses that 
International Relations is gendered so that women’s voices are marginalised, and men’s 
voices and power are privileged (1992). Tickner (1992) espoused that international relations 
should benefit from the value and input of women’s experience and knowledge and this is 
echoed by Wylie and Harding (1993, 1997). While Tickner (1997) criticised IR theorists for 
omitting gender in their analyses Harding (2004:3) highlights that ‘feminist issues should not 
be pigeon-holed and ignored as only women’s issues, but instead has to be seen as valuably 
informing theoretical, methodological and political thought in general’. 
 
These early works opened a door for researchers who wished to explore gender relative to 
political economy and contributed to normalising a feminist lens in IPE. It is opportune, 
therefore, to explores progress in this area. It has become clear that a failure to incorporate 
gender prevents a comprehensive understanding of the impact of many political economy 
decisions across society leaving us with what Cook and Roberts (2000:3) refer to as 
‘androcentric bias’. The early 2000’s saw an increased interest in gender, theoretical 
developments involving gender and political economy, and the scholarly push to disaggregate 
established units and explore differentiated effects based on gender. Despite this, an 
androcentric bias dominated political economy at the time, and arguably, continues to do so. 
As such, political economy analysis suffers from a gendered analysis at its ontological and 
epistemological core. This is reflected in academic journals. Ritter and Mellow (2000:124) 
point out that though there is significant work around gender and feminism, this is not 
reflected in IR academic journals rather they are published elsewhere, in books, collected 
volumes or interdisciplinary journals. They quite rightly point out that this is to the 
disadvantage of both students and other scholars and why there may be a lack of 
‘understanding about the role of gender in shaping politics within the discipline’. 
 
Elson (2002) continues this discussion by challenging macroeconomic policy, charging it with 
being ‘gender blind’. There is a failure in conventional frameworks to recognise fully the 
economic contribution of women. Women’s work is often ‘non-market’ work, such as 
subsistence production, home care or community work, all of which is unpaid. Such work is 
considered a social role rather than an economic activity, but Elson (2002) is keen to point 
out that it is in fact, economic activity as these activities subsidise state or public services such 
as care for the elderly or sick.  
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Elson (2002) emphasises how macroeconomic policy can work against women and reinforce 
gender bias. Policies that favour low inflation, low debt and low public expenditure over full 
employment and high public investment compounds underemployment in women, while also 
challenges women’s ability more than men’s, to access required social safety nets. 
Interestingly Elson (2002) draws our attention to the gender differentiated impacts of crises 
as illustrated by the Asian crisis. Elson (2002) found that where men become unemployed, 
women’s work increases as they move towards being a ‘provider of last resort’ while also, 
retaining the roles of carers and community volunteers.  
 
Elson (2002) questions the conventional financial structures and architecture from a political 
economy perspective. Her analysis is not one simply of gendered differentiated impacts of 
policy; rather it is also one who questions the structures upon which these policies are built 
and the inherent inability of this structure to facilitate alternative dialogues for fear of 
volatility in the market. The approach of this paper is innovative for its time as it displays a 
nuance around gender and IPE in that it not only questions the inclusion of women as a 
subject matter in IPE but also, questions the position of women relative to the political 
economy decision making structures.  
 
Peterson (2005) continues the conversation of gender in political economy pointing out that 
while there is not ‘centrality of gender’ in political economy that the category of women and 
reference to gender is gaining greater attention. It is notable that even scholars who do not 
‘self-identify as feminist’ have begun to see the value of including the category of women. 
Peterson (2005) echoes Elson (2002) in that she stresses the domination of men in the 
‘practice and knowledge production’ in the areas of political economy. This is an important 
point as not only does it support a continuation of an androcentric bias in policy making and 
approaches to policy, but it also contributes to the consignment of gendered research or 
feminist approaches to the ‘other’ or the non-conventional. Peterson (2005) sees little 
evidence that political economy research is adopting an approach which includes a ‘centrality 
of gender’, but this cannot be surprising while systematic gender biases exist in political 
economy structures and architecture. 
 
Peterson (2005) places value in a multi epistemological world, highlighting how rationalist and 
positivist approaches contribute to making women ‘empirically visible’. Empirical approaches 
give life to women within political economy, they give a previously unattested value to 
women and their contributions and quantify how their exclusion as a consideration from 
policy making jeopardises development. On the other hand, Peterson (2005) recognises the 
value that constructivist approaches have, in exploring concepts such as power and privilege 
within political economy. As with all research, the question is key, and for my thesis, the 
making of women visible in the context of IMF policy at a macro and cross-country level 
demands an empirical and positivist approach. Gaining such a new insight is, in the words of 
Peterson (2005), an ‘indispensable project’. Peterson (2005) sees these epistemological 
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choices as key to making gains in the areas of gender and political economy. While Peterson 
(2005) clearly argues for an expansion of constructivist approaches exploring core issues of 
GPE, she also makes it clear that positivist approaches provide an ‘indispensable starting 
point’. 
 
Griffin (2007:719) asserts that gender has only achieved a ‘marginal status’ in IPE at best. She 
takes this opportunity to explore recent work around gender and IPE/GPE by Beneria (2003), 
Elias (2004), Morgan, Brandt and Kvande (2005) and Pun (2005) and echoes Peterson’s call 
for a greater emphasis on gendered IPE analysis. The joint call through these works is for a 
‘refashioned IPE’. One of the most notable points in academic research on gender has become 
the lack of mainstream appeal in academic journals, conferences, and wider discourse. There 
is a sense that dialogue about gender is limited to mainly women. Beneria (2004) criticises 
this limitation, arguing that it results in ‘women…. speaking to themselves’. Griffin rightly 
questions this situation wondering if there is any debate going on at all, pointing out that the 
current debate on gender and IPE is limited to feminists when in fact those most needed in 
the debate are non-feminists. As such it is appropriate to as whether IPE is listening at all. If 
topics of gender or theories grounded in feminism are less valued, there can be no surprise 
when ‘gender remains trivialised in the eyes of the mainstream’ (Griffin, 2007:719). 
 
Griffin (2007) echoes much of Peterson’s (2005) points regarding the epistemological choices 
embedded in current IPE/GPE. A presumption in IPE is that economic discourse is ‘gender 
neutral’, but again Griffin as with other before her (Peterson, 2005; Elson,2002; Buneria, 
2003) sees this as false and a perspective that is grounded in androcentric bias. Griffin (2007), 
through her reviews, weaves an image of IPE that is suffering from a blind spot. The levels of 
analyses chosen by researchers such as states or firms and their relationships with economic 
growth, trade, FDI, debt or monetary policy, compresses IPE. This mainstream approach to 
topics and levels of analyses results in a tight but developed, bubble of knowledge in some 
core areas which then become mainstream. However, as with all bubbles, the space outside 
remains undiscovered.  
 
While Peterson (2005) focused on values brought by epistemological variety, Griffin (2007) 
explores the dearth of ontological variance within mainstream IPE, highlighting that at best, 
critical IPE rarely explicitly speaks to gender concerns, while at worst mainstream IPE 
delegitimizes the ‘inclusion of most gender and feminist considerations’. Ideological 
challenges are present in the discussion including the explicit Marxian forms of analyses 
utilised by Beneria (2003), Elias (2004), and Morgan et al. (2005). While Marxian theories can 
provide interesting lenses through which we may critique IPE research, I assume the current 
GPE structures and ideological frameworks as a basis for my analysis and aim to explore what 
impact the IMF has upon the SES of women through current policy choice which is neo-liberal. 
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This neoliberal policy platform is a product of the IMF managing political, bureaucratic and 
sociological pressures. Politically, shareholders matter and the IMF is the ‘creature of its own 
members and is accountable and responsive to them’ (Mussa and Savastano, 2000). As such 
the IMF policies are in fact, those which its members agree to. However, not all shareholders 
are equal, and specifically, it is the G-7 finance ministries who guide the policy objectives of 
the IMF with countries outside this G-7 having little influence (Woods, 2006). A challenge, 
therefore, exists between the political and the bureaucratic, where differences in policy 
preferences exist between the shareholders and the International Monetary and Financial 
Committee (IMFC). In such cases, it is the shareholders who win out (Woods, 2006). 
Additionally, a battle of ideas exists within the IMF as to the best approach to aid economically 
troubled states. Most recently, senior members of the IMF research team highlighted how 
some neoliberal policies such as capital account liberalisation and fiscal austerity were being 
‘oversold’ (Ostry, Loungani and Furceri, 2016). They emphasised how austerity policies 
damage demand and lead to higher unemployment, and that the short terms, the costs of 
fiscal contraction have been underplayed. Additionally, Ostry et al. (2016) point out that the 
IMF has changed its view regarding capital liberalisation moving towards a more nuanced 
view which acknowledges that capital controls can be a useful tool in certain circumstances. 
Ostry et al. (2016) differentiate between capital inflows which have long term goals such as 
foreign direct investment and short-term or speculative inflows such as portfolio or banking 
investment. This is important as inflows such as FDI ‘do seem to boost growth’ whereas 
speculative inflows do not, and in fact, contribute to greater income inequality. This paper 
illustrates a move within the IMF to review its traditional policy tools and consider alternative 
approaches which may be inconsistent with customary neoliberal norms, and this has been 
noticed. Foreign Policy called it a ‘bombshell’ and a ‘huge concession for an institution known 
for its ideological self-assuredness’ while economists such as Dani Rodrik, Robert Went and 
Fabio Ghironi express a collective surprise (Financial Times, 2016)2. Importantly, Rodrik 
pointed out the bureaucratic stumbling block to bridging the gap between research and policy 
implementation highlighting that the ‘operational side of the IMF … is typically more 
orthodox’. These factors considered, we have arrived at a point where the design of IMF 
programmes focusing on implementing neoliberal policies is understandable.  With this in 
mind, my focus remains one which aims to fill an existing gap in the body of research, rather 
than to propose alternative IPE structures.  
 
As with Peterson (2005), Griffin (2007) highlights how ontological variance allows for choices 
in how to explore gender relative to IPE/GPE. Griffin (2007) draws out Pun’s (2005) analysis 
of social construction in China in the contexts of economics. The ability to explore this from a 
gender-centric perspective highlights clearly how the financial architecture is gendered and 
                                                          
2 https://www.ft.com/content/4b98c052-238a-11e6-9d4d-c11776a5124d FT Analysis on Neoliberalism: 
Oversold by a paper senior IMF researchers Ostry, Loungani and Furceri arguing that some elements of 
neoliberalism are ill-suited policies for economically troubled states and in fact exacerbate income inequality 
and damage economic growth.   
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how a formal and strong gender hierarchy exists in GPE today. Griffin’s (2007) paper and book 
reviews highlight that though women and feminists may be talking among themselves, the 
discussion around IPE and gender continues to advance, and epistemologically, there is a 
progression as we see the inclusion of categorical analysis of women moving further closer to 
mainstream IPE. 
 
The fact that gender issues are not mainstream within political economy cannot be a surprise 
when we consider how women are less prevalent amongst the top international relations 
scholar listings3, or how women in international relations are likely to be less cited than men, 
or how women are less likely to be tenured or reach senior academic roles than men 
(Maliniak, Powers and Walter: 2013). Maliniak, Power and Walters (2013:6) take this analysis 
further and raise an interesting point in that women are more likely write about human rights 
or gender, take a post-positivist approach and are theoretically constructivist, feminist or non-
paradigmatic, while men are more likely to write about security or foreign policy, take a 
positivist approach, and sit within a liberal or realist theoretical setting. These epistemological 
and ontological differences as explanations for a citation gap, as raised by Maliniak, Powers 
and Walters (2013), force us to consider the prioritisation of research, or what kind of 
research is of greater interest or importance to the publishing community.  
 
Browne (2014), explores how and where gender is considered in political economy analysis, 
finding that ‘gender is not systematically included in political economy analysis’ and concludes 
that gender is treated ‘only in passing’. She continues to find that analysis is almost always 
confined to studying the role of gender in society, for example, how many women sit in 
positions of power and influence or the role and impact of women’s lobby groups. Browne’s 
point here is interesting, as that it echoes both Peterson (2005) and Griffin (2007), and it 
appears that little has changed in the intervening years. Browne explores the value that 
including gender into political economy analysis brings, and draws from Haider and Rao 
(2010), outlining the tools that have been developed to facilitate the integration of a 
gendered analysis. These include the Swedish International Development Cooperation 
Agency’s (SIDA) power analysis tool to explore the power distribution between actors and 
institutions, the ‘Strategic Governance and Corruption Analysis’ model which examines 
foundational factors that shape the economic and political systems, the ‘Drivers of Change’ 
model which explores the factors that are drivers for change for girls or women and finally 
the ‘Problem Driven Governance’ model which specifically looks at gendered specific issues 
from a gendered perspective. These models signal a significant development in political 
economy analysis. Their development is practical in nature as they provide frameworks to 
best situate questions in gender and political economy, but they are also facilitative, in that 
they can be incorporated into solution driven programmes. 
                                                          
3 http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/02/03/top-twenty-five-schools-international-relations/ See the bi-annual 
Foreign Policy publication ‘Inside the Ivory Tower’ which includes a listing of the top IR Scholars as voted by  
respondents. 
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While it appears that the prioritisation of gender within political economy is low, it is clear 
there is an increased awareness of including gender as an analytical variable, and that the 
value of including gender analyses in political economy is now more fully understood. 
Researchers who have brought us on this journey have made important contributions, and 
because of their work, we see that ‘gender’ is now increasingly recognised as being a factor 
for consideration to gain a full understanding of poverty, economic development and the 
impact and deepening of globalisation or political regimes and this is most welcome. They 
have paved the road for others to continue to progress this important agenda.  
 
2.3 The IMF and gender 
2.3.1 Early analysis of IMF programmes and gender 
A large body of literature exists which discusses gender and the IMF and provides an excellent 
foundation and some understanding of the impact the IMF has had specifically upon women.  
This literature is mainly qualitative in nature and often finds its home in the field of 
development studies focusing on international financial institutions. The Structural 
Adjustment Programmes implemented by the IMF in the 1980’s faced heavy and justified 
criticism.  Critiquing their design and implementation with a gendered lens, opened a new 
and greater understanding of how their high-level macroeconomic approach did greater 
damage to women’s lives due to a lack of understanding of cultural and social practices. While 
the goal of the IMF may have been to stimulate trade and reduce expenditures, in many ways 
the approach of the IMF was particularly incompatible with the needs of women and children. 
For example, early work by Cornia (1987) highlights how child feeding programmes were cut 
to meet budget reductions. Early qualitative and case-study based work by Due and Gladwin 
(1991), Mehra (1991) and Gladwin et al. (1991) explore the impact of IMF structural 
adjustment programmes upon women, female-headed households and women farmers 
across Africa. This is important as by 1989, 31 African countries had or were undergoing IMF 
structural adjustment programmes. Cultural practices in Africa are such that the power 
relationship between men and women is very uneven. While both men and women may have 
access to resources, it is generally men who have control of resources and decide their 
allocation and distribution. This is a critical point, and Due and Gladwin (1991) find that where 
this inequality in gender relations is significant, the implementation of SAP’s impacts 
negatively upon women, aggravating their poverty and expanding their already chronic 
inequality. For example, they highlight that in Malawi (autocratic from 1964 – 1993 and 
democratic from 1993) at the time, even though 50 percent of all agricultural labour was 
performed by women, 69 percent of full-time farmers were women and 28 percent of all 
households being headed by a female, only 25 percent of credit club members were women. 
As such, women had less access to or control of the redistribution of resources, be it credit 
facilities or farming equipment purchased because of access to credit facilities. This has 
additional implications in that without access to supplies such as fertilisers, women focus 
more on subsistence farming and not cash crops, thus always remaining in a state of poverty, 
lack of influence and low social status. These analyses display the complexity of cultural 
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practices which result in a gender power bias of men in society but importantly, how as a 
foundation, this inequality can create incompatibilities for IMF programmes, resulting in 
unintended negative impacts for women. Importantly we see that this early research 
highlights how a gendered examination of the impacts of IMF programmes can raise valid, 
insightful and complex issues, which illustrates the need for IMF programmes to be sensitive 
to gender. Without such sensitivity, there is a danger that IMF programmes can be counter-
productive for the society.  
Research by Kawewe and Dibie (2000:79) finds that the economic reforms agreed as part of 
an IMF programme were ‘inappropriate public policy for Zimbabwe’ and resulted in an 
increase in poverty and particularly detrimental to women and children. In reacting to 
criticisms against excessive and inappropriate conditionality, the IMF has committed to a 
reduction in conditions, and they have developed additional lending mechanisms with fewer 
and lighter conditionality attached. Elson (2002) explores risks around the liberalisation 
policies promoted by the IMF and their gender-specific implications. She highlights that men 
and women each experience different outcomes from the risk of financial crises. Ooms and 
Schrecker (2005:1821) point out that in Mozambique while under an IMF program, the health 
sector was placed under expenditure ceilings that resulted in any new funding successfully 
sourced from international donors being set-off against the allocated government budgets, 
thus a natural disincentive was created for external funders to offer assistance to tackle 
serious health issues such as AIDS.  
This early research forms a critical part of our understanding of how IMF programmes impact 
women and this early work began a discussion about the gender differentiated impacts of 
IMF programmes which was previously non-existent. This research spurred on further 
questions and drew attention to the importance of considering women’s lives in the context 
of economic decision making. However, as with all early research, these studies have some 
limitations. Firstly, in attempting to understand the interplay between IMF programmes and 
women, this early research primarily used case studies as a tool for analysis. This is valuable 
in that we gain a deep insight into one country, or small set of countries, under a particular 
programme, however it does not allow for a generalisation to be made. The individual 
situation in Zimbabwe may differ dramatically to that of another country and as such, drawing 
conclusions about the impact of one programme may not be generally applicable.  Secondly, 
the focus of this early literature concentrated upon the 1980’s and the deployment by the 
IMF of Structural Adjusted Programmes (SAP’s). This focus is logical as it was of its time. 
However, the findings and implications from these studies are not fully transferable. The 
1990’s and beyond, saw the IMF revise its programme design, widen its suite of programmes, 
expand its no-interest facilities and develop a more nuanced approach to dealing with highly 
indebted countries or extremely poor countries. As such, this early work is again defined by 
its time and lacking it its ability to transfer its findings. Thirdly, there is often a failure to fully 
reflect upon how a state’s individual political situation is impacting either the design or 
deployment of the programme. For example, Malawi was an autocratic state and only moved 
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towards democracy in 1994. While a democratic framework and multi-party system exist, 
there are concerns that democratic structures are slipping (Sevenzo, 2011)4. Additionally, 
Ooms and Schrecker (2005) were criticised5 for not considering political and structural 
incompetences within Mozambique which challenges that country from solving the AIDs 
crisis, instead focusing on the IMF programme. Mozambique suffered through civil wars from 
1977 to 1992; tension filled move towards democracy in the 1990’s with questionable 
electoral processes and natural disasters in the early 2000’s. These are important factors 
which can impact the domestic choices and prioritisation of a state under an IMF programme. 
Fourthly, not only is design of an IMF programme an important consideration, but 
implementation levels are also critical, and this early research fails to account for 
implementation levels.  
While there is no doubt that these early findings have provided enormous insight and 
developed our understanding of how IMF programmes can impact women, there are a 
number of weaknesses which need to be addressed. My thesis attempts to overcome these 
weaknesses through using statistical analysis to gain a greater understanding of the general 
impact of IMF programmes upon women across a much broader set of countries, while also 
conducting my study over a longer period of time and importantly, also considering the level 
of implementation of conditions within each programme. 
 
2.3.2 Recent analysis of IMF programmes and gender 
Dennis and Zuckerman (2006) begin their review of the IMF and World Bank policy as it relates 
to women, by highlighting how 70 percent of the world's poor are women (at the time of their 
review). This is a stark figure indeed and impresses upon the reader the importance of 
considering how national and international economic policies interact with these and all 
women. Dennis and Zuckerman (2006) draw upon the pioneering work of feminist economists 
and review how policies such as privatisation, reduced government spending, trade and 
labour reforms and financial secret reforms have impacted the lives of women. They argue 
that these policies have had a disproportionate and negative impact on women.  
Dennis and Zuckerman (2006) point out that geopolitical issues and the desire to build 
political influence have resulted in irresponsible lending to non-aligned or newly independent 
states. The rich north lent heavily to the poor south, often ignoring corruption within regimes. 
As debt costs spiralled the borrowers became unable to service their debts, and the IMF 
stepped in with further debt and debt restructuring programmes. This an important historical 
point to Dennis and Zuckerman (2006), as to them, it has resulted in poor countries entering 
into a spiralling negative debt cycle and resulting in poor countries ‘sending more resources 
to the north than it receives’. As such, exploring the impact of conditional policies on the 
                                                          
4 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13266263  
5 http://www.imf.org/external/np/vc/2005/061805.htm  
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poorest demographic – women, is apt, and Dennis and Zuckerman (2006) highlight that the 
failure to understand any gendered consequences of IMF loans and conditionality actually 
undermines the empowerment of women and challenges any attempts to reduce poverty. 
The feminist approach taken by Dennis and Zuckerman (2006) results in a dramatically 
different focus compared with a similarly timed piece by Jensen (2004) for example. Their 
focus is human, not national; it is a nuanced look at how lives which are altered, it is 
emotional. While economic measurements of national wealth such as GDP, debt ratios and 
FDI are the focus of Jensen (2004), Dennis and Zuckerman (2006) focus on the personal; how 
privatisation of ADMARC (Agricultural Development and Marketing Corporation) 6 in Malawi 
when coupled with drought, flooding and corruption resulted in a food crisis. This food crisis 
saw women scavenging for leaves and roots to feed themselves and their families. Such food 
crises exacerbated prostitution, which in turn lowered rates charged for sex, increased the 
likelihood of HIV / AIDS and resulted in an increase in child marriages as parents sold off 
daughters for food or income. With this case study in Malawi, Dennis and Zuckerman (2006) 
highlight how the poorest section of society – women, quickly become a simple commodity, 
cheaply transacted and pushed closer towards an underclass from which escape becomes 
increasingly unlikely.  
It is commonly held that education can facilitate a journey out of poverty, however, Dennis 
and Zuckerman (2006) highlight how spending cutbacks disproportionately negatively impact 
women and girls. Cultural preferences ensure that when cutbacks to education or healthcare 
are made, it is more often girls are the ones pulled from education or women who make up 
the health care shortfalls. Dennis and Zuckerman’s (2006) point is that where the IMF policies 
result in budget reductions, particularly in healthcare or education, it is women who suffer 
most and as such these policies deepen gender inequality and increase poverty among 
women. It is no surprise then that Dennis and Zuckerman (2006) are heavily critical of the use 
of ‘user fees’, a policy introduced and used by the IMF in the 1980’s and 1990’s to supplement 
funding shortfalls in the education and healthcare sectors. This policy was dropped in the 
2000’s, and thus, a large increase of girl enrollment was seen, particularly amongst the 
poorest girls. Although Dennis and Zuckerman (2006) take a deeply personal view of national 
and international policy, they, in turn, challenge policy makers to revisit fiscal measures and 
implement an approach that is ‘pro-poor’. Additionally, they illustrate the value of integrating 
gender into economic models as it will allow visibility on the carrying impacts that IMF policy 
has on both men and women. Importantly, they call for the World Bank to strengthen their 
gender policy which again highlights a core missing element in the IMF that is long overdue - 
an inbuilt gender policy.  
There is a charge upon the IMF that participation on an IMF programme has very negative 
impacts upon the weakest in society. ActionAid (2009:28) highlights how for Kenya, which 
participated in 5 IMF programmes from 1993 - 2006, the fiscal readjustment necessary as part 
                                                          
6 http://www.admarc.co.mw/  
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of the negotiated programme redirected government spending away from social areas such 
as health and education towards debt repayment while privatisation restricts employment 
opportunities and that these policies are particularly severe on women and children. 
ActionAid (2009) begins by challenging some of the core arguments in favour of IMF 
programmes calling these arguments fallacies. These include confronting claims of 
privatisation being the only way to ensure effective service provision, or that the IMF 
promotes food governance and democracy as well as transparency and accountability, or that 
IMF programmes stimulate growth and that its technical advice is sound and effective. The 
reframing of these positive arguments in favour of IMF intervention and instead portraying 
them as fallacies allows ActionAid to specifically focus upon how these policies interact with 
women. As with Marphatia (2010), ActionAid (2009) points out the negative impacts on 
growth and employment that an inflation-centered monetary policy brings. While economic 
stability may be achieved, it comes at the expense of poverty reduction and employment 
generation. Specific actions such as wage freezes, government spending reductions and the 
introduction of user fees all became a part of the economic strategy adopted by the Kenyan 
government under their IMF programmes. ActionAid (2009) highlights how this resulted in a 
brain drain, a reduction of capacity in health and education provision and ultimately, reduced 
access and quality of healthcare and education provision. Specifically, in the education sector, 
ActionAid (2009) highlights how the Free Primary Education decree of 1974 was ended in 
1991. From this point onwards, parents were obliged to pay for tuition costs, school 
maintenance fees along with textbooks, uniforms and stationery. A reduction of enrollment 
rates from 95.4 percent (1988) to 87.6 percent (2002) is then hardly surprising. This policy 
was reversed in 2002 as the IMF recognised its negative impacts upon the most vulnerable 
and Kenya saw an increase of primary enrollment rates from 5.9 million in 2002 to 7.2 million 
in 2003, illustrating clearly the barriers that education costs create for accessibility.  
These policies in Kenya had a disproportionate impact on women. Public sector downsizing 
targeted lower graded employees who were mostly women, user fees in education and health 
care affected girl children more than boy children and reduced health care services placed 
health care for families, children and husbands, back upon women and assigned her the role 
of ‘family nurse’. In Kenya, ActionAid (2009) points out that women bear the brunt of poverty, 
and these policies exacerbated this, further pushing women into a negative spiral of 
increasing poverty. 
It is interesting and valuable to explore the level and focus of implementation in the Kenyan 
IMF programmes. My data gathering highlights that in the 5 programmes Kenya underwent 
between 1993 – 2006 (IMF programme numbers, 27, 29, 157, 347 and 524) there is a heavy 
bias towards QPC conditions (fiscal and budgetary conditions). Of a total of 207 conditions 
during these programmes, 180 were QPC conditions – 87 percent. Importantly, 
implementation levels were high ranging from 67 percent (programme number 27) to 83 
percent (programme number 157). As such one can hypothesise that participation in an IMF 
programme played a substantial role in changes to the lives of Kenyans with respect to their 
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health care and education access, and more specifically, contributed negatively to the lives 
and socio-economic status of women in Kenya.  
It is interesting to explore how the Kenyan situation compares to other countries in the 
region. An examination of the African data shows that 39 African countries participated in an 
IMF agreement between 1990 and 2011 with a total of 239 programmes. The average number 
of conditions per programme was 65 with an average completion rate of 56 percent. A more 
nuanced examination again shows a heavy bias towards QPC conditions with the average 
number of QPC conditions per programme being 54 and the average number of SPC 
conditions being 12. The completion rate of QPC conditions was 57 percent versus a 
completion rate of 46 percent for SPC conditions. This data tells us several things. Firstly, 
among African countries - which are some of the poorest countries in the world - the emphasis 
of IMF programme design is on budgetary and fiscal correction measures. Such measures 
often require states to contract government spending which can have a detrimental impact 
on the provision of key services such as health and education. The provision of services in 
these areas are of vital importance to women. Secondly, there is a very low proportion of IMF 
conditions focused upon structural issues – only 13 percent. Structural conditions have the 
potential to stimulate economic growth as they are often focused on liberalising and 
expanding trade or liberalising the capital account which can make way for foreign direct 
investment. Additionally, structural conditions can encourage a state to build mechanisms to 
facilitate the growth of the private sector or expand competition. However, there is a low 
proportion of conditions focused on building the foundational aspects of economic growth 
which is counterproductive. Thirdly, not only is there more conditionality focused upon 
budgetary contraction than correcting structural issues, there is a higher percentage of 
completion rates amongst the QPC focused conditions. This points towards greater 
willingness of African governments to implement budgetary contraction rather than 
structural change despite the much smaller number of SPC conditions in a programme.  
These factors are reflected in research by Marphatia (2010) who presents important points 
as she explores the effects that IMF programmes have upon the health and education 
workforce. Marphatia (2010) examines how the relationship IMF conditionality has with a 
state’s wage bill, and how IMF concerns around deficit reduction and inflation management 
result in conditions that reduce government budgets and more importantly, health and 
education budgets. At the same time, there is a lack of emphasis upon growth orientated 
policies which could stimulate employment opportunities. Marphatia (2010) highlights the 
impacts reduced budgets in health and education have upon the population. Not only does 
this impact negatively the recruitment and retention of skilled teachers and health 
professionals, but also the state moves to hiring less qualified staff. Senegal provides an apt 
example, where the hiring of ‘para teachers’ led to a large reduction in the education budget, 
but the teacher training programmes were reduced from 4 years to 6 months. It is 
unsurprising then, when the quality and standards of education fell and, also that the respect 
held for the teaching profession was also detrimentally impacted. 
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Marphatia (2010) also highlights the gendered impacts of such a policy. Where there are 
shortages of skilled professionals in healthcare and education, it is women and girls who are 
negatively and disproportionately impacted. Marphatia (2010) points out that where the 
quality of education is seen to be low, parents will refuse to invest what are scarce resources, 
into educating girls, thus re-enforcing a life and poverty and ill health upon women and girls. 
Marphatia (2010) stresses the need for gender-sensitive economic policies echoing Stotsky’s 
(2006 b) call upon the IMF to recognise the ‘benefits of decreasing gender inequality’. 
Marphatia (2010) sees the role that international institutions such as the IMF play as critical. 
A state’s ability to design and implement economic and social policy is somewhat dependent 
upon the international system. If the IMF supplies the funding and stipulates the economic 
policy preferences without considering disproportionate and negative gendered impacts, why 
would we expect a state to be able to either implement a gendered sensitive economic policy 
or even care about gendered sensitive policies? 
A most recent paper by Detraz and Peksen (2016) highlights the increased interest in how the 
IMF impacts women. Focused on exploring the impact of IMF programmes upon the economic 
and political rights of women, this is a timely paper following recent comments by Christine 
Lagarde MD IMF, who highlighted the importance of considering the economic effects of 
gender inequality. Detraz and Peksen (2016) enter a poorly researched area pointing out that 
while there are earlier studies which explore the impact that IMF programmes have upon 
women’s health, female education and labour force participation, there are no studies that 
examine what impact IMF programmes have upon women’s economic or political rights. This 
is an important gap in the literature, so such a study is very welcome. Women's economic and 
political equality or inequality has important implications for policy makers and Detraz and 
Peksen (2016) highlight how these factors are instrumental in achieving good governance and 
greater economic development. This circular relationship between gender equality and 
increased economic development should be a critical consideration for IFI's and governments. 
Without ensuring that societal structures foster gender equality, IFI’s and states are failing to 
maximise their potential for economic growth. Detraz and Peksen (2016) propose that IMF 
programmes might have a negative impact on a state’s respect for both the political and 
economic rights of women, pointing out that both conditionality and policy recommendations 
such as privatisation and liberalisation result in a reduction of a government's ability or 
willingness to protect women’s rights. Their findings support their thesis, and Detraz and 
Peksen (2016) have indeed made some interesting progress in understanding how IMF 
programmes impact women. Firstly, their results see a reduction in the level of respect for 
women’s economic rights in countries undergoing an IMF programme. Additionally, it is 
notable that democracy and economic wealth are unlikely to mitigate this negative effect. 
Secondly, Detraz and Peksen (2016) results do not point towards IMF programmes having an 
impact upon women’s political rights. These are very valuable findings and add much to the 
body of literature in this area.  
Theoretically, Detraz and Peksen (2016) ground their arguments in the negative impacts of 
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privatisation. Detraz and Peksen (2016) first explore Egypt to illustrate changes to 
employment patterns of women, highlighting the high rate of female labour force 
participation in the 1960's and 1970's while arguing that decreases in the 1990's and beyond 
are due to IMF policies. While it is fair to say that the IMF heavily promotes privatisation 
Detraz and Peksen (2016) fail to account for cultural or religious factors that also may be at 
play. Hendy (2015) does so in her paper (Economic Research Forum: 2015), exploring 
women’s labour force participation in Egypt between 1998-2012. Hendy (2015) highlights that 
cultural factors are at play, including the cultural acceptance that men are the breadwinners 
and women's role is one of mother and housewife. Interestingly Hendy (2015) is more explicit 
that Detraz and Peksen (2016) when it comes to why women are less likely to remain in the 
private sector post marriage citing ‘long working hours, fewer benefits and larger shares of 
male employees in the workplace’ being the main factors.  
Similarly, the example of Zimbabwe is not the best choice in supporting their theory. Detraz 
and Peksen (2016) attempt to connect participation in IMF programmes to significant drops 
in female labour force participation and shifts in labour patterns. There is no mention of the 
political shift of the 1980's towards a strongly authoritarian government that led to a 
programme of intense human rights violations, mass murders, political repression and deep 
corruption. These actions were irrespective of any IMF programme. While this paper is indeed 
welcome, theoretically there are some gaps which I am hopeful that my thesis will work to 
fill. Firstly, I argue that implementation is an important consideration and to consider 
participation in and IMF programme alone is insufficient. Taking the case studies used by 
Detraz and Pesken (2016) as an example, we see that Egypt was under an IMF programme 
between 1993 - 1996 and again 1996 - 1998. My data collection and analysis highlights that 
the implementation rate of conditions for the first programme was 50 percent and this fell to 
44 percent for the second programme. In the case of Zimbabwe, the implementation rates 
are far lower. Zimbabwe underwent 4 IMF programmes between 1992 and 2000. Between 
1992 and 1995 the average implementation rate was only 23 percent (1992-1995 - 31 percent, 
1992 - 1993 - 27 percent, 1992 - 1995 - 11 percent), while 0 percent of recommendations or 
conditions were implemented between 1998 - 2000. This illustrates several important points. 
Firstly, implementation levels of an IMF programme are a critical consideration, as failure to 
implement conditions points towards domestic issues being stronger candidates for a causal 
mechanism for changes in the levels of gender parity. Secondly, by not considering 
implementation levels, it calls into question their theoretical arguments, which actually may, 
in fact, have some basis. My thesis attempts to overcome these shortcomings by considering 
the types of conditions and also the level of implementation of conditions within each 
programme. 
As already highlighted, existing development literature discussing gender and the IMF mostly 
employs qualitative and case-study based approach and in many cases, has not provided 
systematic and statistical evidence for its arguments. Detraz and Peksen (2016) move to close 
this gap through their study, and this is indeed welcome.  Detraz and Peksen (2016) build a 
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time series, cross-country data panel of low and middle-income countries. They omit high-
income countries as they are ‘least likely recipients of IMF programmes with relatively high 
respect for women’s rights’ as they argue such inclusion would bias the results. However, in 
doing so, they have created an alternative bias. Detraz and Peksen (2016) use a two-staged 
econometric model consisting of two logit models which include IMF participation as a binary 
dependent variable estimating the factors that affect IMF lending decisions. However, their 
slimmed down dataset limits their results. Recent economic crises have shown that high-
income countries are not impervious to requiring IMF support (Iceland, Ireland, Portugal, 
Poland). Additionally, political shifts in ‘high-income countries’ such as Poland, have seen 
governments take steps to undermining women’s rights. Choosing to exclude countries 
because they are high income does not allow for a full comparison within the data pool. Had 
they included high-income countries in the data panel and assigning them a dummy variable 
Detraz and Peksen would have been able to more fully understand how economic wealth and 
regime type interplays with IMF programmes with respect to women’s economic and political 
rights.  
My research faced similar decision points, and I have attempted to mitigate against such 
shortcomings through first utilising a wider set of data (173 countries) and secondly using an 
econometric model that calculates the probability of entering an IMF programme. This allows 
me to minimise issues of selection bias through my econometric model rather than manually 
through omitting data, which in itself, is a selection bias. As such, my research just like Detraz 
and Peksen (2016) will also progress Stotsky’s (2006a) call to conduct a systematic cross-
country study supported by statistical evidence investigating whether IMF programmes and 
the policies they implement, damage or enhance the lives of women in countries undergoing 
an IMF Agreement.  
 
Exploring women’s economic and political rights in the context of IMF programmes has not 
been done before, and Detraz and Peksen’s (2016) research is very welcome and greatly 
enhances the literature in this area. My thesis also attempts to broaden the literature in that 
it explores the impact of IMF programmes upon the socio-economic status of women, 
another area largely un-researched. As such my thesis aims to complement the existing 
literature, including that of Detraz and Peksen (2016), and close another known gap, thereby 
contributing to an expanded understanding of how IMF programmes impact women. 
 
 
 
2.4 IMF conditionality 
2.4.1 A brief background to IMF conditionality 
A traditional and logical argument exists that IMF programmes have an impact on the lives 
and wellbeing of women. For example, the IMF Structural Adjustment Programmes of the 
1980s was heavily criticised and the IMF policies of privatisation, sectoral reform and 
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liberalisation were found to have negative effects on female-headed households and women 
farmers across Africa (Due and Gladwin: 1991, Mehra:1991, and Gladwin et al.:1991). For 
example, Due and Gladwin (1991) highlight how liberalising trade benefitted men more than 
women as male farmers tended to control the growing of crops most likely to be exported 
while women tended to control crops such as vegetables, and food crops. The extra inputs 
gained from trade by male farmers enabled them to invest in fertilisers and make greater 
economic gains as the agriculture sector expanded. Additionally, this resulted in greater 
importance being placed upon export orientated goods increasing their value and increasing 
the economic power of men relative to women. The failure to account for deeply embedded 
societal gender bias in African countries resulted in female-headed households and female 
farmers finding themselves in a weaker socio-economic position. It is not that liberalisation 
policies are bad per se, rather it is imperative that existing cultural and societal gender bias is 
considered when designing liberalisation policies to maximise their benefits and to prevent 
and exacerbation of gender inequality. Additionally, IMF policies are charged with resulting 
in an underinvestment in education and health sectors leading to lower health and education 
provision for women and girls (Marphatia 2005 and 2010). Separately it is also argued that 
IMF programmes result in decreases in health spending (Stuckler and Basu: 2009), and IMF 
programmes correlate with increases in human rights violations (Abouharb and Cingranelli: 
2009), while additional research argues that IMF programmes contribute to increased 
propensity for civil war in politically unstable countries (Hartzell, Hoodie and Bauer, 2010). It 
is then logical to propose that IMF programmes could also have a direct and independent 
impact upon the socio-economic status of women.  
 
IMF programmes and agreements focus on assisting economically troubled states to regain 
economic stability, and agreements often specify conditions that focus on bringing balance to 
national budgets, reforming public sectors and implementing liberalising policies (Harrigan, 
Wang and El-Siad, 2006, Biglaiser and Brown, 2005, Lapavitas, Filho and Johnston, 2005, 
Stiglitz, 2004, The IMF, 2001, Gore, 2000,). It is through this mechanism of conditionality that 
the IMF can affect policy formation in a troubled state and, as such, it is critical to explore the 
literature around the mechanism of conditionality as it relates to the socio-economic status 
of women. 
 
The IMF introduced conditionality to ensure that a country in financial or economic difficulty 
can restore ‘balance of payments viability’, through influencing the economic and financial 
policy direction of the state, and with its introduction, IMF loans became available on a quid-
pro-quo basis Buria (2003:25). With this additional power, the IMF gained an extended ability 
to influence the domestic monetary and fiscal policy of a country undergoing a credit 
agreement and influence it did. Rising oil prices and stagnant growth in the 1970’s formed 
part of an extended economic crisis where industrial production was reduced by 10 percent 
and international trade by 13 percent during the period 1973 – 1975 alone (Armstrong and 
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Glynn, 1991:225). Solutions to these crises were proposed by thinkers such as Fredrich von 
Hayek and Milton Friedman, and the developed world moved towards a rejection of the 
established Keynesian economic policies favouring instead, economic propositions from the 
field of new classical economics. This paved the way for economic policies which became 
known as the ‘Washington Consensus’, and economic policy saw a paradigm shift from ‘state-
led dirigisme to market-oriented policies’ (Gore, 2000:789). This is important, as, during this 
period, International Financial Institutions (IFI’s) such as the World Bank and the IMF became, 
and remain still today, mechanisms for the deployment of such policies at a global level.  
The IMF, through its mechanism of conditionality, was very well placed to propagate these 
new economic policies. While IMF conditionality was initially viewed as an opportunity to 
ensure that states who received funds under an IMF agreement put them to efficient use, it 
also provided an ability for monitoring against any misuse or corruption. Importantly, 
conditionality presented an opportunity to guide a state towards economic policies that could 
contribute to an economic turnaround, that could encourage long-term economic growth, 
and move the state towards a position where they can meet repayments to the fund (Mussa 
and Savastano, 2000, Woods, 2006). This saw the provision of loans by the IMF becoming 
conditional upon the state in question adopting economic policies aimed at liberalising their 
economy in order to; facilitate increased trade and capital flows; stimulate the introduction 
of competition through privatisation and to support the balancing of national budgets 
through expanded taxation measures and cuts to national spending. Over time, these policies 
became known as the ‘Liberal International Economic Order (LIEO)’ (Gore, 2000), and also 
normative economic policies which played a crucial role in defining the global economic order 
over the past three decades.  
Several critics argue that IMF conditionality – the main causal mechanism in this study - is 
designed incorrectly and applied hastily, without regard to local circumstances, cultural 
practices, or social norms in developing countries (Goldstein, 2000, Khor, 2001, Dreher, 2004, 
2009). Consequently, there is a strong argument that IMF programmes may have no effect or 
are possibly damaging to women. In reacting to criticisms against excessive and inappropriate 
conditionality, the IMF has committed to a reduction in conditions, and they have developed 
additional lending mechanisms with fewer and lighted conditionality attached. However, in a 
recent review of IMF policy Ruckert and Labonte (2012:363-364) highlight the significant 
influence that the IMF has over policymaking in low-income countries due to their 
dependence upon IMF finance. They find that during the economic crisis, the IMF did indeed 
reduce the number of conditions dramatically and was ‘more flexible in its crisis response 
than previously’ while also allowing for greater deficits. However, Ruckert and Labonte (2012) 
echoed by Fresnillo (2012), point out that most recently, the IMF has again moved to be a 
‘vocal proponent of tighter fiscal policies’ (Ruckert and Labonte, 2012:363-364). For Ruckert 
and Labonte (2012), this austerity has important and negative impacts upon health in 
developing nations and while Fresnillo (2012) highlights the negative impact upon social 
stability in the Euro area. Thus, it is through the mechanism of conditionality that the IMF is 
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able to impact the economic, social and political reality of state actors, right down to 
individuals, and as such, it is warranted to examine the impact that the IMF has had upon the 
socio-economic status of women. 
 
2.4.2 The impact of IMF programmes on economic and fiscal factors 
There is ample research that explores the impact of the IMF on a range of economic and social 
topics. This research is important because as it often has implications for the SES of women 
under IMF programmes. In the following section, I will review current literature which 
attempts to understand the impact IMF programmes have on these economic and social 
factors; illustrating their implications for women and justifying why exploring the impact of 
IMF programmes upon the SES of women is essential.   
Economic factors 
Firstly, existing literature highlights that the IMF is an agent of economic liberalisation 
(Stiglitz,2004, Biglaiser and Brown, 2005, Harrigan, Wang and El-Siad, 2006), and the obvious 
question is whether this economic liberalisation implemented through IMF conditionality has 
had a positive or negative effect. Ultimately the IMF hopes that conditionality will put in place 
economic reform that results in a stimulation of economic growth which results in greater 
attraction of the troubled state to the FDI community, growth in employment, increase in 
taxation revenue, and a stabilisation of the economy such that the crises can be alleviated. 
However, the literature is mixed on this. Prezworski and Vreeland (2000) find that IMF 
programmes negatively affect a country’s growth rate while under a programme but, once 
the programme has finished, economic growth resumes at a faster rate. This is echoed by 
Dreher (2006) who finds that participation in IMF programmes has a negative impact on 
economic growth. While full compliance with conditionality mitigates this negative impact 
reducing it slightly, the overall impact is a negative one. Dreher and Walter (2010) investigate 
whether IMF intervention impacts the likelihood of a country to experience a currency crisis, 
finding that, while IMF involvement reduces the probability of a crisis occurring, once the 
country is in a crisis, the IMF programmes increase the probability that the country will 
devalue its currency. Dreher and Gassebner (2012) explore the impact participation in an IMF 
or World Bank programme has upon government stability finding that participation in World 
Bank programmes trigger government crises, and government crises are less likely to happen 
under IMF agreements where there is rising inflation. This existing research illustrates the 
complexity of interaction between a state’s economic fragility and the implementation of a 
new and potentially radical departure from their customary monetary, fiscal and economic 
policies.  
Non-economic factors 
In most cases of IMF-centered literature, the emphasis is economic rather than societal, 
however some research explores the impact the IMF has on a variety of non-economic topics 
including the relationship between IMF programmes and civil war (Hartzell, Hoodie and 
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Bauer, 2010) social spending (Clements, Gupta and Nozaki, 2011, Naiman and Watkins 1999) 
family life (Seung-Kyung and Finch, 2002) human rights (Abouharb and Cingranelli, 2008, 
Bradlow, 1996). There is a charge upon the IMF that participation on an IMF programme has 
very negative impacts upon the weakest in society. Cornia (1987) describes how child feeding 
programmes were cut to meet budget reductions in developing countries in the 1980’s SAP’s, 
while more recent research by Kawewe and Dibie (2000:79) finds that the economic reforms 
agreed as part of an IMF programme were ‘inappropriate public policy for Zimbabwe’ and 
resulted in an increase in poverty and particularly detrimental to women and children. 
ActionAid (2009:28) highlights how, for Kenya, the fiscal readjustment necessary as part of 
the negotiated programme redirects government spending away from social areas such as 
health and education towards debt repayment while privatisation restricts employment 
opportunities and that these policies are particularly severe on women and children. This 
research has very important implications for women, as women’s health needs are not only 
different from men’s due to biological differences, but importantly, as mothers and bearers 
of children, women’s health needs expand past issues of general health to maternal health 
care, pre, and post-natal care and contraception needs. As such, any negative impact upon 
health expenditure because of IMF programmes reprioritizing national budgetary spend can 
have additional and unintended impacts upon the health of women. For example, in many 
countries women are the main family carers, often caring for multiple generations, so cuts in 
health care not only burdens women further with extra health care responsibilities in lieu of 
service reduction, but also potentially removes or reduces health services that women 
themselves use, and thus, these cuts result in a potential double impact upon women.  
Abouharb and Cingranelli (2009) explore how IMF programmes affect human rights in 
developing countries. Using data over a period of 22 years, they found that developing 
countries undergoing IMF programmes reduced their respect for human rights, echoing 
earlier findings by Franklin (1997), Keith and Poe (2000), McClaren (1988), Pion-Berlin (1984). 
This finding suggests that some IMF programmes are counterproductive. Kaufman (2004) and 
Sen (1999) find that economies grow faster where the citizens are freely able to exercise their 
human rights, thus, it is in the interest of the IMF to encourage the protection of human rights 
in order to activate economic growth and enable the state to move away from economic 
crisis.  Failure to do so could stimulate a downward spiral of human rights which can 
negatively affect economic growth. This, in turn, may reduce economic opportunities for 
citizens resulting in citizen activation demanding governments make alternative policy 
decisions which in turn encourages a government to move towards more human rights 
repression again damaging economic growth. Thus, a state can very logically move towards a 
negative spiral of increased repression, reduced economic opportunities and increased civic 
unrest. This has an implication for women, as many of the human rights failures may 
specifically relate to women. The added failure to stimulate economic growth may further 
compartmentalise women in society, compounding their already low socio-economic status. 
Kaufman (2004) is a full and comprehensive study using statistical analysis of a large cross-
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country dataset and found a statistically significant negative impact on government respect 
for human rights and the number of years under an IMF programme. 
These studies highlight several important factors. Firstly, these studies highlight the direct 
impact that IMF programmes have on a host of economic and social factors, and as such, it 
becomes logical to question what impact IMF programmes have upon women specifically. 
Secondly, these studies reinforce gaps in the existing literature exploring the relationship 
between IMF programmes and the socio-economic status of women. This area is lacking in 
research, and this dissertation aims to bridge this gap. Thirdly, while this research has 
revealed some of the impact of IMF programmes upon health budgets in Kenya, Malawi and 
Zimbabwe, these countries only represent a fraction of the interaction the IMF has across the 
world over the past number of decades. A gap of coverage exists, and a broader and more 
macro study is required to complement the existing literature providing. There is an 
opportunity for this dissertation to add a valuable contribution to existing research by 
conducting a macro study. Fourthly, the research focused on economic areas mainly uses 
quantitative methods and as such facilitates generalisations which are useful to policy 
makers, however much of the research focused on non-economic areas highlighted above 
adopts qualitative approaches, and while it has facilitated some insight, it is limited and does 
not furnish us with an overarching understanding of what effect IMF programmes have, 
specifically or broadly upon women’s socio-economic status. Nor do we know whether these 
impacts travel beyond the case study countries. As such, this existing research, again 
highlights gaps in our understanding of what impact IMF programmes have upon the socio-
economic status of women, a gap which this dissertation is attempting to narrow.  
2.3 The IMF and regime type 
While the IMF can specify conditionality, the implementation of conditions as part of an IMF 
agreement is dependent upon the state’s political will to implement. Despite the ‘coercive 
and socialisation power’ of the IMF, its ability to influence the economic policy of a member 
‘is mediated by domestic politics’ (Pop-Eleche, 2013). Additionally, the state’s bureaucratic 
ability is also crucial, and states need to have suitable and effective bureaucratic institutions 
to translate IMF conditions and guidance into coherent economic policy (Pop-Eleche, 2009). 
If domestic political and bureaucratic elements influence the implementation of IMF 
conditions, then it is appropriate to ask whether there are any differentiated impacts upon 
the SES of women. One way of exploring differentiated domestic political interests and 
differentiated bureaucratic and institutional frameworks is through the lens of regime types. 
Regime types provide a categorical separation that facilitates another layer of analysis.  
The existing literature clearly indicates that there are different policy preferences amongst 
autocratic and democratic regimes. 
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 It is then appropriate to consider the impact that regime type might play in interactions 
between a state and exogenous institutions such as the IMF. Nooruddin and Simmons 
(2006:1001) make this point clear as they highlight the importance of considering the policy 
preferences of a regime and how there ‘is a good reason to believe that domestic political 
environments influence the effects of austerity’. Nooruddin and Simmons (2006) explore 
whether a country’s regime type influences how it mediates spending reductions while still 
meeting IMF conditionality. Nooruddin and Simmons (2006) uncover an interesting and 
nuanced dynamic between regime type and social spending while under IMF agreements. 
Regime type does matter, and while under IMF agreements, their results point towards 
decreased spending on health and education amongst democracies and increased spending 
on health and education amongst non-democracies. They conclude that in democracies, 
collective organisation and political influence are crucial to preventing cuts in times of 
austerity and that the poor and weaker loose out to those who are well organised and 
politically powerful when it comes to budgetary realignments. 
It is interesting then to read how Bauer et al. (2012) explore the nuances of catalytic effects 
upon FDI (Foreign Direct Investment) because of IMF lending. Existing research in this area is 
contradictory and does not reach consensus and Bauer et al. (2012:34) highlights how Dhonte 
(1997) and Edwards (2005), find evidence of a positive catalytic effect on FDI while Adji et al. 
(1997), Bird and Rowlands (1997,2001), Hajivassiliou (1987), Rodrik (1995) find no effect. 
Bauer et al. (2012), as like Nooruddin and Simmons (2006), propose that this is because 
regime type matters and existing research does not factor this in. Bauer et al. (2012) utilise a 
dichotomous regime classification allowing them to explore the distinction between 
democracy and autocracy and the relationship with FDI following on from an IMF agreement. 
In adopting a two-stage process that incorporates predicted participation in an IMF 
agreement, Bauer et al. (2012) correct for any selection bias while the treatment effects 
Markov transition model allows for estimation of correlation between FDI and IMF 
participation and also being sensitive to regime type. This approach has enabled Bauer et al. 
(2012) to bring much greater clarity on the relationship between a states’ ability to attract FDI 
and participation in IMF agreements. Their results show that failure to consider regime type 
masks the impact IMF programmes have on FDI. Bauer et al. (2012:50) uncover a more refined 
and nuanced picture, one where there is a positive and highly significant effect upon FDI for 
democracies undergoing IMF agreements and a negative and highly significant impact for 
autocracies undergoing IMF agreements. Bauer et al. (2012:52) conclude that the ability and 
commitment to implement the reforms required by the IMF is crucial and this commitment is 
more credible when made by democracies than autocracies. Bauer et al. (2012:52) highlight 
how this commitment is seen to be a ‘seal of approval’ by the market and as such increases 
the ability for democracies to attract FDI while participating in an IMF agreement. 
It is then logical to propose that regime type may also play a direct role in the impact that IMF 
programmes have upon the SES of women. Indeed, attempting to understand the impact of 
IMF programmes on any number of socio-economic areas could benefit from an approach 
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which considers regime type as a differentiator. Existing empirical research could also gain 
from a simple retrofit incorporating this variable for a more accurate and nuanced picture. As 
such, regime type is a highly important factor to consider, if research is to fully understand 
the relationships that exist between a state and its socio-economic policy and the state and 
the IMF. Regime type and its interactions are critical to this research project, and as such, I 
actively build in consideration of regime type. 
2.6 Summary 
 While there remain gaps in our knowledge there has been some progress, most notably 
around a growing focus among academics and researchers on gender and political economy. 
Firstly, we see have seen a drive by feminist, economists and political economists, to 
challenge dominant androcentric approaches to research questions. This has resulted in an 
expansion of research which has a focus on gender and a recognition that policy has gendered 
differentiated impacts. Secondly, there has been the expansion of research exploring how 
IMF programmes specifically impact women’s lives. This research highlights when policy 
makers fail to appreciate the interplay between cultural or social structures and national and 
international policy, this can lead to disproportionately negative impacts upon women. 
Thirdly, while research has expanded, there remain significant gaps in our understanding of 
what impacts IMF programmes have upon women. Gaps include a lack of macro analyses, a 
shortage of research incorporating quantitative statistical analysis and a scarcity of research 
exploring the impact of IMF programmes post-1990. Fourthly, it is fair to say that the existing 
academic literature is uniformly negative about the IMF and women. This includes both older 
qualitative studies and relatively recent work too. Given these findings, it would not be 
surprising if this research were to find the same. However, this dissertation is looking at 
something different which previous studies have not examined econometrically, which is 
women’s SES. As such, it is the intention of this thesis to contribute to the literature by closing 
acknowledged gaps in this area. 
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3 GENDER POLICY AND THE IMF 
3.1 The remit of the IMF 
Of relevance to this study is the importance of gender within the IMF. The 1995 Beijing UN 
Conference on women endorsed a strategy of gender mainstreaming. This UN conference 
highlighted the need for IFI’s and international institutions to have a broad strategy that 
targets gender relations (UN, 2002). The objectives of promoting gender mainstreaming are 
twofold: 
1. To ensure that all analysis and formation of policy is informed by an understanding of 
gender inequalities.  
2. Organisations and countries would seek opportunities to narrow existing gender gaps 
and drive greater gender equality. This could involve: 
a. utilising tools such as gender analysis and metrics to identify where gaps exist 
b. adopting methods such as gender budgeting to help plan out budgets to 
prevent budgets negatively and disproportionately impacting women 
c. employing gender-sensitive training to help transform institutions or 
organisations 
d. monitoring the impact of any changes and also monitor changes in gender 
inequality 
Adopting and integrating a strategy of gender mainstreaming within the IMF is important to 
the IMF specifically for several reasons. Firstly, gender mainstreaming can identify areas 
where gender gaps exist in areas of concern to the IMF. For example, common gender gaps 
include those in labour force participation, wage rates or participation in education, all of 
which undermine economic growth. Developing knowledge around these existing gender 
gaps is one of the first steps to identifying the best policy options to overcome them. 
Secondly, having gained a greater understanding of existing gender gaps, gender 
mainstreaming can contribute to designing policy which is more responsive to the needs of 
both men and women. This includes policy which impacts labour force participation. For 
example, where gender inequalities in the labour force exist, it is sometimes due to national 
employment or taxation laws which discourage women entering or remaining in the 
workforce. As the IMF seeks to maximise a state’s ability for economic growth, it is essential 
to consider whether policy choices as part of an IMF agreement contribute to, or undermine 
future economic growth. Gender mainstreaming strategies aim to ensure policy is designed 
to encourage greater participation of women in education and in the labour force. Such 
advances in gender equality are already known to have a positive impact on economic growth 
(Loko and Diouf, 2009, Cuberes and Teigneir, 2012, Aguirre et al., 2012, Elborgh-Woytek et 
al., 2013, and Gonzales et al. 2015). As such, it is logical for the IMF to employ a gender 
mainstreaming strategy as the outcome of this strategy directly advances the IMF’s main goal 
of economic growth.  
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However, the fact is, there is no gender policy in the IMF, and this is very interesting - 
especially when the IMF is juxtaposed with its sister organisation - The World Bank. The World 
Bank has thoroughly integrated gender into its policy formation process, having approved its 
gender mainstreaming strategy in April 2001 (World Bank, 2002) and followed this with a 
regular monitoring and review cycle. By its own admission, the IMF has yet to adopt a 
systematic approach to gender in its macroeconomic analysis and policy advice (IMF, 2012). 
Existing literature exploring the impact of IMF programmes upon women is almost entirely 
negative, and when one considers the lack of implementing a gender mainstreaming strategy, 
this does not come as a surprise. It is logical to propose that the IMF’s failure to mainstream 
gender within its operations may explain the detrimental findings in many existing academic 
studies along with the real-world failures in programme countries.  
However, it is essential to understand the limitations of the IMF, both in its scope and focus 
of activities which are very different to those of the World Bank. The IMF Articles of 
Agreement outline its mandate which is specific and unique, that is promoting international 
monetary cooperation with the goal of establishing ‘a framework for economic cooperation 
and development that would lead to a more stable and prosperous global economy’7. Within 
this context, the IMF is thus restricted in its focus to critical macroeconomic areas, and until 
very recently, it was clear that issues of gender did not fall under this category. While the IMF 
may highlight the narrowness of its scope and purpose as reasons for failure to establish a 
fully integrated gender mainstreaming strategy the lack of a gender policy has severe 
consequences for the IMF. Firstly, it sends a signal through its organisational culture channels 
that gender equality is not a priority and gender is downgraded. This has impacts for the IMF 
as an organisation itself, but also sends a message to states undergoing an IMF programme 
that advances in gender equality is not a priority. Secondly, it has resulted in a narrowly 
focused research agenda within the IMF with a concentration in hard economics. For 
example, exploring the impact of IMF programmes and policy preferences on FDI or trade or 
GDP, but failing to consider how a lack of concern over gender might be counterproductive 
to attaining its overall goal of economic growth. Thirdly, a failure to implement a gender 
mainstreaming strategy is likely to have contributed to the IMF developing inappropriate 
conditionality that negatively and disproportionately impacts women. Fourthly, the IMF may 
be missing key opportunities to develop long-term economic and social benefits for society 
by not gender proofing conditions. As such, it becomes appropriate and important to review 
IMF-led research that explores gender inequality or the interplay between the IMF and 
gender.  
 
                                                          
7 The IMF Factsheet http://www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/Sheets/2016/07/27/15/31/IMF-World-Bank 
which outlines the purpose of the Bretton Woods institutions.  
 
 
34 
 
3.2 A potential policy pivot in the IMF 
While economic crises bring enormous instability, they also provoke questions around their 
causes, impact and, importantly, discussion as to prevention. The most recent Global 
Recession is no exception, and it provides a point in time to reflect upon what appears to be 
a policy pivot of the IMF. This policy pivot is for the IMF, to incorporate consideration of issues 
such as gender (in)equality into both its internal research areas and following on, its policy 
recommendations for states undergoing an IMF agreement. It is both relevant and logical to 
explore this policy pivot through the IMF research papers, working papers, discussion notes 
and leadership dialogues that have come out from the IMF over the past decade or so and 
this is the focus of this chapter. 
While IMF Working Papers and Staff Discussion Notes may not represent IMF policy, they are 
intended for providing a framework for IMF staff to highlight their areas of work and interest 
and ‘are published to elicit comments and to further debate’. Working Papers and Staff 
Discussion Notes may not be published research in the traditional sense, but they have a 
special status within the IMF, and their recommendation carries great weight with regards to 
policy direction. Working Papers represent a critical point in the development of the 
discussion of the IMF’s remit and what it can influence states to do to stimulate economic 
growth. In the case of gender and the IMF, it was IMF Working Papers which paved a path for 
discussion around the importance of gender relative to macroeconomic policy. Most notably 
is early work by Stotsky in 2006, who started a conversation which helped move the IMF’s 
internal discourse around gender. As such it is relevant to explore hers (and others) Working 
Papers, as she not only calls out the bi-directional relationship between gender equality and 
economic growth but also makes strong pro-women policy recommendations that the IMF 
should adopt.  
 
3.2 Early signs that gender was becoming important 
As already stated, gender has only recently become a topic for exploration by the IMF. Very 
early work in 1998 by the IMF Fiscal Affairs Division saw the Economic Issues series focus on 
the interplay between economic policy and equity. While equity is seen to have a moral basis 
or be a worthy goal itself, it is also seen to be an important consideration for policy making 
that is attempting to reduce both absolute and relative poverty.  Income inequality has risen 
over the past decades to its highest levels with an ever-greater amount of wealth gains 
residing with the wealthiest one percent of the world’s population. While gender was not a 
topic at this conference, this 1998 series of papers8 exploring concepts of equity in the context 
of globalisation and the role of the IMF was certainly notable. Additionally, it allowed for the 
scene to be set to further explore how the IMF has most recently moved towards an 
expansion of its mandate to include other forms of equity such as gender equality. This move 
                                                          
8 http://www.imf.org/external/np/fad/equity/index.htm Summary of the conference focus 
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has been acknowledged by Elson (2002) who highlights that the IMF has ‘become more 
concerned with social policy in recent years’.  
In their IMF Working Paper Heller and Leuth (2003) explored the ability of the IMF to 
contribute to the MDG’s gender goals. They highlight how this might seem an unusual focus 
for an IMF working paper but move onwards to point out the direct relationship between 
tackling issues of gender inequality and poverty reduction and how this is of critical 
importance and relevance to the IMF. Heller and Leuth (2003) draw attention to how 
improvements in the health and education of women are instrumental in reducing fertility 
rates and increasing the labour force participation of women. They particularly focus upon 
how increased education for women contributes to economic growth. These factors are of 
great relevance to the IMF and as such Heller and Leuth (2003) stress the need for the IMF to 
play a strong role in supporting countries to achieve these goals. Heller and Leuth (2003) 
highlighted the very practical measures that the IMF was at the time taking that indirectly 
promoted the realisation of the MDG’s. These included helping prevent financial crises in 
developing countries which ultimately have a disproportionately negative impact on women, 
providing technical assistance regarding budget structuring to ensure that increased social 
spending reached the intended groups, and their move to increase lending within the poverty 
reduction programmes designed for low-income countries.  
Cognizant of the limited mandate of the IMF Heller and Leuth (2003) directly ask what more 
can the IMF do to ensure that the MDG’s around gender equality is realised. For an IMF 
working paper, this is a very direct call out to the IMF to focus upon a topic which had 
previously received little or no attention. Heller and Leuth (2003) see the PRSPs (Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Papers) providing an avenue to promote ‘policies that differentially favour 
women and girls’. While they acknowledge the challenges around translating medium-term 
goals into national budgets, they see the PRSPs providing opportunities for discussion and a 
framework to explore how these two can interconnect. Heller and Leuth (2003) also see value 
in having a gender focus when shaping macroeconomic policy pointing out that the economic 
contributions of women are underestimated due to the high percentage of women working 
in the informal sector, or in unpaid work, or in subsistence farming and the fact that these 
‘nonmarket’ activities are not modeled. Failure to model these ‘nonmarket’ activities results 
in a skewing of policy needs and a failure to define and implement optimum policy. Heller and 
Leuth (2003) also call for the IMF to explore the value of gender sensitive budgeting and 
encourage states to provide social safety nets targeted at girls and women. While Heller and 
Leuth (2003) marry this progressive approach with a pragmatic awareness of the limitations 
and mandate of the IMF by highlighting risks and tensions that are likely, they commit strongly 
to the belief that the IMF must address ‘gender-related biases in our macroeconomic analyses 
and policy advice’. This is a defining paper contributing to the journey that the IMF has taken 
in the recent years to broaden its thinking and approach regarding gender equality.  
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An important discussion in political economy is the relationship between gender equality and 
economic growth and the relevance of gender differences to macroeconomic policy. Stotsky’s 
(2006a) IMF working paper is another milestone in the journey of gender policy within the 
IMF and explores these very topics. Stotsky (2006a), highlights early on how gender 
differences in behaviour can have implications for the macroeconomy, in particular, around 
aggregate consumption and investment decisions. For example, Stotsky (2006a) draws upon 
Blumberg (1988) Bruce (1989), Thomas (1997), World Bank (2001) and Quisumbing (2003) to 
illustrate how women tend to spend more of the available income of the development of 
their children and more on necessities than men do. Additionally, Stotsky (2006a) highlights 
further gender differences in saving tendencies between women and men (Seguino and Floro, 
2003) where women are found to save more than men possibly reflecting their role as ‘home-
builders’. Research also points towards gender differences in risk preferences for 
investments, with women tending to be more risk averse than men (Goldstein, 1999) and 
have better credit ratings. Such differences are crucial, not only from a family perspective but 
also from a community and societal development perspective. Stotsky (2006a) rightly points 
out how important these gendered differences in economic prioritisation are and that fiscal 
and monetary policies are ‘rarely formulated with these gender differences in mind’. Stotsky 
(2006a) believes that these findings illustrate the potential for ‘systematic differences’ in 
financial behaviour between men and women. Such gendered differences have implications 
for policy makers dealing with macroeconomic issues as Stotsky (2006a) points out that 
macroeconomic conclusions can be drawn from modelling systemic and aggregated 
microeconomic behaviours. If issues such as risk and priorities are managed very differently 
based on gender, there are implications for the success of IMF programmes and the ongoing 
balance of payment situation of an affected country. If different macroeconomic decisions 
are required to ensure stability and continuity of a stable and efficient state, then it is in the 
interests of the IMF to promote measures that facilitate this outcome and stimulate situations 
which may lead more positive macroeconomic outcomes. 
Stotsky (2006a) also stresses the bi-directional and positive relationship between greater 
education and social opportunities for women and economic growth. This is an essential point 
to Stotsky (2006a) as failure to invest in women’s education, healthcare and employment, not 
only stymies their own personal development but importantly, it hinders economic growth. 
Such an outcome is again counter to one of the main goals of the IMF – to stimulate economic 
growth. Stotsky (2006a) highlights the gaps in the literature that examines the impacts of IMF 
programmes upon women. By 2006, there still remained a focus upon the effect of the SAP’s 
of the 1980’s and the prevalence of qualitative cast study research. She stresses the need for 
quantitative studies which focus upon later IMF programmes and, also the need for 
longitudinal studies that can ascertain the long-term effects of these programmes and calls 
for of a systematic investigation on the impacts of IMF programmes from a gender 
perspective. Stotsky (2006a) uses these findings and literature gaps to present, not only a 
strong case for greater gender equality, but importantly, a strong argument for how the 
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incorporation of gender-based differences into economic modeling can be very useful, 
particularly as current research supports the ‘premise that gender inequalities lead to slower 
growth’.  Most importantly for the journey of gender policy within the IMF, Stotsky (2006a) 
concludes that policy advice should be designed to further reduce gender inequalities and 
that the IMF should contribute to this through technical assistance. 
Stotsky (2006b) compliments her exploration of gender and its relevance to macroeconomic 
policy with another 2006 IMF working paper examining the concept, relevance and 
appropriateness of gender budgeting. Stotsky (2006b) begins by highlighting how gender 
budgeting can be used to systematically examine the impact of budgets and policies upon 
women with the aim of addressing inequalities between men and women. Pointing out that 
gender budgeting is outside of the mainstream approaches in budgeting, Stotsky (2006b) uses 
her paper to change this and place gender budgeting ‘squarely within the mainstream’ as she 
emphasises that gender budgeting is just good budgeting and that improvements in women’s 
economic opportunities, in turn, lead to increased economic growth. Most importantly and 
relevant to this thesis, Stotsky (2006b), early on stresses that the IMF should work with actors 
to reduce gender inequalities and highlights the value that measures such as gender 
budgeting can play in reducing gender inequalities. 
Stotsky (2006b) sets the scene for her discussion by exploring the inequalities visible through 
social and economic indicators. While advances have been made, inequalities between 
women and men continue to exist in education, healthcare, labour force participation and 
access to productive assets. This is most critical when considered with extreme poverty as 
there also exists an inequality in the ability between men and women to develop their ‘human 
capital’, thus consigning women to being more likely to remain in a cycle of poverty. Assessing 
inequality requires reliable, valid and longitudinal data. Stotsky (2006b) discusses the 
inadequacies of the current data indicators and measures of inequality. Progress must be 
made which addresses some of these shortcomings such as inappropriate weighting within 
aggregated indicators, ensuring data reflects the complexities of rural and urban earning 
abilities or that indicators should consider the role that social institutions play in determining 
the economic participation levels of women. This highlights the need for improvements at an 
international level to ensure a concerted and collective approach to indicator design and data 
collection, for policy decisions, in most cases, relies on such data to lead it towards optimum 
and robust design. Policy can never be optimum if the data it is based upon is inadequate. 
To bring gender budgeting into the mainstream, Stotsky (2006b) draws upon the outcomes 
from the 1995 Fourth World Conferences for Women in Beijing along with research by Elson 
(2002), Sharp and Broomhill (2002), Budlender (2002) and Sarraf (2003) that both outlines 
and structures gender budgets, while Stotsky (2006b) herself justifies their integration into 
mainstream budgeting as they provide a way to optimize budgeting, stimulate economic 
growth by removing gender inequalities, can help interrogate economic instability and its 
causes and can assist governments to mitigate to most negative outcomes of austerity 
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budgets in times of economic crisis. While the frameworks and approaches that Stotsky 
(2006b) draws upon illuminate the practical implementation of gender budgeting, it is 
Stotsky’s (2006b) discussion of how specific policies can reduce gender inequalities where we 
see even more value. For example, gender biases may exist in the taxation systems which 
discourage women from working or where taxes exist on commodities predominantly 
purchased by women. Importantly she discusses how these policies interact with income 
classes, and while gender biases may exist, these are more notable at the ‘bottom end of the 
expenditure distribution’ while case studies illustrate the practical successes of the 
incorporation of gender budgeting. This varies from the ‘not fully successful’ in Australia to 
the somewhat successful in South Africa where gender budgeting was not institutionalised 
but led to a series of training materials on gender issues and a raised awareness of gender 
inequalities. The EU and Nordics provide examples where gender budgeting has been 
adopted in a systematic manner and takes centre stage.   
This is a very notable paper. It is a pointed and specific discussion on how gender inequalities 
matter and how they can be reduced by adopting an alternative budgetary process, and 
importantly, this paper contains a set of recommendations for the IMF. This paper contributes 
to the widening of the portfolio of advice that the IMF can utilise to encourage states to adopt 
measures that help drive economic growth. Stotsky (2006b) clearly recommends that gender 
budgeting is incorporated into the budgeting process and that the IMF should support and 
encourage states to do so. This represents a critical point in the development of the discussion 
of the IMF’s remit and what it can influence states to do to stimulate economic growth. 
 
3.3 Recent progress around gender in the IMF 
The most recent years have seen some noteworthy developments around gender within both 
the IMF publications and the IMF structure. The appointment of Christine Lagarde as the first 
female Managing Director of the IMF has been significant. Lagarde is openly feminist and has 
on numerous occasions highlighted the benefits of gender equality through her IMF Blog, 
speaking engagements representing the IMF or in interviews. Perhaps coincidently, the years 
following her appointment have also seen an almost flurry of IMF Working Papers and Staff 
Discussion Notes focused upon gender and macroeconomic policy which ultimately explore 
what the IMF can do to support the continued expansion of gender equality, particularly in 
the labour force. While this focus on gender and its relevance to macroeconomic policy is ‘a 
relatively new field’ as expressed by Heidi Crebo-Rediker (US Chief Economist, 2013) it is clear 
the existing research in this area has been significant in that it has provided a foundation upon 
which to build arguments for policy change. In a speech to the Peterson Institute,9 she focused 
on how increasing women’s participation in the workforce is key to driving economic growth. 
                                                          
9 https://www.state.gov/e/oce/rls/2013/211088.htm  Remarks from Heidi Crebo-Rediker at the Peterson 
Institute, Washington, DC, June 24, 2013. Ms Crebo-Rediker was the US Chief Economist at the time.  
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She also highlighted the internal politics within the IMF that are pushing forward this agenda 
and the opportunity before the IMF to mainstream gender and women as a ‘drivers of 
economic growth’ and drive systematic change. As such, a review of the most recent activity 
within the IMF around gender is highly relevant. This can be viewed through two lenses, 
firstly, IMF leadership and its agenda around gender and secondly, the research output from 
the IMF. 
3.3.1 IMF leadership and gender 
Leadership matters in determining an overall strategic agenda of an organisation, and while 
the organisational focus may retain a core unchangeable direction, individuals often bring 
with them their own specific agendas which they attempt to blend into the overall direction 
of an organisation10. The appointment of Christine Lagarde as Managing Director of the IMF 
is an example of such an instance. The focus of her predecessor Dominique Strauss-Kahn 
(DSK) revolved around harnessing the unique position of the IMF to drive growth. His 
leadership of the IMF traversed the global recession and, considering this, DSK oversaw the 
expansion of the IMF resources, new lending mechanisms, and an expanded economic 
surveillance programme with the core objectives being to ensure global stability and drive 
labour force participation11 (DSK/IMF, 2008, DSK/IMF, 2010, Stiglitz, 2011). DSK also called for 
a global currency to replace the dollar as a reserve currency for international trade, arguing 
that this would facilitate greater global economic stability and help alleviate global 
imbalances (IMF, 2011). Also, challenged with maximizing the IMF’s ability to drive growth, 
Christine Lagarde’s term as MD of the IMF to date has been focused on several additional 
important issues, firstly, providing support for the economic stabilization of the EU by 
extending huge rescue programmes to Ireland, Greece, Portugal and Spain in partnership with 
the EU and ECB. Secondly, securing the US Congress’s approval for the reforming of the IMF 
Quota System has been a challenging milestone while thirdly, the inclusion of the Renminbi 
in the currency basket for the SDR – Special Drawing Rights has improved relations with China. 
However, knitted throughout these core agenda items of the IMF, has been a constant 
personal agenda item which revolves around issues of gender inequality.  
 
                                                          
10 Kavanagh and Ashkanasy, 2006: The Impact of Leadership and Change Management Strategy on 
Organizational Culture and Individual Acceptance of Change during a Merger: British Journal of Management, 
Vol. 17, S81–S103 (2006). Kavanagh and Ashkanasy suggest that for organizational change to occur energy and 
effort needs to focus on four areas: (1) the behaviour of institutional leaders; (2) the selection and execution of 
appropriate management strategies (particularly change management strategies); (3) an understanding of the 
organization’s basic structure, systems, and formal processes (culture); and (4) actions taken by leaders 
affecting acceptance of change by individuals who play key roles in both formal and informal systems (see also 
Nadler, Thies and Nadler, 2001). 
 
11 The full listing of blog posts by DSK during his term as MD of the IMF https://blog-
imfdirect.imf.org/bloggers/dominique-strauss-kahn/  
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Her opening remarks on her appointment in 2011 where she highlighted how ‘Diversity will 
strengthen legitimacy but will also reinforce effectiveness.’ gave an insight as to how 
important she considered diversity. Lagarde has used her many speaking engagements to 
highlight the importance of considering the role of women as contributors to not only society 
but also economic development. To fully understand the how Lagarde utilises her 
engagement opportunities to convey her support for gender equality and influence her 
audience on this topic I performed a content analysis of her public speeches as MD of the IMF 
from her appointment in 2011 until the end of 2016. An analysis of her speeches from 2011 
to the end of 2016 highlights that across 150 speeches, Lagarde focused some of her speech 
on the issue of gender inequality in 58 speeches. While the content of each speech varies, 
and will often consider other important policy topics, within each of these 58 speeches there 
are pointed and specific references to women’s position in either a specific country, or the 
world in general, and how women’s empowerment can contribute to greater economic 
growth. While she often highlights the human rights element of women’s equality, more 
often, Lagarde focuses on building a business case for greater gender equality and taking 
steps to increase the labour force participation of women. Overall, issues of gender equality 
are highlighted in 39 percent of Lagarde’s speeches. This is highly significant and illustrates 
several important points. Firstly, that she is committed to driving forward the issue of gender 
equality and that her commitment is both personal and professional.  She speaks of women’s 
empowerment as being ‘close to her heart’, while she uses her position as MD of the IMF to 
drive forward this discussion. Secondly, she is embedding gender equality within the context 
of the IMF. As MD of the IMF, her remit is to lead an organisation focused on building 
economic and monetary stability and her speeches are focused upon this core topic. 
However, she weaves issues of gender through them, illustrating the benefits of women’s 
empowerment, particularly increased labour force participation, education and maternal 
health. Such an inter-weaving stresses the importance of gender equality by the IMF and 
repeated iterations over time can only further embed this policy into the IMF’s discussion 
basket. Thirdly she reiterates continuously policy options that contribute to reducing 
women’s inequality. This is both practical and forceful. Such a constant reiteration of specific 
policy options as potential solutions to overcoming barriers faced by women signals approval 
of these policy options by the IMF thereby confirming their appropriateness for use by 
member states. 
Lagarde also uses her social media presence and her IMF Blog to promote women’s 
empowerment. Yet again, one of her most recent blog posts argues that increasing female 
labour force participation is central to boosting economic growth. Lagarde has indeed firmly 
embedded issues of gender equality into her conversations as MD of the IMF12. Over the years 
of her term, her statements also have become more challenging. Her recent statement that 
                                                          
12 For full listing of Christine Lagarde blog posts see https://blog-imfdirect.imf.org/bloggers/christine-lagarde/  
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‘Bold decisions are needed to change corporate cultures and shift social norms’13 and her 
recommendation that further progress in policy areas such as parental leave or providing 
incentives to increase women’s representation on state and corporate boards should be 
considered important progressions in demanding further cultural change. Such statements 
are not in line with previous IMF Managing Directors. It is clear since her appointment in 2011, 
Lagarde has been unequivocal in her commitment to driving gender equality where she can 
and has continued to emphasise how greater participation by women in leadership is key to 
driving economic success and importantly, what role the IMF can play to support this. 
3.3.2 IMF research on gender 
With the leader of the IMF finding new ways to include gender equality into its conversation, 
it is then interesting to review if or how research output within the IMF has developed in 
recent years. Immediately there are some observations worth exploring: 
An expansion of gender-focused Staff Discussion Notes (SDN) 
In 2013, the IMF released the Staff Discussion Note ‘Women, Work, and the Economy: 
Macroeconomic Gains from Gender Equity’ (Elborgh-Woytek et al., 2013), commissioned by 
Christine Lagarde. This was a highly notable paper in that it was the first major paper to focus 
on gender since 2006 and saw an expansion of the discourse around the IMF and gender. The 
paper takes the opportunity to highlight the significant level of research that exists illustrating 
the strong links between gender equality and macroeconomic gains, citing the most recent 
research by Loko and Diouf (2009), Cuberes and Teigneir (2012) and Aguirre et al. (2012). 
These researchers all focus specifically on female labour force participation and suggest that 
increases in labour force participation rates of women, in turn, raise GDP levels. Importantly 
Aguirre et al. (2012) highlight that the greatest gains in female labour force participation are 
to be made in developing and emerging nations who would be most in need of the associated 
economic growth. Elborgh-Woytek et al. (2013) also highlight the gender gaps existing in rates 
of pay, even in the same occupations and controlling for education along with gender gaps in 
part-time work and full-time work rates along with receding, but still existing gender gaps in 
education. While all of this is essentially a retelling of existing research and is not new, what 
is new is that this paper represents a confirmation that gender does matter to the IMF. The 
intrinsic links between the advancement of women, particularly their increased participation 
in the labour force and macroeconomic gains are stressed continuously in this paper.  Greater 
female labour force participation increases GDP (Cuberes and Teigneir, 2012) and economic 
growth is ultimately what the IMF wishes to see.  
The IMF is most often focused on macro issues, and Zuckerman (2014) highlights how the IMF 
has moved slightly out of its norm with this paper. The paper is most interesting in that it 
acknowledges and discusses both the structural and cultural barriers that women face trying 
                                                          
13 See here blog post from Christine Lagarde arguing that increasing female labour force participation is central 
to boosting economic growth. https://blog-imfdirect.imf.org/2016/09/14/to-boost-growth-employ-more-
women/  
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to enter the workforce. While the unpaid work of women in areas such as childcare or 
household management is often undervalued and unappreciated, Elborgh-Woytek et al. 
(2013) point out that this frees up men to participate in the workforce while limiting women’s 
ability to develop economic independence. In many developing or emerging economies, the 
lack of regulatory protection in the informal sector where women often dominate compounds 
women’s economic vulnerability while economic independence is hampered by limited 
property or inheritance rights. Regulatory reform and increased provision of childcare and 
elderly care can provide the supports needed by women to enable them to enter the 
workforce, while steps to change cultural preferences for men in leadership positions so that 
there is greater social acceptance of female leaders contribute to greater female participation 
in the labour market. Such gender-focused policy recommendations are significant and 
certainly represent a new conversation by the IMF, one which is less ‘gender blind’ than it had 
been to date.  
While this paper met with some positive response from Zuckerman (2014) and Williams 
(2014), it also falls short, as the focus of discussion is limited only to female participation in 
the labour force. While this meets the direct needs of the IMF in terms of a purely economic 
focus, Zuckerman (2014) calls for an approach that would also consider women’s rights, 
arguing that ‘women’s rights are drowned out by its smart economics framework’. It is difficult 
to detach this pro-woman IMF paper from the impact that IMF programmes have had upon 
women and Zuckerman and Karamessini (2014) interweave a case study on ‘Women and 
austerity in Greece’ into their critique of Women, Work and the Economy. ‘Severe austerity 
has been devastating for women’s labour market position’ in Greece, and Karamessini 
highlights how female unemployment rates have risen from 16.5 percent to 31.5 percent. 
However, while this might be true, this paper also represents a milestone in the IMF and 
gender, promoting gender equality as an area of concern for the IMF, providing highly 
relevant and useful policy recommendation, recognising the very specific cultural and 
structural barriers women face which contribute to gender inequality and importantly, 
acknowledging the significance of women’s unpaid work in the home as carers or mothers. 
This paper is indeed, as Zuckerman (2014) points out, a ‘rhetorical IMF leap forward’.    
The IMF continued to surprise critics with another paper that put gender equality at the fore 
of its policy recommendations. Gonzales et al. (2015) tackle the interconnectivity between 
gender inequality and income inequality in details in a recent SDN (Staff Discussion Note) 
‘Catalyst for Change: Empowering Women and Tackling Income Inequality’. They stress that 
gender inequality has several major macroeconomic implications including 
• A positive relationship between gender equality and indicators such as HDI, GDP per 
capital and a state’s competitiveness 
• A positive relationship between gender equality and economic growth 
• A positive relationship between gender equality and macroeconomic stability 
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This paper has moved on the 2013 IMF discussion substantially. Elbourg-Woytek et al. (2013) 
are firmly grounded in a ‘smart economic framework’ (Zuckerman, 2014), whereas Gonzales 
et al. (2015) consider a fuller contextualization of gender inequality exploring not only the 
employment-related gender gap but also gender gaps in education, health and financial 
inclusion. The regression analysis produces highly relevant results, finding statistically 
significant correlations between financial openness and rising income inequality, and 
between the easing of labour market regulations in favour of business and greater income 
inequality. Increased government spending and increased education are both positively 
associated with a rise in gender equality. Most importantly, the regression analysis also 
highlights that ‘gender gaps in labour force participation and education are the main drivers 
of income inequality’ (Gonzales et al., 2015). These findings by Gonzales et al. (2015) further 
illustrate the importance of broadening the research in this area, both within the IMF and 
among the wider research community. Arguably, if the IMF’s discussion has expanded to 
these issues, then it is time for studies to explore the impact of the IMF on gender across 
different dimensions. The IMF has a strong influence on national policy which determines the 
direction of government spending and their policy agenda. This spending and policy agenda 
under an IMF agreement has a direct impact on the socio-economic status of women and a 
study on the impact of IMF agreement upon the SES of women is long overdue. It is my 
intention with this thesis to move towards closing this gap in the research. 
However, the most progressive part of the research by Gonzales et al. (2015) is its tone and 
policy recommendations. Gonzales et al. (2015) speaks of the ‘inequality of opportunities for 
women’, acknowledging the structural barriers such as lack of legal rights for women which 
prevent them achieving their full economic potential. Gonzales et al. (2015) stress that 
redistribution alone is insufficient to drive equality and call for ‘specific policies geared to 
reducing gender and income inequality’. They are diplomatic in their intention to not ‘render 
a judgement… of cultural and religious norms’ yet highlight their relevance to achieving 
gender equality on several occasions. The policy recommendations from Gonzales et al. 
(2015) are strong, including the implementation of gender budgeting, revision of tax policies 
which are anti-women, the design and implementation of pro-family measures such as parity 
between paternity and maternity leave and affordable childcare and ensuring that finance is 
made available to women to enable women to achieve greater economic independence and 
influence. In fact, without its title or author details, one might not believe this paper to be 
and IMF staff discussion note at all.  
This surprise is echoed by Duncan Green, the strategic advisor for Oxfam, who describes 
himself as an ‘old lag’ used to condemning the IMF as anti-poor and the epitome of market 
idolatry. Green welcomes the paper for putting ‘women’s rights at the heart of tackling 
income inequality’ and seems struck by the policy recommendations, not because of their 
innovation, but rather because they come from the IMF.  Sargon Nissan of the Bretton Woods 
Project calls the IMF the ‘most unlikely institution to champion gender’s economic 
importance’. Very few would disagree, so when Nissan calls this paper a ‘bold step’ which 
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makes a case for putting gender into the core of economic policy making, Nissan voices a level 
of simultaneous surprise and encouragement felt by those who have long called upon the IMF 
to recognize the need to rethink its policy recommendations and its approach in the context 
of inequality. However, despite the surprise and encouragement both Green and Nissan 
highlight several areas which the paper could have addressed. Green points out the IMF’s 
core point in this paper, that greater labour force participation among women can contribute 
to gender equality is an economically driven argument and that an alternative approach which 
asks how the economy can be organised to support equality and human rights need 
consideration. Nissan echoes this, noting that though ‘things are changing for the better’ 
changing the structure of the economy is necessary for real progress on equality.  
IMF gender budgeting research project 
Two previously mentioned IMF working papers by Sarraf (2003) and Stotsky (2006b) focused 
upon gender budgeting. These papers explored the rationale for gender budgeting, citing it 
as ‘just good budgeting’ (Stotsky, 2006b) but also highlighted how cultural gender biases 
proved difficult obstacles to overcome, for a state to fully implement and see the benefits of 
such progressive budgeting practices (Sarraf, 2003). Both Sarraf (2003) and Stotsky (2006b) 
called for the expansion of gender budgeting, and with this in mind, it is interesting to see 
that Stotsky is currently leading a project in the IMF on gender budgeting exploring how fiscal 
policies are being used by governments to advance gender equality. This is an interesting 
development within the IMF and represents a significant investment into gender-related 
research with this project running over multiple years and hosting a large team of IMF 
analysts. It signifies several important points. Firstly, this implies that the IMF has increased 
the priority given to gender-based research. Secondly, it implies that the IMF sees value in 
the concept of gender budgeting. Research has shown that gender budgeting provides a way 
to ensure that policy formation and national budgeting processes take into account the needs 
of both men and women. The IMF is in a powerful place to influence states undergoing its 
programmes to adopt gender budgeting as a strategy to encourage greater consideration of 
gender equality. Thirdly, while the IMF remit might be purely economic, tools such as gender 
budgeting allow the IMF to remain close within its remit but still interact directly with gender 
issues. This gender budgeting research project illustrates how the IMF can utilise tools to wide 
its influence to include gender equality. This project represents a notable development in 
both the remit of the IMF and also the intent of the IMF to concern itself with issues of gender. 
As such, a review it the research is appropriate.  
Stotsky’s (2016) Gender Budgeting: Fiscal Context and Outcomes papers set the scene for the 
regionally specific papers exploring gender budgeting in the project. Very early on, Stotsky 
draws upon the international commitment to gender equality and the advancement of 
women and girls, referencing the Sustainable Development Goals (which have replaced the 
Millennium Development Goals) and their focus on gender equality. Stotsky also draws upon 
work by the World Bank (2011), Duflo (2012) and Elborgh-Woytek et al. (2013) to highlight 
the economic benefits of greater gender equality with greater gender equality leading to 
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‘more rapid economic growth’.  With such a direct connection between gender equality and 
economic growth, Stotsky and her team are well placed to explore the current trends and 
impacts of gender budgeting, which uses ‘fiscal policy to advance gender equality’. It is 
accepted that states are in varying stages of economic development and this paper explores 
the rationale for gender budgeting, the factors influencing the approaches taken and the 
outcomes of such practices. 
Over 80 countries have implemented some form of gender budgeting and Stotsky and her 
team take the opportunity to review approaches and outcomes through a series of case 
studies covering six regions including Asia (Chakraborty, 2016), The Pacific Islands and The 
Caribbean (Christie and Thakur, 2016), The Middle East and Central Asia (Kolovich and 
Shibuya, 2016), Latin America (Fragosa and Enriquez, 2016), Europe (Quinn, 2016) and Sub-
Saharan Africa (Stotsky, Kolovich and Kebhaj, 2016). This is an ambitious and worthy project. 
Ambitious in its coverage and intention to gain a macro view of how gender budgeting is being 
implemented and, also ambitious in its intention to account for regional differences in fiscal 
journeys. It is worthy in that it has the potential to firstly; highlight approaches that are 
successful and those that are not. Secondly, this study can provide policy makers with 
comparative frameworks to progress their own gender budgeting efforts and thirdly, it can 
build understanding as to how cultural biases interplay with gender budgeting approaches 
either stalling progress or placing parameters on their design or implementation.  
Stotsky (2016) echoes her 2006 argument that gender budgeting can improve budgeting and 
that gender budgeting can be valuable where existing budgetary practices do not consider 
the ‘economic benefits of women’s development and gender equality’. As with Elson (2002) 
and Stotsky (2006b) there is an understanding that government budgeting processes are not 
‘gender neutral’, but rather they are ‘gender blind’ and that gender budgeting relieves this 
blindness. In short, ‘gender budgeting is good budgeting’. Stotsky’s (2016) discussion around 
how gender budgeting can be used to overcome externalities is notable. For example, she 
highlights how education not only benefits the child personally, but it also produces positive 
externalities in that society benefits from a child’s education. The child is better able to 
contribute to society positively, will be statistically more likely to have better health or be 
more actively engaged in society. The opposite externalities arise where no education or sub-
standard is received in that the child will be less able to contribute to society positively, will 
be statistically more likely to have worse health or be less actively engaged in society. These 
arguments are consistent with research that highlight the economic and social benefits that 
arise with the advancement of women and girls. With regards to such policies, there are social 
optimal outcomes, and Stotsky highlights how budgeting can be used to ‘influence a market 
outcome’ where negative externalities are occurring.  
Stotsky’s discussion of gender budgeting frameworks and implementation approaches is 
thorough and insightful. She highlights the importance of certain ministries such as the 
finance ministry leading on gender budgeting efforts as it results in a greater integration of 
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goals. Such an approach then complements approaches taken by spending ministries such as 
health or education, to interweave gender orientated goals into their programme design. The 
project team also explore gender budgeting in the context of governmental and institutional 
layers. International organisations such as the UN Women have played a key role by leading 
on and aiding, the implementation of gender budgeting across the world while research by 
NGO’s has highlighted how fiscal policy has gendered differentiated impacts. Such 
international organisations as well placed and have successfully applied, ‘meaningful pressure 
on governments’ to initiate and deliver measures to support gender equality through their 
budgeting processes. The team also highlight the importance of considering sub-national 
governments. Their role in progressing gender budgeting is also important as they carry the 
principle of gender budgeting through their sub-national budgeting processes.  
There is a sense of impatience and frustration from Stotsky in this paper as she points out the 
‘persistent inadequacy of government budgets’ in addressing women’s development needs. 
The benefits of women’s advancement are clear, and the fiscal tools to drive this 
advancement are present, yet governments are failing here. The tone and point of Stotsky’s 
comments are important in the context of an IMF which is now more often considering the 
importance of gender equality. The point that an IMF team is not only open to gender 
budgeting but is also encouraging it is notable and hints at an internal IMF position around 
gender which is vastly different than what would have been considered ‘normal’ in the 1980’s 
or 1990’s. This, is indeed, progress. 
3.3.3 Making gender diversity Real within the IMF  
The IMF does not only influence through its research and its front-facing leadership, but its 
attitudes towards gender can also be implied through the importance placed upon gender in 
the other tools at its disposal, either through their presence or more often, their absence. The 
IMF for example now has a ‘Gender and the IMF’ section on its website which has links to a 
Gender Budgeting and Gender Equality Database containing all the recent IMF research on 
gender.  In addition, there are links to videos, blogs, public speeches and podcasts, even a 
quiz. The IMF has also opened a conversation with the research communities on gender 
through conferences and calls for papers on gender. It does appear that after many decades, 
gender has finally made it onto the IMF policy listing.    
While issues of gender may now appear to be more important, what of gender within the IMF 
itself? If the IMF is to emphasise the importance of gender equality for macroeconomic 
development, how would the IMF hold up should a gender audit be performed on its 
organisational structure and would it encourage such a review? This is exactly why the recent 
IMF report exploring ‘Gender Diversity in the Executive Board’ is one of the most notable 
reports from the IMF. This report acknowledges how the IMFC had stressed the importance 
of ‘promoting gender diversity in the Executive Board’ and from here reviewed the Executive 
Board in the context of gender diversity and elaborated the case for greater gender balance 
on the Executive Board. In the case of the IMF Executive Board, only 1 of 24 Executive 
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Directors are women with 1 of 24 being the average over the past 10 years. Specific and 
targeted actions were recommended as part of a strategy to deliver change in this area 
including  
• The adoption of Non-binding goals for female representation in key positions such as 
Senior Advisors and Advisor positions 
• Diversity training for staff 
• The establishment of a working group among the Executive Directors focused on 
gender diversity in the Executive Board    
• Calling on member countries to consider gender when nominating candidates for 
Executive Director positions. 
Recent years have also seen a reflection of diversity within the IMF staff. While there are no 
gender quotas regarding staff, nor any statistical breakdown of staff by gender, 2013 saw 
some notable actions with the appointment of a Diversity Advisor whose role it is to ‘monitor 
progress and to develop programmes that will raise the consciousness of the staff in matters 
of diversity’ and the issuing of a ‘Statement on Diversity’14. This level of self-reflection by the 
IMF with regards to gender is remarkable and signals a sea change in the attitudes of the IMF 
with regards to gender. It is also worth remembering that the organisational culture of the 
IMF is part academic economics and part central bank. A recent listing of the top 25 
economists15 across the world was exclusively male, and only a handful of women hold the 
position of Central Bank Governor16. Both sectors have been criticised for their lack of gender 
diversity, so the IMF is already drawing from specialists with poor records on gender. The 
appointment of both Christine Lagarde as MD of the IMF and Janet Yellen as Chair of the 
Board of Governors of the US Federal Reserve is thus significant and highly important. They 
represent role models for women aiming for careers in economics, and their appointments 
contribute to normalising women in leadership positions in this sector.   
 
3.4 Summary 
In summary, the statement that the IMF has no gender policy appears to be in flux. Recent 
developments around gender and the IMF, particularly under the leadership of Christine 
Lagarde, appears to illustrate that the IMF is developing a gender policy, both internally within 
its own organisation and externally in its dealings with member states and recommendations 
within its programmes. However, while there has clearly been a change, attention to gender 
within the IMF remains at an embryonic stage. Firstly, its focus appears to be tightly 
concentrated on women’s role within the macroeconomic stage - more women working 
                                                          
14 https://www.imf.org/external/hrd/diversity.htm Statement on Diversity within the IMF staff 
15 http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21637412-economists-academic-rankings-and-
media-influence-vary-wildly-shifting-clout?fsrc=scn/tw/te/pe/shiftingclout - world’s most influential 
economists. 
16 http://blogs.ft.com/the-world/2013/10/women-of-the-worlds-central-banks/ - Women holding Governor of 
Central Bank positions 
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equals greater economic growth. Despite decades of calls for gender equality because 
‘women’s rights are human rights’, it is the business case for gender equality which is leading 
the progression. However macroeconomic matters are the remit of the IMF, so this should 
not come as a surprise. Secondly, the IMF is challenged to continue this work and progress it 
so that gender becomes embedded within its process. This requires a sustained effort by the 
staff to continue to push the importance of gender equality among member countries who 
are undergoing an IMF programme while also continuing to invest in gender within its 
research agenda. Thirdly, leadership matters, and it is clear that Christine Lagarde has 
enlivened the IMF with her own personal agenda of gender equality. While she has recently 
begun her second term which could allow her to continue her influence, her leadership may 
also be questioned because of her recent conviction of negligence over the handling of public 
monies while Finance Minister of France. While the IMF has continued to support her, it is 
logical to wonder if her power as a leader has been tainted because of this conviction. Her 
determination to push forward the agenda of gender equality within the IMF has been central 
to the increased focus within the IMF research team, and for this to continue, this support is 
necessary. 
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4. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
4.1 Introduction  
In this chapter, I will argue that IMF programme design is important for the socio-economic 
status of women. Variation in the design has the potential to have a significant impact upon 
the SES of women. I argue that spending reforms which focus on public sector budgetary 
contraction and increasing the taxation have a greater likelihood to negatively and 
disproportionately impact the socio-economic status of women while certain structural 
reforms which focus upon economic growth have the capacity to positively impact the socio-
economic status of women. I also argue that while design of a programme is important, the 
levels of implementation of the programme is crucial. While a state may sign an IMF 
agreement with varying conditions, if they do not implement these conditions, then the 
impact that the IMF has on the socio-economic status of women in that state is negligible. 
The opposite holds true in that should a state fully or mostly complete the conditions specified 
within an IMF agreement then I argue that it is possible that changes in the socio-economic 
status of women, whether positive or negative, can be attributed to the IMF programme. 
However, it is also fair to say that these impacts are not foregone conclusions in every case of 
IMF agreements and other factors may be at play which moderate the impact of IMF 
programmes. This has led to the development of an additional layer to my argument which is 
that the effect IMF programmes have on a state’s economy or society may be conditional 
upon regime type. For example, Bauer et al. (2012) argue that access to FDI on entering an 
IMF agreement is dependent upon a state’s credible commitment to the implementation of 
the IMF programme and this credibility varies systematically by regime type. Regime type, 
with its complex combinations of political and economic preferences and variable quality of 
institutional structures has the potential to interact with IMF programmes in numerous ways, 
thus moderating any independent and direct impact IMF programmes have upon women. As 
such I wish to progress the argument that the impact of IMF programmes upon women may 
in-fact, be conditional upon the regime type of the state undergoing an IMF agreement and, 
in this chapter,, I also set out an explanation of how regime type drives variation in the impact 
of IMF programs upon the SES of women.  
 
 
This chapter is structured as follows. Following a brief summary of my theoretical argument, 
I discuss the factors that most commonly contribute to defining women’s socio-economic 
status which include female labour force participation, female education and maternal health 
care. Secondly, I discuss IMF programmes and their focus including the IMF policy preference 
for spending and structural reforms and the mechanisms through which the IMF interacts 
with states. Thirdly, and crucially, I discuss the relevance and importance of programme 
implementation in determining the impact that the IMF can have. Fourthly, I explore whether 
the impact of IMF programmes is conditional upon regime type and finally in this chapter, I 
conclude by summarising my main arguments while also drawing attention to the strengths 
and weaknesses of my research.  
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Conditions attached to IMF agreements can be summarised under two main headings; 1. 
Spending reforms, 2. Structural reforms.  Spending reforms focus on managing budget deficits 
and, or, public sector reform and set out a mix of budget reductions and measures that 
broadening the taxation base. The aim is to ensure the state can meet its budgetary 
obligations. Reductions in national budgets can negatively impact the ability of the state to 
provide effective and efficient public services, while public sector reform may result in a 
reduction of public sector employment or changes to terms of employment to existing public 
service staff. Where spending reforms result in a reduction of the provision of services, 
reductions in staff and pay, caps on hiring, reductions in Research and Development 
investment or even the introduction of user fees to supplement income, the SES of women 
can be negatively impacted by such reform in areas particularly used by women such as 
maternal health care. Where cultural bias exists favouring male children, public sector 
reforms that result in user fees for services may see families opting out of service use for 
female children, instead focusing their limited investment into male children negatively 
impacting the SES of women. The SES of women can also be negatively impacted by such 
public-sector reform in areas where women are heavily employed such as education or health 
care as women’s economic security is threatened. 
Structural reforms aimed at growing the economy include trade or capital account 
liberalisation and privatisation. Such reforms aim to increase foreign direct investment, 
develop employment opportunities and grow the economy. These types of reforms have 
greater potential to positively impact the SES of women as they can increase labour force 
opportunities, increase investment in education and health sectors and stimulate economic 
growth. I argue, the more conditions that focus upon economic growth over spending cuts 
that are included in a program, the greater the likelihood that an IMF programme can have a 
positive effect on women’s SES. 
However, stipulated conditions may not be implemented, and it is the implementation of 
these reforms which is crucial. Should a state have an agreement that specifies both spending 
reform and structural reform conditions but only implement spending reforms, it is likely that 
the impact upon women will be mainly negative. Conversely, programmes which implement 
reforms focused upon economic growth have the potential to have a positive impact upon 
the SES of women. As such, I argue, the more structural reforms focused on stimulating 
economic growth that are implemented as part of an IMF agreement, the greater the 
potential for a positive effect of that IMF programme upon women’s SES. 
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4.2 Dependent Variable  
4.2.1 The socio-economic status of women 
In this section, I will discuss and elaborate upon the concept of women’s socio-economic 
status. This is important as the socio-economic status of women acts as my dependent 
variable. I will bring clarity to its composition, its importance within academic research, its 
validity as a measure which is used by international organisations and international policy 
makers, while I also highlight its current limitations.  
Firstly, the socio-economic status of women is an aggregated concept that considers the 
economic and social position of women relative to men. Components such as labour force 
participation or female education levels are often used as proxy measures for ascertaining 
the socio-economic status of women, as each element can individually contribute to 
determining the ‘socio-economic status of women’. For example, a woman’s economic 
situation affects a woman’s status (Brumberg, 1984:49) while female labour force 
participation has been a decisive area for exploration in the context of both economic 
restructuring (Griffin Cohen, 1994) and globalisation and poverty (Del Rosario, 1997 and 
Ghosh, 1999). Critical to women’s socio-economic status is education, impacting female 
occupational opportunities (Rivera-Batiz, 1992, Iyigun and Owen, 1999) and potential income 
(Ashenfelter and Card, 1999).  
Secondly, as states and international organisations attempt to combat extreme poverty, the 
importance of the SES and maternal health care of women is reflected by their inclusion 
within the millennium development goals (MDG’s). Embedded in MDG is recognition that 
tackling gender inequality is central to combatting poverty, and as such, there are a number 
of gender-specific goals. These focus on three main areas of ‘health of girls, women and 
mothers’, ‘the educational attainment of girls and women’ and ‘the economic independence 
and participation of girls and women’. To facilitate the monitoring of trends in these areas, 
indicators were created (or expanded if already present), and directly linked to each target. 
This global consensus has promoted regular data collection at a national, regional and global 
level and availability of data for my study from central and reliable UN or World Bank 
databases. This target implementation allows me to benefit from rigorously defined and 
agreed indicators which are grounded in specific objectives.  
 
Thirdly, this concept of women’s socio-economic status incorporating labour force 
participation and female education is most often used. However, I argue that this concept 
falls short and does not facilitate fully, an understanding of how policy came to impact a 
woman’s status. Both female health and maternal health contributes substantially to 
women’s socio-economic status impacting their ability to work in paid employment (Artazcoz 
et al. 2004). Critically, maternal health and women’s health have further implications for the 
development of children and the greater family structure, as the health and nutrition of the 
mother has been found to impact greatly upon the health of the foetus and the physical and 
cognitive development of the child in early years (Bradley and Corwyn, 2002). As such, in this 
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thesis, I chose to consider the three elements of labour force participation, female education 
and maternal health care in order to ensure the most comprehensive view of women’s socio-
economic status (hence SES of women). This I believe improves upon previous approaches 
that utilise one or even two measures as proxies for women’s socio-economic status. Such an 
approach facilitates a greater understanding of how IMF programmes can impact the various 
components of women’s lives.  
The socio-economic status of women as a concept captures elements of women’s experience 
that is critical to her quality of life. However, I choose to disaggregate this concept for a 
number of reasons. Firstly, for clarity and definition. By disaggregating SES of women into 
labour force participation, education and maternal health, I am able to observe a more 
nuanced interaction between the SES of women and IMF programmes. Utilising an 
aggregated concept as a measure would limit the depth and breadth of the analysis. Secondly, 
each component part of the SES of women is likely to interact differently with IMF 
programmes. Policy choices under an IMF agreement are varied and may focus on budgetary 
contraction, economic growth or inflation management. Depending upon the policy 
implemented, the effect could be positive or negative on each of the component parts of the 
SES of women. Thirdly, by disaggregating the SES of women into component parts, the 
findings of the analysis can more accurately support policy recommendations recommend 
further study.  
4.2.2 Illustrating inequality 
The 2012 World Bank World Development Report highlights that women represent 40 
percent of the world’s labour force, hold 1 percent of the world’s wealth and that women’s 
earnings vary from 12 cents to the dollar relative to men in developing nation India, to 62 
cents to the dollar relative to men in highly developed and westernised Germany. These 
statistics highlight the weak economic position of women relative to men, or more aptly put, 
the economic inequality between the genders. Importantly these statistics also touch upon 
the complexity and variation in gender inequalities, with gender inequality being far more 
severe in ‘developing nations’. Furthermore, by considering gender, race and class together, 
it is possible to comprehend the multi-dimensionality of inequality, and within the 
exceptional wealth divide between the developed and developing nations, we find the 
poverty of women to be even more greatly exacerbated. An approach that utilises such 
statistical analysis is valuable for several reasons. 
Firstly, statistical analysis brings clarity to the level of relative inequality between the genders, 
and this can provide substantive support for policy change. Secondly, such an approach can 
allow for regular and well-defined tracking of progress, whether positive of negative. Policy, 
cultural, or societal changes can be factored in to view their impact, while budgetary or policy 
variations can also be considered enabling both a practical and sensitive analysis. Thirdly, the 
availability of regular and up-to-date data allows for an analysis that is contemporary and 
relevant.  
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It is clear that economic power influences social standing, and, if women’s economic power 
is weak, this in turns implies a low value attributed to their work and contribution. In society, 
perceived value is rewarded whereas dependency is not, and if a woman’s perceived value is 
less than that of a man, then her standing and societal status will reflect this. As such, it is 
clear that socially constructed factors also determine and influence the relative socio-
economic inequality between the genders. The relative status and inequality between 
genders can be explored through the concept of access points to resources. From a socio-
economic perspective, these access points can be expressed succinctly as:  
1. Control of resources 
2. Access to resources 
It is essential to point out that there is an important distinction between control and access. 
For example, an individual, a group, class or a gender may have control of resources which 
enable that individual, group, class or gender to determine how these resources are allocated. 
They may be able to allocate resources as a whole, favouring certain interest groups or 
supporter bases, or perhaps the allocation is focused upon the re-distribution of surplus 
resources within a community or state. Again, by being in control of the allocation and re-
distribution, this puts the group in control, in a position of power and influence thereby 
confirming their stratification level. From a gender perspective, this is an important point as 
in many cases control of resources most often resides with male leaders.   
Alternatively, the individual, group, class or gender may not have control of resources but 
only access to resources. From a gender perspective, this is highly important, as women may 
not have control of resources but may have access to resources. Women’s access to the 
resources can be determined by government policy (local or national) which may determine 
the distribution of resources. Alternatively, women’s access may be through their class, with 
more affluent classes possibly having greater influence in the redistributive process of 
resources. On a micro level in the home or small community women’s access to resources 
may be determined by their relationship to men such as father, brother or husband. It is 
possible at this home or community level that women may have some control over resources, 
however control at this micro level is very limited in comparison to having macro level control 
of resources. Expanding outwards, this may also imply that without a male relationship, 
women may not even have access to resources. India provides a good example where widows 
are referred to as ‘untouchables’ and rejected by society. The societal pressure in India is 
intense on unmarried, divorced or widowed women, where women without a male live a life 
of utter poverty, abuse and destitution.17  
                                                          
17  “In our country, when women become widows, they cease to exist,” says Winnie Singh, executive 
director and co-founder of Maitri. “It is a failure not only of the government but of society at large.” 
http://world.time.com/2013/10/07/if-youre-an-indian-widow-your-children-could-kick-you-
out-and-take-everything/  
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The tension between control and access is an important point. The lack of control of resources 
facilitates structures that at least maintain, but possibly strengthen, a dependency 
relationship between women and men. This contributes to an ever-increasing devaluing of 
the female status as measured by societal and economic barometers of value.  Acknowledging 
the nuance between control of, and access to, resources, reveals another layer of the socio-
economic inequality between men and women within a structural context. To rebalance 
inequalities between the genders, it is clear that the disparity between control of resources 
and access to resources needs to be resolved.   
However, while the concept of control and access to resources can contribute to explaining 
variation between the socio-economic status of women and men, it is a difficult concept to 
use as a dependent variable. Firstly, and most significantly, there are severe limitations 
around data. There is little, or no data recorded on a cross-country basis over time that 
captures either control of or access to resources by genders. Without data, it becomes 
impossible to measure changes or developments and importantly for this thesis, it is also 
extremely difficult to quantitatively explore any interaction between this concept of the 
socio-economic status of women and IMF programmes. Secondly, this contextualization does 
not provide enough clarity from a gender perspective. Control and access to resources may 
depend on the individual, group, class or gender. While women represent a large portion of 
the world’s poorest people, this is not to say that wealthy women do not have control over 
or access to resources. Where race is involved, again the position of a white middle-class 
woman may be very different to that of a black working-class woman. There is a need for 
clarity and specificity that such a context does not facilitate.  
4.2.3 Gendered governance 
It is important also to reflect upon the extent to which gender bias exists within governance 
as this will play an important role in maintaining, expanding or curbing any cultural or 
systemic inequalities. The ability for women to gain control over resources may be stymied 
through legislative processes such as the controlling of access to suffrage or political rights, 
whereas the access to resources by women is often limited by their ability to determine 
economic independence. Regime types interact with concepts of women’s political, social and 
economic rights differently and it is important to acknowledge any potential connection 
between authoritarianism and gendered governance.  
Non-democratic (autocratic and totalitarian) states are often charged with using oppressive 
methods to subjugate citizens and repress dissent to control political institutions and ensure 
power and control. It is also common that elites tend to have even greater influence in 
autocracies and the policies implemented benefit these elites rather than the majority (see 
Acemoglue and Robinson (2006:17). As such the system and depth of re-distribution benefits 
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a minority rather than a majority. This in itself is interesting as it highlights a difference in 
preferences between democratic and non-democratic regimes. The preference for non-
democratic regimes is also to retain control over political institutions and thus power, 
however non-democratic regimes are not answerable to an electorate and as such utilise 
different mechanism to attain and retain power.    
A limited form of “political pluralism” (See Linz: 1970:255) may develop within 
authoritarian/totalitarian regimes which allows an elite to possess political influence. In 
autocratic regimes, support for the regime may come from a small but powerful group, 
perhaps consisting of various family members of those who have taken power or high ranking 
military officers. Wealth, influence and power will be distributed in an effort to sustain the 
regime and retain power or collusive arrangements between the business, bureaucratic and 
political classes will be common. The primary aim and preference of the regime is to retain 
control over the political institutions and power, while preventing or undermining any dissent 
or development of potential political challengers. As such, establishing collusive relationships 
with non-regime officials, facilitates an exchange system. The elite and regime supporters act 
as informal monitors of dissent and instruments of control, and in exchange they receive 
wealth and limited power. This contributes to greater socio-economic inequality in the state 
and a higher concentration of power.  
 
This is important in the context of gender equality as limited political pluralism may result in 
the creation of powerful support organisations that can help to repress alternative or rival 
political agendas (See Brumberg, 2000:58, Linz, 1970:255). This is often illustrated through 
interaction between the strong state and religion. Religion is an important mechanism at play 
which has the power and ability to enforce a form of oppression specifically upon women. 
The partnership between the State and religion brings further complexity to the construction 
of gender inequality in authoritarian regimes. In the case of Spain great power and influence 
afforded to the Catholic Church by Franco where Catholicism was made the state religion. In 
this case the regime and the Catholic Church both shared a conservative view of gendered 
roles and what the role of women should be. This influence contributed to a ban on 
contraception, abortion and divorce, issues very important to women (See Brooker, 2000:26 
and Morcillo, 2000:214). Across the Middle East religious leaders within Arab states hold 
significant influence and power and in many cases state and religious oppression are 
intertwined. In authoritarian states such as Saudi Arabia and Iran religious law holds 
precedent with Shari’a Law (Islamic Law) determining legislation (see Brumberg, 2002:59).  
While this in itself may not be problematic, and obviously depends upon the interpretation 
and application of Shari’a Law, there are many examples highlighted by academics and 
international organisations such as UNICEF or Sweeney (2004:23) that illustrate that these 
laws are discriminatory against women highlighting that women’s rights are most likely 
violated under a combination of autocratic rule and a powerful religion. 
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Figures 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 illustrate the relationship between regime type and women’s political, 
economic and social rights. From the graphs it is clear that there is a positive relationship 
between women’s political, economic and social rights and countries with higher measures 
of democratic governance.18   
 
Figure 4.1 Relationship between regime type and women’s political rights
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
18 The graphs illustrated in Figures 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 were produced using data from the HumanRightsData.com 
datasets on women’s political, economic and social rights and the Polity IV dataset. Regressions were conducted 
on the full list of countries used in this dissertation for the years 1990 to 2011. See appendix 9:47 for the full list 
of countries used in this study.    
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Figure 4.2 Relationship between regime type and women’s economic rights 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3 Relationship between regime type and women’s social rights 
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I reiterate that my choice to explore the socio-economic status of women by considering 
women’s labour force participation, education and maternal health care provides the most 
appropriate lens. It facilitates greater clarity, specifically enables a gendered focused analysis 
and importantly allows for the testing of my theoretical arguments. 
4.2.3 Labour force participation and the socio-economic status of women 
In this next section, I will explore some of the notable trends in female labour force 
participation in recent decades and then discuss how and why labour force participation of 
women contributes to their socio-economic status. This will provide an important foundation 
for my later discussion on the conditional impact that IMF programmes have upon the labour 
force participation of women.  
Although the twentieth century saw increases in female labour force participation in the US 
and Europe, there still remains huge disparities between the levels of male and female labour 
force participation across the rest of the world. Additionally, there is also variation in the 
progress made by women in developed nations versus developing nations. Progress in labour 
opportunities for women in the US, Europe and East Asia has been made, and female labour 
force participation sits between 60 percent – 70 percent (World Bank Databank, 2017). 
Despite increases in Latin America, female labour force participation remains around 55 
percent (World Bank Databank, 2017). In the Middle East and North Africa, female labour 
force participation lags at 25 percent (World Bank Databank, 2017). There are both cultural 
and economic elements at play in the Middle East and North Africa that work against female 
labour force participation. Where Islam is the dominant religion, the cultural bias against 
women in the labour force is heightened, and the role of mother and homeworker for women 
is strongly encouraged within the community. Most interesting and worthy of comment, is 
the high rate of female labour force participation in sub-Saharan Africa. Almost 65 percent 
women are active in the labour force while almost 70 percent of all labour is categorised as 
‘informal’, which is associated with very low rates of pay. The rates of pay in this region are 
the lowest in the world (De Vreyer and Roubaud, 2013:18) and poverty rates have only begun 
to reduce in recent years (World Bank, 2016). In sub-Saharan Africa, it is essential for everyone 
to work regardless of gender just to survive. 
 
Women’s labour force participation is challenged by both economics and culture. Pre-existing 
gender imbalances influence the impact that trade liberalisation, a prominent IMF condition, 
will have upon female and male labour force participation. Not only are women less 
represented in the labour force, but also gender wage gaps exist across the developed and 
developing world. Lower wage rates of women have contributed to a feminization of sectors, 
such as the textile industry in Asia, as sectors seek to maximise returns and minimise costs 
through taking advantage of the lower rates of pay for women. The liberalisation of trade 
interacts deeply with wage rates as more competitive forces enter the market. From a positive 
perspective, increased employment opportunities in a labour abundant market may help to 
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narrow existing wage gaps between men and women as the relationship between labour and 
capital tightens. However, these increased opportunities may attract men into previously 
female-dominated industries and this can contribute to both a stagnation of female wage 
rates and a decrease in employment opportunities as women are pushed from an industry 
due to its greater appeal to men (Bhattacharya and Rahman, 1999, Saure and Zoabi, 2009, 
Human Development Report, 2015). It becomes clear how IMF policy preferences for trade 
liberalisation can interact with female labour force participation in a positive and negative 
manner, and this has important implications for the socio-economic status of women.   
The participation of women in the labour force facilitates women’s economic independence, 
their social and consumer choice and critically, their ability to develop economic power and 
economic status. Employment is vital for many women, in particular women in developing 
nations, as employment enables them to move away from poverty. Economic status and 
economic power are deeply intertwined, and economic power affects a woman’s privilege or 
status, and there is a deep connection between a woman’s ability to participate in paid labour 
and her status and power (Blumberg, 1984). Importantly, the relationship between 
economics and gender gaps are bi-directional with GDP per capita losses attributable to 
gender gaps (Cuberes and Teignier, 2012). This has implications for national budgets and a 
state’s ability to adequately fund a range of services including those such as health and 
education, while also implying a failure of a state to maximise economic growth.  
The increased propensity of women over men to invest in the education of their children has 
enormous implications for education and economic growth (Heintz, 2006). Most obviously, 
such investment in the education of girl children can contribute to girl children having better 
future employment opportunities. This can ultimately spark a positive loop of education, 
employment and economic power for women of the future and break a cycle of poverty. Such 
investment into education for both boys and girls can contribute to a more highly skilled 
workforce. There is potential for economic growth from this educationally enhanced 
workforce, and it can support more innovative approaches while also being attractive to FDI. 
Additionally, a state benefits economically from an extended talent pool when its entire 
population have access to greater levels of education.  
 
Women’s economic power is a very important indicator of women’s socio-economic status, 
representing the ability for economic independence, ability to access education, health care 
and social supports for herself and her family. Participation in the labour force enables 
women to develop economic power and increase their socio-economic status.   
4.2.4 Education and the socio-economic status of women   
Female education is an important component in understanding my dependent variable – the 
socio-economic status of women. Additionally, as sectoral reform and budgetary contraction 
is a prominent IMF condition that interacts deeply with state provision of educational 
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services, it becomes clear that their interaction is an important consideration for my study. In 
this next section, I will explore some of the notable trends in female education in recent 
decades and then discuss how and why female education contributes to women’s socio-
economic status. This will provide an important foundation for my later discussion on the 
conditional impact that IMF programmes have upon female education.  
 
Education is widely considered to be an investment into human capital, which not only 
benefits the individual but also society as a whole thus leading to greater social cohesion. 
While attempts to highlight the need for, and benefits of, increased female education have 
contributed to great progress, substantial gaps remain. Literacy amongst young females aged 
15-24 stands at 87 percent worldwide against a worldwide young male literacy rate of 92 
percent (World Bank Databank, 2017). Additionally, the ratio of both females to male primary 
enrollment and secondary enrollment is 97:100 (World Bank Databank, 2017). However, large 
gaps between male and female educational attainment are evident when data is 
disaggregated regionally. For example, adult male literacy in Sub-Saharan Africa is currently 
around 70 percent, but female adult literacy is far behind at only 50 percent (World Bank 
Databank, 2017). A much narrower gap exists in the Middle East and North Africa where adult 
male literacy is currently around 83 percent, but female adult literacy sits at 75 percent 
(World Bank Databank, 2017). Again, the regional variation amongst female literacy is worth 
noting. In cultures where boy children are prized over girl children, as is often the case in 
Islamic countries, educational spend is focused on male children. Male children grow up to 
be familial providers, and therefore education is considered a valuable asset. However, when 
women’s labour force participation is not considered culturally appropriate, parents often see 
education for girls as either unnecessary or of no value. A similar argument exists in situations 
of extreme poverty such as that in Sub-Saharan Africa. In the case of extreme poverty, family 
resources may be very limited and as a result, education spend can often favour male children 
over female children. 
Female education levels are central to women’s socio-economic status and an important 
consideration for this study (Malhotra, Pande and Grown, 2005). Education levels influence 
women’s ability to alter their social or economic standing in a number of ways. For example, 
education levels impact an individuals’ occupational opportunities (Iyigun and Owen, 1999, 
Rivera-Batiz, 1992) and onwards their potential income (Ashenfelter and Card 1999) thus 
influencing their economic power. Low levels of educational achievement will restrict 
occupational opportunities and lower the level of potential income and a higher the chance 
of unemployment thus reducing women’s economic power. Conversely, higher levels of 
educational achievement lead to greater labour force opportunities and increased income 
potential. If women have lower levels of education than men or less access to education than 
men, they are more likely to have fewer labour opportunities than men and a lower income 
level than men which is the case in the world today. The working patterns of men and women 
illustrate this disparity. Women are more likely than men to work in informal and temporary 
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employment, work at lower paid or undervalued jobs, or work in areas that are not protected 
by labour laws (ILO: 2014).19 
Female education and societal health are closely interlinked and therefore implications for 
health policy makers. Specifically, existing empirical research displays a direct and negative 
relationship between increased education for girls and women and fertility rates, maternal 
and infant mortality rates (McAlister and Baskett, 2005, Klepinger et al.,1998, Doyle and 
Weale, 1994, Brien and Lillard, 1994, World Bank, 1991). Additionally, education is found to 
have a positive effect on health (Behrman and Wolfe, 1989, Berger and Leigh, 1989, Gilleskie 
and Harrison, 1998, Hartog and Oosterbeek, 1998, Kenkel, 1991, 1995, Leigh, 1998). Female 
education or lack of, also influence maternal mortality rate as women’s educational level 
influences their usage of contraception, the knowledge and use of healthcare facilities and 
the knowledge and use of prenatal and antenatal services (Raghupathy, 1996, Swenson, 
Thang, Nhan and Tieu, 1993, Wong, Popkin, Guilkey and Akin, 1987). In particular, higher 
levels of educational attainment by women such as secondary or tertiary education has a 
significant and positive effect on women’s usage of pre-natal and post-natal care and services 
(Malhorta, Pande and Crown, 2005). The health of future generations is also negatively 
impacted by an under educated female population as evidence illustrates a positive 
correlation between the health and cognitive development of children and the education of 
their parents (Leigh, 1998, Grogger, 1997, Angrist and Lavy, 1996, Kaestner and Corman, 
1995, and Wolfe and Behrman, 1982).  
This matters for my thesis from a number of perspectives. Firstly, it is clear from the literature 
that education matters when considering the socio-economic status of women which is my 
dependent variable. With an already acknowledged gender gap in education, it is clear that a 
failure to reverse this gap not only constrains female occupational attainment, but also 
contributes to systemic health issues for women and children, and ultimately reduces the 
socio-economic status of women. Secondly, any interaction that potentially impacts female 
education also matters and the economic reform as conditioned by IMF agreements interacts 
with education in a number of ways. For example, the economic reform proposed by the IMF 
may result in budgetary contractions which challenge the funding of state-provided 
educational services. Such contractions often impact educational budgets negatively, 
resulting in a reduction of the ability of a state to provide adequate and quality education. 
Economic reform can also drive education reform resulting in liberalising the provision of 
education and facilitating a level of privatisation in education. While positively, new providers 
may bring in alternative practices or modes of supply for education, for example widening 
access to online education or e-learning platforms, from a negative perspective, it may be a 
                                                          
19 ILO, Global Employment Trends, 2014. Table A12, p. 99. 
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/---
publ/documents/publication/wcms_233953.pdf  
See also: http://www.unwomen.org/en/what-we-do/economic-empowerment/facts-and-
figures#notes    
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case that these provisions are only available to the very wealthy and the poor remain 
excluded. Trade liberalisation can stimulate new areas of employment and of particular 
importance in this context is the link between the education of female children and the paid 
employment of her mother (Cubbins, 1991:1065). Where there are extended employment 
opportunities for women, there is an impact on the emphasis and provision of education for 
female children. 
Female education is a very important contributing factor to women’s socio-economic status 
representing the ability for women to improve her employment and income opportunities 
and her ability and propensity to access health care for herself and her family and thus 
increase her socio-economic status. Considering the impact of fewer educational 
opportunities for women upon society and women, in particular, it is unsurprising that 
women are more likely than men to live a life of poverty. This in-turn increases female 
dependency upon male family members who can contribute to women being seen as an 
economic burden. These factors combined create a full circle of exclusion from wealth for 
women ultimately ensuring that women’s social status remains less than that of men. In 
addition, it is then highly appropriate for this dissertation to consider the interaction between 
IMF programmes and female education which will be discussed in greater detail below.  
 
4.2.5 Maternal health and the socio-economic status of women  
In the following section, I will explore some of the significant trends in maternal health in 
recent decades and then discuss how and why maternal health contributes to women’s socio-
economic status. This will provide an important foundation for my later discussion on the 
conditional impact that IMF programmes have upon maternal health.  
 
Health is considered an investment into human capital which benefits individuals and society 
as a whole. Systemic gender inequality at a societal or governmental level has implications 
for female and maternal health care policy. Where adequate and appropriate health care for 
women not is provided, it is likely that there will be negative repercussions upon the wellbeing 
and thus the socio-economic status of women (Chirowa, Attwood and Van der Putten, 2013). 
Women as distinct from men, due to their different biological and physical makeup, have 
separate and additional health care needs. Specifically, women’s need for appropriate 
maternal health care is most important. Internationally, regions with greater gender equality 
have lower maternal mortality rates, and notably, more than 50 percent of all maternal 
deaths in 2008 occurred in just six countries, India, Nigeria, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, 
and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Hogan et al., 2010). However, these regions are 
also less industrialised and poorer. Poverty adds a further layer of complexity to the challenge 
of ensuring a healthy population and the majority of maternal death rates occur in poorer 
countries (Van Lerberghe and De Brouwere, 2001 and Kunst and Houweling, 2001). 
Industrialised countries cut their maternal mortality rates by 50 percent from 1900 to 1950, 
while the increased provision of neonatal health care, technological advances and access to 
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midwives and medical professions at birth has resulted in historically low rates of maternal 
mortality leading into the twenty-first century (Loudon, 1992). It is clear that strategies such 
as increased provision of healthcare professionals and the usage of advanced medical 
technologies have had a huge impact in reducing maternal death overall (Jahn and De 
Brouwere, 2001). Trends in fertility rates have also much to tell, and there are huge 
differences between fertility rates of women in developing and developed nations. While Sub-
Saharan fertility rates have lowered to five births per woman, in Europe and Central Asia 
fertility rates are less than two births per woman. While the provision of skilled health care 
professionals at birth is strongly correlated with lower maternal mortality, some less 
developed nations reach less than 10percent of the requirements in this area (World Health 
Organization, 2005). 
 
Maternal health is an important consideration for women’s socio-economic status for a 
number of reasons. Firstly, inadequate levels of skilled birth professionals present at birth 
jeopardise the lives of many women and infants while failure to provide post-natal care and 
support can result in unnecessary infection or haemorrhaging of the mother or illnesses of 
the child. Such lack of medical care can result in women leading unhealthy lives post-partum, 
challenging their ability to enter or remain in the labour force, or ensuring their disability and 
thus dependency upon state or family. This contributes to a lowering of women’s socio-
economic status. Secondly, recent studies suggest that the health and nutrition of the mother 
significantly impact the health of the foetus and the physical and cognitive development of 
the child in early years (Bradley and Corwyn, 2002). This has enormous implications for the 
socio-economic development of future populations, in particular, girl children. Unhealthy girl 
children may be viewed as a social and economic burden thus contributing to a worsening of 
women’s socio-economic status. Lack of cognitive development in girl children can generate 
additional reasons for families not to invest in education in them while also creating a further 
barrier for women in accessing the labour market as an adult. These factors contribute 
strongly to reducing the socio-economic status of women. Thirdly, studies also confirm that 
women who are oppressed, impoverished and ill-informed have the highest maternal 
morbidity and mortality rates (Bhatia, 1994). As such, women are kept in a cycle of continual 
poverty, lacking in real representation and influence, which guarantees the consistently low 
socio-economic status of women, leading to continued and heightened gender inequality.  
Maternal health is central to women’s socio-economic status representing the ability for 
women to remain healthy and be able to contribute to her home and community establishing 
her value and status. Importantly her health also allows her to improve her employment and 
income opportunities and her ability and propensity to access health care for herself and her 
family and thus increase her socio-economic status. The nuance of health requirements for 
women is lost through lack of ability to relate to or understand specific female health needs. 
The lack of female influencers – either at a policy or political level – ensures a failure to 
counter-balance male perspectives with female perspectives, who better understand their 
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own health needs. This in-turn facilitates the continuous female dependency upon male 
family members who can contribute to women being seen as a social and economic burden 
when their health fails ensuring that women’s social status remains less than that of men. As 
such, it is then fundamental to my study to consider the interaction between IMF 
programmes and maternal health in the following section exploring my independent variable 
IMF Programmes.  
4.3 Independent Variable: IMF programmes 
In this section, I will discuss and elaborate upon the focus and purpose of IMF programmes. 
This is important as IMF programmes act as my independent variable. As such I wish to bring 
clarity to why states enter into an IMF programme, what costs do states pay for entering into 
an IMF programme, the significance and impact of IMF programmes within recent academic 
research as well as compliance with IMF programmes while also discussing the mechanisms 
the IMF uses to influence economic reform. This is important as the IMF has an invasive 
involvement in a state’s domestic policy formation for a period of time and I argue that this 
results in my independent variable – IMF programmes – having an effect on my dependent 
variable – the socio-economic status of women.  
4.3.1 Why do states enter an IMF agreement?  
It is important to appreciate why states enter into IMF programmes as this enables us to 
understand why certain conditions may be attached to an IMF programme. The reasons states 
have sought IMF lending has varied through the decades. Post-war lending focused on helping 
industrial countries as the IMF concentrated on rebuilding the international monetary system. 
The 1970’s oil shock saw lower and middle-income countries entering IMF agreements in 
order to cope with increasing debt. Debt management issues have often been a forerunner 
to IMF programme participation. Latin American countries in the 1980’s turned to the IMF for 
financial aid to help manage high levels of public debt that had been accumulated from 
excessive borrowing and rising oil prices in the 1970’s. While some debt was restructured 
under the Brady Plan, the IMF facilitated lending that was tied to strict and severe adjustment 
programmes that enabled Latin American states to pay down debt. The Latin American debt 
was of systematic importance to the West, in particular, the US, and its repayment came at 
the expense of social investment and with severe political consequences (Pop-Eleches, 2009). 
 
The fall of communism and the transition of Eastern European States towards market 
economies in the 1990’s led to increased demand for IMF resources. In the case of Eastern 
Europe’s post-Communist transition, the IMF provided loans, conditional agreements and 
policy reform assistance with the aim of stimulating economic growth, managing inflation and 
encouraging foreign direct investment. The IMF intervention in Eastern Europe’s post-
Communist transition was more constructive than its dealings with Latin America or Africa, 
and this particular intervention has faced less criticism that IMF involvement in Africa or Latin 
America (Roaf et al., 2014, Pop-Eleches, 2009, Stone, 2002,). 
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Balance of payments issues due to capital flight, economic crises, exchange rate weaknesses 
or just the continued implementation of poor domestic fiscal and economic policies often 
precede IMF agreements. Such a collection of issues precipitated the Asian crisis in 1997. The 
Asian crisis was a perfect storm of inadequate regulation, and lack of transparency (Stiglitz, 
1998) crony capitalism (Wade and Veneroso, 1998, Furman and Stiglitz, 1998) asset bubbles 
stimulated by rapid capital account liberalisation (Wade 1998, Furman and Stiglitz, 1998), 
revaluations in the yen and dollar and shifts in international markets (Wade 1998, Radelet 
and Sachs, 1998) and generally weak fundamentals within the socio-economic and political 
structures (Wade, 1998). The IMF intervention in the Asian crisis was intense, pervasive, and 
deeply felt across may areas. Conditions demanded continued capital account liberalisation, 
the breaking up of relationships between governments and business, the opening up business 
and domestic economies to international competitors, changes in labour laws and the 
imposition of a western ‘Basel’ style of regulation to manage banking capital ratios. For this, 
the IMF faced heavy criticism. There were accusations that these conditions were actually 
contributing to the exacerbation of the crisis although the IMF firmly defended its policy 
choice, in particular, its commitment to capital account liberalisation (Fisher, 1997) 
 
The reasoning behind why states enter into IMF agreements matters for my thesis for a 
number of reasons. Firstly, when states adopt strategies to correct issues under an IMF 
programme, there is recognition that some level of austerity will be necessary along with 
potential changes in monetary and fiscal policy (Nooruddin and Simmons, 2006 and Conway, 
2003). Secondly, it is also evident from past programmes, that the circumstances preceding 
an IMF agreement especially influences the type and focus that the programme takes. If a 
programme has been established to assist a state in managing its debt obligations, then it will 
be unsurprising to see conditions that strongly and severely target public spending levels. This 
challenges a state’s ability to provide adequate social services such as education or 
healthcare. In situations such as these, debt repayments may come at the expense of state 
investment into social care. However, where programmes are established to assist countries 
in managing transitions to market economies and where no major debt issues exist, the focus 
of the programme may be on liberalising policies, inflation controlling policies or exchange 
rate mechanisms and not a contraction of public spending budgets. These differences in focus 
of an IMF programme will interact with different elements of women’s socio-economic status. 
Specifically, budgetary contraction will interact with the provision of female education and 
maternal health care while liberalising policies will interact with female labour force 
participation, while policies aimed at curbing inflation often come at the expense of 
employment opportunities. This is why it is appropriate that my study considers the nuance 
of why a state requires IMF assistance as this has implications for policy choice and policy 
implementation throughout the programme. 
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4.3.2 What are the different types of IMF programmes? 
With such diverse reasons for needing finance, it is appropriate and unsurprising that the IMF 
would have a variety of programme types. Each programme type will aim to provide a specific 
framework that meets the individual economic needs of the state. While the IMF SBA (Stand-
By-Arrangement) facility was initially a prominent funding instrument, the IMF has evolved 
their funding mechanisms to deal with the variety of fiscal and monetary needs of states in 
economic difficulty. For example, countries considered to be developing nations have 
required long term support which includes, not only a line of credit but also extensive 
economic guidance and support. Benin provides a good example, as it has been continuously 
under an IMF agreement since 1993 after transitioning from a Marxist state towards 
democracy in 1991. The needs of such a state are different from Greece who has been under 
an IMF agreement since only 2010. The recent global crises highlighted corrupt and harmful 
internal financial practices in Greece which weakened the state. These practices made Greece 
particularly vulnerable to the global economic downturn and resulted in Greece requiring 
substantial financial support to cope. These individual yet somewhat common needs of states 
have required the IMF to create a variety of programmes that can manage the short-term 
balance of payments issues and facilitate full economic recovery in the longer term. Such 
instruments provide frameworks that can be individualised and deployed and Table 4.1 below 
summarise these IMF tools. Also, worth noting, is how many original agreement types – such 
as the ESAF – are no longer present but have evolved into facilities better able to provide 
solutions to the members’ economic issues.  
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Table 4.4 IMF Credit Agreements 
 
Agreement  Agreement Title Term Agreement Description Conditionality 
ECF Extended Credit Facility Max 5 years, renewable Evolution of PRFG and designed to move a member towards sustainable 
growth and poverty reduction.  Used extensively with LIC’s for medium 
term lending and has concessional interest rates (zero in 2014).  
Yes 
EFF Extended Fund Facility Max 4 years A comprehensive programme providing both financial assistance and 
structural reform policies that will support a correction of structural 
imbalances. Medium and long-term support that is non-concessional 
and has been a prominent tool in recent years as a result of the global 
economic crisis.  
Yes 
ESAF Enhanced Structural 
Adjustment Facility 
3 years and renewable Designed for low-income countries providing concessional lending with 
a focus on poverty reduction. Replaced by the PRFG in 1999. 
Yes 
FCL Flexible Credit Line 12-24 months A line of renewable non-concessional credit without conditionality, 
available to countries with strong economic fundamentals that are 
facing balance of payment issues. Single, upfront rather than dispersed 
payment structure.  
No 
RCF Rapid Credit Facility  Similar to the RFI, the RCF provides rapid access to concessional 
financing without a full-fledged IMF programme in place to members 
facing balance of payments issues 
No 
RFI Rapid Financing Instrument  Rapid access to financing without a full-fledged IMF programme in place 
in order to assist member with urgent needs such as natural disasters, 
price shocks or post-conflict situations 
Yes 
PLL Precautionary Liquidity Line 6 – 24 months Similar to the FCL but for countries with less strong economic 
fundamentals but may include limited but focused conditionality. 
Limited 
PRFG Poverty Reduction and Growth 
Facility 
3 years and renewable For poorest members and make poverty reduction and growth central 
to the lending agreement. These agreements provide concessional 
lending while specifying key structural policy reforms 
Yes 
PSI Policy Support Instrument Max 5 years and renewable Prov des LIC’s Fund advice without entering an IMF agreement.  No 
SBA Stand-by Agreements 12-36 months Rapid response credit facility, with front loading, to support recovery 
post-crisis and restore sustainable growth. Short term lending and can 
be provided on a precautionary basis. 
Yes 
SCF Standby Credit Facility 12-24 months Concessional lending available to LIC’s challenged with balance of 
payment issues or facing episodic shocks or in need of short-term 
finance. 
Yes 
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4.3.3 IMF programme design 
As both parties enter into the agreement to provide the necessary support to the country in 
economic difficulty the IMF has at its disposal a number of mechanisms that allow them to 
influence the outcome. These include 
• Loan size 
• Conditionality 
• Implementation review process and tranche release 
• Knowledge gained from country’s participation in past programmes and Article IV 
surveillance missions 
 
These mechanisms are important tools for the IMF, but they do not stand in isolation away 
from the economically challenged country, rather it is essential to point out that the state in 
question has some ability to influence the outcome of each of these factors. The programme 
entered into by a state is the result of a demanding and difficult negotiating process. As such, 
the size of the loan, terms and conditions of the loan, the implementation timelines and 
tranche release stipulations are all decided and agreed through a bargaining process between 
the state and the IMF. It could be more accurate to point out the subsequent journey of 
austerity, and budget contraction that is undertaken by a state could be considered to be a 
decision which is inherently endogenous (Conway 2003, Nooruddin and Simmons 2006). 
However, let us not forget that most states are in very weak economic positions when 
applying to the IMF and this impacts their negotiating ability. As such, the negotiation 
capability and strategies of the country seeking aid is influenced by a large number of factors 
including its own economic situation and its immediate financial needs, but also by its own 
size and resources, its geopolitical importance, its domestic and international institutional 
structures and, importantly to this research, its societal pressure groups.  
 
I have outlined the reasons why countries seek IMF assistance along with the types of 
programmes the IMF have developed to provide such support. Now it is fitting to discuss the 
role conditionality plays in IMF agreements. In designing a programme, the IMF will attempt 
to balance loan amounts and dispersal with conditionality. Conditionality is the IMF’s attempt 
to ensure that states correct practices which contributed to the economic crisis in the first 
place and is an important fact of an IMF agreement. IMF conditions converge into one of two 
groupings. Firstly, spending reforms or Quantitative Performance Criteria (QPC); which are 
macroeconomic targets that focus upon fiscal measures. These targets seek to bring national 
budgets under control, manage deficits, meet debt obligations or maintain appropriate 
reserve levels.  Secondly, structural reforms; which link IMF lending to policy reform. The aim 
is for the state to develop macroeconomic stability, economic growth, stimulate employment 
and facilitate investment. These structural reforms can be binding which means that 
disbursement of funds is dependent upon the conditions being fulfilled, or non-binding, 
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where the meeting of benchmarks are important and influential factors considered by the 
IMF during performance reviews.  
While Table 4.1 highlights that there are a number of programmes that facilitate IMF support 
without conditions attached, the vast majority of programmes undertaken by states do have 
conditions (Griffiths and Todoulos, 2014). This is supported in my own dataset which 
documents the IMF participation rates of 173 countries over 22 years from 1990 – 2011 with 
a total of 3806 observations. Of this total, 1104 records detail an IMF agreement with 1069 
of these, stipulating conditionality. 
4.3.4 Specific types of IMF conditionality: spending reforms 
In the following section, I will review the most common types of conditions under two main 
headings of spending reforms and structural reforms. I will also examine how these conditions 
directly interact with the SES of women. Even though the IMF operates at a macro level 
attempting to influence the direction of an economy through conditional lending, the 
mechanism of conditionality and the reforms it stipulates, has direct implications for the 
citizen population of the borrowing state. These implications are both positive and negative. 
These implications can be explored from the perspective of the entire citizens or more 
relevant to this study, specifically upon my dependent variable – the SES of women.  
While some deficits are manageable, a large debt to GDP ratio is highly problematic, 
particularly if interest rates are rising. Alternatively, economic crises that result in depletion 
of reserves, capital flight or growing inflation also pose significant dangers to a state. In 
keeping with their goals, any economic reform proposed by the IMF is intended to help the 
troubled state return to a point where these challenges are controllable, and a state can meet 
their balance of payment. In reality, the options open to a state are reasonably limited. They 
either involve rebalancing state income and expenditure through budgetary reorganisation 
or stimulating economic growth and economically growing out of the problem. Ideally, the 
solution includes a mixture of both these solutions, while most importantly, avoiding a 
situation where the cure is worse than the disease. 
This is important to my thesis for a number of reasons. Firstly, national budgets allow for the 
redistribution of resources amongst the state citizens and sectors. Important to this thesis, 
this includes the services and sectors that affect the socio-economic status of women such as 
education and health care. Any large budgetary contraction in these areas can negatively 
impact the socio-economic status of women. Secondly, national budgets provide the financial 
support for policies that support and encourage private sector investment, such as taxation 
policies. Changes to taxation policy can impact the ability of women to enter or remain in the 
labour force. Taxation reform that increases the tax burden of citizens will most likely result 
in a decrease in disposable income, and while this might stem inflationary pressures, it can 
also stem growth. On the other hand, taxation reform increasing private sector contributions 
can result in a contraction of investment into the private sector. This can also prevent growth, 
jeopardise employment and ultimately, reduce the tax take. Reductions in labour force 
 
 
70 
 
opportunities can directly result in women being unable to enter the labour force, or force 
women out of the labour force in favour of men, or result in wage reductions for women as 
the balance between capital and labour changes. This directly impacts the socio-economic 
status of women. Thirdly, spending reforms stemming from an IMF agreement can contribute 
to greater competition for influence over the redistribution of the reduced state resources. 
Sacred cows will be protected from cuts (Conway, 2003, Nooruddin and Simmons, 2006) and 
lobbying of the government is likely to become more intense. Where there is gender bias in 
terms of collective bargaining ability, this can result in redistribution that is unfavourable to 
women and negatively impacting their socio-economic status. Thus, it is apt that I explore IMF 
conditionality and spending reform in the context of its interaction with the socio-economic 
status of women. 
 
Spending cuts:  
Within the context of Quantitative Performance Criteria (QPC), the IMF can specify spending 
reform conditions attempting to reduce budget deficits. Tightening of public expenditure or 
budgetary austerity is common in IMF agreements (Pop-Eleches, 2007, Nooruddin and 
Simmons, 2006, Conway, 2003, Mussa and Savastano, 2000) and this can help states to 
control or reduce any existing deficits. Reducing public sector budgets is often partnered with 
public sector reform aimed at bringing efficiencies and could be seen as an attempt to provide 
the same or increases services with less financial investment. 
Any changes in the level of public expenditure directly impact a state’s ability to provide public 
services and, in turn, impacts those that use such services. This interacts with the SES of 
women in a number of ways. Firstly, budget reductions in the health sector challenge a state’s 
ability to provide adequate health. This disproportionately impacts women and girls who have 
health needs additional to those of men, needing both general health care and maternal 
health care. Additionally, women often act as the main carer for the elderly or very young, 
and cuts to health budgets place greater strain on their role as carers (Seguino, 2000). Where 
budget reductions result in user fees or less subsidization of services or prescriptions, any 
increase in costs associated with health services disproportionately impacts women who have 
less economic independence, and where a cultural preference exists for male children, 
additional costs may result in families investing their limited resources in the health needs of 
boys over girls. These factors illustrate how reductions in public health disproportionately 
impact the SES of women and contribute to their continued unequal socioeconomic status 
relative to men.  
 
Secondly, budget reductions in the area of education impact the state’s ability to provide 
adequate educational services. This can disproportionately impact girls access to education 
where cultural bias in favour of male children exists. This can result in families focusing their 
available education spend upon male children to the detriment of female children. These 
factors contribute to a continued gender inequality or increased poverty. 
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Thirdly, budget reductions and sectoral reform that target public services impact public sector 
employment levels. This can disproportionately impact women’s labour force participation 
where women are heavily represented in the public-sector workforce. This can result in an 
increase in the number of women unemployed, or alternatively, reduce the earnings of those 
that remain in the public service. Consistent across all economies women earn less than men 
and face greater economic difficulty. Such inequality contributes to their socio-economic 
status being less than men. Budgetary cuts in areas of high employment for women 
compounds this economic inequality and disproportionately impacts the SES of women. This 
contributes to the continuation of women’s unequal socio-economic status relative to men.  
 
Tax reform: 
Tax reform which includes tax increases, the widening of the tax base or the expansion of 
indirect taxes is often used to help restructure budget deficits. Such measures will most likely 
reduce the take-home pay of those in employment while tax increases for employers may 
challenge their ability to continue to provide employment. This can impact the SES of women 
in a number of ways. Firstly, increased taxes on the employer can result in a reduction of 
employment opportunities or a reduction of rates of pay in the private sector, thus 
challenging women’s ability to participate in the labour force. Secondly, tax increases that 
target employees can result in a reduction of disposable family income. A reduction in family 
income challenges the ability of a family to invest in health or education services. Thirdly 
indirect taxes such as VAT are regressive, and affect to a greater extent, those that are 
economically weak, such as women. 
It is clear that tax increases have the potential to raise extra revenue for the state but used in 
this simplistic manner they are a blunt instrument. Women’s employment is more elastic than 
men’s (Alesina, Ichino and Karabarbounis, 2011) and such a blunt approach can have a 
disproportionate impact on female employment reducing female employment and thus 
contributing to a deterioration of women’s economic independence. An alternative and more 
nuanced approach to tax reform would be a restructuring of the taxation system to remove 
gender inequalities and promote female employment. Thus, taxation reform can accomplish 
two goals, firstly, a broader tax base producing increase revenue and secondly, facilitate 
increased female employment which can contribute to greater economic growth. The first 
blunt approach decreases women’s socio-economic status while the second nuanced 
approach has the potential to improve women’s socio-economic status.  
In short, while spending cuts, sectoral reform and increased taxation do contribute to a 
rebalancing of national deficits but they can have a disproportionately negative impact on 
women. Spending cuts often target areas which provide the most effective social safety nets 
for women, sectoral reform of the public services challenge women’s employment security 
and increased taxation take money out of the economy and further contribute to the 
economic dependency of women upon men. These measures combined are anti-growth and 
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contract a state’s economy. While these steps may prevent, or reduce inflationary pressures, 
they also prevent economic growth that is required to stimulate employment. As such, 
women remain disproportionately economically weak, have less ability to invest in education 
and also have less ability to access quality healthcare. Such reforms contribute and compound 
the decrease in the SES of women. 
4.3.5 Specific types of IMF conditionality: structural reforms 
The second type of reform prominent in IMF agreements is structural reform and is focused 
on implementing measures to stimulate economic growth. These conditions drive policy 
change that aims to facilitate the growth of the private sector by:  
1. removing monopolies and encouraging competition,  
2. developing institutional frameworks and appropriate regulation that can support the 
growth of the private sector,  
3. reducing or removal of trade barriers to stimulate international trade,  
4. liberalising the state’s capital account to allow for increased inflows of FDI.  
These structural conditions interact with the economic architecture of a state in very different 
ways to spending reform conditions. Spending reforms, in general, can contribute to an 
economic contraction as the overall spending capability of the state is reduced. Such 
reduction results in public spending cuts, reductions in public sector employment and cuts to 
public sector pay and benefits and ultimately less ability for the citizens to be economically 
active. Structural reforms, on the other hand, focus on increasing the role of the private sector 
within the state and growing the economy. An increased private sector becomes an 
alternative source of employment and facilitates the development of entrepreneurship. The 
removal of monopolies opens opportunities for local or international investment and the 
development of alternative suppliers. The reduction of trade barriers allows for the expansion 
of trading relationships for national producers while the liberalisation of the state’s capital 
account can open new sources of finance. These are all growth orientated reforms and focus 
on economic expansion rather than economic contraction.  
This is important to my thesis for several reasons. Firstly, policies that focus on economic 
growth have greater potential to have a positive impact upon the SES of women than policies 
that contract an economy. Economic growth through the development of an expanded 
private sector can provide increased employment opportunities for women thus facilitating 
their increased economic independence. In particular, where women’s employment is 
focused within the public sector, an expanded private sector can provide labour opportunities 
for women who are disproportionately impacted by public sector employment contraction. 
Thus, an expanded private sector can have additional benefits for women over men. Secondly, 
structural reforms that remove monopolies and open competition can stimulate a drive for 
greater quality.  Where competition exists, providers have to ensure, both a high level of 
quality as well as a competitive pricing model, in order to retain its market share. When 
sectors such as health or education are opened to competition, it can have a specific positive 
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impact upon the quality of the provision of services. This increased competition can have 
positive impacts for the SES of women as sectors such as health or education make a greater 
drive to improve the quality of services. Thirdly, structural reforms that move to open the 
state's capital account has the potential to introduce new funding into the state. This new FDI 
may be attracted to investment opportunities arising from private sector expansion policies 
or the breaking up of monopolies. In the absence of FDI it will be more difficult to expand the 
private sector or develop competition in services unless the state intervenes, and during 
economic crises, this is an unlikely scenario. As such, FDI becomes an important component 
in aiding the development or expansion of a private sector. This impacts the SES of women 
specifically in the areas of labour force opportunities, while potential investment in health or 
education R&D also has implications for the SES of women. 
 
A crucial difference between structural reforms and spending reforms is that structural 
reforms have the potential to positively impact the SES of women, while spending reforms 
have a greater likelihood to negatively impact the SES of women and disproportionately so. 
By choosing to build in reforms that focus on economic growth, the IMF has the potential to 
help a state develop labour force opportunities, drive quality in service provision and avail of 
international investment to expand the state’s private sector. All of these contribute to 
expanding the state’s economy and can contribute to increasing the SES of women. As such, 
it is apt that I explore IMF conditionality and structural reform in the context of its interaction 
with the SES of women. 
 
Structural reform: privatisation 
The IMF has long encouraged states to expand their private sector, introduce competition 
and move the state away from being the sole provider of certain services.  Privatisation of 
state-owned enterprises transfers the provision of services away from the state into the 
private sector. The IMF has encouraged the privatisation of state-owned enterprises arguing 
that it increases the supply-side of an economy, leads to greater efficiencies within sectors, 
and stimulates economic growth. This increases the size and power of the private sector and 
also reduces the state’s funding obligations. This condition can facilitate the entrance of new 
providers to a state’s health or education sector that provides an alternative service. 
Additionally, state utilities such as electricity or water, or services such as transportation, 
ports or airports are often privatised. This also enables new providers to enter these sectors 
and stimulates competition to the sector. Importantly, privatisation removes the cost 
associated with these SEO’s (state owned enterprises) from the public purse. While states can 
benefit from the sale of these SEO’s – as their sale raises funds that can be used to reduce 
budgetary deficits – the privatisation of such key services and sectors has come under 
significant criticism over the years (Mussa and Savastano, 2000, Boorman, 2000, Buria, 2003, 
Eurodad, 2006, Woods, 2006, Norwegian Church Aid, 2007, Molina and Pereira, 2008).  
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Privatisation interacts with the SES of women in a number of ways, both positively and 
negatively. From a negative perspective, the privatisation of water services has had a 
disproportionately negative impact on women in the developing world (Dennis and 
Zuckerman, 2006, Adedokun et al., 2000). More specifically, it is those that are very poor and 
live in rural areas which are most negatively impacted (WHO, 2000, UN Habitat, 2003).  
Privatisation of educational or health services may also negatively and disproportionately 
impact women. Cultural and gender bias in families, can result in education spending being 
focused upon male children over female children. As a result, any costs on education set 
against such cultural bias can contribute to girls and women experiencing continued poverty 
and gender inequality.  
 
However, it is important to note that IMF privatisation conditions have focused on much 
broader areas. Conditions specifying privatisation have encompassed diverse sectors such as 
telecommunications, infrastructure, energy, natural resources, banking, transportation and 
land privatisation. These areas represent most of the privatising conditions rather than health 
or education (Molina and Pereira, 2008).  Privatisation in these areas interacts with the SES 
of women in a very different way.  Revamping a state’s economic architecture towards the 
private sector has the potential to be positive for the SES of women.  
 
Firstly, the mechanism of privatisation sends a signal to the market of opportunity for 
investments (Brune, Garratt and Kogut, 2004, Perotti and van Oijen, 2001). This is a crucial 
signal in times when a state is attempting to enlarge its private sector. This signal is also 
important in the context of the state’s position regarding capital account liberalisation. If 
capital flows are liberalised in tandem with privatisation, this can encourage FDI to locate and 
bring new investment to the ailing state. This expansion of the private sector is critical to 
stimulating economic growth and increasing labour force opportunities and economic 
independence for women, just as for men, is gained through labour force participation. 
Without this expansion of the private sector, labour force opportunities are limited to those 
within the public sector, and the state becomes a gatekeeper to economic independence.  If 
the state already facilitates a cultural bias towards employment of men over women, labour 
opportunities for women will be naturally curtailed and controlled. A large and empowered 
private sector may have less of this kind of bias and has the potential to provide expanded 
labour force opportunities for women. Labour force opportunities, particularly for women, 
can be created if a state chooses a structure that incorporates both public and private 
healthcare and education services. New competition in the healthcare and education sectors 
can open up employment opportunities for health care professionals and teachers. This can 
particularly benefit women, as women tend to be highly represented in both the teaching and 
health care profession. As such, women are then in a position to bring their past experiences 
and any demands for process review that might lead to improvements. 
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Secondly, the private sector differs from the public sector in its ability to grow. Public sector 
growth or expansion comes at the expense of higher or wider taxation or increased debt 
obligations. It is an expensive form of growth, both to the citizens and also to the economic 
stability of the state. Private sector growth is less costly to the state and its citizens as it is 
stimulated by a combination of technological advancement, FDI, sectoral efficiencies, and 
increased market share. While a state can influence these within their borders, no single state 
can affect all of these at a global level. Private sector growth can play an important role in 
increasing the SES of women, particularly in the ongoing creation of labour force 
opportunities, wage growth or enabling women to gain new and transferable labour skills.  
 
Thirdly, privatisation of sectors such as telecommunications, infrastructure, energy, natural 
resources, banking or transportation has the potential to generate large incomes for 
governments that can be used to reduce debt obligation or be invested in essential social 
services remaining under state control. Reductions in debt obligations can allow governments 
to focus on creating a sustainable and manageable budget. This can have a positive impact 
upon the SES of women as when debt is reduced the state can focus on delivering efficient 
public services in core areas such as health and education, rather than servicing large debt 
mountains.  
  
Fourthly, privatisation of such sectors as telecommunications, infrastructure, energy, natural 
resources, banking, transportation transfers the operational costs to the private sector. This 
divests the state from large budget obligations that are beyond its affordability. A state’s 
income drawn from taxation and, or, borrowing has limitations, and constant subsidisation of 
inefficient SOE’s is unsustainable. Such practices challenge a state’s ability to provide 
adequate and effective services in the areas of healthcare, education or security which could 
be considered to be of higher priority to both a state and its population. Adopting a more 
pragmatic prioritisation for state services, allows a state to focus its limited resources on core 
areas of higher importance, and deliver better quality essential services, while the private 
sector provides services that it is best placed to provide. This can have a positive impact upon 
the SES of women in that the state concentrates on select public services. With a more 
concentrated focus, the state is better able to drive for quality in areas such as health or 
education.  
 
Fifthly, the introduction of new providers to the market can bring access to international best 
practices, research and development or technological advances that were previously 
inaccessible. These can have impacts beyond their sectors. For example, advancing 
telecommunications infrastructures can support the deployment of online education portals, 
thereby giving supports to schools in rural areas. A wider set of banking providers with access 
to greater levels of finance can support micro-financing projects. Public-private partnerships 
in infrastructural and transportation projects can ensure easier access to services such as 
hospitals, schools or simply getting to work. Best practices in governance can introduce new 
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frameworks that challenge corruption and malpractice, all of which can contribute to making 
the state increasingly attractive for future and ongoing FDI.  
 
Sixthly, an approach that facilitates both private and public health care can reduce demand 
upon public hospitals by moving a percentage of the population away from public health care 
to private health care. This allows public hospitals to restructure and service a smaller 
population and can have positive impacts upon their ability to provide basic services. 
Additionally, competition in the health care market can introduce a greater drive for quality 
which can have a positive impact on maternal care as there will be a drive to limit maternal 
mortality at birth and provide adequate neonatal care.   
 
Finally, a public and private approach to health care and, or education, can see the 
introduction of new methods, skills, techniques, structures and services are likely to have a 
positive impact on the healthcare sector in general. These new providers add investment into 
the sector and may also bring with them international experience cutting edge techniques, 
which can ultimately contribute to an improvement in healthcare and education provision. 
While it can be argued that these provisions are available to only a portion of the population 
due to a cost barrier, it is also likely that over time there will be a transfer of any newly 
introduced skills, techniques and processes from these new providers to the established 
public health care sector.    
 
Structural reform: economic liberalisation   
The IMF has always espoused liberalisation of trade and removal of trade barriers to stimulate 
trade and economic growth, and in recent years has also championed capital liberalisation 
(Chwieroth, 2010). The values and dangers of capital account liberalisation are hotly debated 
as capital is ‘fickle’ (Bluedorn et al., 2013). This poses problems for emerging economies. 
When interest rates rise in the industrialised nation's capital will move for improved yields. 
This results in a challenge to economic stability as capital will always seek to maximise returns 
(Stiglitz 2000). Though controversial, the IMF has remained committed to capital account 
liberalisation. It stresses that capital liberalisation imposes good policy making upon 
governments so as to avoid capital flight while understanding that states may need to 
maintain capital controls in certain situations (IEO, 2005 and 2015). The IMF has used 
conditionality to encourage the structured and paced removal of capital controls in 
developing nations and emerging economies. The aim of such a condition is to facilitate 
international investment and the flow of capital so that emerging or developing economies 
can benefit from the investment.  
 
This is important for my thesis as liberalisation directly interacts with the SES of women. 
Firstly, liberalisation of trade can stimulate economic growth and increased export 
opportunities. Recent research by Wacziarg and Horn Welch (2008) builds upon earlier work 
by Sachs and Warner (1995) and finds that countries that liberalised experienced greater 
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levels of capital investment than countries that did not liberalise. This additional capital 
investment is critical for states to promote or experience economic growth. This additional 
level of capital investment also becomes important where the state provides opportunities 
through privatisation or enlargement of the private sector.  
 
Secondly, increased female labour force participation leads to significant macroeconomic 
gains (Loko and Diouf, 2009; Dollar and Gatti, 1999) while gender gaps in labour force 
participation are contributing to losses in GDP (Cuberes and Teignier, 2012). Economic growth 
results in greater labour force opportunities for women directly impacting the SES of women 
while a stronger and more affluent economy allows the state greater resources to invest in 
areas such as health care and education which directly impact the SES of women. Where trade 
and capital liberalisation stimulate economic growth, they directly impact the SES of women, 
my dependent variable. 
 
Thirdly, trade liberalisation has the potential to impact female wage rates as well as labour 
force participation. Existing gender pay gaps and the wage rates of women directly impact 
the SES of women. Reductions in the gender wage gap are essential if women are to gain full 
equality. Where a woman is viewed to be worth less than a man her socio-economic status is 
compromised and gender inequality re-enforced. 
 
Structural reforms: financial sector reform  
In many cases, states requesting IMF funding have significant issues within their financial 
sector and would benefit from reform. An appropriate level of regulation has to be in place 
to facilitate growth, ensure good governance of the financial sector, prevent corruption and 
enable the country to actively participate in a globalised economy. It is also essential that the 
banking system has effective and suitable institutions in place. Such institutions include a 
central bank and an appropriately capitalised operational banking system which can provide 
financial services and facilitate the requirements of both the largest investors advancing 
infrastructural needs, right down to the smallest farmers operating at a rural level.  
 
IMF conditions often stipulate reform in these areas, highlighting that a strong and sound 
financial sector is a necessity for economic growth. Financial sector reform may open avenues 
for additional foreign direct investment or increase the ease of setting up businesses while 
also creating appropriate regulatory structures to govern business and finance and minimise 
corruption. While reform of the financial sector may not have such a specific and direct impact 
upon the SES of women, it does influence a structure that influences the SES of women. 
Firstly, financial sector reform can help mitigate against corruption, and this can have a 
positive impact on economic growth. Secondly, financial sector reform can help create a 
system that facilitates increased and open investment, and this can also stimulate economic 
growth. These steps towards creating an effective and efficient financial sector are important 
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foundations for a state’s economic stability. They are also critical to a state’s ability to drive 
economic growth, and as such, have the potential to impact the SES of women.  
 
4.3.6 What influences conditions in IMF programmes? 
Several factors influence the severity and quantity of these conditions. Firstly, the type of 
crisis that the state is facing will have a strong influence on any conditionality associated with 
IMF lending. For example, if domestic economic policy choices have resulted in a state 
consistently overspending and running budget deficits over an extended period of time, then 
it is likely that IMF conditions will seek to redress the balance between the state’s spending 
and income. On the other hand, if the state is seeking to move towards a more market 
orientated or mixed economy model, then conditions might be focused less on budget 
balancing but upon structural reforms. In short, the level of debt matters in the design of IMF 
agreements and the level and severity of conditions attached (Copelovitch, 2010). 
Secondly, the relationship the state has with the main IMF shareholders is an important factor 
in the level and quantity of conditions applied to the lending agreement. If the troubled state 
is important to the main shareholders, then it may be in their interest to support an 
agreement with less severe or fewer conditions. The state may be politically or economically 
important in several ways. From geopolitical perspective countries that are strongly allied to 
the US in terms of UN voting decisions, have been found to have fewer conditions (Dreher 
and Jensen, 2007). From an economic protection perspective, the increased economic 
exposure of the main shareholder’s results in fewer binding conditions in an IMF agreement 
(Breen, 2014). Breen refers to this approach, taken by the main shareholders as being, a 
‘process of risk and burden sharing’ (Breen, 2014:421). As tranche releases are tied to 
completion of conditionality, it is in the interests of the shareholders that the troubled state 
can complete the conditions. Failure to do so jeopardises the trouble state’s access to IMF 
funding, and important to the shareholders, this lack of access to funding may jeopardise the 
security of their own economic interests in the troubled state. Thus, the economic and 
political value of the state in the global context is important and is particularly relevant where 
the IMF (and shareholders) will wish to mitigate against any contagion or expansion of crises. 
Thirdly, the goals of government or regime are important factors that may influence the level 
or severity of conditions. While most states will try to minimise the level and severity of 
conditions, there may be a regime preference for economic reform. The IMF agreement can 
provide cover for the state to implement such reform against a backdrop of political 
opposition (Vreeland, 2003, Vreeland and Przeworski, 2000). In cases such as these, Vreeland 
highlights how countries that may be less in need of an IMF loan, undertake an IMF agreement 
to push forward with unpopular reforms. The severity and level of conditions in agreements 
such as these reflect the specific government goals.  
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Fourthly, the behaviour of countries in past IMF agreements may influence the level and 
severity of conditions applied in a new IMF agreement. Often, states undergo more than one 
IMF programme. In many cases, the economic restructuring required demands support from 
the IMF over an extended period of time. Borrowers might evolve from one programme focus 
to another, for example, an Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) programme which 
offers concessional lending for structural reforms for low-income countries onwards to an 
Extended Credit Facility (ECF) designed to move the borrower to sustainable growth. There 
are a number of insights gained by both a state and the IMF when a country undergoes an 
IMF programme. From the IMF’s perspective, they gain knowledge and understanding about 
a country’s political and ideological preferences while also their approach to stakeholder 
management. A poorly performing borrower may lead the IMF to adopt caution regarding 
loan size, demand further and more stringent conditions, while also then putting in place 
more rigorous and insistent oversight, whereas a borrower with a positive track record may 
lead the IMF to adopt a softer stance, including greater leeway on loan size, fewer conditions 
and a more supportive oversight plan.  
4.3.7 IMF programme implementation  
Exploring conditionality specified in IMF agreements alone does not give us a full picture as 
to how IMF agreements can impact the SES of women. While a state may agree to the 
specified conditionality, the state may not fully comply with the agreement and for many 
reasons may fail to fully, or even partially, implement the agreed conditions. Although a 
schedule of activity will be agreed between the borrower and the IMF, and the IMF will 
monitor progress quarterly and semi-annually to ensure compliance of the borrower to the 
programme, the programme may not be implemented. Programme implementation and 
compliance are critical to my thesis for the following reasons. Firstly, though a state may sign 
an IMF agreement with varying conditions, if they do not implement these conditions, then 
the impact that the IMF has upon the SES of women in that state is negligible. Failure to 
comply may result in the cancelling of the agreement or possibly the inability of the state to 
access IMF funding. In cases such as this, the actions of the state may result in a change in the 
SES of women, but this change, whether positive or negative, is derived from the actions of 
the state and not from the IMF. 
Secondly, the opposite holds true in that should a state fully or mostly complete the 
conditions specified within an IMF agreement then I argue that it is possible that changes in 
the SES of women, whether positive or negative, can be attributed to the IMF programme.  
Thirdly, it is important to clarify partial implementation and differentiate between countries 
that implement spending reforms only, structural reforms only or a mix of these two reform 
types. Not only do spending reforms and structural reforms interact with the SES of women 
in very different ways, but additionally, the regime will face different challenges 
implementing each of these reform types.   
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Fourthly, implementing either spending reforms or structural reforms may not be politically 
feasible for certain regimes. For some regimes, such as autocratic regimes, implementing 
structural reforms that aim to liberalise sectors and capital flows, may contribute to a level of 
political instability as the interests of the regime's elites are challenged (Bremmer, 2006, 
Hellman, 1998). In such cases, implementing spending reforms as opposed to structural 
reforms may be both preferable and easier for autocratic regimes. This has an implication for 
the SES of women. In states where it is not politically viable to liberalise, the only other option 
available to the state to correct balance of payments is to cut spending and increase taxes. 
This negatively and disproportionality impacts the SES of women.  
4.3.8 Do states complete IMF programmes?  
Early research in the 1980’s found low levels of compliance with IMF programmes. Haggard 
(1985) found low levels of compliance with Extended Fund Facility (EFF) programmes in the 
1970’s. In a sample of 30 programmes, 16 were cancelled while 8 others were implemented 
but not to the specified programme. Edwards (1989) found that of the 34 programmes 
approved in 1983, government deficit targets were only met in 30 percent of programmes. 
Polak (1991) reviewed programmes in place between 1988 - 1989 and found that compliance 
with fiscal and credit targets was low. While EASF programmes met 60 percent compliance, 
SAF programmes only had 40 percent compliance. More recent work by Edwards (2001) 
found a high level of interruption and suspension for 347 programmes running between 1979 
– 1997. Taking into account such suspensions Edwards found a completion rate of just 60 
percent. 
The IMF MONA Database records the details of each programme for all countries. The IMF 
has been compiling this data since 1993, and while its data could be considered a bit 
‘scattered’ at times (Mercer-Blackman and Unigovskaya, 2000:12), it is a valuable resource in 
determining programme compliance. Though useful it is important to note that data for some 
programmes experiencing major interruptions are not available. By utilising an Index of Fund 
Implementation in a group of countries transitioning from post-communist to market 
orientated economies, Mercer-Blackman and Unigovskaya found higher completion levels 
with these programmes, 100 percent for Estonia, high 90’s for Poland, Hungary and the Czech 
Republic. Belarus and Bulgaria were the lowest performers with 62 percent and 50 percent 
respectively. Mercer-Blackman and Unigovskaya also found that countries which 
implemented programmes early on and completed them, as measured by the Index of Fund 
Implementation, experienced the best growth results. 
4.3.9 Factors that influence programme implementation 
Ivanova, Mayer, Mourmouras and Anayitos (2001), Bird and Rowlands (2002), Edwards (2005) 
and Vreeland (2006) all highlight the importance of considering implementation and 
compliance levels in IMF programmes when exploring the impact of IMF programmes. All 
point out that that econometric studies exploring the impact of IMF programmes often lack 
this important factor, and as such, there is a weakness in some existing research. 
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Implementation is affected by a number of factors. Firstly, domestic political economy choices 
rather than programme design can impact completion rates (Mecagni, 1999). Governments 
are prone to change, and where a new government takes power, it can revise the political 
and economic direction of the state. Such political instability can jeopardise the 
implementation of an IMF programme (Ivanova et al., 2001) 
Secondly, vested interests may lobby and influence the economic and political direction taken 
by the government away from the specified reforms. Reforms may aim to liberalise 
productive sectors that are controlled by powerful elites, and this may result in these 
powerful vested interests lobbying intensively against the full implementation of these 
conditions. The oil and energy sectors in Eastern European and the previously communist 
states provides an apt example for Ivanova et al. (2001) as they found the liberalisation of 
these sectors to problematic and somewhat unsuccessful. Vested interests managed to 
influence government policy direction and retain power over these sectors.  
Thirdly, another reason why states may fail to comply fully with IMF agreements is that of the 
political and economic preferences of the regime type. Relationships between the autocratic 
regime and its elites can result in the autocratic regime being more sensitive to the impact 
that IMF economic reforms have on their political stability. This thought borrows from and is 
consistent with Brumberg (2002), who highlighted that liberalisation proves to be a dilemma 
for autocracies. As such, autocrats may resist or not fully commit to certain IMF conditions 
that aim to liberalise and reform the economy as it may impinge negatively upon the elites 
that benefit from the lack of competition. While an autocratic government may subscribe to 
the full set of IMF conditions on the outset, the regime may meet resistance internally during 
the implementation phase and only partially fulfil the conditions. They may, in fact, focus their 
energies on budgetary cuts over liberalising steps so as to avoid any threats to their political 
instability. The adoption of budgetary cuts can reduce investment into core areas of public 
interest such as health or education which is problematic. More problematic, however, is the 
failure by, or political inability of, autocratic regimes to follow through on the economic 
reform agreed in order to satisfy rent seekers priorities and retain political stability. This may 
result in the state not being so attractive to FDI providers, and this can contribute to a lack of 
investment in the private sector. As a result, the state loses out on the potential economic 
benefits from additional sectoral competition and fails to make intellectual gains or advances 
from innovations due to added sectoral competition. Democratic states do not experience 
these challenges and have a greater ability to implement structural reforms in partnership 
with spending reforms. Consequently, I argue that autocratic regimes implement fewer 
conditions with the potential to have a positive impact on women and democracies are more 
likely to implement conditions that can have a positive impact on women. 
 
Fourthly, domestic institutional situations are also important. Programme design may be over 
ambitious and fail to consider structural weaknesses or institutional dependencies 
adequately. Turkey’s 1999 programme focused on reducing inflation provides a good 
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example. In this case, the failure to introduce an effective banking structure and appropriate 
regulation prior to the programme contributed to the failure of the programme (Capoglu, 
2004). 
Such factors can and have affected the completion of IMF programmes, and this has serious 
implications for the IMF in designing future programmes. It implies that the IMF needs to pay 
greater attention to domestic political and institutional issues when designing programmes.  
4.3.10 What happens when states do not complete IMF programmes?  
The IMF binds lending to completion of conditions, and when conditions are not completed, 
it would be no surprise to see lending end. In such cases, the IMF has several options. It can 
allow for a review to take place by facilitating a waiver (IMF, 2016) where quantitative 
performance criteria are not met. No waivers are necessary when structural conditions are 
not met. Instead, the IMF monitors these in the context of the overall programme 
performance. The IMF has the option to suspend the programme and, or, lending tranches 
until the state corrects course. Recent negotiations with Greece resulted in the IMF 
disqualifying Greece from the third round of IMF loans due to failure by the Greek 
government to implement reforms. The IMF also has the option to replace the agreement 
with another, refining the conditionality.  
Beyond the mechanics of programme continuation, there are other important implications 
for a country upon non-completion of an IMF programme becomes a reality. Firstly, a failed 
programme sends signals to the market that the state may not be an appropriate place for 
investment. Such failure has been found to promote capital flight to such a degree that it the 
state suffers a loss greater than they would have had then not entered an IMF programme 
(Edwards, 2001). This has implications for the long-term economic development of a state. 
This capital and portfolio flight found by Edwards can have negative impacts on research and 
developmen investment, corporate tax revenue and ultimately employment. This can signal 
the start of a deeper negative economic spiral, that may be very difficult to recover from. 
Such reputational damage may take a significant period of time to heal. Secondly, the state 
may suffer reputational and relationship damage with the IMF. This is important in cases 
where the state remains in economic turmoil and needs financial assistance. Faced with 
capital and portfolio flight, the concept of the IMF as the lender of last resort becomes even 
more pronounced. Suspension may challenge working relationships and make subsequent 
negotiations more difficult. Thirdly, states will bear high social costs from a failed programme. 
Access to credit is likely to be more difficult and more expensive. This can challenge the state’s 
ability to provide adequate and essential services such as health, education or security. 
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4.4 Control Variable: regime type 
At this point it may be logical to question why regime type should be considered a control 
variable; why not institutional quality. Political science has benefitted enormously from the 
sophisticated reflections of Douglas North whose definition of institutions are so widely used. 
Douglas North defines institutions as the formal and informal rules of the game (North, 1990, 
1993, 2005) where a game is any social interaction, while importantly institutions are 
distinguished from organizations, which are the players of the game. This human or social 
interaction is shaped by these institutions which employ constraints such as formal rules or 
conventions or codes of behaviour (North 1990:4), thus institutions lend themselves as an 
exogenous modifier of human behaviour and interaction. Institutions can be legal, political, 
economic or social, but essentially institutions provide for an aggregation of rules and 
procedures and an appropriate framework for human interaction under specific 
circumstances. While institutions can be disaggregated into their rules and procedures and 
also their focus, it is also clear that regime preferences for power, influence not only, the 
manner in which the institutions are formalised, but importantly, the quality of the 
institutions. While each institution, regardless of regime type facilitate human interaction, 
the institutional quality of autocratic regimes is one that facilitates the control of power while 
the institutional quality of democratic regimes could be considered to be one that facilitates 
the diffusion of power. As such regimes type becomes an effective separator and a proxy for 
institutional quality.  
However, institutional quality is not the only concern and state preferences are also of great 
importance. A state’s economic, political and social preferences determine who in a state 
forms a “winning coalition", who are the elites as well as the focus, ethos and outlook of the 
institutions. Preferences will determine whether a state is inward or outward looking or 
whether oppressive or libertarian and these factors are particularly important when 
considering a state’s interaction with the IMF, as IMF mechanisms of conditionality directly 
interact with these concepts. The opposing preferences of autocratic and democratic regimes 
again illustrate an opportunity where regime type again is an effective separator and a proxy 
for political, economic and social preferences. It is this complex interaction between 
preferences and institutional formation that allows us to see a polarisation in both 
construction of institutions and output from institutions between autocratic institutions and 
democratic institutions. In effect, regime type aggregates and encapsulates a number of 
nuanced variables proving itself a more complex and complete representation of polarisation, 
making it more appropriate as a control variable for this study. 
 
4.4.1 Understanding regime characteristics 
Understanding how and why regime type can contribute to IMF programmes having a 
conditional impact requires a greater understanding of the various domestic political and 
economic preferences as well as institutional capacity of both autocratic and democratic 
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regimes, thus “regime type” becomes a control variable in my study. From a political economy 
perspective this study takes its lead from work by Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006, Bueno de 
Mesquita et al, 2003, McGuire and Olson, 1996, Olson, 1993, Wintrobe, R., 1990, 1998, 1999 
and 2002 with regards to outlining crucial differences between regimes. This existing 
literature clearly indicates that autocracies and democracies differ in terms of political access 
and interaction with its citizens. Acemoglu and Robinson (2006: 17) take a "Schumpetarian" 
(Schumpeter, 1942) view on this and express this as a political equality in democracies versus 
a political inequality in autocracies. Political power is derived from the political institutions 
and methods of gaining control over the political institutions differ dramatically between 
democracies and autocracies. Politically, the distinct difference between autocratic and 
democratic regimes lies in whether citizens have the ability to participate in free, open 
elections where a diverse range of electoral options are present from a left, centre or right 
leaning political spectrum which ultimately has the potential to change of government. For 
democracies this scenario holds true, but for autocracies, power is obtained and retained 
either through a hereditary system, or perhaps a leadership backed by military control. In the 
case of autocracies, the regime is supported by an elite minority who make gains through the 
support of the regime.  
 
The literature also points to different policy preferences and differences in the systems of 
redistribution between autocratic and democratic regimes. For example, McGuire and Olson 
(1996:73) explore the concepts of autocracy and democracy and highlight that an “optimizing 
majority in control of a society necessarily redistributes less income to itself than a self-
interested autocrat would have redistributed to himself.” It is then appropriate to consider 
the impact that regime type might have on the interplay between IMF programmes and 
women.  
 
Two notable principles within political institutions which are distinct to democratic regimes 
as opposed to autocratic regimes are: 
1. Accountability of government 
2. The ability for citizens to have authorship of decision making. 
 
In identifying the electoral process as a foundational principle of democracy we can see how 
it provides a mechanism for accountability to be activated on a recurring basis. However, 
examples such as North Korea illustrate how an electoral mechanism is not sufficient in itself 
to determine accountability in a democracy (see Schmitter & Karl: 1991, Reisinger: 1997, 
Prezworski: 2003, Post: 2006). To ensure the value of democratic accountability this system 
must be a competitive process allowing for the existence of multiple parties seeking the vote 
of the electorate. This “free and fair” competition allows for the electorate to make a choice 
and distribute power as they see fit under agreed voting terms such as majority or 
proportional representation. This is the antithesis of an autocratic regime where full suffrage 
and regular elections may exist but what is absent is a choice for the voter and the ability of 
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the voter to re-distribute power. Thus, accountability becomes a critical and defining 
component of democracy if it is facilitated by the ability for: 
1. Political parties to compete for the potential re-distribution of power without the 
“fear of being eliminated from the process” (Reisinger 1997:32: Editor: Grey) 
2. Giving the losers the opportunity to wait “for their chance to win office” (Shapiro and 
Hacker-Cordon: 1999:5) 
3. Allowing voters, the capacity to “get rid of governments without bloodshed” 
(Presworski 1999:23: Editors Shapiro and Hacker-Cordon) 
 
It is clear that it is not sufficient to just say non-democracies are politically the opposite of 
democracies, in fact this would not only lack insight but also be untrue. Of course, in 
highlighting the defining characteristics of democracies we in highlighted those qualities that 
do not exist in autocracies. However, it is necessary further explore the distinctive 
characteristics of autocracies that are relevant for this study. While fascism and communism 
might be best described as represented the ideological leanings of a government to the right 
or left, there are also substantial differences between a totalitarian or authoritarian regime 
(See Brooker, 2000:9, Arendt: 1962, Friedrich and Brzezinksi: 1958 and Linz: 1970). Non-
democracies can be led by military power or a single party system, or perhaps they follow a 
charismatic and powerful one-leader model. However, what is common amongst all forms of 
non-democracies is a political institutional system that allows for a concentration of power, 
extended rule and, prevention of the development, or instead, the co-option of political 
opposition.  
 
 
4.3.2 Political institutions and democratic regime preferences 
Regime preferences are an important factor for consideration in identifying how regime 
leaders maintain control of political institutions and ultimately power. From a democratic 
regime’s point of view, the preference is for re-election. As such the mechanisms that 
facilitate re-election to political institutions become central to the election strategies of both 
the government in power and the opposition. This leads to interaction with the electorate in 
an attempt to understand their needs while also appeal to them for support for future 
elections. Re-election to the political institutions and the continued access to power becomes 
dependent upon how well the regime satisfies the needs and wants of the constituents. There 
is a tension between political competition and democratic regime preferences, as the greater 
the political competition the more sensitive democratic regimes preferences are to electorate 
influence that can favour the electorate. As such it is not surprising that where political 
competition is high there is increased ability for women to alter policy in their favour (See 
Brown: 2004:151).  
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The drive to attain their preference for (re) election, results in a democratic regime facilitating 
not only wider contact with the electorate but also enabling influence for aggregated interests 
such as lobby groups, influential sectors, and significant or powerful individuals. This 
facilitation opens up demands upon the regime to meet a greater variety of needs that may 
be socially or economic focused. For example, trade unions or private sector lobbyists may 
gain great influence or power within democratic regimes as not only is their existence 
facilitated, but they represent the interests of large portions of the constituents and as such 
have the potential to sway voters. It is therefore in the interests of democratic regimes to 
meet the economic needs of these aggregated actors with the hope and anticipation that 
greater support for the regime can be established and, ultimately the regime can be re-
elected to the political institutions and power retained. 
 
The interests of the regime are therefore impacted by its preference for power retention. 
Because leaders in democracies retain control over the political institutions through the 
decisions of the electorate, the interests of the electorate are important to the regime. As 
such it is necessary for democratic regimes to align their interests somewhat with those of 
the electorate – or at least the portion of the electorate that can form a winning coalition. 
This results in the electorate gaining influence over the political institutions and policy 
decisions of the government. 
 
4.4.3 Political institutions and autocratic regime preferences 
Non-democratic (autocratic and totalitarian) states are often charged with using oppressive 
methods to subjugate citizens and repress dissent to control political institutions and ensure 
power and control. It is also common that elites tend to have even greater influence in 
autocracies and the policies implemented benefit these elites rather than the majority (see 
Acemoglue and Robinson (2006:17). As such the system and depth of re-distribution benefits 
a minority rather than a majority. This in itself is interesting as it highlights a difference in 
preferences between democratic and non-democratic regimes. The preference for non-
democratic regimes is also to retain control over political institutions and thus power, 
however non-democratic regimes are not answerable to an electorate and as such utilise 
different mechanism to attain and retain power.  
 
While control over the political institutions can be first attained through a military coup d’état 
(Czechoslovakia 1948, Burma 1962, Chile 1973) or the rise of a powerful charismatic leader 
(Hitler, Mussolini) or perhaps the installation and backing of a new leader (Kim Il-sung first 
installed by the Soviets in 1945 as Chairman of the North Korean branch of the Korean 
Communist Party), it is clear in authoritarian and totalitarian regimes that access to political 
institutions is tightly controlled with the intention of and preference for, retaining power and 
office. A limited form of “political pluralism” (See Linz: 1970:255) may develop within 
authoritarian/totalitarian regimes which allows an elite to possess political influence. In 
autocratic regimes, support for the regime may come from a small but powerful group, 
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perhaps consisting of various family members of those who have taken power or high-ranking 
military officers. Wealth, influence and power will be distributed in an effort to sustain the 
regime and retain power or collusive arrangements between the business, bureaucratic and 
political classes will be common. The primary aim and preference of the regime is to retain 
control over the political institutions and power, while preventing or undermining any dissent 
or development of potential political challengers. As such, establishing collusive relationships 
with non-regime officials, facilitates an exchange system. The elite and regime supporters act 
as informal monitors of dissent and instruments of control, and in exchange they receive 
wealth and limited power. This contributes to greater socio-economic inequality in the state 
and a higher concentration of power. States such as Saudi Arabia, Iraq under Saddam Hussain, 
Egypt under Mubarak or Tunisia under Bel Ali, and Zimbabwe under Mugabwe provide 
examples of, or variations of this theme.  
 
Limited political pluralism may result in the creation of powerful support organisations that 
can help to repress alternative or rival political agendas (See Brumberg, 2000:58, Linz, 
1970:255). This is often illustrated through interaction between the strong state and religion. 
Religion is an important mechanism at play which has the power and ability to enforce a form 
of oppression specifically upon women. The partnership between the State and religion brings 
further complexity to the construction of gender inequality in authoritarian regimes. In the 
case of Spain great power and influence afforded to the Catholic Church by Franco where 
Catholicism was made the state religion. In this case the regime and the Catholic Church both 
shared a conservative view of gendered roles and what the role of women should be. This 
influence contributed to a ban on contraception, abortion and divorce, issues very important 
to women (See Brooker, 2000:26 and Morcillo, 2000:214). Across the Middle East religious 
leaders within Arab states hold significant influence and power and in many cases state and 
religious oppression are intertwined. In authoritarian states such as Saudi Arabia and Iran 
religious law holds precedent with Shari’a Law (Islamic Law) determining legislation (see 
Brumberg, 2002:59).  While this in itself may not be problematic, and obviously depends upon 
the interpretation and application of Shari’a Law, there are many examples highlighted by 
academics and international organisations such as UNICEF or Sweeney (2004:23) that 
illustrate that these laws are discriminatory against women highlighting that women’s rights 
are most likely violated under a combination of autocratic rule and a powerful religion. 
 
Under non-democratic political arrangements, the “ordinary citizen” has limited influence. 
Citizens have few or no mechanisms to interact with the political institutions or directly 
influence government policy, for example, a free and open electoral system that allow citizens 
to choose its government is not present. North Korea provides a good example where voting 
takes place but with limited choice for the citizens and the power mechanisms of the state 
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ensure almost 100% turnout and approval for itself20. Under such regimes, attempts to 
influence government policy are often seen as threatening and subversive, which may lead to 
additional repression. It is not the preference of the regime to allow such interaction with the 
political institutions at a state level as this has the potential for creating situations that 
challenge the regimes hold on power.   
 
The interests of the autocratic regime are just like democratic regimes – impacted by its 
preference for power retention. Authoritarian or totalitarian regimes retain control of the 
political institutions and power through the support of the military or the elite, and as such, 
it is necessary for non-democratic regimes to align their interest with the military or elite and 
not the electorate. This results in the elite or military gaining influence over political 
institutions and government policy, and the preferences and interests of these elites taking 
precedent over the citizen. Due to this partnership between the autocratic regime and its 
elites to control the political institutions, autocracies are more likely to be subject to rent 
seeking opportunities by regime elites that may control various economic sectors. This results 
in autocratic regimes facing extra domestic challenges than democratic governments when 
implementing structural changes which moderates autocratic government’s ability to do so 
successfully or fully. Relationships between the autocratic regime and its’ elites may result in 
the autocratic regime being more sensitive to the impacts that changes to a sector may have 
on their political stability. As such autocrats may resist or not fully commit to certain IMF 
conditions that aim to liberalise and reform the economy as it may impinge negatively upon 
the elites that benefit from the lack of competition or perhaps challenge socially conservative 
agendas of the elites or government supporters. While an autocratic government may 
subscribe to the full set of IMF conditions on the outset, they may meet resistance internally 
during implementation and only partially fulfil the conditions, focusing energies on budgetary 
cuts over liberalising steps so as to avoid any threats to their political instability. This 
challenges credibility of commitment by a state to IMF conditions.  
 
These difference in regime preferences and interests have an enormous impact upon the 
ability for women to either influence or determine their socio-economic status. I argue that 
failure by autocratic regimes to follow through IMF conditions in order to satisfy rent seekers 
priorities and retain political stability may result in the state not being so attractive to FDI 
                                                          
20 “According to the report by the Central Election Committee on August 4, 99.9 percent of all the eligible 
voters registered on the poll books went to the polls and 100 percent of the casters voted for the candidates 
of deputies to the SPA who had registered at all the constituencies. 
This is an "expression of all the voters" support for and trust in the DPRK government and a manifestation of 
our army and people's steadfast will to consolidate the people's power as firm as a rock and accomplish the 
revolution under the guidance of the Workers' Party of Korea, the Central Election Committee said” 
http://www1.korea-np.co.jp/pk/195th_issue/2003081602.htm. Access date 01 August 2018. 
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providers, losing out on the economic benefits from additional sectoral competition or failing 
to make intellectual gains and advances that may spin-off from innovations due to added 
sectoral competition. The IMF programme in an autocratic state thus has the potential to miss 
out on economic investment and this absent economic investment combined with sectoral 
reform can logically have negative impacts on the SES of women or the population in general. 
As such it is logical that in that in democracies the SES of women increases whereas in 
autocracies, the SES of women remains stagnant or declines. 
 
4.3.4 Economic institutions and democratic regime preferences 
Acemoglu & Robinson (2000, 2006) and Acemoglu et al (2005) have brought significant clarity 
to our understanding of institutions, the roles they play, their development as well as 
highlighting the explicit interactions between political institutions and economic institutions. 
As already stated political power, and its distribution, is derived from the political institutions 
which are determined by the regime type. However, an important additional point is; those 
who gain political power also hold sway over the composition, direction and quality of the 
state’s economic institutions. The quality of a state’s political and economic institutional 
frameworks plays an important role in its ability to protect property rights, stimulate sectoral 
competition, appropriately regulating an efficient and effective financial system, as well as 
gather taxes and prevent corruption while essentially, the ability of a state to attract capital 
is also influenced by its institutional quality (see e.g. Alfaro et al., 2008; Ju & Wei, 2007). From 
an economic institution perspective, regime type again offers us a separator to explore the 
relationship between the preferences of autocracies and democracies and the quality of their 
economic institutions and how regime type contributes to a moderation of impact of IMF 
programmes upon women.  
Both democracies and autocracies use economic institutions as tools for power retention. 
From the perspective of a democracy, because the regime answers to the electorate, the 
regimes preference is for economic institutions that maximise their re-election prospects. 
This means that the economic institutions must facilitate greater economic growth, must 
generate employment opportunities, must act as effective wealth redistributive mechanisms 
and must minimise economic and political corruption while also facilitating the full movement 
of capital. This is because all of these elements play into the relationship that the state’s re-
election process creates between the holders of political institutions and its electorate. While 
political office holders may have ideological variations of left, center and right, in a 
democracy, the economic preferences of the electorate for employment and control of 
inflation dictates that the economic institutions in some ways must meet their needs, or else 
control of the political institutions are lost.      
In a democracy, it is valuable to the regime to have a strong private sector. This can contribute 
to stimulating entrepreneurship thus creating employment and contributing to economic 
growth which in turn meets the needs of those (the electorate) that influence who holds and 
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retains control over the political institutions. Thus, it is in the interest of a democratic regime 
to develop economic institutions that facilitate this, and it should be no surprise that of the 
top 50 countries ranked in order of ease of doing business by the World Bank Doing Business 
Project (www.doingbusiness.org) 42 are democracies. The ‘Doing Business Project’ consider 
factors such as property rights, contract enforcement, construction and utilities provision as 
well as taxation policies and credit facilities when calculating the ease of doing business within 
a particular state. It is clear that these capacities and capabilities are essential components 
for a smooth functioning and active indigenous private sector while they also support a 
regime in attracting FDI or getting market by-in for their macro-economic policy. The IMF has 
long encouraged the creation or restructuring of economic institutions in order to facilitate 
these policies along with a general reinforcement for states to move towards greater 
liberalisation of their economic policy. These elements are clear conditions in most all of its 
credit agreements, and as such the interests of democratic government and the IMF in 
relation to economic institutions may seem somewhat aligned and democratic governments 
may find such conditionality to their liking.   
However, things are more complex than this. It is important to highlight the role that “the 
market” plays in any potential economic recovery. Democracies have a greater tendency 
towards economic openness (See Thacker:2007, Milner & Kobuta:2005, Mansfield, Milner & 
Rosendorff:2000 and 2002) as such market by-in and approval, matters to democracies to a 
greater extent than autocracies. This is because greater integration into the global economy 
puts a state at a disadvantage if the market is not fully convinced of the state’s commitment 
to the economic reform that the market requires. This can result in a failure of the state to 
stimulate inward international investment, retain existing capital investment, achieve 
favourable terms on bond yields or retain positive national credit ratings. These factors all 
impact a state’s economic recovery and because of their increased economic openness, 
democracies can be more sensitive to these factors. It is therefore a preference of democratic 
regimes to ensure that the market has a favourable perception of the state’s commitment to 
its IMF programme.  
Importantly these exogenous factors of the market also influence endogenous policy making 
in democracies. Democracies, because of their increased economic openness relative to 
autocracies, recognise that these exogenous factors impact national issues that directly 
influence the regimes ability to retain power. National issues such as levels of employment, 
credit availability or the cost of credit have a direct bearing upon whether the electorate will 
return the regime to power. Failure by the regime to satisfy the market as to the credibility of 
its implementation of an IMF agreement and its move to economic recovery will result in 
further negative shocks to the electorate, thus making retention of power seem unlikely. 
Conversely, adherence to and full implementation of IMF conditions sends signals to the 
market which results in the market being assured of the economic viability of the state going 
forward. Therefore, democracies under an IMF agreement have both a preference in 
convincing the market of its commitment to the IMF agreement and a preference in 
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minimising the shock to its electorate to ensure re-election and as such these preferences 
ensure the regimes commitment to implementing the IMF conditions. 
 
4.3.5 Economic institutions and autocratic regime preferences 
From an autocracies perspective, the interplay between economic and political institutions is 
also very intimate. There is a bi-directional and circular relationship where control of a state’s 
political institutions also allows for control over the state’s economic potential, and that 
economic institutions can be used in turn to solidify this political power. In an autocracy the 
citizens are without influence and the elite gains influence over the focus and quality of 
economic institutions. An elite may support an autocracy as they gain greater ability for 
expropriation of national income and / or FDI through control of various productive sectors 
or expropriation from the working class to the elite through the control and influence over 
taxation policy that transfers wealth from the working class to the elites. As such it is the 
preference of the elite who sustain the regime that the economic institutions facilitate their 
economic needs and wants. 
In an autocracy the political preferences impact the economic preferences quite differently 
than in a democracy. A strong private sector may be inconsistent with the needs and 
preferences of the elite. In autocracies, various productive sectors may be controlled by the 
elite, and while there may be a presence of a private entrepreneurship, any growth of private 
entrepreneurship threatens the economic power and market share of the elite and can 
challenge the level of support the elite has for the regime. As such it is logical in autocratic 
regimes that the elite push for economic institutions which make private entrepreneurship 
and sectoral competition difficult and support unnecessary regulation. Thus, is no surprise to 
see that in the Doing Business Project rankings, 35 of the bottom 50 regimes (most difficult 
to set up businesses) are autocracies with many of the other 15 being only newly 
democratised states.  
In order to ensure maximum opportunity for power retention, the autocratic regime is very 
aware of their domestic constituency which is often a minority elite. Support for the regime 
by this elite is contingent upon the regime confirming and ensuring the status, wealth and 
power of this elite. IMF conditions which threaten this power are in conflict with the 
preferences of the autocratic regime as they challenge regime stability. For example, greater 
provision of international capital in autocracies brings both benefits and disadvantages, yes 
more capital is available for sectoral investment which benefits the elites, but there is also a 
distributive impact which results in greater capital available for private entrepreneurship or 
the potential to provide supports to extend a middle class, which in turn reduces power of 
the elites (see Dadasov, Harms & Lorz, 2009). Economic policies which support greater 
financial integration leads to an increase in trade and liberalisation of finance, which again 
defuses the political and economic power of an autocratic regime (see Rajan & Zingales, 
2003). Increased liberalisation and globalisation has been found to make the rise of 
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democratic thought and a democratic society more probable, which would again challenge 
the stability and power of an autocratic regime and most definitely not be in their interest 
(see Brumberg, 2002, Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006). As a result, it becomes clear that policies 
of liberalisation, privatisation are inconsistent with the needs of autocracies and could be 
considered counter-productive to their power and stability. 
 
4.3.6 Regime preferences and IMF programmes  
Regime preferences are important considerations where IMF agreement conditions specify 
structural and sectoral adjustments that require the government to create competition 
through privatisation of state owned enterprises or introduce competition to public sector 
health and education provisions or open up capital flows or liberalise trade. From a 
democratic regime’s perspective, the promised resultant economic growth will meet the 
needs of the electorate who influence the holders of the political institutions and in turn the 
economic institutions, thus there is a credibility of commitment when democratic regimes 
pledge to liberalise as it is in their interests. Whereas with an autocratic government, the 
economic preferences of the regime and thus the economic institutions – do not lean 
convincingly towards a more liberalised economic model as the resultant diffusion of power, 
potential creation of a middle class and or the potential wealth redistribution all conflict 
strongly with the preferences of the elite that maintain the security and stability of the 
autocratic regime. 
The lack of credibility around the ability or desire to implement a more liberalised economic 
model is an extra challenge faced by autocracies over democracies that enter an IMF 
agreement.  At best the state may first have to institute legislative or regulatory changes in 
order to facilitate these changes at a foundational level which in turn demands more time 
and resources and delays the actual implementation of the agreed IMF conditions, while at 
worse they may commit in principle without the intention of complying or completing the 
conditions.  Concurrent with this, these steps can also lend towards damaging the regimes 
political stability as elites see their rewards for supporting the regime dwindle. As such 
autocratic states under IMF agreements may not be so attractive to FDI providers or potential 
sectoral competitors, thus there may be an inability to maximise the economic and 
intellectual benefits to be gained from additional sectoral competition. The resultant lack of 
potential economic growth and sectoral efficiencies is likely to have negative impacts on the 
SES of women or the population in general. As such it is logical that in that in democracies the 
SES of women increases whereas in autocracies, the SES of women remains stagnant or 
declines. 
While it is arguable that the preferences of autocratic and democratic regimes themselves 
have an independent effect upon the SES of women outside of an IMF programme, it is crucial 
to highlight that these preferences drive the regimes ability and desire to implement fully an 
IMF programme. As such, the subsequent impact of an IMF programme upon the SES of 
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women is conditional on the regime type, because due to economic and political preferences 
and institutional structures, each regime differs systematically in their ability to competently, 
credibly and fully implement an IMF programme. This leads to a moderation of impact upon 
IMF programmes upon women. Thus, we see how, rather than an independent effect, it is 
logical to propose that the IMF programmes have a conditional effect upon the SES of women 
dependent upon regime type. As such I propose that The SES of women increases in 
democracies under an IMF agreement and that the SES of women decreases or remains 
stagnant in autocracies under an IMF agreement. 
 
4.4 Hypotheses and summary 
IMF programme design is important for the SES of women. Variation in the design has the 
potential to have a significant effect upon the SES of women. I argue that spending reforms 
that focus on public sector budgetary contraction and increasing the tax base have a greater 
likelihood of negatively and disproportionately affecting the SES of women. Public sector 
budget reductions challenge a state’s ability to provide adequate health care and education 
and may contribute to the introduction of extra user costs to subsidise the system. This 
disproportionately impacts the SES of women due to their additional and specific health 
needs, while cultural bias can result in families focusing their available education or health 
care spends upon male children to the detriment of female children. As women are heavily 
represented in the public-sector workforce, particularly in the areas of education, health and 
social services, reductions that impact these areas negatively and disproportionately impact 
the employment opportunities and the earning potential of women. Tax reform that increases 
and widens taxation may be necessary to balance the national budget, but certain taxation 
policies such as joint income filing for taxation purposes discriminate against women as they 
tend to result in higher taxation of the lower earner, which is more often the woman. 
Additionally, as women’s employment is more elastic than men (Alesina, Ichino and 
Karabarbounis, 2011), a blunt approach to tax reform has a disproportionately negative 
impact women’s earning power and employment opportunities thus contributing to a 
deterioration of women’s economic independence. 
I also argue that structural reforms focusing on economic growth have the capacity to 
positively impact the SES of women. Growth policies attempt to increase the private sector, 
private sector employment and facilitates the development of entrepreneurship. 
Additionally, the reduction of trade barriers allows for the expansion of trading relationships 
for national producers. These policies have the potential to expand employment 
opportunities for women. Importantly, privatisation removes a large cost base from the state 
and allows the state to reprioritize its budget focusing on fewer services. This can have a 
positive effect on essential services such as education, health or security, services which 
strongly influence the SES of women.  
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I also argue that the level of implementation of IMF agreements is a critical factor. There are 
several factors as already outlined which may influence a state’s ability to implement the 
conditions specified in their IMF agreement. If a state does not implement these conditions, 
then the impact that the IMF has on the SES of women in that state is negligible. In such cases, 
I argue that any changes in the SES of women within the state, whether positive or negative, 
is derived from the actions of the state and not from any partnership with the IMF. The 
opposite holds true, in that where states fully or mostly complete the conditions specified 
within an IMF agreement then I argue that it is possible that changes in the SES of women, 
whether positive or negative, can be attributed to the IMF programme.  
Finally, I also argue that regime type has the potential to drive variation in results. Autocratic 
regimes have different domestic political sensitivities which may have an impact on their 
ability to implement IMF programmes. This argument is consistent with Brumberg (2002), 
who highlighted that liberalisation proves to be a dilemma for autocracies.  
From these theoretical settings, I propose to examine the relationship between  
1. IMF programme participation and the SES of women 
2. IMF programme design and the SES of women 
3. IMF programme implementation and the SES of women 
Conceptually, there are a number of hypotheses which could be derived from my theoretical 
arguments. A rational hypothesis entails that participation in an IMF Programme has a 
negative impact on the SES status of women. This is in line with existing research and is a 
logical hypothesis when one considers that participation in an IMF programmes often results 
in austerity measures which reduce national investment into key areas which have the 
potential to negatively impact the SES of women. However, as already stated, I argue that 
programme design and programme implementation are central to understanding the impact 
of IMF programmes and as such this hypothesis is lacking in depth. With this in mind, I propose 
alternative hypotheses.  
H1. The more an IMF programme focuses upon spending cuts over structural reforms, the 
greater its negative impact upon the SES of women. 
 
H2. The more an IMF programme focuses on structural reforms over spending cuts, the 
greater its positive impact upon the SES of women. 
 
H3: The SES of women increases in democracies under an IMF agreement 
 
H4: The SES of women decreases or remains stagnant in autocracies under an IMF 
agreement 
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5.0 METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter, which reviewed the existing literature around the IMF and the 
interaction between the IMF and gender, found considerable gender-focused research on the 
impact of IMF programmes. However, it is important to point out that this research is mainly 
qualitative in nature and case-study based research. There are few studies that adopt a 
quantitative, cross-country approach to the effect of IMF programmes on women. Though 
this existing qualitative research provides enormous insight into how women’s lives have 
been affected by various policies, there is an acknowledged gap in the literature. Stotsky 
(2006a:52) in an IMF working paper which has argued that we need a ‘more systematic look 
at the gender-differentiated effects of IMF programs’. To assist in closing this gap in the 
literature, it is essential to not only ask the correct questions but importantly employ 
appropriate methodological approaches.  
The structure of this chapter is as follows: After a brief introduction highlighting the 
importance of this research I firstly, outline my data sources and data collection, while also 
exploring the measures taken to ensure the validity and reliability of information and 
analytical techniques. Secondly, I explore and operationalize my dependent variable, the 
socio-economic status of women. Here I outline recent advances made in establishing useful 
metrics which are tied to national and international policy while also pointing out the many 
challenges faced by researchers utilising these more recent metrics and indicators. Thirdly, I 
describe and operationalize my independent variable – participation in an IMF programme.  
Finally, I discuss the control variables that are important to this research.  
5.2 Data 
5.2.1 Case selection 
This study will test a number of hypotheses and will attempt to draw conclusions on the 
impact of the independent variable - IV (IMF participation) upon the dependent variable - DV 
(socio-economic status of women). However, entry into an IMF agreement is not a random 
process, and many factors influence a state's journey towards participation in an IMF 
agreement. The obvious question lies around the selection criteria for determining the panel 
of cases that will become the large-n study. To address this selection bias, it is essential to 
understand how states enter IMF programmes. The IMF represents a collection of countries 
vastly diverse in nature in terms of economic development, regime type, social structures, 
geopolitical influence and economic system. Few organisational memberships can truly 
reflect the varied characteristics of the world within which it sits, but the IMF membership of 
188 members of a possible 206 states worldwide (190 declared, 16 in dispute – www.un.org) 
closely reflects the great political and socio-economic heterogeneity existing in today’s world.  
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However, selecting all countries as cases would not be fitting and would be lacking in thought. 
Przeworski, in the condensed version of the Centre for International Studies Symposium of 
1995 (Peter J. Katzenstein, Peter B. Evans, James C. Scott, Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, Adam 
Przeworski, Theda Skocpol, Atul Kohli, 1995:19) warned us that ‘we cannot do good 
comparative research unless we worry about selection, that is, until we ask each time how our 
observations are produced’. This is echoed by Geddes (2008:127) who points out the 
importance of appropriate and well thought out selection highlighting dangers around 
selecting observations for study because they are ‘doing especially well’ or ‘especially badly’. 
As such, not all of the 188member countries of the IMF may prove to be worthy observations. 
Narrowing the selection of the countries for use within the study requires a logical and 
justifiable approach. With this in mind, I have omitted countries with a population of less than 
1 million as many are listed as tax havens. This provided a total of 173 suitable countries for 
the study. Some countries are presently, or at some point in the past have been under an IMF 
agreement while others have never undergone an IMF programme. Importantly, this 
selection of countries is diverse in nature from a socio-economic, political and geographical 
perspective. Time-series-cross-section data covering these 173 countries 1990 to 2011 were 
gathered. The observations are country-year, but not all observations are complete due to 
missing data for certain variables and/or country-years. The full list of all countries within my 
dataset is included in Appendix 9.46. 
5.2.2 Data sources 
The World Bank databank (http://data.worldbank.org/) is home to a collection of world 
development indicators. Compiled from officially recognised national resources the data bank 
provides access to extensive annual time-series data, updated quarterly for 214 economies 
around the globe from 1960 onwards. Additionally, the IMF also publishes time series data 
on member countries but has a more fiscal and economic focus, with data on IMF lending, 
economic and financial indicators, exchange rates along with country reports and reports on 
global financial issues. I supplement these sources with additional information from the 
International Financial Statistics and the IMF’s online archives to ensure that the data being 
analysed is wide-ranging and complete.  
    
5.3 Dependent variable data: socio-economic status of women 
The dependent variable is operationalised as the ‘socio-economic status of women’, but this 
is a large and expansive concept. It is essential that the impact is measured not only against a 
variety of indicators that determine the status of women but also against indicators that are 
considered important and relevant. Currently, there are several aggregated indices measuring 
the status of women, notably the GDI – the Gender-related Development Index (GDI). This 
index measures achievement in the same manner as the Human Development Indicator (HDI) 
does but takes account of inequality in achievement between women and men and discounts 
or adjusts downwards the HDI for gender inequality. Additionally, the GEM – Gender 
Empowerment Measure, was introduced expressly to measure women’s political and 
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economic standing.  It is important to note that both of these indices were only introduced 
into the Human Development Report in 1995 and with less than 20 years of data, this 
becomes problematic to researchers that wish to explore prior to 1995 or conduct long term 
effect studies. These indices are also far from complete as not all states have been diligent in 
their collection of these data. Due to these limitations in data, it has not been possible to 
include the GDI or GEM into the modelling for analysis. One would be hopeful that states 
would increase their focus on collecting such data and that, once sufficient data has been 
gathered for these indices that they will become suitable for research that employs cross-
country panel data analysis methods. 
 
While these two indices are important, it is also necessary to consider additional individual 
indicators that can allow for a disaggregated measure of women’s socio-economic status. 
Such indicators can enable a more in-depth refined analysis but only if the appropriate 
indicators are selected. Murray (2007:866-867) in his extensive work exploring good practice 
for health statistics, highlights the dangers of selecting inappropriate indicators, pointing out 
that these indicators can then become the ‘de facto quantity of interest in policy debates’. 
There are several concerns worth noting. Firstly, the selection of inappropriate indicators can 
lead to highly problematic decision making based on an analysis which is irrelevant. Secondly, 
this can also lead to poor policy prioritisation which is to the detriment of needier areas, and 
thirdly this can contribute to a regression in development or and undermining of previous 
progress. Murray (2007) explores how the health community worldwide has had to face the 
challenge of refining its selection and usage of available health indicators. The purpose of 
refining the focus on certain health indicators was to enable the health community to make 
improvements on a small set of priority areas. In essence, the comprehensive nature of the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDG’s) has required the worldwide health community to 
strategically understand: 1) appropriate and suitable policy choice: 2) the prioritisation of 
deployment of solutions: and 3) the thorough gathering and measuring of output and results. 
To facilitate all of these needs and more requires a framework which is cognizant of national 
and international parameters such as time, resources and finance. Additionally, fundamental 
to the attainment of the MDG’s is the gathering and measurement of data and the 
development of priority indicators. This strategic top-down approach can only be effective if 
the bottom up approach, which includes data gathering, is grounded in a methodology and 
approach that is appropriate and reliable.  
Murray’s point is not specific to statistics and research in the area of health but is relevant to 
all areas of quantitative research. The key point of Murray’s article is that lessons can be 
learned from the MDG’s health indicators, which in themselves provide a structural schema 
for the conceptual ‘socio-economic status of women’. The Millennium Development Goals are 
a set of development targets that have been agreed by all world nations and development 
institutions as the key areas of priority that require focus from the international community 
in order to eradicate extreme poverty and improve the welfare of the world’s poorest people. 
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The eight agreed goals focus on eradicating extreme poverty and hunger; achieving universal 
primary education; reducing child mortality; improving maternal health; combating HIV/AIDS, 
malaria and other diseases; ensuring environmental sustainability; the creation of a global 
partnership for development, with targets for aid, trade, and debt relief; and important to 
this study - the promotion of gender equality and empowerment of women. With this in mind, 
let us reflect upon Murray’s title of ‘Lessons from the MDG Health Indicators’ and when 
applied from a gender perspective we see that the MDG’s provide a guideline as to 
appropriate, relevant, reliable and comparable data points that can act as individual 
indicators that disaggregate the broader concept of the socio-economic status of women.  
Table 5.5 below, is adapted from Grown et al. (2005: 31) and illustrates clearly the MDG’s 
from a gender perspective. 
Though eight goals are listed and discussed from a gender perspective it is clear that they 
collectively focus on three main areas and allows for the deconstruction into smaller 
measurable units: 
• Health of girls, women and mothers 
• Education attainment 
• Economic independence and participation 
It is also clear from existing research that these are areas of concern and are commonly 
utilised in determining the ‘socio-economic status of women’. Ghosh (1999) considered 
women’s labour force participation, fertility rates, literacy and education rates when she 
examined the impact of globalisation upon women in Asia. Griffin and Cohen (1994) examined 
intently the impact upon women’s labour force participation in the context of economic 
restructuring in Canada. Del Rosario (1997) explores the impacts of women’s labour force 
participation, migration and poverty rates in her study ‘Women and Children in the Global 
Economy’. Heller and Leuth (2003) discuss the intersection between the IMF and the MDG’s 
pointing out that the MDGs can be a powerful tool for improving the welfare of women and 
girls.  ‘MDGs are a powerful tool for enhancing the economic welfare of girls and women in 
the poorest societies’ and that ‘The IMF has an important role to play in achieving the MDGs’. 
As such I follow existing research along with the themes from the MDG’s to build the socio-
economic status of women from a combination of these three areas. Having defined themes, 
it is then possible to disaggregate further to individual units within each theme but always 
cognizant of Murray’s point that the data within each individual indicator is ‘valid, reliable, 
timely’ and has ‘comparable measurements’ when selecting the indicator. 
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Table 5.5 Summary of MDG’s 
Goal Description 
Goal 1. Eradicate extreme poverty 
and hunger  
Equal access for women to basic transport and energy infrastructure can lead to 
greater economic activity • Investment in women’s health, and nutritional status 
reduces chronic hunger and malnourishment, which increases productivity and 
wellbeing.  
Goal 2. Achieve universal primary 
education  
Educated girls and women have greater control over their fertility and participate 
more in public life. • A mother’s education is a strong, consistent determinant of 
her children’s school enrolment and attainment and their health and nutrition 
outcomes.  
Goal 3. Promote gender equality 
and empower women  
This central goal dedicated to gender equality and women’s empowerment 
depends on the achievement of all other goals for its success.  
Goal 4. Reduce child mortality  A mother’s education, income, and empowerment have a significant impact on 
lowering child mortality.  
Goal 5. Improve maternal health  A mother’s education, income, and empowerment have a significant impact on 
lowering maternal mortality.  
Goal 6. Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, 
and other diseases  
Greater economic independence for women increased ability to negotiate safe 
sex, and more awareness of challenges around traditional norms in sexual 
relations are essential for preventing the spread of HIV/AIDS and other epidemics.  
Goal 7. Ensure environmental 
sustainability  
Gender-equitable property and resource ownership policies enable women (often 
as primary users of these resources) to manage them in a more sustainable 
manner.  
Goal 8. Develop a global 
partnership for development  
Greater gender equality in the political sphere may lead to higher investments in 
development cooperation. 
 
5.3.1 Health 
The area of health is particularly broad and spans areas such as Mental Health, Genetic 
Disorders, Degenerative Diseases, Sexual Health, Infectious Diseases and Physical Health and 
Obesity. Medical and health related issues across these areas are common to both men and 
women, and many studies such as Lugalla (2007) have examined the impact of IMF SAP’s upon 
the health of women and children, with a particular emphasis on maternal mortality, nutrition 
and HIV/AIDS strategies. Huynen, Martens and Hilderink (2005) explores how globalisation 
affects health, and how international organisations such as the IMF and World Bank are 
influencing health-related policies. De Vogli and Birbeck (2005) look at the impact of SAP’s 
upon women and children’s vulnerability to HIV / AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa, finding that 
adjustment policies might expose women and children to HIV/ AIDS inadvertently. ActionAid 
(2009) amongst other areas, looks at the impact of the IMF on women’s health in Kenya and 
find that SAP’s are associated with a brain drain of health professionals and a reduction in 
access and quality of healthcare for women.  However, it is crucial to identify the dimension 
of health that is the best proxy for women’s SES.  Reflecting back to the MDG’s, ‘Goal 5 – 
Maternal Health’ is the best fit for this objective. This goal has now been subsumed into Goals 
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3 and 5 of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG’s). The UN breaks this concept into the 
following key performance indicators:21 
• Increasing the number of pregnant women receiving prenatal health care 
• Increasing the number of births attended by skilled health professionals  
• Lowering Maternal Mortality rates 
• Increasing contraception prevalence of women 19-49 
• Lowering the lifetime risk of maternal death 
• Reducing the level of teenage mothers aged 15 – 19 
• Lowering of Fertility Rates 
 
These more specific areas provide a disaggregation of maternal health and utilising these 
indicators as smaller and more specific measures of maternal health facilitate a more nuanced 
and explicit exploration of the impact of IMF programmes on maternal health. Importantly 
the World Bank databank provides extensive data on these indicators which I relied heavily 
upon, in the constructing of a master dataset suitable for data analysis. Table 5.6 outlines the 
descriptive statistics for these maternal health indicators. 
 
Table 5.6 Descriptive Statistics of Maternal Health Indicators      
Variable Mean Count Max Min Std Deviation 
Births attended by skilled professionals 83.09 1071 100 5 24.94 
Contraception prevalence of women 
19-49 
48.34 661 96 1.7 24.12 
Pregnant women receiving pre-natal 
health care 
82.02 653 100 15.4 19.32 
Lifetime risk of maternal death % (The 
cumulative probability of becoming 
pregnant over whole life and dying 
from that pregnancy) 
1.31 825 11.82 .003 2.02 
Teenage mothers aged 15 – 19 18.78 220 43.1 2.8 10.22 
Maternal mortality rates (per 100,000 
live births) 
250.79 825 1900 2 326.05 
Fertility rates 3.37 3763 8.6 .82 1.81 
 
5.3.2 Education 
The World Bank highlighted (2008) that ‘Educating girls and women is critical to economic 
development’ a point which is often echoed by the current MD of the IMF Christine Lagarde; 
yet Rowden (2011) in his paper for the Education International Research Institute highlights 
                                                          
21 See http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/goals/gti.htm#goal5 and  
http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/maternal.shtml and https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdg3 for 
detailed breakdown of UN SDG’s / MDG’s around gender, women’s health and maternal health. 
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how the tight fiscal and monetary policies imposed by IMF agreements including low inflation 
rates, deregulation and capital account liberalization involve raising real interest rates which 
in turn limits productive output lowering tax revenues and ultimately leads to a lack of public 
investment particularly in education.22 It has become, as highlighted by UNICEF (2010) that:  
 
‘macroeconomic and expenditure decisions are often taken without an adequate 
analysis of their potential impacts in terms of employment, social development and 
inclusive and resilient growth.'  
Contrary to this, a recent IMF study by Clements, Gupta and Nozaki (2011) of 140 countries 
with data from 1985 – 2009 found that spending on education and health rose at a faster pace 
in countries undergoing IMF-supported programmes than in developing countries as a whole. 
It is thus essential to explore IMF agreements in the context of their impact on education. The 
MDG’s Goal 2 places specific emphasis on the achievement of Universal Primary Education. I 
have chosen to disaggregate education into the following four sub-sections: 
• Literacy 
• Primary Education 
• Secondary Education 
• Tertiary Education  
By disaggregating education into these sub-sections, I am able to measure the comparative 
progress of women and men across these sub-indicators. This allows me to explore whether 
the effect of IMF agreements upon education varies between male and female. Many of the 
states applying for credit facilities from the IMF may be considered to be developing countries 
in terms of economic advancement. African countries, in particular, would fit this description 
along with certain states in Central and South America and Asia. In many of these states, there 
are strong drives to improve participation and completion of primary and secondary 
education. The area of tertiary education in many cases may remain only within the capacity 
of the elite and outside the reach of the general population. The ability to identify trends and 
nuances within the area of female participation in tertiary education – both in its relationship 
with the female population and also as a comparator against the male tertiary education 
population – would prove valuable and insightful. It could lead to further inferences about 
the general status of women, their ability to contribute to the decision-making process, 
potential development of a middle class and whether there are changes in the ratio of 
participation in tertiary level education among women from working, middle and upper 
classes. The available education indicators are numerous, and Table 5.7 below lists all the 
indicators I chose to include in my dataset with Table 5.8 setting out the descriptive statistics 
for each indicator. These collectively comprise female education and male education: 
                                                          
22 http://www.ei-ie.org/en/ The Education International Research Institute paper by Rowden, 2011. 
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Table 5.7 List of Education Indicators 
Indicator Focus Indicator Focus 
Expected Years of Schooling – female  Expected Years of Schooling –male  
Female Children not in school  Male children not in school 
Female Adjusted net intake primary school  Male Adjusted net intake primary school  
Female literacy rate 15+  male Literacy rate 15+  
Female Literacy rate 15-24+  male Literacy rate 15-24  
Average years’ primary female 15  Total literacy rate 15+  
Average years primary female 15-19  Total literacy rate 15-24  
Average years primary female 20-24  Total primary completion rate 
Average years primary female 25-29  Male Primary Completion Rate 
Average years primary female 29-34  Female primary completion rate 
Female / male primary enrolment (ratio)  Female / Male secondary enrolment (ratio) 
Progression to secondary – female  Progression to secondary – Male 
Average years’ secondary female 15-19  Average years’ secondary female 25-29  
Average years’ secondary female 20-24  Female / male tertiary enrolment (ratio) 
Average Tertiary 15 plus female  Average Tertiary 15 plus male  
Average tertiary 15-19 female  Average tertiary 15-19 male  
Average tertiary 20-24 female  Average tertiary 20-24 male  
Average tertiary 25-29 female  Average tertiary 25-29 total  
Average tertiary 30-34 female  Average tertiary 30-34 total  
Average tertiary 25+ female  Average tertiary 25+ male  
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Table 5.8 Descriptive statistics of female and male education indicators      
Indicator Name Mean Count Max Min Std Deviation 
Female-male primary enrolment  94.02 2859 121.87 0 10.72 
Female-male secondary enrolment 94.39 2411 149.56 0 18.76 
Female-male tertiary enrolment 106.77 2121 560.21 6.4 56.68 
Female primary completion rate 79.87 1935 137.78 6.28 26.58 
Male primary completion rate 82.49 1935 133.15 14.57 22.47 
Total primary completion rate 81.75 2100 128.55 14.03 24.06 
Progression to secondary - female 82.53 1473 100 4.97 20.52 
Progression to secondary - male 82.66 1473 100 6.15 19.42 
Female children not in school 261114.9 1671 1.40e+07 10 876829 
Male children not in school 199982.1 1671 70096696 10 580189.4 
Adjusted net intake rate primary female 78.271   1882 100   8.59    22.79 
Adjusted net intake rate primary male 78.80    1882 100 8.57   21.84 
Average years primary female 15+ 4.28   690 8.84    .27 1.74 
Average years primary female 15-19 4.84   690 8.66     .73                1.53      
Average years primary female 20-24 4.87   690 8.99     .40 1.72 
Average years primary female 25-29 4.76   690 8.99     .19 1.84 
Average years primary female 30-34 4.60 690 8.99 .08 1.93 
Average years of secondary female 15-
19 
2.39 690 7.46 .006 1.58 
Average years of secondary female 20-
24 
3.24 690 7.83 .06 1.94 
Average years of secondary female 25-
29 
2.97 690 8.07 .04 1.88 
Average tertiary female 15+ .31 690 1.59 .003    .31 
Average tertiary male 15+  .33 690 1.59 .003 .30 
Average tertiary female 15-19 .09 690 1.06 0 .15 
Average tertiary male 15-19 .08   690 .93 0 .13 
Average tertiary female 20-24 .47 690 2.71     0 .50 
Average tertiary male 20-24 .42 690 2.52 0      .44 
Average tertiary female 25+ .33 690 1.72 .003 .33   
Average tertiary male 25+  .36     690 1.71 .005 .32   
Average tertiary female 25-29 .47 690 2.69     0 .50  
Average tertiary total 25-29 .44 690 2.34 0 . 43 
Average tertiary female 30-34 .46 690 2.72     0 .48   
Average tertiary total 30-34 .44 690 2.02 0 .42 
Literate rate total 15+ 78.92 442 100        9.39 21.14 
Literate rate females 15-24 85.39 437 100 8.95 21.04 
Literate rate male 15-24 89.56       437 100  13.69       14.74       
Literate rate total 15-24 87.39 438 100 14.00 17.78 
Literate rate female 15+  74.45 441 100 4.59 24.89 
Expected years schooling female  11.54   2181 21.11   1.42    4.10   
Expected years schooling male 11.70 2181 20.49 2.70 3.27 
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5.3.3 Labour force participation 
The subject of women and the labour force has been a significant area of research for many 
years. The existing literature points towards substantial gains when women are able to fully 
develop their labour force potential. In the broadest sense, research has borne out that that 
economic liberalisation and economic growth has yielded positive outcomes for the socio-
economic status of women in advanced industrialised democracies over the last one hundred 
years (Weiss, Ramerez and Tracy 1976, Clark, Ramsbey and Adler, 1991, World Bank 1995). 
Economic growth theory and research suggest that liberalisation has reduced gender 
inequalities. Examples such as Agenor and Montiel [1996], Aghion and Howitt [1998] and 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin [2004]) highlight these findings strongly. This is echoed by Stotsky 
(2006a and 20006b) who finds that stronger economic growth leads to reduced gender 
disparities and who also points out the simultaneous relationship between economic growth 
and gender equality.  
In an IMF Working Paper, Loko and Diouf (2009:6) specifically explore the relationship 
between gender and labour force participation and highlight the positive potential gains for 
both women and the economy when women are able to contribute fully to their national 
economies. They point out that in developed countries, women allocate a greater share of 
the household income to education and healthcare than men thus resulting in a boost in 
productivity in the longer term. A recent IMF Staff Discussion Note (Elborgh-Woytek et al., 
2013) examined whether there are macroeconomic gains from gender equity in the 
workplace. Citing existing literature such as Cuberes and Teignier (2012) and Aguirre et al. 
(2012) they found that increasing female labour force participation in relation to country 
specific male rates are associated with an increase in GDP of that country. Beyond an increase 
in GDP, there is also extensive research which points towards higher investment in education 
and greater access to talent pools for companies should labour force participation amongst 
women increase. The report by Elborgh-Woytek et al. (2013) suggested a host of steps that 
the IMF can take to promote labour force participation, and it is obvious that increased GDP 
and productivity of countries under IMF agreements would be a welcome development, thus 
ensuring not only a greater chance of repayment of outstanding loans but also a move 
towards a more stable economic position. As such it is fitting to ask what – if any – has been 
the impact of IMF agreements on the female labour force participation. The available labour 
force indicators are numerous and Table 5.9 below lists all the indicators I chose to include in 
my dataset with Table 5.10 setting out the descriptive statistics for each indicator. These 
collectively comprise female labour force participation and male labour force participation. 
Again, as with education, I wish to draw attention to any comparative effect that IMF 
programmes have upon both women and men in the labour force. As such I have built the 
dataset to include data on both male and female labour force participation. This allows for an 
important comparison to be made and to identify whether the effect of IMF programmes 
varies between male and female labour force participation. 
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Table 5.9 List of labour force participation indicators 
Female Labour Force Indicators Male Labour Force Indicators 
Female agricultural employment Male agricultural employment 
Female service employment Male service employment 
Female industrial employment Male industrial employment 
Labour force participation females 15-24 Labour force participation males 15-24 
Labour force participation females 15-64 Labour force participation males 15-64 
 
Table 5.10: Descriptive statistics of labour force participation indicators      
Indicator name Mean Count Max Min Std 
Deviation Female agricultural employment 15.59   1715 96.6 0 20.40 
Female service employment 68.38   1717 98.7 2.1 20.09   
Female industrial employment 15.61   1717 50.5 .4 7.46   
Labour force participation females 15-24 42.17 3652 84.3 5.9 17.04 
Labour force participation females 15-64 55.33 3652 91.9 9.7 18.28   
Male agricultural employment 18.77   1715 86.9 0 17.31   
Male service employment 50.42 
 
1717 84.5 9.3 12.31 
Male industrial employment 30.32   1717 60.9 3.3 8.92     
Labour force participation males 15-24 49.46 3652 82.7 14.2 13.41    
Labour force participation males 15-64 67.86 3652 91.5 38.9 10.51 
 
 
5.4 Independent variable data: IMF programme participation 
As highlighted, the independent variable of interest is IMF participation, a variable I refer to 
as ‘IMF Programme’. This is a dichotomous variable that measures whether or not a country 
was participating in an IMF arrangement in a particular year. The ‘IMF Programme’ variable 
has a value of ‘1’ if a country was participating in an IMF arrangement in a given year and ‘0’ 
if not.  Accurate and comprehensive codification of all selected countries was essential, and 
codification focused upon whether or not and also when, various countries participated in an 
IMF agreement. This data is held by the IMF both online and within their archives. Mussa and 
Savastano (1999:86) give a very clear account of the process whereby a country enters into 
an agreement with the IMF. After the initial ‘Inception’ phase, a ‘Blueprint’ is drawn up, and 
negotiations begin with a series of missions to the applicant country. From the negotiations, 
a series of documents including the Letter of Intent is produced. The ‘Letter of Intent’ defines 
the terms and conditions of the agreement between the IMF and the applicant country. 
Within these agreements are the details around the proposed implementation of conditions, 
the credit facility agreed and the number of years the state will be participating in an IMF 
programme. Importantly, the IMF holds details of all quantitative and structural conditionality 
for each agreement since 2002 on its MONA Database (Monitoring of Fund Arrangements) 
with archived information going back to 1993. It is important to note that the MONA Database 
only contains data from loans where the Letters of Intent have been made public. Any 
conditions agreed outside of the public sphere are not included in this database. Each of the 
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conditions is categorised within the MONA database. Additionally, this is further supported 
by the quarterly reports communicated between the state and the IMF with these reports 
detailing progress made within the agreed area along with Country Reports issued by the IMF 
on an ad-hoc basis for selected countries. 
 
5.4.1 IMF programme design 
In my theoretical framework, I argue that analysing participation alone cannot result in the 
most accurate assessment of how an IMF programme can and does impact the SES of women 
(or any dependent variable). It is important to consider how the IMF programme is designed 
and what type of conditionality is imposed. As already highlighted in my theoretical 
framework, IMF conditions converge into one of two groupings. Spending reforms or 
Quantitative Performance Criteria (QPC) focusing on fiscal measures and structural reforms 
linking IMF lending to policy reform. The vast majority of programmes undertaken by states 
do have conditions (Griffiths and Todoulos, 2014) and this is evident in my own dataset which 
documents the IMF participation rates of 173 countries over 22 years from 1990 – 2011 with 
a total of 3806 records. Of this total, 1104 records detail an IMF agreement and 1069 of these 
records stipulate conditionality, or alternatively, 97 percent of all agreements in my dataset 
stipulate conditions. 
Significant data analysis was required to enable me to test my hypothesis that programme 
design matters. While the MONA database and IMF archives hold data on most IMF 
agreement since 1993, it is held across multiple databases; these multiple databases do not 
follow the exact same format, combine qualitative and quantitative measurements, and are 
in general, not usable in their current layout. However, in saying this, it was possible to collate 
this data into one single format and present the data in a manner that is interpretable and 
usable, and that can be incorporated into my models as a control variable. Drilling down on 
the dataset, of the 173 countries between 1990 and 2011, 110 have undergone an IMF 
agreement. In total, there have been 529 programmes across these 110 countries from 1990 
- 2011. Table 5.11 below summarises their high-level programme type.  
My analysis explored each of these 529 programmes, and I collated the type and quantity of 
conditions applied in each programme. While the MONA database (including the archives) 
records the conditions specified in each programme categorising them as a QPC condition 
(Quantitative Performance Criteria focused on redressing budget imbalances), or an SPCPA 
SB condition (Covers structural conditions related to performance criteria (SPC), prior actions 
(PA) required under the programme, and programme benchmarks (SB)), the data is stored in 
multiple spreadsheets, is not in a format that can be easily analysed, and is not consistent in 
its completeness across all records. As such, significant data gathering, reformatting and 
analysis were required to create a quantitative measure of both QPC and SPCPASB conditions 
for each of the 529 programmes over 22 years. 
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Table 5.11 IMF programme type in dataset  
Programme Type Programme Description Number of Programmes 
ECF / EFF Extended Credit Facility/Extended Fund Facility 76 
ESF / ESAF Exogenous Shock Facility/Extended Structural 
Adjustment Facility  
153 
SBA Stand-by Arrangement 177 
SCF Standby Credit Facility 2 
PCL Precautionary Credit Line 3 
PRGF Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility 100 
PSI Policy Support Instrument 16 
Total Total number of programmes 529 
 
To create this variable, I counted all QPC conditions and all SPCPA SB conditions for each of 
the 529 programmes. In the vast majority of cases, there are more QPC conditions than SPC 
conditions in each programme. Having calculated the numbers of QPC and SPCPA SB 
conditions I was then able to create a ratio indicator that measured QPC versus SPCPA SB 
conditions and this value became an appropriate measure that could illustrate the focus of 
the programme design. This I did by dividing the value representing QPC conditions by the 
value representing SPCPA SB conditions to calculate a ratio value for each programme. This 
value became the variable RatioQPCSPC, and I was able to use this variable in my data 
analysis. 23 
This ratio as a variable (RatioQPCSPC) is central to my argument as it roughly captures the 
extent to which the programme is structural rather than macroeconomic adjustment-based. 
Of course, the perpetual criticism of all studies that use the number of conditions as a variable 
is that some conditions are more important than others. However, published studies have not 
yet managed to address this problem, and while it may seem an incomplete measure, it is the 
best available proxy as there are no accepted alternative solutions. I incorporated the 
indicator into the model as a control variable and used it as a proxy for programme design. 
This allowed me to explore how programme design affects the impact IMF programmes have 
upon the SES of women. Table 5.12 below illustrates the descriptive statistics for this indicator 
which measures the ratio between QPC and SPC conditions. It is clear that from the minimum 
value, that some programmes do have a strong structural focus, however, the mean value 
illustrates that that QPC conditions, or conditions with a fiscal correction orientation, are far 
more prominent than SPC conditions. The mean of RatioQPCSPC is worthy of comment. In 
this case, over the complete 529 programmes, the average ratio of QPC to SPC conditions is 
25.08, or there are on average 25.08 QPC conditions to every SPC condition across all 529 
                                                          
23 The full data analysis for the creation of this variable can be found in the supplementary datasets. These 
datasets summarise all IMF programmes from 1993 – 2012. There is a total of 529 programmes during this time 
period. The supplementary datasets record all conditions for each programme and codifies each condition in 
terms of its focus – fiscal / structural as well as codifying each condition in terms of its implementation level.  
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programmes. Additionally, it is important to highlight why the minimum value is zero. The 
zero represents where the SPC conditions outnumber the QPC conditions. As an example, 
Burkina Faso was under an IMF agreement from 1993 - 1996. In their agreement, there were 
no QPC conditions and 16 SPC conditions. Hence the ratio is zero. There are a number of 
programmes where the SPC count exceeds the QPC count, which results in a minimum mean 
value being zero.  The full list of countries with their QPCSPCRatio value can be found in 
Appendix 9:101. 
Table 5.12 Descriptive statistics of ratio of QPC SPC conditions      
Indicator Focus Mean Count Max Min Std Deviation 
Ratio QPC SPC 25.08 1108 111 0 27.20 
 
It is also interesting to explore any regime type and regional variations in programme design.  
 
Figure 5.13 Ratio of fiscal to structural conditions by regime type 
 
Figure 5.13, table 5.14 and figure 5.15 illustrate that there are large differences in programme 
design at a regime type and regional level. From a regime type, the ratio of QPC to SPC 
conditions is much higher for democracies than autocracies. IMF programmes for both 
autocracies and democracies mainly specify fiscal conditions. However, figure 5.13 implies 
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that IMF programmes for democracies have an even greater focus on fiscal conditions than 
IMF programmes for autocracies. Viewing the data from a regional perspective, it is clear that 
African countries have undergone the most IMF programmes within the specified time period. 
The number of conditions specified under these programmes is striking in comparison to 
other regions. While the ratio of QPC to SPC conditions is high for Africa, it is Europe which 
has the highest ratio of QPC to SPC conditions.  
 
Table 5.14 Regional view of IMF programme design       
Region Number of 
programmes 
Total # 
Conditions 
Total QPC 
Conditions 
Total SPCPC SB 
Conditions 
Mean 
QPC/SPCPC 
SB Ratio 
Median 
QPC/SPCPC 
SB Ratio Europe 78 8335 7164 1171 32.08 13 
CIS 60 6490 5127 1363 15.56 6 
Asia Pacific 46 6668 5467 1201 17.27 4.5 
Africa 239 15661 12861 2800 20.17 6 
Latin 
America 
87 6689 5972 717 28.46 21 
Arab 
States 
19 2165 1731 434 19.66 8.65 
 
There are several points worth noting about this data. Firstly, Europe. While Europe may have 
the highest QPC to SPC ratio, comparatively, it has very different economic structures. 
Relative to Africa, Arab countries or Latin America, Europe could be considered to have a 
more advanced market economy. The private sector could also be considered to be more 
vibrant in Europe while national budgets of European countries will be significantly higher 
than those in most of the other regions. As such, it is unsurprising that the focus of an IMF 
agreement might veer towards fiscal conditions, budgetary contraction and monetary policy, 
as many of the structural concerns around competition and monopolies or excessive state-
owned enterprises and stimulating a private sector are not core issues for European 
countries.  
 
Secondly, the CIS region provides an interesting contrast. The CIS region which has the lowest 
ratio of QPC to SPC conditions, implying that there was a greater focus on structural 
conditions. The focus of the CIS countries undergoing IMF agreements in the 1990’s was in 
most cases, to help these countries to develop a market economy post the fall of the Soviet 
Union. As such, conditions such as privatisation or restructuring state-owned enterprises 
were a priority just as much as developing a suitable monetary policy and tax framework in 
order to move towards a market economy.  
 
Thirdly, the data for Africa is also notable.  While Africa does not have the highest QPC / SPC 
ratio, it is still very high. Additionally, Africa has undergone the most programmes with the 
highest number of conditions. The financial systems and economic structures of African 
countries are considered to be the most underdeveloped in the world (Allen et al., 2011). 
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With 53 countries in the continent, there is diversity not only in culture and society but there 
is also diversity in economic and financial structures, economic capability and economic 
wealth. Common trends among African countries include the dominance of state-owned 
banks and the need for diversity in ownership in the banking industry, the high level of 
investment in government securities and treasury bills by this state-owned banking industry, 
and a low level of private credit provision (Allen et al., 2011). Additionally, the stock market 
is underdeveloped, and the African stock market is the smallest regional stock market in terms 
of its value and the number of companies listed. Financial structures such as an efficient and 
well-capitalised banking system and an active stock market system matter for economic 
growth. This importance is captured by Rateiwa and Aziakpono (2015) who explored the 
relationship between economic growth and financial systems in Africa’s three largest 
economies, Egypt, Nigeria and South Africa. In a market-based economy such as South Africa, 
economic growth leads the development and expansion of the stock market which in turn 
leads to greater economic growth, while in the bank-based economies of Egypt and Nigeria, 
it is the financial structure that has the positive impact on economic growth. The direction of 
causality between financial structure and economic growth is absolutely important, but it 
highlights several key considerations for structural and economic planning for African states 
and also for the IMF who will design programmes and credit agreements. Firstly, it highlights 
the importance of implementing structural changes which facilitate diversity in the financial 
system. This includes supporting the development of a diverse economic model which 
facilitates both an efficient banking system and also a stock market. Secondly, it highlights 
that the IMF needs to support African countries to encourage diversity within the banking 
system which can be facilitated through privatisation. This is immensely important in 
countries which have a financial system which is banking based. The lack of diversity, 
efficiency and credit provision are hampering economic growth and limiting development at 
a person and a state level. Reflecting back at the programme design of IMF programmes in 
African countries, the high ratio of fiscal to structural conditions can be seen in a practical 
light. Structural elements such as financial systems are foundational, and good foundations 
are necessary to stimulate economic growth.   
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Figure 5.15 Regional view of IMF programme design 
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5.4.2 Implementation of an IMF agreement 
In addition to programme design being important, I also argue that implementation of an IMF 
programme is crucial. While a state may sign an IMF agreement with varying conditions, if 
they do not implement these conditions, then the impact that the IMF has upon the SES of 
women in that state is negligible. Alternatively, should a state fully or mostly complete the 
conditions specified within an IMF agreement then it is possible that changes in the SES of 
women, whether positive or negative, can be attributed to the IMF programme?  
Measuring implementation also required significant data manipulation and analysis. Again, 
the MONA databases and archives provided a starting point. MONA records whether a 
condition was implemented, partially implemented or not implemented at all. However, 
similar to programme design, the data is stored in multiple spreadsheets, is not in a format 
that can be easily analysed and is not consistent in its completeness across all records. To 
facilitate my data analysis, I collated the following: 
 
• The total number of conditions applied to each programme 
• The percent of conditions implemented as a percent of the overall number of 
conditions 
• The total number of QPC conditions out of the total number of conditions 
• The percent of QPC conditions implemented 
• The total number of SPCPA SB conditions out of the total number of conditions 
• The percent of SPCPA SB conditions implemented 
 
Having gathered these data, I was then able to calculate an implementation rate for each 
programme which is the percent of conditions implemented in the agreement. This forms a 
good proxy for implementation levels. This indicator (Imp_Level) was then incorporated into 
the model as a control variable and used as a proxy for the level of implementation of the IMF 
agreement. This allowed me to explore how programme implementation affects the impact 
IMF programmes have upon the SES of women. Table 5.15 below illustrates the descriptive 
statistics for this indicator that measures the implementation levels of IMF programmes. It is 
clear that from the minimum value, that some programmes were not implemented at all, 
however, the median value illustrates that that implementation levels across the panel of 529 
programmes stand at a reasonably high rate of 57 percent. More specifically, on average 59% 
of QPC conditions were implemented, and 46% of SPC PA SB conditions were implemented. 
The full list of countries with their levels of conditions implemented can be found in Appendix 
9:107. 
 
Table 5.16 Descriptive statistics of implementation levels in IMF programmes     
Indicator Focus Median Mean  Max Min Std Deviation 
Implementation Level 61 57 100 0 25.63 
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Figures 5.17, table 5.18 and figure 5.19 illustrates the variations in implementation levels by 
regime type and by region. A number of points are worth noting. Firstly, the mean levels of 
implementation at a regime type level are similar for both autocratic and democratic regimes. 
Autocracies implement 57 percent of QPC conditions and 46 percent of SPC conditions, while 
democracies implement 60 percent of QPC conditions and 45 percent of SPC conditions. 
Secondly, the mean level of implementation across all regions is between 53 percent and 64 
percent. While these implementation levels might not be considered high, they do illustrate 
that states on average implement more than half of the conditions specified in their IMF 
agreement. Thirdly, when we consider the type of conditions implemented, we see a clear 
division. It is clear that across regime types and all regions, states implement fiscal orientated 
conditions to a greater extent than structural conditions. It is arguable that implementing QPC 
type conditions such as budgetary reductions or tax reform may be more easily achieved than 
conditions such as breaking up state-owned enterprises and privatising industries. Yes, the 
complexity levels of these different policy choices vary dramatically, but also a state will 
engage with very different constituents and interest groups when implementing either policy. 
Fourthly, in all cases except the Arab states, countries are, on average, implementing less than 
50 percent of the structural conditions specified in an IMF programme. 
 
 
Figure 5.17 Implementation levels of IMF programmes by regime type    
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Table 5.18 Regional variations in implementation levels      
Region 
Mean 
Implement 
Mean QPC 
Implement 
Mean 
SPCPA SB 
implement 
Median 
Implement 
Median 
QPC 
Implement 
Median 
SPCPA SB 
implement 
Europe 64 percent 66 percent 44 percent 67 percent 67 percent 44 percent 
CIS 53 percent 57 percent 47 percent 51 percent 50 percent 47 percent 
Asia 
Pacific 54 percent 57 percent 49 percent 58 percent 60 percent 47 percent 
Africa 56 percent 57 percent 46 percent 60 percent 64 percent 48 percent 
Latin 
America 59 percent 61 percent 31 percent 67 percent 67 percent 37 percent 
Arab 
States 54 percent 56 percent 51 percent 59 percent 68 percent 47 percent 
 
These findings have implications for the IMF and their partnerships with states. Structural 
conditions are specified for a reason. They can help a state to establish and improve systemic 
elements of a state’s economic and financial structure. If economic growth is influenced by 
the stability, efficiency and strength of a state’s economic and financial structures as research 
shows (Allen et al., 2011, Rateiwa and Aziakpono, 2015), then failure to implement conditions 
which aim to improve this, is counterproductive and opportunities for economic growth are 
lost. The IMF needs to consider how it can get maximum buy-in from states regarding 
structural changes along with supporting states to implement these conditions considering 
the individual political context of each state. 
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Figure 5.19 Regional variations in implementation levels 
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5.5 Control Variables 
There are many factors that influence my dependent variable, the socio-economic status of 
women and consideration of these influences will allow for a truer understanding of the 
relationship between the dependent and independent variables or ‘ceteris paribus’. A variety 
of control variables is appropriate when the socio-economic status of women or one of its 
disaggregated health, education or labour force participation variables is being considered. 
5.5.1 HDI: Human Development Index 
The Human Development Index (HDI) is a composite indicator that measures average 
achievement in key dimensions of human development. First designed by Pakistani economist 
Mahbub ul Haq and Indian economist Amartya Sen in 1990, it is published annually by the 
UN.24 Sen (1999:24) harks back to Aristotelian theories on the quality of life and Adam Smith’s 
‘necessities and conditions of living’ as he outlines the importance of considering ‘quality of 
life and substantive freedoms, rather than just on income and wealth’. The HDI considers life 
expectancy, education and standard of living through GNI (GDP was used in earlier iterations), 
however, it does not consider inequality, security or poverty. In 2010 a new version of the 
HDI was developed. Ravallion (2010) highlighted that the new version comes with a relaxation 
of assumptions of ‘perfect substitutability between its three components’ and restructuring 
of the weighting systems for the longevity of poor countries relative to rich countries and a 
move away from the previously equal weighting of the components. Ravallion (2010:6) 
illustrates that these scaling and weighting issues may obscure successes in a component, 
using Zimbabwe as an example. Zimbabwe has the lowest HDI value of states covered. A 
closer look finds that Zimbabwe has an extremely low score in the income component which 
pulls down the overall average despite having a schooling value 56th from the bottom. 
However, despite these concerns and considering the positive trade-off of a composite index 
with data available back to 1990, the HDI proves to be a valuable measurement for 
researchers and is an appropriate control variable for testing the impact of IMF programmes 
upon women’s SES, whether health, education or labour force related. The data for the HDI 
is available from the World Development Indicators (WDI), and I have sourced the data from 
the World Bank Data Bank to build my dataset. 
5.5.2 Health expenditure per capita 
The World Bank databank specifies the Health Expenditure per capita indicator25 as being the 
sum of public and private health expenditure as a ratio of the total population. This value is 
expressed in $US and covers the provision of health services – preventative and curative, 
family planning activities nutrition activities and emergency aid. It does not include the 
provision of water and sanitation. This indicator is an important control variable most 
especially when analysing the impact of the IV (IMF Participation) on maternal health related 
                                                          
24 http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi Details of UN HDI 
Indicator 
25 The details of the health expenditure per capital indicator are to be found here:   
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.XPD.PCAP. 
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DV’s. The 1995 Fourth World Conference on Women drew attention to how gender 
inequalities and lack of spending on women’s health was hampering development, and this 
provided an impetus to increase focus upon maternal health in the MDG’s later on in 2000. 
In other academic research Elola, Daponte, and Navarro (1995) in an extensive cross-country 
statistical analysis of 17 European countries found that health care expenditures were 
inversely correlated to infant mortality rates and positively correlated to female longevity 
while Anyanwu and Erhijakpor (2007) in a study of 47 African countries found that health 
expenditure had a statistically significant effect on infant mortality and under-five mortality. 
The connection between better health care and a reduction in depreciation of educational 
capital and thus ultimately increased economic growth is also underscored by Barro (1996). 
Research by Bloom and Canning (2000, 2003) demonstrates a multitude of benefits to labour 
force participation and the economy as a result of a healthier workforce, including a reduction 
of absence due to sickness, an increase in investment in self-education leading to greater 
productivity along with greater saving and spending potential. This points towards health 
expenditure being a highly valuable control variable – in particular when considering the 
impact of the IV (IMF Participation) upon the DV (maternal health). The data for the total 
health expenditure per capita is available from the World Development Indicators (WDI), and 
I sourced the data to build the dataset from the World Bank Data Bank. 
5.5.3 Education expenditure per capita 
The World Bank databank specifies the public expenditure on education as a percentage of 
total government expenditure26 as being the total public education expenditure – both 
current and capital as a percentage of the total government expenditure across all sectors in 
a given year. This value is expressed in $US and includes government spend on both public 
and private educational institutions, related educational administration and subsidies for 
private entities such as students/households. This indicator is an important control variable 
most especially when analysing the impact of the IV (IMF Participation) on education related 
DV’s. The achievement of universal primary education is set out as Goal 2 in the MDG’s, and 
significant emphasis is placed on international institutions and governments to attain this 
goal. There is a substantial body of work exploring the impact of investment in education. 
Jorgenson and Fraumeni (1992) look at the impact of investment in education upon economic 
growth in the US finding a positive correlation. They highlight the benefits of such investment 
citing increased labour force participation and increased income in the labour force which in 
turn provides for the potential of increased tax revenues.  This is echoed in research by Rivera-
Batiz (1992) and Iyigun and Owen (1999) who find that greater levels of education improve 
employment opportunities. Research by Klepinger et al. (1999), Brien and Lillard (1994) and 
Rosenzweig and Schultz (1989) have established links between greater education and fertility 
control while Vila (2005) refers to Scarpetta et al. (2000), when highlighting that technological 
and organisation advancements are dependent upon the educational levels of a labour force. 
                                                          
26 The details of the education expenditure per capital indicator are to be found here 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.XPD.TOTL.GB.ZS 
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The data for the total public education expenditure as a percentage of GDP is available from 
the World Development Indicators (WDI), and I have sourced the data for my dataset from 
the World Bank Data Bank. 
5.5.4 Log of GDP 
The Gross Domestic Product is used to describe the health of a country’s economy 
representing the monetary value of all the goods and services generated by that economy in 
a given time period – usually per year. The GDP also reflects the size of the economy. Using 
the log of GDP allows for the consideration of compounded values, as values increase or 
decrease, and the Log of GDP provides a more exact, meaningful and robust way to measure 
changes. Using GDP as a measurement, a country’s relative economic development becomes 
clear. Countries with a higher GDP value may also have higher industry levels, output levels, 
employment levels and foreign direct investment levels which in turn may have an impact 
upon any of the DV’s maternal health, education or particularly labour force participation – 
and as such it is appropriate to include Log of GDP as a control variable. The data for GDP is 
available from the World Development Indicators (WDI) and sourced from the World Bank 
Data Bank, and for the purpose of this study, an additional variable was created GDP_Log to 
contain the log value of GDP. 
5.5.5 GNI 
Gross National Income is the sum of GDP plus the net income received from overseas. While 
HDI, of course, includes GNI as one of its components, it is important to distinguish GNI as a 
separate entity from being a composite of HDI and show its relevance as an additional 
indicator. Ravallion (2010) highlighted that the weighting system of the HDI components has 
the potential to mask extremely positive or negative values of the other two components. His 
example highlighted how Zimbabwe’s education score was concealed by its highly negative 
income score. Should the reverse be true in an example then the specific controlling of a very 
strong or very weak GNI value would be lost if GNI were not to be utilised as a specific control 
variable and as such it is appropriate and wise to include GNI as separate a control variable? 
The data for GNI is available from the World Development Indicators (WDI) and sourced from 
the World Bank Data Bank. 
5.5.6 Regime type 
I argue that regime type drives variation in the impact of IMF programmes upon women. As 
such I argue that it is important to control for regime type in the statistical tests which follow. 
The Polity dataset is a widely used dataset that grades all independent states as to their level 
of democracy or autocracy. Polity IV reviews a states’ electoral process and using a 20-point 
scale from -10 to +10 determines whether a state is autocratic (-10 to -6), anocratic (-5 to 5) 
or democratic (6 to 10). This dataset has proven invaluable and has facilitated research that 
explores the impact regime type has on a number of other variables. However, the Polity 
dataset has some challenges and Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2009) introduced a new 
dataset called Democracy-Dictatorship providing a dichotomous measure of a state’s regime 
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type in the context of either democracy or autocracy. This new dataset aimed to improve 
existing measures by extending country and year coverage and their six-fold regime type 
classification cover 199 countries with full codification and no missing data. Research has 
already benefited from this new dataset in particular Bauer et al. (2012) hypothesised that 
the regime type of the state is a critical component in the attraction of FDI for states 
undergoing an IMF agreement. This dataset is also particularly appropriate for my thesis. This 
dichotomous measure of regime type enables me to categorise my data into democracies and 
dictatorships and facilitates analysis to determine whether regime type drives variation in the 
effect that IMF agreements have upon the socio-economic status of women. Importantly this 
will allow me to highlight any potential ‘hiding’ of possible important findings when data is 
pooled. However, in the interest of robustness, I have used both datasets in my modelling to 
ensure the robustness of my tests.  Table 5.20 displays the split of programme types by regime 
type.  
 
Table 5.20 IMF programme types with regime split 
 
Programme 
Type 
Total programmes Democracy Autocracy 
ECF / EFF 76 45 31 
ESF / ESAF 153 52 101 
SBA 177 129 48 
SCF 2 0 2 
PCL 3 1 2 
PRGF 100 45 55 
PSI 16 4 12 
Total 529 276 251 
 
5.5.7 Country fixed effects and year effects 
Observational studies are often prone to omitted variable bias which is dangerous and can 
mislead the interpretation of results. As such it is important to approximate a randomised 
experiment as closely as possible. Already specified are a number of important control 
variables, but additional unobserved factors might also affect the regression. It is possible to 
extend these controls with the use of fixed effect methods which enables me to control for 
possible characteristics of the countries in the study as long as the characteristics do not 
change over time. Allison (2005:2) outlines two requirements which are that: 
 
‘Each individual in the sample must have two or more measurements on the same 
dependent variable. At least some of the individuals in the sample, the values of the 
independent variable(s) of interest must be different on at least two of the measurement 
occasions.’ 
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This is true for the data in my study and as such fixed effects become a useful tool. This allows 
me to eliminate a large source of bias and as such, it is wise to include country fixed effects 
and year effects within the regression, thus eliminating sources of omitted variable bias, 
namely, unobservable cross-country and across-year differences. 
 
5.5.8 IMF agreement types 
The focus of IMF lending has evolved since its inception in order to meet various crises. Post-
war lending focused on industrial countries as the IMF concentrated on rebuilding the 
international monetary system while the 1970’s oil shock saw lower and middle-income 
countries entering IMF agreements in order to cope with increasing debt. The fall of 
communism and the transition of Eastern European States towards market economies in the 
1990’s led to increased demand for IMF resources.  
 
While the IMF SBA (Stand-By-Arrangement) facility was initially a prominent funding 
instrument, the IMF has evolved their funding mechanisms to deal with the variety of fiscal 
and monetary needs of states in economic difficulty.  
 
Many original agreement types – such as the ESAF – are no longer present but have evolved 
into more appropriate facilities with greater ability to provide solutions to the members’ 
economic issues. As such, in the dataset, countries undergo varied IMF agreements – 
represented by the variable ‘IMF Arrangement Type’ which allows for interrogation and data 
analysis to provide a more nuanced view of the impact of IMF agreements upon the socio-
economic status of women. 
 
5.6 Dataset 
The full dataset totals 3806 records and contains data for 173 countries over 22 years from 
1990 to 2011. Specified in each record is whether the country was under an IMF agreement 
in that given year. In my dataset, there are 1104 instances where a state is under an IMF 
agreement and 2702 records where the state is not under an IMF agreement in that given 
year. Additionally, each record contains data measuring health, education and labour force 
participation, economic data, IMF programme type, regime type and specifics, and also data 
related to HDI, GII and GEM measurements. The full list of countries in my dataset can be 
found in Appendix 9:106 
5.7 Summary 
In summary, in this section of my thesis, I have outlined the approach that I have taken to 
investigate what effect IMF programmes have upon the socio-economic status of women. 
Significantly, I highlight that in selecting a quantitative approach that facilitates a large macro 
study with statistical analysis, I can contribute to an extension of the literature on the IMF 
and gender which has to date, been mainly qualitative and case study based. Importantly, in 
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outlining the choices and sources for my data selection, I acknowledge the gaps and 
limitations of the data available for this thesis. 
 
Throughout this section, I have highlighted and operationalized the foundational concepts of 
this study. My independent variable is IMF programme participation, and this becomes a 
dichotomous variable, with data being sourced from the IMF MONA database and the IMF 
archives. Importantly, I have operationalized and disaggregated my dependent variable, the 
socio-economic status of women, clearly outlining its component parts, data composition and 
source of the data. Similarly, I have outlined my selection of control variables, reasons for 
their selection along with the sources of these data. 
 
This disaggregation and operationalization of these concepts is essential and support the 
theoretical arguments made in this thesis and facilitates greater clarity and logically supports 
the hypotheses proposed. Geddes (2006:40) is unambiguous as to the value of such dissection 
arguing that it is necessary to break up large concepts and to move past ‘Big romantic, 
untestable ideas’. In moving past the ‘big romantic untestable’ hypothesis of what is the 
impact of IMF agreements upon the socio-economic status of women, this refinement allows 
for a finer and more nuanced level of interaction and analysis providing a more 
comprehensive and valuable approach.  
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6.0 DATA ANALYSIS 
6.1 Introduction 
Participation in an IMF agreement is an open signal of a state’s economic difficulty to the 
international community. Through participation in an IMF agreement, a state aims to access 
economic support in the form of funding and economic advice in order to attain or return to, 
economic stability and growth. However, a commitment to participate in an IMF agreement 
is but the first in a number of steps that can result in significant economic reform that has the 
potential to impact the socio-economic status of women. 
 
In this thesis, I argue that IMF programme design is important for the SES of women as 
variation in the design has the potential to impact upon the SES of women in different ways 
and intensities. I argue that spending reforms which focus on public sector budgetary 
contraction and increasing the tax base have a greater capacity to negatively and 
disproportionately impact the socio-economic status of women while certain structural 
reforms which focus upon economic growth have the capacity to positively impact the socio-
economic status of women. I also argue that while the design of a programme is important, 
the levels of implementation of the programme is crucial. A state may sign an IMF agreement 
with varying conditions, but if they do not implement these conditions, then the impact that 
the IMF has on the socio-economic status of women in that state is negligible. The opposite 
holds true in that should a state fully or mostly complete the conditions specified within an 
IMF agreement then I argue that it is possible that changes in the socio-economic status of 
women, whether positive or negative, can be attributed to the IMF programme.  
 
This chapter is structured as follows. Following a brief reference to my theoretical arguments, 
I first test the argument that both IMF programme design and implementation levels of an 
IMF agreement drive variation in the impact that IMF programmes have upon the SES of 
women. Importantly, I outline the econometric approach and modelling which facilitated the 
testing of my hypotheses including the type of software used to manipulate the data. This is 
useful as it facilitates replicability, transparency, allows me to highlight any challenges 
regarding the analysis of the data while also allowing me to demonstrate how I overcame 
these challenges. Secondly, I present findings from my statistical analysis. The goal of this 
quantitative analysis is to provide an overview of the relationship between IMF programmes, 
their design and their implementation levels and the SES of women. This is useful as it 
facilitates the unpicking of the causal relationship between IMF programmes and the SES of 
women and helps establish a more general macro level finding. Thirdly, following this 
overview of the results I discuss the results of the quantitative analysis in terms participation 
in an IMF agreement, IMF programme design and IMF programme implementation levels and 
the. Finally, I conclude the chapter with a summary of the key findings. 
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6.2 Considerations for model design 
Selecting an appropriate model for the analysis of the data is essential. Not only does the 
model need to effectively analyse the data, but it also needs to be able to overcome technical 
challenges. Firstly, the methods of analysis must consider the possibility of an endogenous 
relationship between the dependent and independent variables, in this case, whether there 
is a loop of causality between the socio-economic status of women and participation of a 
country in an IMF agreement. It is agreed that entry into an IMF agreement is not random 
and there is the potential that the factors influencing the independent variable are the same 
as those influencing entry into and IMF agreement. For instance, it is logical to propose that 
GDP and GDP Growth influence a states’ need for IMF support. Low-income countries often 
seek financial support IMF support when trying to overcome economic difficulty. At the same 
time, it is also logical to propose that a state's GDP and GDP Growth levels influence a states’ 
ability to invest in social services such as public health, public education, security, all of which 
impact the socio-economic status of women. This is a common problem with research 
exploring the impact of IMF participation, as such, Bauer et al. (2012:44) highlights that such 
work is ‘plagued with statistical problems’ as a result of endogeneity and omitted variable 
bias.   
 
Secondly, heteroscedasticity is often an issue for analyses that utilise ordinary least square 
(OLS) regression on cross-sectional and panel data. Testing of homoscedasticity will highlight 
whether the regression model has the ability to consistently predict across all values of the 
dependent variable, both high and low. Such consistency of prediction is essential to a 
model’s success.  Using time-series cross-sectional data adds complexity and Beck and Katz 
(1995) point out that it is likely the errors for a particular country are related to errors for that 
country in other years. Additionally, it is also likely that errors for one country in a particular 
year are related to errors in other countries for that same year.  With this in mind, Beck and 
Katz (1995), point out that a simple OLS is not preferable and advocate using a standard 
ordinary least squares regression with panel corrected standard errors (OLS-PCSE) when 
working with time-series cross-sectional data. Such an approach corrects panel 
heteroscedasticity and the correlation of errors. 
 
Thirdly, omitted variable bias needs consideration. If important variables are not included in 
the model, it means that any estimated resulting parameters are likely to be biased as the 
model is not considering influential data. The inclusion of country and year fixed effects in 
models will allow my model to exploit variation within a grouping of data and is a necessary 
inclusion to help eliminate sources of omitted variable bias. While the use of fixed effects 
does not eliminate entirely the possibility of omitted variable bias, it does reduce it 
substantially and is a common mechanism used when dealing with cross-country panel data.  
 
 
 
 
 
124 
 
6.3 Model design 
For my model design, I take the lead from Bauer et al. (2012). Their model takes these 
corrections a step further with the use of a Heckman treatment effects model with a Markov 
transition in the treatment equation. The impact of an IMF programme on the SES of women 
is best thought of as two-step process. Firstly, it is necessary to consider the importance of 
entry into an IMF agreement programme which is a non-random event. The impact of an IMF 
programme on the SES of women is not an independent decision and will be determined by 
participation in an IMF agreement.  Secondly, it is necessary also to consider the elements 
which determine the SES of women.  
 
The Heckman treatment effects model is a well-established approach for researchers 
exploring the impact of IMF programmes on a variety of socio-economic variables. It models 
a two-stage process including a regression equation which considers the contribution of 
factors to the outcome variable, in this case the SES of women, and a selection equation which 
considers the portion of the dataset whose outcome is observed and the factors which 
determined the selection process, in this case the probability of entry into an IMF agreement. 
 
The Heckman model also allows me to better manage issues of endogeneity, autocorrelation 
and heteroscedasticity. Treatment effects models allow researchers to estimate the causal 
effect of a treatment upon an outcome using observational data and is an appropriate model 
for my analysis. Treatment effects models are a two-stage process with an endogenous 
treatment variable of IMF participation and are a popular choice amongst researchers 
examining the impact of IMF agreements on various factors as they address endogeneity bias. 
The term ‘treatment effect’ refers to the underlying effect of a binary (0–1) variable, in this 
case, participation or not in an IMF agreement, on an outcome variable, in this case, the socio-
economic status of women. One of the main challenges for treatment effects is selection bias. 
In this case, as with all research exploring the impact that IMF programmes have on various 
variables, entry into an IMF agreement is not a random occurrence. A Markov transition 
encompasses the shift from one state of being to another. This is illustrated in illustration 6.16 
below. In the case of IMF participation, a Markov model can assume that tomorrow’s 
participation in an IMF agreement is a function of today’s IMF participation level (either 
participation or not). Since IMF participation is determined by a number of complex variables, 
it is important to consider the transition probabilities of a state transitioning in or out of an 
IMF agreement. The inclusion of this Markov transition enables the model predictions to be 
more accurate and better able to mitigate against selection bias issues as already highlighted 
above in section 6.21. 
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Illustration 6.21 Markov transition 
 
 
6.4 Model specification 
As already stated, the Heckman treatment effects model encompass two equations. The first 
being a treatment regression equation of the dependent variable and the second the 
endogenous treatment variable equation measuring the participation/non-participation in an 
IMF agreement. Firstly, let me begin with the treatment regression equation. In my study, the 
dependent variable is the SES of women, and this concept may be represented by both an 
aggregated and disaggregated indicator. My theory argues that the SES of women is best 
captured by the maternal health of women, female education and female labour force 
participation. In my data, each of these three areas is represented by an index while also, 
these areas are further disaggregated and represented by a selection of individual health, 
education and labour force indicators. This allows me to interrogate the data at both a high 
level and granular level, facilitating a deeper analysis. The treatment regression equation, 
therefore, explores the causal impact of explanatory variables upon my dependent variable.  
 
The second part of the endogenous treatment variable equation measures the 
participation/non-participation in an IMF agreement. In my study, as already stated, this is a 
dummy variable specifying whether a country is within an IMF agreement or not in any given 
year. In my data, this variable is imfprogramme. As highlighted earlier the independent 
variable ‘IMF Programme’ has a value of ‘1’ if a country was participating in an IMF 
arrangement and ‘0’ if not. As per Beck and Katz (1995) and Jensen (2004), I include a lagged 
dependent variable in the specifications to correct for serial autocorrelation. 
 
Important for my thesis is the consideration of what factors influence a state’s entry into an 
IMF programme. Macroeconomic factors dominated in early research, with current account 
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deficits and inflation (Bird and Orme,1986, Joyce,1992) reserves and debt servicing (Cornelius 
1987), GDP, net foreign assets and political instability (Edwards and Santealla,1993) found to 
be significant factors. Additionally, past participation in an IMF programme (Conway, 1994) 
and trade levels and international finance (Bird, 1995) were also found to be of considerable 
importance. Newer research is taking a more nuanced approach. Vreeland (2003) progressed 
the argument that states use the IMF as a cloak for policy implementation and that under an 
IMF agreement they are better able to push through unpopular economic reforms, while 
Breen (2014) develops the theory that the IMF shareholders favour agreements where it 
results in added protection from economic exposure to financial crises in developing and 
emerging economies. From this discussion, it becomes clear that participation in an IMF 
programme is not a random event. Specific macroeconomic and environmental forces play 
into a state’s participation in an IMF agreement, and it is critical for the analysis to incorporate 
these forces to gain a more accurate understanding of the interplay between IMF 
programmes and the SES of women. In the creation of my model, I have drawn from this 
research, and I have included variables commonly found to be significant in determining 
whether a state participates in an IMF agreement. Also, because IMF participation is modelled 
using a first order Markov process, I have included the interaction terms of the independent 
variables with the lag of IMF programme participation. Thus, the variables of interest for my 
independent variable IMF Participation are listed in Table 6.22. 
 
Table 6.22 Summary of lagged variables of interest for independent variable – IMF 
participation 
 
Lag of IMF Participation Lag of country’s IMF participation interacted with lag of 
country’s GDP per Capita 
Lag of country’s GDP per Capita Lag of country’s IMF participation interacted the lag of log of 
country’s GDP 
Lag of the log of country’s GDP Lag of country’s IMF participation interacted the lag of 
country’s GDP Growth 
Lag of country’s GDP Growth Lag of country’s IMF participation interacted with lag of log of 
country’s GDP growth 
Lag of the log of country’s GDP growth Lag of country’s IMF participation interacted with lag of 
country’s reserves 
Lag of country’s total reserves Lag of country’s IMF participation interacted with lag of 
country’s regime type 
Lag of Regime type of country  
 
 
This model can be expressed by the following equation: 
 
Equation 6.23 Treatment effects regression model 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝑌𝑖𝑡(𝑡 − 1)) + 𝛽2(𝑍𝑖𝑡(𝑡 − 1)) + 𝛽3(𝑋𝑖𝑡(𝑡 − 1)) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
 
127 
 
 
Where  
• 𝑌𝑖𝑡 denotes the measures of the dependent variable the SES of Women, with the 
subscripts i and t indicating the observation and year 
• 𝛽0 is the intercept 
• 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the error term 
• 𝛽1(𝑌𝑖𝑡(𝑡 − 1)) This is the dependent variable of interest including its explanatory 
variables 
• 𝛽2(𝑍𝑖𝑡(𝑡 − 1)) This comprises the explanatory variables including participation in an IMF 
programme along with other socio-economic indicators determining IMF participation.  
• 𝛽3(𝑋𝑖𝑡(𝑡 − 1)) represents the outcome of unobserved variables which is a function of 
participation in an IMF programme in the previous year. 
 
 
6.4.1 Probability of participation in IMF agreement 
 
A probit model determining participation in an IMF programme can be written as follows: 
 
Equation 6.24: Probit model determining participation in an IMF programme 
 
𝑃(𝑖𝑚𝑓𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 1)
= 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑡 (𝛽1(𝑖𝑚𝑓𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑖(𝑡 − 1)) +  𝛽2(𝑋𝑖(𝑡 − 1))
+ 𝛽3 (𝑖𝑚𝑓𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑖(𝑡 − 1)  ∗ 𝑋𝑖(𝑡 − 1))) +  𝜇 
 
Where: 
β1: Represents the impact of the lag of IMF participation / being under an IMF agreement set 
in time − 1 on the probability of continuing to remain under an IMF agreement 
 
β2: Represents the impact of indicator variables Xi(t−1) (These are variables that determine 
IMF programme participation) on the probability of entering an IMF agreement by a state 
who is not currently under an IMF agreement. 
 
β3: Signifies the difference between the impact of indicator variables Xi(t−1) when the 
country is already under an agreement compared to when the country is not already under 
an agreement. 
 
From this model, it will be possible to analyse the coefficients and identify variation in the 
contributing factors of an IMF agreement including within the context of continuous 
participation in an IMF programme versus transitioning into an IMF programme. 
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The results of this probit model are displayed below in Table 6.25. Four models are specified. 
The first is the basic probit model including the various economic indicators which are likely 
to contribute to a state choosing to enter into an IMF agreement. Here I take my lead from 
Bauer et al. (2012) and Vreeland (2000, 2002) who outline key economic determinants 
common among states entering into an IMF agreement. Model 2 build on this specification 
by adding variables to control for regime type. Regime type proves to be of statistical 
significance which is notable. To facilitate a more nuanced analysis model 3 facilitates a split 
in the data running the probit on data whose regime type are democracies only and model 4 
is also run on a split of that data, this time only where regime types are autocracies only.  
Again, following Bauer et al. (2012) I have chosen to split the data using the Cheibub et al’s 
(2009) binary measure of regime type. Their data allows for the division of the data into 
democracies and autocracies. As with Bauer et al. (2012) I use a 1-year lag of the data for 
regime type, as this helps reduce endogeneity should entry into an IMF programme 
contribute to regime change.  
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Table 6.25 Results of probit model determining participation in an IMF programme 
Variable Pooled Data Inc Regime 
Type 
Democracies 
Only 
Autocracies 
only 
IMF Programme Lagged  5.43*** 4.61*** 5.78*** 3.15 
Standard errors (-1.48) (-1.64) (-2.17) (-2.52) 
GDP Per Capita Lagged -0.00* -0.00** 0 0 
Standard errors (0) (0) (0) (0) 
Log of GDP Per Capita Lagged -0.25*** -0.27*** -0.30*** -0.24** 
Standard errors (-0.06) (-0.06) (-0.08) (-0.12) 
GDP Lagged 0 0 0 0.00** 
Standard errors (0) (0) (0) (0) 
Log of GDP Lagged 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.02 
Standard errors (-0.03) (-0.03) (-0.05) (-0.06) 
GDP Growth Lagged 0 0.01 0.05 0 
Standard errors (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.04) (-0.01) 
Log of GDP Growth Lagged -0.11* -0.13* -0.29** -0.03 
Standard errors (-0.07) (-0.07) (-0.13) (-0.10) 
Total reserves as percent GDP 
Lagged 
-0.00* 0 0 -0.00** 
Standard errors (0) (0) (0) (0) 
IMF lagged * GDP Per Capita 
Lagged 
0 0 0 0 
Standard errors (0) (0) (0) (0) 
IMF lagged * Log of GDP Per 
Capita Lagged 
0.02 0.07 -0.01 0.17 
Standard errors (-0.14) (-0.14) (-0.19) (-0.25) 
IMF lagged * with lag GDP 0 0 0.00* 0 
Standard errors (0) (0) (0) (0) 
IMF lagged *log of GDP Lagged -0.15** -0.12* -0.16 -0.08 
Standard errors (-0.07) (-0.07) (-0.09) (-0.10) 
IMF lagged *GDP Growth lagged -0.04 -0.04 -0.01 -0.07** 
Standard errors (-0.03) (-0.03) (-0.07) (-0.03) 
IMF lagged * Log GDP Growth 
lagged 
0.13 0.07 0.01 0.23 
Standard errors (-0.14) (-0.16) (-0.28) (-0.20) 
IMF lagged * Total Reserves 
lagged 
0 0 0 0 
Standard errors (0) (0) (0) (0) 
Regime type Lagged   -0.09*     
Standard errors  (-0.03)   
IMF lagged * Regime Type lagged  0.04   
Standard errors  (-0.06)   
 Observations 2,674 2,405 1,505 1,161 
Standard errors in parentheses:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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6.4.2 Robustness checks of probit model 
Running tests to ascertain the ‘goodness of fit’ of the model are essential. Such tests compare 
the observed values in the models presented to the expected values and how accurate the 
models are in their predictability. I have run several tests across each of the four models 
presented and these are presented below in Table 6.26. In this case, the results range from 
the lowest of McFaddens Adj R2 of 0.599 to the highest of Cragg-Uhler (Nagelkerke) R2: 1.000. 
While these statistics are not direct equivalents of R-squared in linear regression, generally 
they suggest a good overall fit for the model. This gives me confidence in the accuracy and 
appropriateness of my model specification. 
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Table 6.26 Results of goodness-of-fit tests 
Test Pooled 
Data  
Inc Regime 
Type 
Democracies 
only 
Autocracies 
only 
Interpretation 
Log-Link Intercept 
Only: 
-1710.684 -1547.779 -953.266 -953.266 log-likelihood for a model with the intercept only 
Log-Link Full Model:   -685.674 -614.909 -375.336 -375.336 log-likelihood for the full model 
D: 1371.348 1229.817 750.673 750.673 Deviance with degrees of freedom. Deviance in logistic regression is analogous to the sum of squared residuals in OLS 
regression. LR(11): 2050.020 1865.741 1155.860 1155.860 The likelihood ratio chi-square with degrees of freedom (11), 
Prob > LR: 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 The p-value for this chi-square 
McFadden's R2:  0.599 0.603 0.606 0.606 According to McFadden (1979) ‘to evaluate the goodness-of-fit of logistic models, several pseudo-R-squared have been 
developed.   These are ‘pseudo’ R-squared because they look like R-squared in the sense that they are on a similar 
scale, ranging from 0 to 1 (though some pseudo-R-squared never achieve 0 or 1) with higher values indicating better 
model fit 
McFadden's Adj R2: 0.590 0.592 0.589 0.589 McFadden's adjusted mirrors the adjusted R-squared in OLS by penalising a model for including too many predictors. If 
the predictors in the model are effective, then the penalty will be small relative to the added information of the 
predictors.  If a model contains predictors that do not add sufficiently to the model, then the penalty becomes 
noticeable, and the adjusted R-squared can decrease with the addition of a predictor, even if the R-squared increases 
slightly. Negative McFadden's adjusted R-squared is possible. 
ML (Cox-Snell) R2: 1.000 1.000 0.536 0.536 The ratio of the likelihoods reflects the improvement of the full model over the intercept model (the smaller the ratio, 
the greater the improvement). 
Cragg-Uhler 
(Nagelkerke) R2: 
1.000 1.000 0.536 0.536 This adjusts Cox and Snell's so that the range of possible values extends to 1. 
McKelvey and 
Zavoina's R2:  
0.773 0.750 0.789 0.789 M &K calculations are based on predicting a continuous latent variable underlying the observed 0-1 outcomes in the 
data.  The model predictions of the latent variable can be calculated using the model coefficients (NOT the log-odds) 
and the predictor variables. 
Efron's R2: 0.674 0.677 0.671 0.671 Here -the model residuals are squared, summed, and divided by the total variability in the dependent variable, and this 
R-squared is also equal to the squared correlation between the predicted values and actual values. 
Variance of y*:  4.408 3.993 4.741 4.741 The variance of the underlying latent dependent variable 
Variance of error: 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000   
Count R2: 0.915 0.914 0.912 0.912   
Adj Count R2:  0.748 0.748 0.731 0.731   
AIC:    0.525 0.525 0.520 0.520 Akaike's Information Criterion 
AIC*n: 1403.348 1263.817 782.673 782.673 Akaike's Information Criterion 
BIC: -
19603.809 
-17361.492 -10143.667 -10143.667 Bayesian Information Criterion 
BIC': -1963.215 -1772.317 -1075.378 -1075.378 Bayesian Information Criterion 
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6.4.3 Results of probit testing and probability of IMF participation 
With the goodness of fit statistics pointing towards a high level of confidence in the model’s 
ability to predict IMF participation, it becomes appropriate to note the most significant 
results. In keeping with my theoretical questions, one of which proposes that regime type 
plays a role in what impact the IMF programme may have on women, I have created the 
models to reflect the complexity of regime type to understand what role it plays. Initially, I 
used Polity IV data (as developed by Marshall and Gurr) to capture the regime spectrum. 
Polity IV uses a 21-point scale ranging from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated 
democracy)27, but some instances suffer from missing data. As such I chose then to uses data 
from an alternative dataset called Democracy-Dictatorship developed in 2009 by Cheibub, 
Gandhi and Vreeland. This is an improved dataset and provides a dichotomous measure of a 
states’ regime type in the context of either democracy or autocracy and has no missing data. 
As such, the Cheibub et al (2009) dataset is a better-quality dataset and a more appropriate 
choice. This decision is also consistent with Bauer et al. (2012). As already stated models 1 
and 2 uses a pooled set of date, in that, both autocracies and democracies are included. 
Model 3 only uses data for democratic states and model 4 only autocratic states. This 
refinement allows me to uncover any variation hidden through pooling the data. 
Firstly, from the results, it is clear that past participation in an IMF programme is a key 
determinant of whether a state will undergo an IMF agreement in models 1, 2 and 3. The 
coefficient for previous participation in an IMF agreement is positive and highly significant to 
a P value of .005 for models 1, 2 and 3. This is a logical result. While some states may be in a 
position to conclude their agreement with the IMF and return to a position of economic 
sovereignty, it is also logical that many states undergoing an IMF agreement might be likely 
to either continue on with the current programme or alternatively sign a new programme 
with the IMF for continued support and finance until their economic position improves.  
Secondly, the influence which regime type has is of statistical significance. This is indeed 
noteworthy as it begs the question as to whether democracies have different experiences 
under IMF programmes than autocracies, gain better terms to resign agreements than 
autocracies, or is it that autocracies withdraw from IMF support more readily? Model 2, which 
is performed on pooled data, would indicate that regime type is indeed highly significant and 
negative, in that as countries’ regime type score falls (closer to autocracy), IMF participation 
becomes more likely. Thirdly, leading on from the statistical significance of regime type it then 
becomes appropriate to explore the impact of regime type more fully. Models 3 and 4 use 
split data with model 3, using only data for democracies only and model 4 using data for 
autocracies only. There is variance between regime types and what is surprising is that 
previous participation in an IMF agreement is not statistically significant for autocracies. On 
splitting the data, the results illustrate a more nuanced finding which is that regime type 
                                                          
27 About Polity Project: http://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html  
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drives variation in IMF participation. Finally, an increase of a democratic level also increases 
the likelihood of IMF participation. 
This could support Vreeland’s (2001) theory of political will, where countries that have a 
strong level of political will submit to IMF programmes for the long terms benefits. 
Democracies with their need to satisfy a greater variety of domestic interests may have the 
greater political will to work for long-term economic benefits. Some autocracies differ from 
democracies dramatically. Relationships between the autocratic regime and its elites logically 
result in the autocratic regime being more sensitive to the impact that IMF economic reforms 
have on their political stability. This thought borrows from and is consistent with Brumberg 
(2002), who highlighted that liberalisation proves to be a dilemma for autocracies. As such, 
certain autocrats may resist IMF agreements that aim to liberalise and reform the economy 
as it may impinge negatively upon the elites that benefit from the lack of competition, as such 
past participation does not play the same role in the IMF agreement process for autocracies. 
Alternatively, autocrats with strong control may find elements of an IMF programme 
beneficial and may be able to manage internal domestic interests sufficiently in order to 
develop the political will to sign an IMF agreement.  Another possibility is that all else being 
equal, the IMF Executive Board may be less likely to approve a programme for autocracies, 
than for democracies. 
The results displayed in Table 6.25 also illustrate some similarities between regime types who 
enter an IMF agreement. All of the variables which are statistically significant are in the same 
direction across the models.  The Log of GDP Per Capita is negative and highly significant to a 
P value of .01 for all 4 models.  Additionally, the Log of GDP Growth is also negative for all 
models and statistically significant for all models with the exception of model 4. This is also a 
logical result. GDP per capital is a reflection of a state’s economic output and GDP Growth is 
a reflection of a state’s economic strength and the model predicts that IMF participation is 
more likely if GDP per capita or GDP Growth reduces. It is clear that not only does regime type 
play a significant role in itself, but it is also clear that the impact of GDP Growth as a 
determining factor in IMF participation differs depending upon the regime construction. 
The main contribution this dissertation aims to make is to uncover the impact of IMF 
programmes upon the SES of women. As such, the probit models above in Table 6.25 are 
mainly important for their inclusion into the full two-stage treatment effects model. However, 
the better the ability of the model to predict participation / non-participation in an IMF 
agreement, then the better the model will perform in the full two-stage treatment effects 
model. 
6.5 Impact of IMF programmes on the socio-economic status of women 
As already stated, treatment effects models combine two equations. The results relating to 
the participation in an IMF agreement has already been presented it is now appropriate to 
present the outcome upon the SES of women with IMF participation as the endogenous 
dummy variable. As already outlined, the SES of women is an aggregated concept that 
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considers maternal health care, female education and female labour force participation. To 
adequately understand the impact that IMF participation has upon the SES of women I 
conducted a number of tests using variables that represent the SES of women at both an 
aggregated and disaggregated level.  
6.5.1 Maternal health 
1. Maternal health index 
As outlined earlier the following indicators are considered important indicators of maternal 
health. Firstly, to gain insight at a high level, I created a scaled index comprised of key 
maternal health indicators listed below in Table 6.27. 
I named this index variable Maternal Health Index. The only indicator requiring scaling was 
the maternal mortality rate which was first on the scale of 1:100000 births and I reduced this 
to 1:100 to fit the model. For the purpose of the index, all indicators were structured to move 
in the same direction. I edited the index to take account of the fact that some of the indicators 
are positive increasing and some negative increasing. For example, an increase in fertility 
rates impacts female health and wellbeing negatively while an increase in births attended by 
skilled professionals impacts female health and wellbeing positively. As such, I edited the sign 
of the of the indicators ensuring that the constructed index is powerful and responsive, and 
this variable was then integrated into the various two-step models for analysis. This is 
presented below in Table 6.27. 
Table 6.27 Maternal health index composition 
Composition of scaled Index Sign direction 
Births attended by skilled professionals sign remained positive 
Contraception prevalence of women 19-49 sign remained positive 
Pregnant women receiving prenatal health care sign remained positive 
Lifetime risk of maternal death made sign negative 
Teenage mothers aged 15 – 19 made sign negative 
Maternal mortality rates made sign negative 
Fertility rates made sign negative 
 
In presenting my results, it is important to present the most robust results to ensure the 
validity and thoroughness of my dissertation. To ensure that the model mitigated the risk of 
endogeneity which can be caused by omitted variable, simultaneous causality or errors of 
measurement, it was essential to consider incorporating fixed effects. The Hausman test can 
indicate whether to include fixed effects in panel data analysis. In this case the Hausman test 
proved significant and indicated that it is important to include country fixed effects to help 
counter endogeneity. As such my testing included running the treatment model with country 
fixed effects allowing the model to capture systematic differences across each of the 
countries in the dataset. The results for each of these tests related to maternal health can be 
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seen in Appendix 9.1 – 9.24. I present the results of testing including country fixed effects. I 
believe that my choice to present the results using country effects is the best choice. It is 
accepted that using both country and year fixed effects often removes any significance from 
the results and presenting the results using country effects is also consistent with Bauer et al. 
(2012). In reviewing the test results throughout this dissertation, it is important to highlight 
that there was insufficient data for some tests. As such, the model did not return valid results 
which could be included in this dissertation. In such cases, the table highlights that insufficient 
data was available for the model to return valid results.     
To understand the impact IMF programmes have upon the maternal health of women, I begin 
my analysis at a high level. Firstly tables 6.28 through to 6.30 display the impact IMF 
programmes have on the maternal health index. The model includes country effects as per 
Bauer et al. (2012). 3 models are presented with Table 6.28 illustrating the impact of IMF 
programme participation on the maternal health index, while Table 6.29 controls for 
implementation levels and Table 6.30 controls for programme design focus. Not only have I 
have tested against a pooled set of data that incorporates all regimes types I have also tested 
to see if regime type drives variation in impact. Additionally, to gain greater insight I have also 
run tests to uncover any regional variation and the results from these tests are also presented 
in Table 6.31, Table, 6.32 and table 6.33.  There are several points worth noting from these 
results, and I shall address them in turn. 
Participation in an IMF programme: 
There are no results of statistical significance from testing against the pooled data or when 
the data is split by regime type. Participating in an IMF programme does not have a 
statistically significant impact upon the SES of women as represented by the maternal health 
index in these cases. Exploring the impact of participation in an IMF programme upon the 
maternal health index from a regional view has one interesting finding (Table 6.31). There is 
a statistically significant reduction in the maternal health index of 4.08 percent in the CIS 
region. While it is important to acknowledge that the sample size is small, this finding would 
be in line with existing research which finds that the Post-Soviet economic transition was not 
positive for women’s health and welfare (Wejnert, Parrot and Djumabaeva, 2008, Dagaragulia 
and Badashvili, 2010). 
Implementation of an IMF programme: 
Theoretically, I argue that while participation in an IMF programme is important, the crucial 
question should be around whether the state has actually implemented the IMF programme. 
Where the state has implemented the programme, it is fair to argue that the IMF has had the 
potential to significantly alter policy direction. However the corollary applies, and where the 
state does not implement the programme, then it is also fair to argue that the impact the IMF 
can have in this state is minimised. In the case of the pooled data and the data split by regime 
type, the results are not statistically significant. However, the results in Table 6.32 illustrate 
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that there is indeed regional variation in the impact of IMF programmes upon women when 
implementation levels are controlled for.   
Design of an IMF programme: 
My theoretical questions also proposed that programme design is important. Conditions built 
into IMF programmes can focus on spending reforms or Quantitative Performance Criteria 
(QPC). These are macroeconomic targets that focus upon fiscal measures or seek to manage 
national budgets with many focused on monetary policy and exchange rate issues. 
Alternatively, or additionally, the IMF may specify structural reforms which link IMF lending 
to policy reform. These policy reforms focus upon developing macroeconomic stability, 
economic growth, employment and investment. In this case of the maternal health index, the 
results are not statistically significant.  
  
 
 
137 
 
Table 6.28: The impact of IMF participation on Maternal Health index 
Dependent Variable Maternal Health Index Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF Programme (IMF Programme) 
No of Obs: 1014 
Wald chi² (157) = 481.38 
Prob > chi² = 0.00 
Rho = -0.04026 
No of Obs: 601  
Wald chi² (92) = 342.80  
Prob > chi² = 0.00 
Rho = -0.04219 
No of Obs: 407 
Wald chi² (71) = 136.10 
Prob > chi² = 0.00 
Rho =-0.05370 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme -0.44 -1.02 -0.73 -1.33 -0.44 -1.74 
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1) 4.45* -2.404 3.82 -3.217 -1.741 7.71 
GDP per capita (t-1) -2.404 0 -3.217 0 -6.885 0 
Log of GDP per capita (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Log of GDP (t-1) -0.35*** -0.107 -0.37*** -0.139 -0.22 -0.271 
GDP Growth (t-1) 0.05** -0.023 0.02 0.066 0.05 -0.029 
Log of GDP Growth (t-1) -0.40*** -0.129 -0.38*** -0.202 0.31 -0.234 
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita 0.17 -0.202 -0.07 -0.279 0.61 -0.443 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1) -0.17 -0.112 -0.09 -0.152 -0.239 -0.01 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1) -0.04 -0.057 -0.104 0.46 -0.081 0.14 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1) 0.39 -0.256 0.46 -0.384 0.14 -0.412 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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Table 6.29: The effect of IMF Programme Implementation on Maternal Health index 
Dependent Variable Maternal Health Index Pooled Data28 Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF Programme (IMF Programme) 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
No of Obs: 144 
Wald chi² (41) = 92.32 
Prob > chi² = 0.00 
Rho = -0.57673 
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme     5.25 -4.95 
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1)     -5341.11*** -4.346 
GDP per capita (t-1)     4.44*** -0.089 
Log of GDP per capita (t-1)     -1170.30*** -4.059 
GDP (t-1)     0 0 
Log of GDP (t-1)     0.01 -0.174 
GDP Growth (t-1)     0.03 -0.072 
Log of GDP Growth (t-1)     -0.18 -0.337 
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1)     0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1)     -4.44*** -0.089 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita     -1170.68*** -4.076 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP     0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1)     0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1)     0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1)     0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1)     0 0 
Implementation Levels (t-1)     0 -0.006 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
                                                          
28 In reviewing the test results throughout this dissertaion it is important to highlight that there was insufficient data for some tests. As such, the model did not return valid results which 
could be included in this dissertation. In such cases, the table highlights that insufficient data was available for the mode to return valid results. 
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Table 6.30: The effect of IMF Programme Design on Maternal Health index 
Dependent Variable Maternal Health Index Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF Programme (IMF Programme) 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
No of Obs: 142 
Wald chi² (41) = 91.95  
Prob > chi² = 0.00 
Rho = -0.52856 
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme     4.66 -4.63 
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1)     -5402.02*** -4.345 
GDP per capita (t-1)     -4.45*** -0.089 
Log of GDP per capita (t-1)     -1184.02*** -4.065 
GDP (t-1)     0 0 
Log of GDP (t-1)     0.01 -0.171 
GDP Growth (t-1)     0.04 -0.071 
Log of GDP Growth (t-1)     -0.25 -0.339 
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1)     0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1)     -4.50*** -0.089 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita     1184.50*** -4.018 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP     0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1)     0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1)     0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1)     0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1)     0 0 
Ratio of QPC Conditions to SPC Conditions     0.01** -0.006 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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Table 6.31 Regional view of the impact of IMF programme participation on the maternal health index  
Dependent 
Variable Maternal Health Index 
Asia Pac Europe / Nth America Africa Latin America CIS Arab States 
Independent 
Variable 
Participation in IMF 
Programme (IMF 
Programme) 
Insufficient data for 
model to return results 
No of Obs: 243 
Wald chi² (42) = 225.71 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = - 0.52573 
No of Obs:329 
Wald chi² (50) = 66.06 
Prob > chi² = 0.0636 
Rho = -0.20576 
No of Obs: 152 
Wald chi² (28) = 58.18 
Prob > chi² = 0.0007 
Rho = 0.33344 
No of Obs: 50 
Wald chi² (11) = 49.15 
Prob > chi² = 0.0000 
Rho = 1.000 
No of Obs:76 
Wald chi² (15) = 3.92  
Prob > chi² = 0.9980 
Rho = 1.00 
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on IMF programme   2.27 -2.202 0.71 -1.944 -3.6 -2.883 -4.80* -2.703 -3.1 -7.93 
Participation on IMF programme (t-1)   19.69 -20.002 -3.6 -6.596 21.8 -15.36 310.18 0 1,476.07 0 
GDP per capita (t-1)   0 0 0 0 0 -0.001 -0.01 -0.258 -0.03 -8.129 
Log of GDP per capita (t-1)   -1.15** -0.474 -0.37 -0.387 0.99 -1.771 81.04 0 -70.36 0 
GDP (t-1)   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Log of GDP (t-1)   0.32 -0.281 0.18 -0.17 0.52 -0.33 -23.77 -21.715 93.93 -402.34 
GDP Growth (t-1)   -0.11 -0.151 0.02 -0.072 -0.8 -0.492 13.58 -13.748 0.05 -750.92 
Log of GDP Growth (t-1)   -0.11 -0.29 -0.21 -0.413 1.24 -1.205 -59.54 -59.735 3.56 0 
Reserves as percentage of GDP (t-1)   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP 
Per capita (t-1)   0 -0.001 0 0 0 -0.001 -0.02 -0.261 -0.08 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of 
GDP Per capita   -0.79 -2.099 0.65 -0.509 -1.76 -1.973 -51.54* -30.158 145.19 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of 
GDP (t-1)   -0.64 -0.514 0.09 -0.295 -0.42 -0.384 5 -17.683 -99.7 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP 
Growth (t-1)   0.26 -0.356 -0.03 -0.096 0.87* -0.521 -11.99 -12.014 0.03 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of 
GDP Growth (t-1)   0 -1.048 0.34 -0.51 -1.33 -1.326 43.25 0 -3.73 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total 
Reserves (t-1)   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Country Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
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Table 6.32 Regional view of the impact of IMF programmes implementation on the maternal health index  
DV Maternal Health Index Asia Pac Europe / Nth America Africa Latin America CIS Arab States 
Independent 
Variable 
Participation in IMF 
Programme (IMF 
Programme) 
Insufficient data for 
model to return results 
Insufficient data for 
model to return results 
No of Obs: 187 
Wald chi² (37) = 66.78 
Prob > chi² = 0.0019 
Rho = -.51356 
No of Obs: 60 
Wald chi² (21) = 30.82 
Prob > chi² = 0.0766 
Rho = -0.05463 
Insufficient data for 
model to return results 
Insufficient data for 
model to return results 
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on IMF programme     4 -5.236 3.29 -10.679     
Participation on IMF programme (t-1)     3,979.23*** -5.351 -366.54 0     
GDP per capita (t-1)     -4.67*** -0.063 0.03 -0.125     
Log of GDP per capita (t-1)     927.40*** -2.652 -57.25 -39.581     
GDP (t-1)     0.00*** 0 0 0     
Log of GDP (t-1)     0.29 -0.241 0.14 -0.224     
GDP Growth (t-1)     0 -0.066 0.13 -0.19     
Log of GDP Growth (t-1)     0.03 -0.315 -0.2 -0.608     
Reserves as percentage of GDP (t-1)     0 0 0 0     
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP 
Per capita (t-1)     4.67*** -0.063 -0.03 -0.125     
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log 
of GDP Per capita     -927.08*** -2.668 55.65 -39.56     
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP     -0.00*** 0         
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of 
GDP (t-1)                  
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP 
Growth (t-1)                  
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log 
of GDP Growth (t-1)                  
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total 
Reserves (t-1)                  
Implementation Levels (t-1)     0.01 -0.006 -0.01 -0.008     
Country Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
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Table 6.33 Regional view of the impact of IMF programme design levels on the maternal health index 
DV Maternal Health Index Asia Pac Europe / Nth America Africa Latin America CIS Arab States 
Independent 
Variable 
Participation in IMF 
Programme (IMF 
Programme) 
Insufficient data for 
model to return results 
No of Obs: 38 
Wald chi² (15) = 5.19 
Prob > chi² = 0.9904 
Rho = -1.000 
No of Obs: 187 
Wald chi² (37) = 66.69 
Prob > chi² = 0.0020 
Rho = -0.56394 
No of Obs: 60 
Wald chi² (21) = 30.56 
Prob > chi² = 0.0814 
Rho = 0.09222 
Insufficient data for 
model to return results 
Insufficient data for 
model to return results 
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on IMF programme   42.75 -41.393 4.63 -5.389 1.43 -10.099     
Participation on IMF programme (t-1)   4.06 -400.79 4,471.78*** -5.375 -381.24 0     
GDP per capita (t-1)   0 -0.001 -5.25*** -0.069 0.03 -0.125     
Log of GDP per capita (t-1)   -1.21 -2.115 1,042.03*** -2.881 -59.38 -39.591     
GDP (t-1)   0 0 0.00*** 0 0 0     
Log of GDP (t-1)   -0.03 -0.63 0.3 -0.244 0.13 -0.23     
GDP Growth (t-1)   0.23 -0.356 0 -0.063 0.15 -0.188     
Log of GDP Growth (t-1)   -0.55 -1.085 0.06 -0.305 -0.25 -0.6     
Reserves as percentage of GDP (t-1)   0 0 0 0 0 0     
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) 
* GDP Per capita (t-1)      5.25*** -0.069 -0.03 -0.125     
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) 
* Log of GDP Per capita      -1,041.77*** -2.893 57.91 -39.572     
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) 
* GDP      -0.00*** 0        
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * 
Log of GDP (t-1)                
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * 
GDP Growth (t-1)                
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) 
* Log of GDP Growth (t-1)                
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * 
Total Reserves (t-1)                
Programme Design (t-1)   -0.01 -0.014 0.01 -0.005 -0.01 -0.009     
Country Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
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2. Maternal health indicators 
The results from this high-level analysis demand further investigation, and as such, it is 
appropriate to present some of the findings from testing the individual components of 
Maternal Health Index to understand more clearly where the impact is felt most. It is clear 
from the results displayed in Appendices 9.1 - 9.24 that IMF programmes do indeed have an 
impact on certain elements of the maternal health care of women. While earlier results 
looked at an aggregation of maternal health care indicators, drilling down to an individual 
indicator level allows me to gain a more nuanced view and explore the specific areas impacted 
or not. It is also clear that implementation and programme design matters at this more 
granular level. Firstly, IMF programmes appear to have a statistically significant impact on the 
number of pregnant women receiving prenatal health care. Participation in an IMF 
programme has a positive impact on women receiving prenatal care with democracies seeing 
a 1.88 percent increase in the number of women receiving prenatal care as a result of 
participation in an IMF programme – see Table 9.19. In keeping with my theoretical argument 
that implementation and programme design are what matters, it is then interesting to see 
that the results change. On controlling for implementation levels or programme design focus, 
we see that there is a positive and statistically significant impact on rates of prenatal care in 
autocracies. Controlling for implementation (Appendix 9.20) sees a 12.2 percent increase in 
the number of women receiving prenatal care in autocracies and controlling for programme 
design (Appendix 9.21) sees an 8.6 percent increase in the number of women receiving 
prenatal care in autocracies. It is important to caveat these results with an acknowledgement 
of the sample size. The sample size is very low for this indicator with only 219 observations. 
With such a low sample size over a 21-year period across 173 countries, is it difficult to 
consider this result with confidence. It is also important to comment on this sample size. The 
lack of data points towards a failure of states to gather this essential information, reflecting 
the low importance placed upon women’s maternal health care.  
Secondly and of particular note is the relationship between IMF programmes and maternal 
mortality rates. Most interesting, when first we look at the pooled data we see a statistically 
significant reduction of almost 22 maternal deaths per 10,000 as a result of participation in 
an IMF programme (Appendix 9.16). However, participation in an IMF programme has a 
stronger statistically significant impact on maternal mortality in autocracies than 
democracies. While participation in an IMF programme significantly reduces the rates of 
maternal mortality, when implementation levels or design of the IMF programme are 
considered, the statistical significance is lost (Appendix 9.17 and 9.18). The sample size is 
much increased for maternal mortality rates with 1007 observations. As such, it is possible to 
have greater confidence in the result. Similarly, lifetime risk of maternal death with a total of 
874 observations, also sees statistically significant reductions which are lost on controlling for 
implementation levels or programme design (Appendices 9.13, 9.14 and 9.15). These results 
illustrate that the real impact is obscured by analysis on pooled data and failure to consider 
implementation levels or programme design leads to an incomplete analysis. 
 
 
144 
 
Table 6.34 Full list of results exploring impact of IMF programmes on maternal health 
Appendix 
Number 
Table Description  
9.1 The Impact of IMF Programme participation on Maternal Health Index 
9.2 The Impact of IMF Programme implementation on Maternal Health Index 
9.3 The Impact of IMF Programme design on Maternal Health Index 
9.4 The Impact of IMF Programme participation on Births attended by Health Professional 
9.5 The Impact of IMF Programme implementation on Births attended by Health Professional 
9.6 The Impact of IMF Programme design on Births attended by Health Professional 
9.7 The Impact of IMF Programme participation on Contraceptive prevalence among married 
women aged 19-49 
9.8 The Impact of IMF Programme implementation on Contraceptive prevalence among married 
women aged 19-49 
9.9 The Impact of IMF Programme design on Contraceptive prevalence among married women 
aged 19-49 
9.10 The Impact of IMF Programme participation on female fertility rates 
9.11 The Impact of IMF Programme implementation on female fertility rates 
9.12 The Impact of IMF Programme design on female fertility rates 
9.13 The Impact of IMF Programme participation on lifetime risk of maternal death 
9.14 The Impact of IMF Programme implementation on lifetime risk of maternal death 
9.15 The Impact of IMF Programme design on lifetime risk of maternal death 
9.16 The Impact of IMF Programme participation on Maternal Mortality rates 
9.17 The Impact of IMF Programme implementation on Maternal Mortality rates 
9.18 The Impact of IMF Programme design on Maternal Mortality rates 
9.19 The Impact of IMF Programme participation on Pregnant women receiving prenatal care 
9.20 The Impact of IMF Programme implementation on Pregnant women receiving prenatal care 
9.21 The Impact of IMF Programme design on Pregnant women receiving prenatal care 
9.22 The Impact of IMF Programme participation on teenage mothers aged 15-19  
9.23 The Impact of IMF Programme implementation on teenage mothers aged 15-19 
9.24 The Impact of IMF Programme design on teenage mothers aged 15-19  
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6.5.2 Female education 
1. Female education index 
Female education is also highly important when considering the SES of women. As with 
maternal health, to gain insight at a high level, I created a scaled index comprised of the 
following female education indicators. The composite indicators of this index are listed below 
in Table 6.35:  
Table 6.35 Female education index composition 
 
Indicator Name Indicator Name 
Female-male primary enrolment  Average years primary female 15+ 
Female-male secondary enrolment Average years primary female 15-19 
Female-male tertiary enrolment Average years primary female 20-24 
Female primary completion rate Average years primary female 25-29 
Progression to secondary - female Average years primary female 30-34 
Female children not in school Average years of secondary female 15-19 
Average tertiary female 15+ Average years of secondary female 20-24 
Average tertiary female 15-19 Average years of secondary female 25-29 
Average tertiary female 20-24 Adjusted net intake rate primary female 
Average tertiary female 25+ Expected years schooling female 
Average tertiary female 25-29 Literate rate females 15-24 
Average tertiary female 30-34 Literate rate female 15+  
 Literate rate adult female 
 
I named this index variable Female Education Index. The only indicator requiring scaling was 
‘female children not in school’ which I rescaled from 0:14,000,000 to 0:140 the to fit the 
model. Additionally, I also reversed the sign of this indicator to reflect its negative impact. 
Increases in all other indicators are to be considered a positive for girls and women. However, 
a rise in the number of female children not in school is undoubtedly negative. This index 
variable was then integrated into the various two-step models for analysis. The results of the 
tests exploring the impact of IMF programmes upon female education are presented below 
in Tables 6.36, 6.37 and 6.38. 
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Table 6.36 The impact of IMF programme participation on female education index 
Dependent Variable Female Education Index Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF Programme (IMF Programme) 
No of Obs: 1382 
Wald chi² (146) = 2407.84  
Prob > chi² = 0.0000 
Rho = -0.14358 
No of Obs: 937 
Wald chi² (92) = 1450.27 
Prob > chi² = 0.0000 
Rho = -0.24277 
No of Obs:441 
Wald chi² (71) = 915.53  
Prob > chi² = 0.0000 
Rho = -0.01500 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme 2.25 -1.427 5.46*** -1.942 -1.97 -2.254 
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1) 3.51 -2.24 5.72 -3.648 -4.33 -4.338 
GDP per capita (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Log of GDP per capita (t-1) -0.30*** -0.098 -.29** -.121 -0.46** -0.203 
GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0.00** 0 
Log of GDP (t-1) 0.05 -0.056 0.02 -.088 0 -0.112 
GDP Growth (t-1) 0.01 -0.025 0.08 -0.061 0 -0.037 
Log of GDP Growth (t-1) -0.15 -0.111 -0.40** -0.179 0.01 -0.185 
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0 -0.00** 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita 0.18 -0.215 -0.13 -0.308 0.86** -0.431 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1) -0.1 -0.107 -0.11 -0.166 0.08 -0.183 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1) 0 -0.057 -0.03 -0.109 0 -0.078 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1) 0.04 -0.246 0.13 -0.391 0.12 -0.379 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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Table 6.37: The effect of IMF Programme Implementation on female education index, treatment effect model with Markov transition 
Dependent Variable Female Education Index Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF Programme (IMF Programme) 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
No of Obs:166 
Wald chi² (44) = 251.26 
Prob > chi² = 0.0000 
Rho = 0.17260 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme     -5.62 -10.872 
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1)     -3,709.06*** -3.852 
GDP per capita (t-1)     2.77*** -0.054 
Log of GDP per capita (t-1)     -799.71*** -2.731 
GDP (t-1)     0 0 
Log of GDP (t-1)     0.14 -0.155 
GDP Growth (t-1)     -0.01 -0.068 
Log of GDP Growth (t-1)     0.16 -0.328 
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1)     0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1)     -2.78*** -0.054 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita     800.12*** -2.752 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP     0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1)     0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1)     0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1)     0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1)     0 0 
Implementation Levels (t-1)     0 -0.006 
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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Table 6.38: The effect of IMF Programme Design on female education index, treatment effect model with Markov transition 
Dependent Variable Female Education Index Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF Programme (IMF Programme) 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
No of Obs:166 
Wald chi² (44) = 251.33 
Prob > chi² = 0.0000 
Rho = 0.17260 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme     -7.03 -11.048 
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1)     -3,704.27*** -3.896 
GDP per capita (t-1)     2.77*** -0.055 
Log of GDP per capita (t-1)     -798.62*** -2.741 
GDP (t-1)     0 0 
Log of GDP (t-1)     0.15 -0.152 
GDP Growth (t-1)     -0.01 -0.068 
Log of GDP Growth (t-1)     0.17 -0.329 
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1)     0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1)     -2.77*** -0.055 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita     799.02*** -2.765 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP     0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1)     0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1)     0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1)     0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1)     0 0 
Ratio of QPC Conditions to SPC Conditions     0 -0.005 
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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Table 6.36 considers the impact of IMF participation upon the female education index and 
shows no statistically significant correlation in the pooled data. However, the results do 
suggest that there are different processes happening dependent upon regime type and the 
effect of participating in and IMF agreement upon female education is obscured by pooling 
the data. IMF participation is associated with a statistically significant and positive impact on 
female education as represented by the female education index but in democracies only. The 
results for autocracies are not of statistical significance, and notably, the direction of the 
coefficients differ between democracies and autocracies. An analysis solely focused on 
pooled data would have missed out variation due to regime type.  
Table 6.37 incorporates an additional control for implementation levels while Table 6.38 
controls for programme design. These models allow me to test my hypothesis that while 
participation in an IMF programme is important, it is implementation and programme design 
which matters. The initial results utilising the female education index as a measure of the SES 
of women support this, and we see that when implementation and programme design are 
considered and included as a control variable, any impact of IMF programmes is altered. Any 
potential positive impact upon female education is lost implying that, while participation in 
an IMF agreement has the potential for a positive impact in democracies, the design and 
implementation of the programme fails to maximise this potential positive impact. This is in 
line with my theoretical argument. 
To uncover additional nuance, I have also used to model to test for any regional variations. 
Below I have presented a selection of notable results below in Tables 6.39 to 6.41. These 
results illustrate that there are indeed regional variations present in how IMF programmes 
impact the female education index. The only notable result is from Latin America where 
participation in an IMF has a statistically significant positive impact on female education as 
represented by the female education index. However, this is lost when controlling for 
programme design or implementation. It is important to caveat these results and note the 
lower level of observations, particularly with data from CIS and the Arab states.  As such, while 
they provide some indication of potential trends, these results should not be relied upon in 
isolation.   
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Table 6.39: The effect of IMF Programme participation on female education index, Regional View 
Dependent 
Variable 
Female Education 
Index 
Asia Pac Europe / Nth America Africa Latin America CIS Arab States 
Independent 
Variable 
Participation in 
IMF Programme 
(IMF Programme) 
No of Obs: 244 
Wald chi² (27) = 397.33 
Prob > chi² = 0.0000 
Rho = -0.22369 
No of Obs: 446 
Wald chi² (39) = 427.55  
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = -0.10972 
No of Obs: 358 
Wald chi² (46) = 610.69  
Prob > chi² = 0.0000 
Rho = -0.09355 
No of Obs: 201 
Wald chi² (26) = 188.59 
Prob > chi² = 0.0000 
Rho = -0.19636 
No of Obs: 67 
Wald chi² (11) = 136.12 
Prob > chi² = 0.0000 
Rho = -0.26184 
Insufficient data for 
model to return results 
           
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on IMF programme -1.87 -3.616 2.91 -2.904 -0.85 -2.152 7.27* -4.109 5.47 -5.338   
Participation on IMF programme (t-1) 19.2 -14.244 0.17 -13.279 -0.23 -7.527 21.95 -16.869 -1,838.05 0   
GDP per capita (t-1) 0 -0.001 0.00* 0 -0.00* -0.001 0 0 0 -0.412   
Log of GDP per capita (t-1) 0.88 -0.784 -1.68*** -0.465 0.8 -0.73 0.57 -1.176 141.40*** -36.794   
GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   
Log of GDP (t-1) 0.2 -0.161 0.27 -0.318 -0.16 -0.193 0.11 -0.194 
-
125.30*** -10.301   
GDP Growth (t-1) 0.04 -0.127 0 -0.131 0.03 -0.093 -0.06 -0.141 2.73 -13.338   
Log of GDP Growth (t-1) -0.36 -0.34 -0.25 -0.238 0.22 -0.387 -0.03 -0.455 -21.89 -114.081   
Reserves as percentage of GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   
Participation in IMF programmes (t-
1) * GDP Per capita (t-1) 0 -0.003 -0.00* 0 0 -0.001 0 -0.001 0 -0.412   
Participation in IMF programmes (t-
1) * Log of GDP Per capita -0.48 -2.001 3.04** -1.258 -0.76 -0.824 -2.17 -2.03 
-
136.76*** -36.697   
Participation in IMF programmes (t-
1) * GDP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * 
Log of GDP (t-1) -0.55 -0.423 -0.80* -0.47 0.29 -0.294 -0.22 -0.417 123.15*** -9.444   
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * 
GDP Growth (t-1) 0.24 -0.658 0.22 -0.294 -0.05 -0.117 0.22 -0.221 -0.29 -14.009   
Participation in IMF programmes (t-
1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1) -2.14 -3.755 -1.58 -1.481 0.11 -0.523 -0.23 -0.609 -0.05 -120.598    
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * 
Total Reserves (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0    
             
Country Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
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Table 6.40: The effect of IMF Programme Implementation on female education index, Regional View 
Dependent 
Variable 
Female Education 
INdex 
Asia Pac Europe / Nth America Africa Latin America CIS Arab States 
Independent 
Variable 
Participation in 
IMF Programme 
(IMF Programme) 
Insufficient data for 
model to return results 
Insufficient data for 
model to return results 
No of Obs: 206 
Wald chi² (36) = 278.54 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = -0.15254 
Insufficient data for 
model to return results 
No of Obs: 45 
Wald chi² (10) = 72.71 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = 0.000 
Insufficient data for 
model to return results 
           
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on IMF programme     -2.91 -8.169   2.25 -8.225   
Participation on IMF programme (t-1)     
-
5,325.15*** -5.402        
GDP per capita (t-1)     3.99*** -0.251   -0.44 0   
Log of GDP per capita (t-1)     
-
1,148.65*** -11.955   1,260.69 0.00   
GDP (t-1)     0 0   0 0   
Log of GDP (t-1)     0.09 -0.222   -1,296.97 0.00   
GDP Growth (t-1)     -0.01 -0.077   201.89 0   
Log of GDP Growth (t-1)     0.26 -0.37   -1,726.60 0.00   
Reserves as percentage of GDP (t-1)     0 0   0 0   
Participation in IMF programmes (t-
1) * GDP Per capita (t-1)     -3.99*** -0.251        
Participation in IMF programmes (t-
1) * Log of GDP Per capita     1,148.79***         
Participation in IMF programmes (t-
1) * GDP               
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * 
Log of GDP (t-1)               
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * 
GDP Growth (t-1)               
Participation in IMF programmes (t-
1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1)               
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * 
Total Reserves (t-1)               
Implementation Levels (t-1)     0.01 0   -13.87 0   
Country Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
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Table 6.41: The effect of IMF Programme Design on female education index, Regional View 
Dependent 
Variable 
Femal Education 
Index 
Asia Pac Europe / Nth America Africa Latin America CIS Arab States 
Independent 
Variable 
Participation in 
IMF Programme 
(IMF Programme) 
Insufficient data for 
model to return results 
Insufficient data for 
model to return results 
No of Obs: 206 
Wald chi² () =  
Prob > chi² =  
Rho =  
Insufficient data for 
model to return results 
No of Obs: 45 
Wald chi² () =  
Prob > chi² =  
Rho =  
No of Obs: 45 
Wald chi² () =  
Prob > chi² =  
Rho =  
           
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on IMF programme     -9.77 -8.777   15.65 -13.179 15.65 -13.179 
Participation on IMF programme (t-1)     
-
5,302.41*** -5.463         
GDP per capita (t-1)     3.97*** -0.248   -0.02 -0.024 -0.02 -0.024 
Log of GDP per capita (t-1)     
-
1,143.76*** -11.859   21 -25.422 21 -25.422 
GDP (t-1)     0 0   0 0 0 0 
Log of GDP (t-1)     0.13 -0.23   -11.54 -16.226 -11.54 -16.226 
GDP Growth (t-1)     -0.03 -0.071   2.07 -5.504 2.07 -5.504 
Log of GDP Growth (t-1)     0.38 -0.355   -22.43 -53.612 -22.43 -53.612 
Reserves as percentage of GDP (t-1)     0 0   0 0 0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-
1) * GDP Per capita (t-1)     -3.97*** -0.248         
Participation in IMF programmes (t-
1) * Log of GDP Per capita     1,143.75*** -11.868         
Participation in IMF programmes (t-
1) * GDP                
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * 
Log of GDP (t-1)                
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * 
GDP Growth (t-1)                
Participation in IMF programmes (t-
1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1)                
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * 
Total Reserves (t-1)                
Programme Design (t-1)     -0.01 -0.006   -0.27 -0.395 -0.27 -0.395 
Country Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
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2. Female Education Indicators 
As with maternal health, the results from this high-level analysis demands further 
investigation, and as such, it is appropriate to present some of the findings from testing the 
individual components of the female education index to understand more clearly where the 
impact is felt most. The full list of results is presented in Appendices 9.25 – 9.57 and illustrate 
the findings focusing on literacy, average years of schooling, enrolment and completion rates 
of primary, secondary and tertiary education and also, female progression to secondary level 
education. From a comparative perspective, I have included results for both female and 
males. There is value to be found in exploring whether there is variation in the impact that 
IMF programmes have between male and female. Existing research highlights that there is 
already a gender gap present in education and in countries where gender bias exists, there is 
often a cultural preference for investing available education funds into boys over girls. As 
such, it is relevant and important to understand how participating in an IMF programme 
interacts with this existing gender gap.  
Table: 6.42 – List of tables presenting results of Impact of IMF programmes on education  
Appendix 
number  
Tables Description 
9.25 The Impact of IMF Programme participation on Female Education index 
9.26 The Impact of IMF Programme implementation on Female Education index 
9.27 The Impact of IMF Programme design on Female Education index 
9.28 The Impact of IMF Programme participation on expected years of schooling – Female 
9.29 The Impact of IMF Programme implementation on expected years of schooling – 
Female 
9.30 The Impact of IMF Programme design on expected years of schooling – Female 
9.31 The Impact of IMF Programme participation on expected years of schooling – male 
9.32 The Impact of IMF Programme implementation on expected years of schooling – 
male 
9.33 The Impact of IMF Programme design on expected years of schooling - male 
9.34 The Impact of IMF Programme participation on the Male / Female Ratio for Primary 
Enrolment 
9.35 The Impact of IMF Programme implementation on the Male / Female Ratio for 
Primary Enrolment 
9.36 The Impact of IMF Programme design on the Male / Female Ratio for Primary 
Enrolment 
9.37 The Impact of IMF Programme participation on the Male / Female Ratio for 
secondary Enrolment 
9.38 The Impact of IMF Programme implementation on the Male / Female Ratio for 
secondary Enrolment 
9.39 The Impact of IMF Programme design on the Male / Female Ratio for secondary 
Enrolment 
9.40 The Impact of IMF Programme participation on the Male / Female Ratio for Tertiary 
Enrolment 
9.41 The Impact of IMF Programme implementation on the Male / Female Ratio for 
Tertiary Enrolment 
9.42 The Impact of IMF Programme design on the Male / Female Ratio for Tertiary 
Enrolment 
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9.43 The Impact of IMF Programme participation on primary school completion rates – 
female 
9.44 The Impact of IMF Programme implementation on primary school completion rates – 
female 
9.45 The Impact of IMF Programme design on primary school completion rates – female 
9.46 The Impact of IMF Programme participation on primary school completion rates – 
male 
9.47 The Impact of IMF Programme implementation on primary school completion rates – 
male 
9.48 The Impact of IMF Programme design on primary school completion rates – male 
9.49 The impact of IMF Programme participation on progression to secondary education – 
Female 
9.50 The impact of IMF Programme implementation on progression to secondary 
education – Female 
9.51 The impact of IMF Programme design on progression to secondary education – 
Female 
9.52 The impact of IMF Programme participation on progression to secondary education – 
Male 
9.53 The impact of IMF Programme implementation on progression to secondary 
education – male 
9.54 The impact of IMF Programme design on progression to secondary education – male 
9.55 The impact of IMF Programme participation on literacy rates – Female 
9.56 The impact of IMF Programme implementation on literacy rates – Female 
9.57 The impact of IMF Programme design on literacy rates – Female 
9.58 The impact of IMF Programme participation on literacy rates – Male 
9.59 The impact of IMF Programme implementation on literacy rates – male 
9.60 The impact of IMF Programme design on literacy rates – male 
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On reviewing the results presented in Appendices 9.25 – 9.60, it is clear that participation in 
an IMF programme does have a significant and positive impact on some female and male 
education indicators.  The results also illustrate that both implementation and programme 
design does indeed matter and it is not sufficient to consider participation in an IMF 
agreement alone. For example, participation in an IMF programme has no statistically 
significant impact on female literacy rates but controlling for implementation deeply affects 
the result for female literacy rates in democracies, seeing a 3.67 percent increase in female 
literacy rates (Appendix 9.56). This result is statistically significant with a P value of .1. 
Similarly, the impact of IMF programmes upon female/male primary enrollment is more 
pronounced when the model considers implementation levels or programme design focus. 
While the impact of participating in an IMF results in a 1.05 percent increase in the ratio 
between male/female primary enrollment in democracies (Appendix 9.34), the impact is far 
greater controlling for implementation levels with the pooled data seeing an increase of 4.59 
percent and a dramatic increase in the ratio in democracies of 11.1 percent (Appendix 9.35). 
Similarly, controlling for programme design leads to an increase in the ratio of male/female 
primary enrollment of 5.04 percent using the pooled data and 10.17 percent for democracies 
(Appendix 9.36). This trend of seeing a greater and more statistically significant impact when 
controlling for implementation levels or programme design continues through other 
indicators, such as male/female secondary enrollment ratio (Appendicess 9.37, 9.38 and 9.39) 
and female progression to secondary education (Appendicess 9.49, 9.50 and 9.51). This 
illustrates that only considering participation in an IMF agreement actually masks the full 
impact an IMF programme may have on the SES of women. 
Also, worth noting is some of the more nuanced findings, which include the variation in results 
dependent upon regime type. These results imply that there are different processes 
happening under democracies and autocracies and that the pooled data is masking the real 
impact. Female literacy rates see a statistically significant increase of 3.67 percent in 
democracies when controlling for implementation while the pooled data gives no signed of a 
statistically significant impact. The pooled data for male/female primary enrollment shows a 
4.59 percent increase in this ratio but drilling down it is democratic regimes where the 
increase really lies. The pooled data again obscures the impact of IMF programmes on 
male/female secondary enrollment (Appendices 9.37, 9.38 and 9.39) showing no statistically 
significant results. The nuanced approach of splitting shows that IMF programmes, controlling 
for implementation, lead to an increase in this ratio of 19.22 percent for democracies. This is 
statistically significant to a P value of .05. There is no statistically significant result for 
autocracies. A similar trend exists for male/female tertiary enrollment (Appendicess 9.40, 
9.41 and 9.42). The model with pooled data, controlling for implementation, points to a large 
increase of over 22 percent in this ratio. However, this pooled data again obscures where the 
real impact lies. This increase is only found in democracies. These results are important as 
they strongly suggest that there are different processes at play in autocracies and 
democracies. This raises questions for policymakers as to how to minimise or completely 
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remove any disproportionate impact that IMF programmes may have upon women taking 
account of their own political and structural dynamics. 
It is also important to highlight any gender differentiated impacts of IMF participation, 
implementation levels or programme design, and there are many. The impact of IMF 
programmes controlling for implementation levels upon progression to secondary for both 
female (Appendicess 9.49, 9.50 and 9.51) and males (Appendicess 9.52, 9.53 and 9.54) 
provides a good example. The results indicate that IMF programmes controlling for 
implementation have a statistically significant negative impact on the progression rates of 
both females and males to secondary schooling for autocracies only. However, it is worth 
noting that the impact is more severe for females, with an 18.89 percent reduction of females 
progressing to secondary versus a 15.87 percent reduction in males progressing to secondary 
school. Similarly, there also seems to be gender differentiated impacts of IMF programmes 
upon literacy rates. While it is positive to see an increase in female literacy rates of 3.67 
percent in democracies when controlling for implementation (Appendix 9.56), it is 
noteworthy that the comparable figure for male literacy rates is a 5.4 percent increase 
(Appendix 9.59).  
Also relevant is whether there are any regional variations. In Tables 6.43, 6.44 and 6.45 I 
present a selection of results which explore whether variation in results is present at a 
regional level. There are only a few notable results and it is essential to caveat these results 
with the fact that the observations are very low. As such, it is not appropriate to make 
generalized inferences about regional variations.  
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In summary, we learn a number of things from these results. Firstly, that programme 
implementation levels and programme design matters. Often, exploring the impact of IMF 
programmes using participation in an IMF programme alone does not tell an accurate story. 
Secondly, using a data sample which includes both autocratic and democratic regime types 
does not give us a true reflection as to how IMF programmes are impacting women’s 
education. The pooled data obscures variation in regime type and fails to illustrate how 
different domestic political pressures interact with how an IMF programme is designed or 
implemented. In some cases, the pooled data hides substantial and striking results. Thirdly, 
this data also highlights the ongoing trend across all of the findings, which is that IMF 
programmes have a negative or negligible impact on female education in autocracies and it is 
only in democracies where we see any positive impacts. Fourthly, it is also clear that there 
are some interesting trends to be found in comparing results for females against males. IMF 
programmes have a positive impact on female/male ratios of primary, secondary and tertiary 
rates – but only in democracies. IMF programmes also have a positive impact on literacy rates 
for both female and males in democracies, but at greater rates for males, while IMF 
programmes have a disproportionately negative impact on female progression to secondary 
level than males in autocracies. Finally, while there are some regional variation present, 
implying there are different processes at play in the design and implementation of IMF 
programmes at a regional level, it is important to note the reduced observations in these 
tests. 
This disparity in impact is an important finding as it illustrates that the participation, 
implementation or design of IMF programmes may not be gender neutral and that factors are 
at play that impacts men and women differently. Any disproportionate impact upon women 
is a critical factor for consideration for future design and implementation of IMF programmes. 
This again supports my hypothesis that implementation levels and programme design 
matters, and that it is not sufficient to explore the impact of IMF programmes upon women 
by only exploring participation in an IMF programme. 
6.5.3 Female labour force participation 
1. Female labour force participation index 
The final component element of the SES of women is female labour force participation. As 
with maternal health and female education, I created a scaled index consisting of the 
following female labour force participation indicators: 
 
• Female agricultural employment 
• Female industry employment 
• Female service employment 
• Labour force participation females 15-24 
• Labour force participation females 15-64 
• Labour participation rate female 15+  
• I named this index variable index_labour_female 
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All indicators were already expressed in terms of percent, so no rescaling was required. Once 
the index was created as a single variable, I then integrated this variable into the various two-
step models for analysis. Table 6.46, 6.47 and 6.48 illustrates the results of testing the impact 
of IMF programmes upon the labour force participation of women as expressed by 
index_labour_force. 
 
  
 
 
159 
 
Table 6.43: The effect of IMF participation on Female Labour Force Participation index 
Dependent Variable Female Labour Force Participation Index Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF Programme (IMF Programme) 
No of Obs: 1014 
Wald chi² (157) = 5165.56 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = 0.03538 
No of Obs: 601 
Wald chi² (100) = 2250.87 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = 0.08295 
No of Obs: 407 
Wald chi² (71) = 2247.79 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = -0.00882 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme -0.21 -0.72 -0.51 -0.96 -0.08 -1.18 
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1) 4.45* -2.404 3.82 -3.217 7.71 -6.885 
GDP per capita (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Log of GDP per capita (t-1) -0.35*** -0.107 -0.37*** -0.139 -0.22 -0.271 
GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Log of GDP (t-1) 0.1 -0.069 0.06 -0.09 0.41* -0.24 
GDP Growth (t-1) 0.05** -0.023 0.02 -0.066 0.05 -0.029 
Log of GDP Growth (t-1) -0.40*** -0.129 -0.38* -0.202 -0.31 -0.234 
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita 0.17 -0.202 -0.07 -0.279 0.61 -0.443 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1) -0.17 -0.112 -0.09 -0.152 -0.43 -0.293 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1) -0.04 -0.057 -0.02 -0.104 -0.01 -0.81 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1) 0.39 -0.256 0.46 -0.384 0.14 -0.412 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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Table 6.44: The effect of IMF Programme Implementation on Female Labour Force Participation index 
Dependent Variable Female Labour Force Participation Index Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF Programme (IMF Programme) 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
No of Obs: 144 
Wald chi² (41) = 878.02 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = -0.86776 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme     6.29 -3.84 
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1)     -5341.11*** -4.346 
GDP per capita (t-1)     4.44*** -0.089 
Log of GDP per capita (t-1)     -1170.30** -4.059 
GDP (t-1)     0 0 
Log of GDP (t-1)     0.01 -0.174 
GDP Growth (t-1)     .003 -0.072 
Log of GDP Growth (t-1)     -0.18 0.337 
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1)     0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1)     -4.44*** -0.089 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita     -1170.68*** -4.076 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP     0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1)     0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1)     0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1)     0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1)     0 0 
Implementation Levels (t-1)     0 -0.006 
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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Table 6.45: The effect of IMF Programme Design on Female Labour Force Participation index 
Dependent Variable Female Labour Force Participation Index Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF Programme (IMF Programme) 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
No of Obs: 143 
Wald chi² (41) = 875.39 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = -0.70029 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme     4.67 -3.42 
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1)     -5,402.02*** -4.345 
GDP per capita (t-1)     4.5*** 0 
Log of GDP per capita (t-1)     -1,184.20*** -4.065 
GDP (t-1)     0 0 
Log of GDP (t-1)     0.01 -0.171 
GDP Growth (t-1)     0.04 -0.071 
Log of GDP Growth (t-1)     -0.25 -0.339 
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1)     0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1)     -4.5*** -0.089 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita     1,184.50*** -4.081 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP     0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1)     0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1)     0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1)     0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1)     0 0 
Ratio of QPC Conditions to SPC Conditions     0.01** 0 
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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The results displayed in Table 6.43, 6.44 and 6.45 where enough data is present, point 
towards IMF programmes having no statistically significant impact on female labour force 
participation as represented by the labour force index. Table 6.43 considers participation in 
an IMF programme, while Table 6.44 incorporates an additional control for implementation 
levels and Table 6.45 controls for programme design.  
To understand whether there are regional differences, I have also used a model to test for 
any regional variations. Below I have presented a selection of notable results in Tables 6.46, 
6.47 and 6.48. These results illustrate that there are indeed regional variations present in how 
IMF programmes impact the female labour force participation index. The only notable result 
is from the Arab States where implementation of an IMF has a statistically significant negative 
impact on female labour force participation as represented by the female labour force index. 
However, it is important to point out the very low number of observations.   
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Table 6.46: The effect of IMF Programme participation on female labour force index, Regional View 
Dependent 
Variable 
Femal Labour 
force index 
Asia Pac Europe / Nth America Africa Latin America CIS Arab States 
Independent 
Variable 
Participation in 
IMF Programme 
(IMF Programme) 
No of Obs: 164 
Wald chi² (27) = 741.12 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = 0.06353 
No of Obs: 243 
Wald chi² (42) = 1388.84  
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = 0.17025 
No of Obs: 329 
Wald chi² (50) = 1752.76 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = -0.27227 
No of Obs: 152 
Wald chi² (28) = 472.06 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = 0.20885 
No of Obs: 50 
Wald chi² (11) = 75.64 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = -0.02875 
No of Obs: 76 
Wald chi² (15) = 159.39  
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = 1.000 
           
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on IMF programme -1.34 -1.637 -0.66 -1.818 1.73 -1.157 -1.57 -1.85 -3.02 -2.83 0.23 -4.154 
Participation on IMF programme (t-
1) 3,219.41*** -22.185 19.69 -20.002 -3.6 -6.596 21.8 -15.36 310.18 0 1,476.07 0 
GDP per capita (t-1) -0.33 -0.768 0 0 0 0 0 -0.001 -0.01 -0.258 -0.03 -8.129 
Log of GDP per capita (t-1) 383.55 -290.306 -1.15** -0.474 -0.37 -0.387 0.99 -1.771 81.04 0 -70.36 0 
GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Log of GDP (t-1) 44.15 -64.191 0.32 -0.281 0.18 -0.17 0.52 -0.33 -23.77 -21.715 93.93 -402.336 
GDP Growth (t-1) 3.89 -29.411 -0.11 -0.151 0.02 -0.072 -0.8 -0.492 13.58 -13.748 0.05 -750.918 
Log of GDP Growth (t-1) -16.51 -50.855 -0.11 -0.29 -0.21 -0.413 1.24 -1.205 -59.54 -59.735 3.56 0 
Reserves as percentage of GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-
1) * GDP Per capita (t-1) 0.35 -0.768 0 -0.001 0 0 0 -0.001 -0.02 -0.261 -0.08 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-
1) * Log of GDP Per capita -386.35 -290.344 -0.79 -2.099 0.65 -0.509 -1.76 -1.973 -51.54* -30.158 145.19 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-
1) * GDP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) 
* Log of GDP (t-1) -43.23 -64.194 -0.64 -0.514 0.09 -0.295 -0.42 -0.384 5 -17.683 -99.7 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) 
* GDP Growth (t-1) -2.93 -29.421 0.26 -0.356 -0.03 -0.096 0.87* -0.521 -11.99 -12.014 0.03 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-
1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1) 8.7 -51.159 0 -1.048 0.34 -0.51 -1.33 -1.326 43.25 0 -3.73 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) 
* Total Reserves (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
             
Country Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
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Table 6.47: The effect of IMF Programme Implementation on female labour force index, Regional View 
Dependent 
Variable 
Female Labour 
Force Index 
Asia Pac Europe / Nth America Africa Latin America CIS Arab States 
Independent 
Variable 
Participation in 
IMF Programme 
(IMF Programme) 
Insufficient data for 
model to return results 
Insufficient data for 
model to return results 
No of Obs: 187 
Wald chi² (37) = 792.54 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = -0.65299 
No of Obs: 60  
Wald chi² (21) = 212.32 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = -0.85304 
Insufficient data for 
model to return results 
Insufficient data for 
model to return results 
           
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on IMF programme     4.94 -3.628 8.46 -6.585     
Participation on IMF programme (t-1)     3,979.23*** -5.351 -366.54 0     
GDP per capita (t-1)     -4.67*** -0.063 0.03 -0.125     
Log of GDP per capita (t-1)     927.40*** -2.652 -57.25 -39.581     
GDP (t-1)     0.00*** 0 0 0     
Log of GDP (t-1)     0.29 -0.241 0.14 -0.224     
GDP Growth (t-1)     0 -0.066 0.13 -0.19     
Log of GDP Growth (t-1)     0.03 -0.315 -0.2 -0.608     
Reserves as percentage of GDP (t-1)     0 0 0 0     
Participation in IMF programmes (t-
1) * GDP Per capita (t-1)     4.67*** -0.063 -0.03 -0.125     
Participation in IMF programmes (t-
1) * Log of GDP Per capita     -927.08*** -2.668 55.65 -39.56     
Participation in IMF programmes (t-
1) * GDP     -0.00***         
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * 
Log of GDP (t-1)               
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * 
GDP Growth (t-1)               
Participation in IMF programmes (t-
1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1)               
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * 
Total Reserves (t-1)               
Implementation Levels (t-1)     0.01 -0.006 -0.01 -0.008     
Country Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
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Table 6.48: The effect of IMF Programme Design on female labour force index, Regional View 
Dependent 
Variable 
Female Labour 
Force Index 
Asia Pac Europe / Nth America Africa Latin America CIS Arab States 
Independent 
Variable 
Participation in 
IMF Programme 
(IMF Programme) 
Insufficient data for 
model to return results 
No of Obs: 38 
Wald chi²(15 ) = 253.89  
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = 0.54999 
No of Obs: 187 
Wald chi² (37) = 809.05 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = -0.39748 
Insufficient data for 
model to return results 
No of Obs: 28 
Wald chi² (10) = 43.76 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = -0.22607 
Insufficient data for 
model to return results 
           
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on IMF programme     2.92 -3.637   -6.25 -4.825   
Participation on IMF programme (t-1)     4,471.78*** -5.375        
GDP per capita (t-1)     -5.25*** -0.069   -0.07 -0.138   
Log of GDP per capita (t-1)     1,042.03*** -2.881   127.37** -62.886    
GDP (t-1)     0.00*** 0   0 0    
Log of GDP (t-1)     0.3 -0.244   
-
129.02*** -20.288    
GDP Growth (t-1)     0 -0.063   1.69 -35.013    
Log of GDP Growth (t-1)     0.06 -0.305   -33.45 -281.155    
Reserves as percentage of GDP (t-1)     0 0   0 0    
Participation in IMF programmes (t-
1) * GDP Per capita (t-1)     5.25*** -0.069         
Participation in IMF programmes (t-
1) * Log of GDP Per capita     
-
1,041.77*** -2.893         
Participation in IMF programmes (t-
1) * GDP     -0.00*** 0         
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * 
Log of GDP (t-1)                
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * 
GDP Growth (t-1)                
Participation in IMF programmes (t-
1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1)                
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * 
Total Reserves (t-1)                
Programme Design (t-1)     0.01 -0.005   0.37* -0.204    
Country Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
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2. Female labour force participation indicators 
While the results do not point towards any notable impact of IMF programmes upon the 
labour force participation of women it is not sufficient to conclude here. These findings 
demand a greater investigation. Is female labour force participation in specific sectors 
impacted? How do these findings compare with the impact that IMF programmes have upon 
male labour force participation? It is relevant and important to explore whether the impact 
of women’s labour force participation differs from that of men’s. To gain a greater insight I 
also tested my model against a number of male labour force participation indicators. 
 
Appendices 9.61 – 9.102 present the results from these tests. Below, in Table 6.49, I list each 
of the tables and the specific results they present. For a comparative perspective, I have also 
included results for male agricultural, industry and service employment as well as male 
employment of men over 15 and between the ages of 15-24 and 15–64 as there is value to 
be found in exploring whether there is variation in the impact that IMF programmes have 
across genders. The results presented include country fixed effects.  
 
Table 6.49 - List of tables presenting results of Impact of IMF programmes on education  
9.61 The impact of IMF Programme participation on female labour force participation index 
9.62 The impact of IMF Programme implementation on female labour force participation index 
9.63 The impact of IMF Programme design on female labour force participation index 
9.64 The impact of IMF Programme participation on male labour force participation index 
9.65 The impact of IMF Programme implementation on male labour force participation index 
9.66 The impact of IMF Programme design on male labour force participation index 
9.67 The impact of IMF Programme participation on Female agricultural employment 
9.68 The impact of IMF Programme implementation on Female agricultural employment 
9.69 The impact of IMF Programme design on Female agricultural employment 
9.70 The impact of IMF Programme participation on male agricultural employment 
9.71 The impact of IMF Programme implementation on male agricultural employment 
9.72 The impact of IMF Programme design on male agricultural employment 
9.73 The impact of IMF Programme participation on Female industrial employment 
9.74 The impact of IMF Programme implementation on Female industrial employment 
9.75 The impact of IMF Programme design on Female industrial employment 
9.76 The impact of IMF Programme participation on male industrial employment 
9.77 The impact of IMF Programme implementation on male industrial employment 
9.78 The impact of IMF Programme design on male industrial employment 
9.79 The impact of IMF Programme participation on Female service employment 
9.80 The impact of IMF Programme implementation on Female service employment 
9.81 The impact of IMF Programme design on Female service employment 
9.82 The impact of IMF Programme participation on male service employment 
9.83 The impact of IMF Programme implementation on male service employment 
9.84 The impact of IMF Programme design on male service employment 
9.85 The impact of IMF Programme participation on Female employment age 15-24 
9.86 The impact of IMF Programme implementation on Female employment age 15-24 
9.87 The impact of IMF Programme design on Female employment age 15-24 
9.88 The impact of IMF Programme participation on Female employment age 15-64 
9.89 The impact of IMF Programme implementation on Female employment age 15-64 
9.90 The impact of IMF Programme design on Female employment age 15-64 
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9.91 The impact of IMF Programme participation on male employment age 15-24 
9.92 The impact of IMF Programme implementation on male employment age 15-24 
9.93 The impact of IMF Programme design on male employment age 15-24 
9.94 The impact of IMF Programme participation on male employment age 15-64 
9.95 The impact of IMF Programme implementation on male employment age 15-64 
9.96 The impact of IMF Programme design on male employment age 15-64 
9.97 The impact of IMF Programme participation on Female labour force participation aged 15 plus 
9.98 The impact of IMF Programme implementation on Female labour force participation aged 15 
plus 
9.99 The impact of IMF Programme design on Female labour force participation aged 15 plus 
9.100 The impact of IMF Programme participation on male labour force participation aged 15 plus 
9.101 The impact of IMF Programme implementation on male labour force participation aged 15 
plus 
9.102 The impact of IMF Programme design on male labour force participation aged 15 plus 
 
 
Firstly, these results suggest that IMF programmes have a statistically significant impact on 
several aspects of female labour force participation. The results of the sectoral analysis show 
that participation in IMF programmes has no impact on female labour force participation in 
the agricultural (Appendices 9.67, 9.68 and 9.69) or service sectors (Appendices 9.79, 9.80 
and 9.81) however, participation in an IMF programme does have a statistically significant 
and negative impact on female labour force participation in the industrial sector (Appendix 
9.73) reducing this by almost 1 percent.  
 
Secondly, regime type does seem to drive variation. Participation in an IMF programme also 
has a statistically significant negative impact on female labour force participation of women 
over 15 (Appendix 9.99) and also between the ages of 15–24 (Appendix 9.85) and 15-64 
(Appendix 9.88). For each of these categories female labour force participation is reduced by 
almost 1 percent as a result of participating in an IMF agreement, but only in autocracies. 
Participation in an IMF agreement has no statistically significant impact on these indicators in 
either democracies or the pooled data. It is notable to see that the biggest impact is among 
younger women in the 15–24 age group.  
 
Thirdly, just as with the results from testing maternal health and education indicators, 
controlling for implementation and programme design matters. On controlling for 
implementation levels and programme design focus, all statistical significance is lost. This 
confirms that it is not sufficient to consider participation alone to understand the impact IMF 
programmes may have and that different forces are at play at each level of interaction with 
the IMF.     
 
These results have a number of implications. Firstly, the years between the ages of 15 and 24 
are a crucial time for women to develop their economic independence. This negative impact 
of IMF programmes on labour force participation during these years suggest that the 
reduction happens early on in the female life and that perhaps, fewer women are entering 
the workforce in the first place. This jeopardises women’s ability to ever attain economic 
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independence. In countries where women’s role is seen primarily as a homemaker and 
mother, as it is in many autocracies, such an impact could copper fasten this role and the 
societal view that women are best placed working in the home. Secondly, such a negative 
impact could contribute to a greater difficulty for women to move towards to more senior 
decision-making roles in their employment. With fewer women entering the workforce and a 
greater emphasis on remaining at home, the place of men as senior decision makers in 
employment is strengthened. Thirdly, on comparing the impact that participation in an IMF 
programme has upon labour force participation between men and women, the results of the 
testing point towards a disproportionately negative impact on women in autocracies. This is 
important as it illustrates that there is variation in how participation in an IMF programme 
affects women and men.  
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6.6 Summary 
These findings on the relationships between IMF programmes and the SES of women as 
represented by maternal health, female education and labour force participation of women 
(and men) are crucial.  I have argued that the IMF may harm women’s SES in countries under 
their programmes, particularly if their programmes are loaded with spending cuts and lacking 
structural reforms. Moreover, I have argued that the level of harm may be greater than in 
countries in similar circumstances that are not under such an IMF programme. However, I 
have found that on balance IMF programmes are often not strongly associated with harmful 
effects on women’s SES. While there is some evidence of a negative impact on health, and 
across several, health, labour market, and education sub-indicators, these statistical 
associations are often not robust to the inclusion of programme design and programme 
implementation levels in the statistical tests. When the models incorporate information 
about the design of an IMF programme and the extent to which a borrowing country has 
implemented programme content, differences in women’s SES no longer diverges from 
countries in similar economic circumstances that are not under an IMF programme. 
This illustrates firmly that it is not enough for research to consider only participation in an IMF 
agreement when exploring the impact that the IMF can have. It is essential that, along with 
participation, programme implementation and design need to be considered or the findings 
from the statistical analysis may be flawed. Where research fails to account for 
implementation levels or programme design, it will find itself without robust or nuanced 
outcomes, and its recommendations then become inappropriate and unsuitable. 
My results are important to policy makers as they illustrate the importance of the design and 
implementation of an IMF programme. The focus of the programme design and the levels of 
implementation of a programme can drive variation in the impact of IMF programmes upon 
important socio-economic areas. Such a finding can empower states and the IMF to ensure 
that programme design is appropriate and that implementation of the programme is 
prioritised so that negative impacts upon important public policy areas are minimised.     
Additionally, my results also point towards different processes happening in autocracies and 
democracies, and this is visible across participation, programme design and programme 
implementation.  
Therefore, my overall finding is that while IMF programmes have the potential to be harmful 
they are not typically harmful on average, and that differences in programme design and (or) 
failure to implement potentially harmful programmes are two important reasons why we do 
not see strong associations. Previous studies on the impact of IMF programmes on social 
outcomes often omit these two key variables and may have may reach flawed conclusions as 
a consequence. 
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7.0 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
7.1 Recapitulation of purpose and findings 
The purpose of this dissertation was to explore the impact of IMF programmes upon the 
socio-economic status of women. Specifically, this exploration was facilitated by hypotheses 
centred around the design and implementation of IMF programmes.  
Firstly, the initial design of the IMF programme has consequence, and a variation in the design 
of IMF programmes has the potential to have a significant impact upon the SES of women. I 
argue that spending reforms, which focus on public sector budgetary contraction and 
increased taxation have a greater likelihood to negatively and disproportionately impact the 
socio-economic status of women, while certain structural reforms which focus upon 
economic growth have the capacity to positively impact the socio-economic status of women.  
Secondly, I argue that while design of a programme is important, the levels of programme 
implementation is critical. While a state may sign an IMF agreement with varying conditions, 
if that state fails to fully implement these conditions, then the impact that the IMF has on the 
socio-economic status of women in that state is negligible.  
The opposite holds true, in that should a state fully or mostly complete the conditions 
specified within an IMF agreement, then I argue that it is possible that changes in the socio-
economic status of women, whether positive or negative, can be attributed to the IMF 
programme. These arguments led to the following hypotheses. 
H1. The more an IMF programme focuses upon spending cuts over structural reforms, the 
greater its negative impact upon the SES of women. 
 
H2. The more an IMF programme focuses on structural reforms over spending cuts, the 
greater its positive impact upon the SES of women. 
 
H3: The SES of women increases in democracies under an IMF agreement 
 
H4: The SES of women decreases or remains stagnant in autocracies under an IMF 
agreement 
 
A number of themes emerged from my analysis. 
7.1.1 Programme design 
IMF conditions converge into one of two groupings.  
Firstly, spending reforms or Quantitative Performance Criteria (QPC). These are 
macroeconomic targets that focus upon fiscal measures. These targets are designed to bring 
national budgets under control, manage deficits, meet debt obligations or maintain 
appropriate reserve levels.   
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Secondly, structural reforms (SPC PA SB or structural performance criterion (SPC), prior action 
(PA), or structural benchmark (SB)). These are conditions which link IMF lending to policy 
reform. The aim of implementing structural reforms is for the state to develop 
macroeconomic stability, economic growth, stimulate employment and facilitate investment. 
The interrogation of the data suggests that while some programmes do have a strong 
structural focus, the vast majority of conditions in IMF programmes are QPC or fiscally 
orientated conditions. The creation of an indicator which measures the ratio of QPC to SPC 
conditions facilitated clarity on the focus of each of the 529 programmes analysed. Across the 
529 programmes, the average ratio of QPC to SPC conditions is 25.08. Expressed simply, on 
average there are 25.08 QPC conditions to every SPC PA SB condition across all 529 
programmes. 
The study also highlights interesting variation in programme design at a regime type and also 
at a regional level.  
Firstly, from a regime type, the ratio of QPC to SPC conditions is much higher for democracies 
than autocracies. IMF programmes for both autocracies and democracies mainly specify fiscal 
conditions, the ratio of QPC to SPC PA SB conditions for autocracies is 18 while for 
democracies it is 28. It is clear from these findings that IMF programmes for democracies have 
a much greater focus on fiscal conditions than IMF programmes for autocracies.  
Secondly, there is also variation in programme design from a regional perspective. Europe 
which has the highest ratio of QPC to SPC conditions followed by Latin America, Africa, Arab 
States, Asia-Pacific and lastly the CIS region. 
 
7.1.2 Programme implementation 
The implementation of IMF programmes is crucial to their success from an IMF perspective. 
It is also critical in ascertaining whether IMF programmes impact a number of socio-economic 
factors in the affected state. For this dissertation, implementation levels are key to 
understanding what impact IMF programmes have upon the socio-economic status of 
women. When IMF programme conditions are not implemented, then the impact the IMF has 
on the socio-economic status of women in that state is negligible. Changes in the socio-
economic status of women, whether positive or negative, can be more easily attributed to 
the IMF programme if programmes are implemented to a high level.  
The data analysis suggests a reasonably high level of implementation of IMF programmes. 
The average implementation level across the panel of 529 programmes is 57 percent. While 
some programmes were not implemented whatsoever, the mean value illustrates that that 
implementation levels across the panel of 529 programmes stand at a reasonably high rate of 
57 percent. More specifically, on average 59 percent of QPC conditions were implemented, 
and 46 percent of SPC PA SB conditions were implemented. 
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There is also variation in implementation by regime type. Firstly, the mean levels of 
implementation at a regime type level vary slightly for autocratic and democratic regimes. On 
average, autocracies implement 55 percent of all conditions while democracies implement 59 
percent. There is variation in the implementation levels of the types of conditions. On 
average, autocracies implement 57 percent of QPC conditions and 46 percent of SPC 
conditions, while democracies implement 60 percent of QPC conditions and 45 percent of SPC 
conditions. The lower rates of implementation by autocracies is in-line with existing research. 
Research finds that relationships between the autocratic regime and its elites can result in 
the autocratic regime being more sensitive to the IMF economic reforming impact that has 
on their political stability (Brumberg, 2002).  
Policies that demand liberalisation often proves to be a dilemma for autocracies. Autocrats 
may resist or not fully commit to certain IMF conditions that aim to liberalise and reform the 
economy, as it may impinge negatively upon the elites that benefit from the lack of 
competition. With this in mind, it may be easier for autocracies to focus their energies on 
budgetary cuts over liberalisation policies. While this enables autocrats to avoid any threats 
to their political instability, this may result in reduced investment into core areas of public 
interest such as health or education. This is problematic, particularly for women, whose 
health needs are more diverse than men’s and who often are already experiencing gender 
gaps in access to education. Democratic states do not experience these challenges and have 
a greater ability to implement structural reforms in partnership with spending reforms.  
Regional variation in implementation is also present. The mean level of implementation 
across all regions is between 53 percent and 64 percent. These implementation levels are 
reasonably high, and they illustrate that states on average, implement more than half of the 
conditions specified in their IMF agreement.  
Drilling down into condition type we see an obvious diversion. Across regime types and all 
regions, states implement fiscal orientated conditions to a greater extent than structural 
conditions.  Europe has the highest average implementation rate of an IMF programme at 64 
percent and also implements 66 percent of QPC conditions.  
Other regions implement between 53 percent and 59 percent of the total conditions and 
between 56 percent and 61 percent of QPC conditions. The findings around structural 
conditions illustrate a clear divergence in the implementation focus. In all cases except the 
Arab states, countries are, on average, implementing less than 50 percent of the structural 
conditions specified in an IMF programme with Latin America implementing 31 percent of 
structural conditions.  
7.1.3 Maternal health 
IMF programmes’ impact can be explored through a number of lenses. Firstly, participation 
in an IMF programme holds promise for the maternal health of women. There are statistically 
significant reductions in the rates of maternal mortality and statistically significant reductions 
in the lifetime risk of maternal death.  
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Secondly, regime type drives variation in these results and the gains in the reductions of 
maternal mortality rates and the lifetime risk of maternal death are more pronounced in 
autocracies than democracies.  
Thirdly, these gains are washed out when programme design or implementation levels are 
controlled for.  
There are some interesting variations at a regional level. There are signs of a reduction in 
births attended by skilled professionals in Europe, perhaps as a result of the heavy focus of 
QPC conditionality. There are also indications of an increase in pregnant women receiving 
pre-natal care in Africa, Latin America, CIS and the Arab States. The results also point towards 
an increase in maternal mortality rates in the Arab states. However, one must caveat these 
regional results with an awareness of the much smaller number of observations available for 
these tests.  
It is important to consider these results in light of the specified hypotheses. Ultimately, it is 
clear when considering an IMF agreement alone not being sufficient to understand what 
impact IMF programmes have upon women’s maternal health. This study highlights how any 
potential gains that are associated with participating in an IMF agreement are lost when 
controlling for programme design or programme implementation. I argue that this is due to 
the focus of design and implementation of IMF programmes centres around QPC conditions. 
As such, I argue that my proposed hypotheses hold true.  
I also argued that any gains in the Maternal Health of women following an IMF agreement 
would be seen in democracies and that Maternal Health in autocracies would decrease or 
remain stagnant. The results were mixed. Democracies did see some gains, in particular in a 
lowering of fertility rates, a decrease in lifetime risk of maternal death, decreases in maternal 
mortality and increase in prenatal care for pregnant women and while the results pointed 
towards an increase in teenage mothers the number of observations was very low and the 
cannot form a reliable generalisation. From the perspective of autocracies, increases were 
seen in fertility rates, but decreases in the lifetime risk of maternal death, maternal mortality 
rates to a greater extent than in democracies. Additionally, autocracies saw increases in 
prenatal care for pregnant women and a reduction in teenage mothers, but the number of 
observations was very low and the cannot form a reliable generalisation.  
7.1.4 Female education 
This study has found a number of notable results while exploring the impact of IMF 
programmes upon female education. In particular, IMF programmes have a statistically 
significant and positive impact on the female/male ratios for enrollment into primary, 
secondary and tertiary education. This implies that the IMF programmes have a statistically 
significant and positive impact on the number of females enrolling into all levels of education. 
There is much variation in these high-level results.  
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Firstly, there is strong variation in the results when controlling for programme design or 
programme implementation levels. The results imply that it is the programme design and the 
programme implementation which has the greatest impact on these female education 
indicators.  
Additionally, regime type also drives variation. In the case of the female/male ratios 
measuring primary, secondary and tertiary enrollment, it is notable that the gains are only 
made in democracies. IMF programmes have no material impact on these indicators in 
autocracies. This is in line with my argument that gains in female education from an IMF 
programme would only be seen in democracies.  
This study also found evidence of gender-differentiated impacts of IMF programmes. The 
rates of progression to secondary education provides a good example. While participation in 
programme shows no statistically significant results, the results indicate that IMF 
programmes controlling for implementation have a statistically significant negative impact on 
the progression rates of both females and males to secondary schooling but only for 
autocracies.  
Implementation of IMF programmes in autocracies is associated with a 15.87 percent 
reduction in males progressing to secondary school but with an 18.89 percent reduction of 
females progressing to secondary.  
Similarly, there also seems to be gender differentiated impacts of IMF programmes upon 
literacy rates. While it is positive to see an increase in female literacy rates of 3.67 percent in 
democracies when controlling for implementation, it is noteworthy that the comparable 
figure for male literacy rates is a 5.4 percent increase. 
It is important to consider these results in light of the specified hypotheses. It is again clear 
that programme design and implementation are more substantive contributors to how IMF 
programme impact women. It is also clear that any gains to female education following an 
IMF programme are seen only in democracies. The impact of IMF programmes on female 
education in autocracies is not statistically significant. This is in line with my argument that 
gains in female education from an IMF programme would only be seen in democracies. The 
results for female education are interesting in the context of the proposed hypotheses.  
Despite the high focus on QPC conditions, both in programme design and programme 
implementation, the results point towards some positive impact on female education.  
An interesting viewpoint is when maternal health impacts are compared to female education.  
When compared to the mainly neutral, and in some cases, negative impact IMF programmes 
have on maternal health; there is an implication from other positive results. In female 
education, is it highly likely that are different design and implementation considerations in 
IMF programmes. For example, the results also point to positive impacts on certain elements 
of male education, and then to a greater extent than female education.  
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Perhaps female education is somewhat protected under an IMF agreement, where steps are 
taken within a state to protect education budgets. It is arguable that the protection of 
education could be considered gender neutral. Education could also be represented by a 
stronger state interest group, than for example, maternal health care. For these reasons, IMF 
programmes could potentially be designed cognizant of avoiding overtly detrimental policies 
to education. 
Analysis by regime type and by regions brings greater clarity to the results. Increases in female 
education enrollment occur in democracies under IMF agreements. Reduction in female 
education progression can be observed in autocracies.  
These findings raise questions for policymakers as to how to minimise or completely remove 
any disproportionate impact that IMF programmes may have upon women taking account of 
their own political and structural dynamics.  
7.1.5 Female labour force participation 
This study highlights that participation in an IMF programmes has a statistically significant 
impact on several aspects of female labour force participation.  
 
From a sectoral perspective, the results demonstrate that participation in an IMF programme 
has a statistically significant and negative impact on female labour force participation in the 
industrial sector, reducing such participation by almost 1 percent.  
 
An IMF programme also has a statistically significant negative impact on female labour force 
participation of women between the ages of 15–24 and 15-64. For each of these categories, 
female labour force participation is reduced by almost 1 percent as a result of participating in 
an IMF agreement. This reduction in female labour force participation is only found in 
autocracies. Controlling for implementation or programme design, we see that all statistical 
significance is removed. This implies that while participation in an IMF programme may hold 
promise for increasing male and female labour force participation, any potential gains are lost 
through the design or the implementation of the programme. This has several implications 
for policy makers at an IMF or state level. If a principle goal of an IMF programme is to aid 
economic recovery, then increasing the labour force participation should be a key objective. 
This could be considered a lost opportunity for all parties.    
 
As with maternal health and female education, this study highlights how any potential gains 
that are associated with participating in an IMF agreement are lost when controlling for 
programme design or programme implementation. I contend this is due to the IMF 
programme design and implementation centering around QPC conditions. As such, I argue 
that my proposed hypotheses are supported.  
Finally, I also argued that gains in female employment from an IMF programme would only 
be seen in democracies and that the impact of IMF programmes on female employment 
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would be negative or stagnant. The impact of IMF programmes on female labour force 
participation in democracies proved to be insignificant however, the impact of IMF 
programmes on female employment age 15-24, female employment age 15 – 64 and female 
employment age 15+ was negative and statistically significant in autocracies, which was in 
line with my proposed hypothesis. 
7.1.6 The IMF and gender 
One of the most relevant and interesting findings is uncovering the level of interest in, 
research on, and attention given, to gender within the IMF.  
In recent years, through the leadership of the MD Christine Lagarde, gender has become a 
topic of focus by the IMF. The level of research on gender by IMF staff has increased 
dramatically, recommendations such as gender budgeting are commonplace in IMF Country 
Reports, and Lagarde is personally driving conversations around the socio-economic benefits 
of gender equality in her role as MD of the IMF.  
Where I have explored the impact of IMF programmes upon the SES of women, my findings 
are (to some extent) at odds with the existing body of research intersecting the IMF and 
gender. Existing research points to the IMF having an almost exclusively negative impact upon 
the SES of women. This research has mainly used qualitative methods such as case studies to 
explore this critical area. These approaches do not facilitate a high-level macro study using 
statistical analysis. Using a different methodological approach, I have been able to uncover 
alternative findings.  
 
The central argument that programme design and programme implementation are vital 
factors for consideration when exploring the impact of IMF programmes upon the socio-
economic status of women holds true. Firstly, the findings illustrate, where participation in an 
IMF agreement has a statistically significant impact on maternal health, female education or 
female labour force participation, this impact is most often washed out when controlling for 
implementation or programme design. This suggests that IMF programmes offer the potential 
for positive impact but due to bad design, or lack of implementation, this positive impact is 
lost.  
Secondly, in some cases, the results suggest that participation has no impact on women’s 
maternal health, education or labour force participation, but controlling for implementation 
or programme design does reveal a statistically significant impact. This implies again that the 
design and implementation of IMF programmes are critical to understanding the true impact 
of IMF programmes on the SES of women and importantly, they can be designed and 
implemented to drive a positive impact upon the SES of women (and men) if so desired.  
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7.2 Limitations of research 
There are several limitations to my study. The first limitation relates to how I capture and 
measure programme design. The variable RatioQPCSPC is central to my argument, as it 
roughly captures the extent to which IMF programmes are structural rather than 
macroeconomic adjustment-based. While the IMF MONA databases store vast amounts of 
data dating from 1993 onwards, this data is not organised in a usable format. With no existing 
dataset available which measures the focus of a programme, this study undertook to create 
such a dataset. The approach which was taken was a straight forward codifying and counting 
of conditions. Conditions from the MONA datasets are already separated into 
macroeconomic and structural, so codification for this study took its lead from the MONA 
datasets. However, a simple tally of conditions per programme is open to criticism. The 
perpetual criticism of all studies that use the number of conditions as a variable is that some 
conditions are more important than others. For example, one condition may specify the 
submission of national budgets to parliament for approval, while another may specify a 
complete special audit of the central bank's reserve assets and report these to the IMF while 
still another may request a state to implement the privatisation of a national transportation 
system. These conditions are diverse in focus, in importance and in complexity. There is an 
argument that conditions should be weighted. I have not done this. There is no agreed 
weighting system either from the IMF or the wider research community. Published studies 
have not yet managed to address this problem, and while it may seem an incomplete 
measure, the ratio I have created it is the best available proxy as there are no accepted 
alternative solutions. 
 
The second limitation relates to how I capture and measure programme implementation. The 
variables Imp_Level is also central to my argument as it roughly measures the level of 
implementation of a condition. This variable reflects the number of conditions which have 
been implemented as a proportion of the total number of conditions in the agreement. The 
MONA database records whether a condition was implemented, partially implemented or not 
implemented at all. This provided a starting point for the creation of a variable that could 
measure implementation levels. There are two main issues with my measurement of 
implementation which should be acknowledged. Firstly, it is important to acknowledge that 
full accuracy regarding implementation is not possible. The data in the MONA database is 
somewhat scattered, particularly regarding conditions which are partially completed. I have 
attempted to ensure that my variable IMP_Level is as accurate as possible by only counting 
conditions which were fully implemented. Secondly, as with programme design, conditions 
are diverse in nature, and I do not apply a weighting system which considers the importance 
or complexity of the condition. As with programme design, there is no agreed weighting 
system either from the IMF or the wider research community which can be applied to IMF 
conditionality and published studies have not yet managed to address this problem. While 
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my measure of implementation may seem an incomplete measure, the measurement which 
I have created it is the best available proxy as there are no accepted alternative solutions. 
The third limitation relates to the interpretation of some of my presented results. This is 
particularly relevant to the impact of IMF programmes on the SES of women from a regional 
perspective. While the regional perspective is enormously valuable, in some cases the 
number of observations is low, and the error term is high. These demand caution when 
interpreting the results. 
The fourth limitation relates to the scope of this study. My analysis has concentrated on the 
impact of IMF programmes on the SES of women. It would be logical to ask what consideration 
I have given to its sister organisation The World Bank. In short, I have not considered the 
World Bank in this study, rather I have focused solely upon the IMF. Research exploring the 
relationship between gender within the World Bank is far more advanced. Not only is there 
an active and growing body of research in this area, but also the World Bank has a thoroughly 
integrated gender policy at organisational level and embedded within its programmes. This is 
a notable difference to the IMF and also re-enforces the need to address some of the research 
gaps existing in the area of the IMF and gender. Additionally, this highlights the need for the 
IMF to address gender, both in the context of its own organisational structure as well as from 
a policy perspective.    
 
7.3 Implications 
There are a number of implications for this study. The first implication of this study is focused 
upon how we assess what impact IMF programmes might have on the SES of women and 
other socio-economic indicators. Both programme design and programme implementation 
provide accurate frameworks for understanding how the IMF interacts with socioeconomic 
factors and follows existing research from Ivanova, Mayer, Mourmouras and Anayitos (2001), 
Bird and Rowlands (2002), Mercer-Blackman and Unigovskaya (2004) Edwards (2005) and 
Vreeland (2006) who all highlight the importance of considering implementation and 
compliance levels in IMF programmes when exploring the impact of IMF programmes. In the 
case of this study, the complexity of assessing impact was seen when results differed 
depending upon interaction. In the case of maternal health, participation in an IMF 
programme showed potential as results pointed towards a statistically significant reduction 
in maternal mortality rates and lifetime risk of maternal death. However, the programme 
design and the programme implementation failed to harness this potential. In the case of 
female education, it was when the model considered programme design and programme 
implementation that the results pointed towards a positive impact on female enrollment into 
primary, secondary and tertiary education. There are strong theoretical reasons for the 
diversion in results. The broader implication outside of this study is that it confirms the need 
for a more comprehensive approach when assessing the impact of IMF programmes. All 
future research which is attempting to explore the impact IMF programmes have should 
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consider both programme design and programme implementation to arrive at a more 
accurate result.  
 
The second implication from this study is that there is variation in impact of IMF programmes, 
both at a regime level and at a regional level. For example, in the case of female education, 
the statistically significant impact IMF programmes have on female enrollment into primary, 
secondary and tertiary education was only present in democracies. This study is similar in its 
findings to Bauer et al. (2012) in that the pooling of data obscures the actual impact that IMF 
programmes have. Such variation implies that there are different processes at play at regime 
and regional level in the design and implementation of IMF programmes. Theoretically, I 
borrow from Bremmer (2006) and Hellman (1998) and argue that different domestic political 
preferences play a role in autocracies. However, the wider implication is that the results from 
this study confirm the need for all future studies exploring the impact of IMF programmes to 
consider potential variation and build into their research design methods which interrogate 
any potential variation.  
 
The third implication centres around the understanding of what impact that the IMF can have 
upon the SES of women. Existing research is consistent, IMF programmes mainly negatively 
impact on women. However, this study has variable findings and, in some ways, run counter 
to current research. Yes, this study finds some statistically significant negative impacts of IMF 
programmes on women, specifically on the fertility rates of women in autocracies and more 
precisely in Africa, along with negative impacts on the labour force participation of women. 
However, this study also finds statistically significant and positive impacts on female 
education and maternal mortality rates. This study provides evidence that our current 
understanding of what impact IMF programmes have upon women may not be fully correct. 
Rather this study provides evidence that IMF programmes have the potential for some 
positive impact, but in the main, have no material impact on a host of indicators related to 
the SES of women.  
 
Fourthly, this study has implications for the IMF, specifically around the role it could play to 
ensure its programmes maximise their potential and also mitigate against risks of 
programmes disproportionately and negatively impacting women. This study found that IMF 
programmes had some positive and some negative impacts upon female education. However, 
there is evidence of gender-differentiated impacts of IMF programmes. Implementation of 
IMF programmes had a negative impact on the progression rates of both females and males 
to secondary schooling, but the reduction of females was much higher. Similarly, there also 
seems to be gender differentiated impacts of IMF programmes upon literacy rates. It is 
imperative that where states need to implement an IMF agreement, that the programme, at 
least does not have a negative impact on the SES of women but also avoids any 
disproportionate negative impact from a gender perspective. 
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Fifthly, this study and its results have implications for the IMF in relation to its core objective 
and helping a state regain economic stability and moving towards economic growth. The key 
to economic growth, innovation and stability, is an educated and healthy population who 
have opportunities to contribute to the labour market. I argue that IMF programmes which 
negatively impact these elements is actually counter-productive and is actually stopping the 
IMF from achieving its own goals. I would also argue that it is not enough for IMF programmes 
to not have a negative impact, or even have no impact, upon the SES of women (or men), 
rather, in order to help states, regain economic stability and stimulate growth, I argue that 
IMF programmes should aim to have a positive impact on the SES of people, in particular, 
their participation in the labour force.  
 
Finally, this study also highlighted the current emphasis on gender within the IMF which 
should be welcomed. This also has implications for the IMF and its next steps regarding 
gender. For example, the IMF has the power to build in elements of its agreements which 
support and encourage states to implement policies which would improve the SES of women. 
The IMF has the ability to ensure that gender budgeting is mainstreamed in its programmes 
and that a focus on gender is also built into its country reports so that quarterly progress 
assessments factor in consideration of gender. This would be particularly beneficial in 
countries where there is severe gender inequality. One of the notable findings in this study 
has been the lack of parity in data collection across genders for various socio-economic 
indicators. The IMF also has within its power, the ability to specify and guide states 
undergoing IMF programmes, around the gathering of such data. The IMF itself acknowledges 
the lack of an integrated gender policy and has yet to adopt a systematic approach to gender 
in its macroeconomic analysis and policy advice (IMF, 2012). Steps to change this are 
necessary and important. The IMF holds considerable influence and power and needs to show 
leadership in this area. As already highlighted at the beginning of this study, if the IMF does 
not consider the gendered impacts of economic policy choice, then why would we expect a 
state to be able to either implement a gendered sensitive economic policy or even care about 
gendered sensitive economic policies?  
 
7.4 Contribution and Future Research 
I argue that this study has made a number of contributions to the existing body of research in 
the area of IMF and gender. There is also room for continued work in this area. This study has 
brought new insight on what impact IMF programmes have on the SES of women, specifically, 
maternal health, female education and female labour force participation. This study also 
explored male education and male labour force participation enabling a level of comparative 
analysis. This is also a new contribution to the existing body of research and is an important 
contribution to the current body of research. 
Current research is heavily qualitative in approach and most often uses case studies to explore 
detail. This study focused on developing a cross-country macro understanding of the impact 
 
 
181 
 
of IMF programmes upon the SES of women, primarily utilising quantitative methods. This 
answers a call from Stotsky (2006a) for a systematic cross-country study supported by 
statistical evidence investigating whether IMF programmes damage or enhance the lives of 
women. As such, this study adds to the body of literature and will help to bridge our 
knowledge of what impact IMF programmes have upon women (and men). 
Future research should continue to observe the impact that IMF programmes have upon the 
SES of women. This study focused upon the time period of 1990 – 2011. It would be valuable 
to extend this period of investigation and to expand research to include current data as far as 
possible. This new time period also holds the potential to explore the impact of the recent 
IMF policy pivot on gender and whether and how current IMF interest in gender is being 
deployed into IMF agreements. Future research should also extend the study through the use 
of case study. It would be valuable to select a smaller subgroup data and conduct a deeper 
analysis through case studies. This smaller subset could include countries where the impact 
IMF programmes varied from positive to negative. This would provide an opportunity for 
exploring the very specific nature of the programme design and programme implementation 
in the context of gender. 
This study importantly presents two new datasets. The first new dataset attempts to measure 
IMF programme design and roughly captures the extent to which an IMF programme is 
focused upon macroeconomic or structural adjustment. This dataset has the potential to be 
valuable past this study and become a resource to the wider community exploring the impact 
of IMF programmes. Secondly, this study also presents a new dataset measuring IMF 
programme implementation which captures the level to which states complete or implement 
their IMF programmes. There is also nuance to this dataset as it facilitates not only an overall 
completion rate but also completion rates of macroeconomic or structural conditions. Again, 
this dataset has the potential to be valuable past this study and become a resource to the 
wider community exploring the impact of IMF programmes.  
It is important to ensure that future research includes a focus to ensure that these new 
datasets constructed for this study are suitable and available for use within the wider research 
community. The IMF has enormous power and influence. It is imperative that researchers 
explore the impact of IMF programmes, have available to them, datasets which can help 
facilitate greater analytical nuance.  
Finally, this study contributes a review of the current “state of play” of gender within the IMF, 
highlighting the potential ‘policy pivot’ around gender. It is clear from the level of research 
coming from the IMF, along with the discourse from its leader, that gender is now a key topic 
of interest within the IMF. Leaders within the IMF are interested in employing a gender 
mainstreaming strategy. However, there are limitations to this policy pivot which should be 
noted. The remit of the IMF is economic, and the focus of the IMF’s own research in regard 
to gender is centred around female labour force participation. There is not only room for, but 
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also a necessity to, keep the IMF ‘in check’ with regards to this approach. As with men, there 
are multiple socio-economic concerns with regard to women.  
Future research should continue to hold a broader contextualization of women and their 
relationships with IMF programmes. This is not to say each individual research project should 
always consider the SES of women, multiple indicators or a variety of measures relating to 
women. Future research should not be limited to economically focused measures of women. 
The results of this study highlight the irony of such a situation, illustrating no material impact 
of IMF programmes on women’s labour force participation, yet also finding a statistically 
significant of IMF programmes on maternal health and female and male education. I echo 
Zuckerman’s (2014) calls for an approach that would also consider women’s rights, arguing 
that ‘women’s rights are drowned out by its smart economics framework’. The reality is, the 
IMF may have at its core, a remit which is fiscal and economic, IMF programmes may be 
fiscally and economically orientated, but the impact of IMF programmes goes far beyond the 
economic and the fiscal.  
This reality demands responsibility from the IMF to recognise that its programmes can 
improve their potential for economic growth by incorporating measures to tackle gender 
inequality. 
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9.0 APPENDICES 
9.1 Appendix 1: The impact of IMF programme participation on maternal health index 
Dependent Variable Maternal Health Index Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF Programme (IMF Programme) 
No of Obs: 1014 
Wald chi² (157) = 481.38 
Prob > chi² = 0.00 
Rho = -0.04026 
No of Obs: 601  
Wald chi² (92) = 342.80  
Prob > chi² = 0.00 
Rho = -0.04219 
No of Obs: 407 
Wald chi² (71) = 136.10 
Prob > chi² = 0.00 
Rho =-0.05370 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme -0.44 -1.02 -0.73 -1.33 -0.44 -1.74 
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1) 4.45* -2.404 3.82 -3.217 -1.741 7.71 
GDP per capita (t-1) -2.404 0 -3.217 0 -6.885 0 
Log of GDP per capita (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Log of GDP (t-1) -0.35*** -0.107 -0.37*** -0.139 -0.22 -0.271 
GDP Growth (t-1) 0.05** -0.023 0.02 0.066 0.05 -0.029 
Log of GDP Growth (t-1) -0.40*** -0.129 -0.38*** -0.202 0.31 -0.234 
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita 0.17 -0.202 -0.07 -0.279 0.61 -0.443 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1) -0.17 -0.112 -0.09 -0.152 -0.239 -0.01 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1) -0.04 -0.057 -0.104 0.46 -0.081 0.14 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1) 0.39 -0.256 0.46 -0.384 0.14 -0.412 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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9.2 Appendix 2: The impact of IMF programme implementation on maternal health Index 
Dependent Variable Maternal Health Index Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF Programme (IMF Programme) 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
No of Obs: 144 
Wald chi² (41) = 92.32 
Prob > chi² = 0.00 
Rho = -0.57673 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme     5.25 -4.95 
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1)     -5341.11*** -4.346 
GDP per capita (t-1)     4.44*** -0.089 
Log of GDP per capita (t-1)     -1170.30*** -4.059 
GDP (t-1)     0 0 
Log of GDP (t-1)     0.01 -0.174 
GDP Growth (t-1)     0.03 -0.072 
Log of GDP Growth (t-1)     -0.18 -0.337 
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1)     0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1)     -4.44*** -0.089 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita     -1170.68*** -4.076 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP     0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1)     0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1)     0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1)     0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1)     0 0 
Implementation Levels (t-1)     0 -0.006 
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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9.3 Appendix 3: The impact of IMF programme design on maternal health index 
Dependent Variable Maternal Health Index Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF Programme (IMF Programme) 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
No of Obs: 143 
Wald chi² (41) = 91.95  
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho =-0.52856 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme     4.66 -4.63 
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1)     -5402.02*** -4.345 
GDP per capita (t-1)     -4.45*** -0.089 
Log of GDP per capita (t-1)     -1184.02*** -4.065 
GDP (t-1)     0 0 
Log of GDP (t-1)     0.01 -0.171 
GDP Growth (t-1)     0.04 -0.071 
Log of GDP Growth (t-1)     -0.25 -0.339 
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1)     0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1)     -4.50*** -0.089 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita     1184.50*** -4.018 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP     0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1)     0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1)     0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1)     0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1)     0 0 
Ratio of QPC Conditions to SPC Conditions     0.01** -0.006 
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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9.4 Appendix 4: The impact of IMF programmes participation on births attended by a health professional 
Dependent Variable Births attended by health professional Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF Programme (IMF Programme) 
No of Obs: 595 
Wald chi² (135) = 37768.25 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho =0.02802 
No of Obs:316 
Wald chi² (81) = 29508.76 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = -0.09885 
No of Obs: 274 
Wald chi² (66) = 13698.20 
Prob > chi² = 0.000  
Rho = 0.17695 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme -0.35 -0.659 0.61 -0.696 -1.98 -1.247 
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1) 2.96 -2.833 2.21 -4.011 -0.12 -7.679 
GDP per capita (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Log of GDP per capita (t-1) -0.29* -0.173 -0.04 -0.348 -0.4 -0.317 
GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Log of GDP (t-1) 0.1 -0.082 0.01 -0.112 0.22 -0.249 
GDP Growth (t-1) 0.06** -0.026 -0.01 -0.102 0.08** -0.037 
Log of GDP Growth (t-1) -0.50*** -0.157 -0.46 -0.28 -0.4 -0.299 
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1) 0 0 0 0 -0.00* -0.001 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita 0.31 -0.26 -0.18 -0.442 1.30** -0.615 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1) -0.14 -0.13 0.01 -0.18 -0.23 -0.312 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1) -0.02 -0.07 0.11 -0.153 -0.05 -0.089 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1) 0.4 -0.322 0.14 -0.551 0.36 -0.487 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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9.5 Appendix 5: The impact of IMF programme implementation on births attended by a health professional  
Dependent Variable Births Attended by health professional Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF Programme (IMF Programme) 
No of Obs: 255 
Wald chi² (80) = 14633.37 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = 0.65903 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
No of Obs: 98 
Wald chi² (0) =  . 
Prob > chi² = . 
Rho = -0.12118 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme -3.81 -2.69   -0.74 -3.81 
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1) -115.37 -166.897   -32.81 -115.37 
GDP per capita (t-1) 0.01 -0.032   -0.13 0.01 
Log of GDP per capita (t-1) 0.53 -23.894   1.02 0.53 
GDP (t-1) 0 0   0 0 
Log of GDP (t-1) -3.3 -9.931   0.03 -3.3 
GDP Growth (t-1) 33.13*** -12.372   0.03 33.13*** 
Log of GDP Growth (t-1) -131.33 0   -0.1 -131.33 
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1) -0.00* 0   0 -0.00* 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1) -0.01 -0.032   0.13 -0.01 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita -0.63 -23.895   0 -0.63 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP 0 0   0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1) 3.31 -9.931   0 3.31 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1) -33.09*** -12.372   0 -33.09*** 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1) 131.20*** -0.288   0 131.20*** 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1) 0 0   0 0 
Implementation Levels (t-1) 0 -0.004   0 0 
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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9.6 Appendix 6: The impact of IMF programme design on births attended by a health professional  
Dependent Variable Births Attended buy health professional Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF Programme (IMF Programme) 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
No of Obs: 98 
Wald chi² (37) = 4592.19 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = -0.08960 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme     -0.89 -4.092 
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1)     -35.05*** -5.273 
GDP per capita (t-1)     -0.14 -3.232 
Log of GDP per capita (t-1)     0.99* -0.541 
GDP (t-1)     0 0 
Log of GDP (t-1)     0.05 -0.197 
GDP Growth (t-1)     0.03 -0.077 
Log of GDP Growth (t-1)     -0.07 -0.37 
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1)     0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1)     0.14 -3.232 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita     0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP     0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1)     0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1)     0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1)     0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1)     0 0 
Ratio of QPC Conditions to SPC Conditions     0.01* -0.006 
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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9.7 Appendix 7: The impact of IMF programme participation on contraceptive prevalence among married women aged 19-49 
Dependent Variable Contraceptive prevalence Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF Programme (IMF Programme) 
No of Obs: 489 
Wald chi² (119) = 22571.00 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = 0.04891 
No of Obs: 260 
Wald chi² (72) = 16611.96 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho =-0.14620 
No of Obs: 224 
Wald chi² (59) = 6586.03 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho =0.14655 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme 0.39 -0.752 0.84 -0.9 -0.09 -1.296 
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1) 3.51 -3.124 4.27 -4.915 -7.47 -11.837 
GDP per capita (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 -0.002 
Log of GDP per capita (t-1) -0.30* -0.173 0.15 -0.348 0.11 -1.15 
GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Log of GDP (t-1) 0.05 -0.088 -0.06 -0.133 0.03 -0.34 
GDP Growth (t-1) 0.06* -0.03 0.26 -0.212 0.1 -0.064 
Log of GDP Growth (t-1) -0.48** -0.216 -1.70* -0.896 -0.44 -0.402 
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1) 0 0 0.00* 0 0 -0.002 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita 0.18 -0.314 -0.67 -0.561 0.78 -1.267 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1) -0.13 -0.145 0.02 -0.241 0.22 -0.413 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1) -0.04 -0.069 -0.2 -0.239 -0.06 -0.11 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1) 0.48 -0.343 1.61 -0.992 0.34 -0.575 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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9.8 Appendix 8: The impact of IMF programme implementation on contraceptive prevalence among married women aged 19-49 
Dependent Variable Contraceptive prevalence among women aged 19-49 Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF Programme (IMF Programme) 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
 
 
 
9.9 Appendix 9: The impact of IMF programme design on contraceptive prevalence among married women aged 19-40  
Dependent Variable Contraceptive prevalence among women aged 19-49 Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF Programme (IMF Programme) 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
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9.10 Appendix 10: The impact of IMF programme participation on female fertility rates 
Dependent Variable Female Fertility Rates Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF Programme (IMF Programme) 
No of Obs: 998 
Wald chi² (155) = 143731.34 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = 0.08455 
No of Obs: 594 
Wald chi² (99) = 90587.32 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = 0.28299 
No of Obs: 398 
Wald chi² (70) = 44197.66 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = -0.03179 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme -0.02 -0.021 -0.05* -0.025 -0.01 -0.038 
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1) 4.83* -2.494 4.79 -3.49 7.8 -6.9 
GDP per capita (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Log of GDP per capita (t-1) -0.33*** -0.108 -0.35** -0.142 -0.16 -0.289 
GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Log of GDP (t-1) 0.08 -0.07 0.04 -0.095 0.40* -0.239 
GDP Growth (t-1) 0.05** -0.023 0.02 -0.066 0.05 -0.029 
Log of GDP Growth (t-1) -0.40*** -0.128 -0.39* -0.202 -0.31 -0.232 
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita 0.17 -0.204 -0.03 -0.287 0.55 -0.455 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1) -0.18 -0.118 -0.14 -0.17 -0.42 -0.292 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1) -0.04 -0.057 -0.03 -0.104 -0.01 -0.081 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1) 0.4 -0.255 0.49 -0.383 0.14 -0.411 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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9.11 Appendix 11: The impact of IMF programme implementation on female fertility rates  
Dependent Variable Female Fertility Rates Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF Programme (IMF Programme) 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
No of Obs: 144 
Wald chi² (41) = 13202.28 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = -0.90961 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme     0.23* -0.125 
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1)     -5,341.11*** -4.346 
GDP per capita (t-1)     4.44*** -0.089 
Log of GDP per capita (t-1)     -1,170.30*** -4.059 
GDP (t-1)     0 0 
Log of GDP (t-1)     0.01 -0.174 
GDP Growth (t-1)     0.03 -0.072 
Log of GDP Growth (t-1)     -0.18 -0.337 
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1)     0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1)     -4.44*** -0.089 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita     1,170.68*** -4.076 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP     0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1)     0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1)     0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1)     0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1)     0 0 
Implementation Levels (t-1)     0 -0.006 
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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9.12 Appendix 12: The impact of IMF programme design on female fertility rates 
Dependent Variable Female Fertility Rates Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF Programme (IMF Programme) 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
No of Obs: 143 
Wald chi² (41) = 19061.28 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = -0.75024 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme     0.17* -0.093 
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1)     -5,402.02*** -4.345 
GDP per capita (t-1)     4.50*** -0.089 
Log of GDP per capita (t-1)     -1,184.20*** -4.065 
GDP (t-1)     0 0 
Log of GDP (t-1)     0.01 -0.171 
GDP Growth (t-1)     0.04 -0.071 
Log of GDP Growth (t-1)     -0.25 -0.339 
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1)     0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1)     -4.50*** -0.089 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita     1,184.50*** -4.081 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP     0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1)     0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1)     0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1)     0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1)     0 0 
Ratio of QPC Conditions to SPC Conditions     0.01** -0.006 
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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9.13 Appendix 13: The impact of IMF programme participation on lifetime risk of maternal death  
Dependent Variable Lifetime risk of maternal death Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF Programme (IMF Programme) 
No of Obs: 874 
Wald chi² (156) = 54292.36  
Prob > chi² = 0.00 
Rho = 0.32611 
No of Obs: 514 
Wald chi² (99) = 45798.15 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = 0.46905 
No of Obs: 360 
Wald chi² (71) = 21455.16  
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = 0.25643 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme -0.19*** -0.032 -0.13*** -0.033 -0.23*** -0.055 
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1) 4.78* -2.704 4.58 -3.94 7.85 -7.159 
GDP per capita (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Log of GDP per capita (t-1) -0.36*** -0.113 -0.37** -0.153 -0.21 -0.276 
GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Log of GDP (t-1) 0.08 -0.072 0.03 -0.101 0.4 -0.245 
GDP Growth (t-1) 0.05** -0.023 0.04 -0.069 0.04 -0.03 
Log of GDP Growth (t-1) -0.41*** -0.133 -0.44** -0.209 -0.3 -0.235 
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita 0.28 -0.217 -0.03 -0.312 0.68 -0.47 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1) -0.21* -0.128 -0.13 -0.192 -0.46 -0.303 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1) -0.04 -0.06 -0.02 -0.113 -0.01 -0.082 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1) 0.41 -0.268 0.47 -0.414 0.16 -0.423 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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9.14 Appendix 14: The impact of IMF programme implementation on lifetime risk of maternal death  
Dependent Variable Lifetime risk of Maternal Death Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF Programme (IMF Programme) 
No of Obs: 302 
Wald chi² (86) = 28116.55 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = -0.29577 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme 0.01 -0.133     
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1) -74.24 -422.605     
GDP per capita (t-1) 0 -0.006     
Log of GDP per capita (t-1) 4.86 -33.932     
GDP (t-1) 0 0     
Log of GDP (t-1) -4.56 -22.011     
GDP Growth (t-1) -1.07 -20.608     
Log of GDP Growth (t-1) -0.37 0     
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1) 0 0     
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1) 0 -0.006     
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita -5.02 -33.933     
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP 0 0     
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1) 4.48 -22.011     
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1) 1.08 -20.608     
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1) 0.37 -0.234     
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1) 0 0     
Implementation Levels (t-1) 0 -0.004     
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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9.15 Appendix 15: The impact of IMF programme design on lifetime risk of maternal death 
Dependent Variable Lifetime risk of maternal death Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF Programme (IMF Programme) 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
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9.16 Appendix 16: The impact of IMF programme participation on maternal mortality rates 
Dependent Variable Maternal Mortality Rates Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF Programme (IMF Programme) 
No of Obs: 1007 
Wald chi² (156) = 88286.50 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = 0.21547 
No of Obs: 594 
Wald chi² (99) = 94741.49 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho =0.16704 
No of Obs: 407 
Wald chi² (71) = 29686.18 
Prob > chi² = 0.00 
Rho = 0.23399 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme -21.49*** -4.975 -8.84* -4.822 -26.25*** -8.799 
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1) 4.99** -2.493 4.79 -3.49 7.71 -6.885 
GDP per capita (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Log of GDP per capita (t-1) -0.34*** -0.108 -0.35** -0.142 -0.22 -0.271 
GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Log of GDP (t-1) 0.09 -0.07 0.04 -0.095 0.41* -0.24 
GDP Growth (t-1) 0.05** -0.023 0.02 -0.066 0.05 -0.029 
Log of GDP Growth (t-1) -0.40*** -0.129 -0.39* -0.202 -0.31 -0.234 
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita 0.18 -0.204 -0.03 -0.287 0.61 -0.443 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1) -0.19 -0.117 -0.14 -0.17 -0.43 -0.293 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1) -0.04 -0.057 -0.03 -0.104 -0.01 -0.081 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1) 0.4 -0.255 0.49 -0.383 0.14 -0.412 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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9.17 Appendix 17: The Impact of IMF programmes implementation on maternal mortality rates  
Dependent Variable Maternal Mortality Rates Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF Programme (IMF Programme) 
No of Obs: 348 
Wald chi² (88) = 28829.75 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = 0.03256 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
No of Obs: 144 
Wald chi² (41) = 5739.35 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = 0.10303 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme -16.27 -21.294   -21.04 -34.5 
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1) -76.17 -363.403   -5,341.11*** -4.346 
GDP per capita (t-1) 0 -0.01   4.44*** -0.089 
Log of GDP per capita (t-1) 8.24 -82.954   -1,170.30*** -4.059 
GDP (t-1) 0 0   0 0 
Log of GDP (t-1) -8.07 -31.653   0.01 -0.174 
GDP Growth (t-1) -14.5 -24.197   0.03 -0.072 
Log of GDP Growth (t-1) 75.73 0   -0.18 -0.337 
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1) 0 0   0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1) 0 -0.01   -4.44*** -0.089 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita -8.45 -82.954   1,170.68*** -4.076 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP 0 0   0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1) 8.04 -31.653   0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1) 14.52 -24.197   0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1) -75.75*** -0.226   0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1) 0 0   0 0 
Implementation Levels (t-1) 0 -0.003   0 -0.006 
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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9.18 Appendix 18: The Impact of IMF programme design on maternal mortality rates  
Dependent Variable Maternal Mortality Rates Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF programme (IMF programme) 
No of Obs: 347 
Wald chi² (88) = 29205.60 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = 0.04303 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
No of Obs: 143 
Wald chi² (41) = 5930.78 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = 0.12367 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme -17.53 -21.217   -23.82 -32.252 
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1) -75.09 -364.357   -5,402.02*** -4.345 
GDP per capita (t-1) 0 -0.01   4.50*** -0.089 
Log of GDP per capita (t-1) 8.17 -84.233   -1,184.20*** -4.065 
GDP (t-1) 0 0   0 0 
Log of GDP (t-1) -8.02 -31.831   0.01 -0.171 
GDP Growth (t-1) -14.84 -24.308   0.04 -0.071 
Log of GDP Growth (t-1) 76.85 0   -0.25 -0.339 
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1) 0 0   0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1) 0 -0.01   -4.50*** -0.089 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita -8.38 -84.233   1,184.50*** -4.081 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP 0 0   0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1) 7.98 -31.831   0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1) 14.85 -24.308   0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1) -76.88*** -0.226   0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1) 0 0   0 0 
Ratio of QPC Conditions to SPC Conditions 0 -0.003   0.01** -0.006 
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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9.19 Appendix 19: The Impact of IMF programme participation on pregnant women receiving prenatal care 
Dependent Variable Pregnant women receiving prenatal care Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF programme (IMF programme) 
No of Obs: 219 
Wald chi² (105) = 3247.40 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = 0.63258 
No of Obs: 114 
Wald chi² (56) = 2930.92 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = -0.36655 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme -2.03 -1.255 1.88* -1.107   
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1) -4.37 -6.033 -7.29 -8.627   
GDP per capita (t-1) 0 0 0 -0.001   
Log of GDP per capita (t-1) -0.05 -0.47 0.86 -1.122   
GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0   
Log of GDP (t-1) 0.05 -0.229 -0.26 -0.346   
GDP Growth (t-1) -1.09 -0.7 -1.64 -1.348   
Log of GDP Growth (t-1) 1.69 -1.646 2.67 -3.143   
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0   
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1) 0 0 0 -0.001   
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita 0.55 -0.574 -0.49 -1.227   
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP 0 0 0 0   
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1) 0.06 -0.269 0.42 -0.398   
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1) 0.93 -0.709 1.53 -1.355   
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1) -0.81 -1.722 -2.08 -3.207   
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1) 0 0 0 0   
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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9.20 Appendix 20: The Impact of IMF programme implementation on pregnant women receiving prenatal care  
Dependent Variable Pregnant women receiving prenatal care Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF programme (IMF programme) 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
No of Obs: 39 
Wald chi² (25) = 811.85 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = -1.000 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme     12.21* -7.209 
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1)     0 0 
GDP per capita (t-1)     0 -0.002 
Log of GDP per capita (t-1)     0.44 -1.046 
GDP (t-1)     0 0 
Log of GDP (t-1)     0.78* -0.465 
GDP Growth (t-1)     -0.80** -0.354 
Log of GDP Growth (t-1)     3.53** -1.649 
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1)     0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1)     0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita     0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP     0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1)     0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1)     0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1)     0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1)     0 0 
Implementation Levels (t-1)     0.03* -0.017 
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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9.21 Appendix 21: The Impact of IMF programme design on pregnant women receiving prenatal care 
Dependent Variable Pregnant women receiving prenatal care Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF programme (IMF programme) 
No of Obs: 99 
Wald chi² (59) = 3302.46 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = 1.000 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
No of Obs: 39 
Wald chi² (25) = 1482.56 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = -1.000 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme -6.65 -5.406   8.60* -4.861 
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1) -3.07 -379.651   0 0 
GDP per capita (t-1) 0 0   0 -0.002 
Log of GDP per capita (t-1) 0.53 -0.338   0.57 -1.044 
GDP (t-1) 0 0   0 0 
Log of GDP (t-1) 0.13 -0.146   0.68 -0.412 
GDP Growth (t-1) -0.15 -0.108   -0.60** -0.297 
Log of GDP Growth (t-1) 0.84* -0.509   3.35** -1.55 
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1) 0 0   0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1) 0 0   0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita 0 0   0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP 0 0   0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1) 0 0   0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1) 0 0   0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1) 0 0   0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1) 0 0   0 0 
Ratio of QPC Conditions to SPC Conditions 0.01 -0.006   0.02* -0.012 
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
 
 
 
233 
 
9.22 Appendix 22: The Impact of IMF programme participation on teenage mothers aged 15-19 
Dependent Variable Teenage mothers 15-19 Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF programme (IMF programme) 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
No of Obs: 44 
Wald chi² (34) = 2377.07 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = 1.000 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme   4.06*** -1.562   
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1)   38.81 -227.603   
GDP per capita (t-1)   -0.01 -0.007   
Log of GDP per capita (t-1)   9.47 -11.409   
GDP (t-1)   0 0   
Log of GDP (t-1)   -1.78 -2.893   
GDP Growth (t-1)   -6.01 -11.306   
Log of GDP Growth (t-1)   14.94 -35.072   
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1)   0 0   
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1)   0.01 -0.013   
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita   -15.29 -15.018   
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP   0 0   
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1)   3.02 -14.749   
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1)   14.6 -21.11   
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1)   -52.59 -94.219   
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1)   0 0   
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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9.23 Appendix 23: The Impact of IMF programme implementation on teenage mothers aged 15-19 
Dependent Variable Teenage mothers 15-19 Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF programme (IMF programme) 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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9.24 Appendix 24: The Impact of IMF programme design on teenage mothers aged 15-19 
Dependent Variable Teenage mothers 15-19 Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF programme (IMF programme) 
No of Obs: 46 
Wald chi² (135 = 1137.96 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = 1.000 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme -6.58 -8.374     
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1) -3.72 -435.624     
GDP per capita (t-1) 0 0     
Log of GDP per capita (t-1) 0.61 -0.608     
GDP (t-1) 0 0     
Log of GDP (t-1) -1.03 -0.787     
GDP Growth (t-1) -0.36 -0.41     
Log of GDP Growth (t-1) 2.39 -2.431     
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1) 0 0     
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1) 0 0     
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita 0 0     
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP 0 0     
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1) 0 0     
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1) 0 0     
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1) 0 0     
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1) 0 0     
Ratio of QPC Conditions to SPC Conditions 0 -0.013     
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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9.25 Appendix 25: The Impact of IMF programme participation on female education index 
Dependent Variable Female Education Index Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF programme (IMF programme) 
No of Obs: 1382 
Wald chi² (146) = 2407.84  
Prob > chi² = 0.0000 
Rho = -0.14358 
No of Obs: 937 
Wald chi² (92) = 1450.27 
Prob > chi² = 0.0000 
Rho =-0.24277 
No of Obs:441 
Wald chi² (71) = 915.53  
Prob > chi² = 0.0000 
Rho = -0.01500 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme 2.25 -1.427 5.46*** -1.942 -1.97 -2.254 
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1) 3.51 -2.24 5.72 -3.648 -4.33 -4.338 
GDP per capita (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Log of GDP per capita (t-1) -0.30*** -0.098 -.29** -.121 -0.46** -0.203 
GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0.00** 0 
Log of GDP (t-1) 0.05 -0.056 0.02 -.088 0 -0.112 
GDP Growth (t-1) 0.01 -0.025 0.08 -0.061 0 -0.037 
Log of GDP Growth (t-1) -0.15 -0.111 -0.40** -0.179 0.01 -0.185 
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0 -0.00** 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita 0.18 -0.215 -0.13 -0.308 0.86** -0.431 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1) -0.1 -0.107 -0.11 -0.166 0.08 -0.183 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1) 0 -0.057 -0.03 -0.109 0 -0.078 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1) 0.04 -0.246 0.13 -0.391 0.12 -0.379 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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9.26 Appendix 26: The Impact of IMF programme implementation on female education Index 
Dependent Variable Female Education Index Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF programme (IMF programme) 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
No of Obs:166 
Wald chi² (44) = 251.26 
Prob > chi² = 0.0000 
Rho = 0.17260 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme     -5.62 -10.872 
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1)     
-
3,709.06*** -3.852 
GDP per capita (t-1)     2.77*** -0.054 
Log of GDP per capita (t-1)     -799.71*** -2.731 
GDP (t-1)     0 0 
Log of GDP (t-1)     0.14 -0.155 
GDP Growth (t-1)     -0.01 -0.068 
Log of GDP Growth (t-1)     0.16 -0.328 
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1)     0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1)     -2.78*** -0.054 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita     800.12*** -2.752 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP     0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1)     0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1)     0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1)     0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1)     0 0 
Implementation Levels (t-1)     0 -0.006 
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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9.27 Appendix 27: The Impact of IMF programme design on female education index 
Dependent Variable Female Education Index Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF programme (IMF programme) 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
No of Obs:166 
Wald chi² (44) = 251.33 
Prob > chi² = 0.0000 
Rho = 0.25489 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme     -7.03 -11.048 
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1)     
-
3,704.27*** -3.896 
GDP per capita (t-1)     2.77*** -0.055 
Log of GDP per capita (t-1)     -798.62*** -2.741 
GDP (t-1)     0 0 
Log of GDP (t-1)     0.15 -0.152 
GDP Growth (t-1)     -0.01 -0.068 
Log of GDP Growth (t-1)     0.17 -0.329 
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1)     0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1)     -2.77*** -0.055 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita     799.02*** -2.765 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP     0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1)     0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1)     0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1)     0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1)     0 0 
Ratio of QPC Conditions to SPC Conditions     0 -0.005 
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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9.28 Appendix 28 The Impact of IMF programme participation on expected years of schooling - Female 
Dependent Variable Expected Years of Schooling - Female Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF programme (IMF programme) 
No of Obs: 893 
Wald chi² (130) = 39638.15 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = 0.08974 
No of Obs: 683 
Wald chi² (85) = 19664.01 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho =0.10764 
No of Obs: 210 
Wald chi² (58) = 15979.80 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = 0.15999 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme 0 -0.108 -0.08 -0.14 0.14 -0.134 
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1) 3.43 -3.393 6.24 -5.757 -3.04 -8.77 
GDP per capita (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 -0.002 
Log of GDP per capita (t-1) -0.39*** -0.143 -0.54*** -0.171 0.54 -0.993 
GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Log of GDP (t-1) 0.16* -0.09 0.09 -0.125 -0.01 -0.23 
GDP Growth (t-1) 0 -0.049 0.06 -0.081 -0.14 -0.202 
Log of GDP Growth (t-1) -0.23 -0.167 -0.39** -0.2 0.42 -0.679 
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 -0.002 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita 0.35 -0.289 0.22 -0.434 -0.14 -1.146 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP 0 0 0.00** 0 -0.00* 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1) -0.12 -0.165 -0.19 -0.261 0.28 -0.351 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1) 0.19 -0.153 0.23 -0.247 0.25 -0.289 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1) -0.84 -0.763 -1.22 -1.193 -0.94 -1.235 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1) -0.00* 0 -0.00* 0 0 0 
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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9.29 Appendix 29: The Impact of IMF programme Implementation on expected years of schooling - female 
Dependent Variable Expected Years of Schooling - Female Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF programme (IMF programme) 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
No of Obs: 79 
Wald chi² (32) = 1037.09 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = 1.000 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme     -0.48 -1.243 
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1)     0 0 
GDP per capita (t-1)     0 -0.001 
Log of GDP per capita (t-1)     0.37 -0.576 
GDP (t-1)     0 0 
Log of GDP (t-1)     0.27 -0.271 
GDP Growth (t-1)     0.1 -0.204 
Log of GDP Growth (t-1)     -0.5 -1.02 
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1)     0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1)     0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita     0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP     0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1)     0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1)     0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1)     0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1)     0 0 
Implementation Levels (t-1)     0 -0.009 
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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9.30 Appendix 30: The Impact of IMF programme design on expected years of schooling - female 
Dependent Variable Expected Years of Schooling - Female Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF programme (IMF programme) 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
No of Obs: 79 
Wald chi² (32) = 582.84 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = 1.000 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme     -0.93 -1.528 
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1)     0 0 
GDP per capita (t-1)     0 -0.001 
Log of GDP per capita (t-1)     0.38 -0.579 
GDP (t-1)     0 0 
Log of GDP (t-1)     0.27 -0.266 
GDP Growth (t-1)     0.11 -0.201 
Log of GDP Growth (t-1)     -0.53 -1.013 
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1)     0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1)     0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita     0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP     0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1)     0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1)     0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1)     0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1)     0 0 
Ratio of QPC Conditions to SPC Conditions     0 -0.008 
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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9.31 Appendix 31: The Impact of IMF programme participation on expected years of schooling - male 
Dependent Variable Expected Years Schooling - Male Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF programme (IMF programme) 
No of Obs: 893 
Wald chi² (130) = 31361.05 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = -0.04226 
No of Obs: 683 
Wald chi² (85) = 17488.46 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho =-0.03275 
No of Obs: 210 
Wald chi² (58) = 8150.61 
Prob > chi² = 0.00 
Rho = 0.11577 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme 0.11 -0.095 0.09 -0.12 0.04 -0.135 
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1) 3.43 -3.393 6.24 -5.757 -3.04 -8.77 
GDP per capita (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 -0.002 
Log of GDP per capita (t-1) -0.39*** -0.143 -0.54*** -0.171 0.54 -0.993 
GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Log of GDP (t-1) 0.16* -0.09 0.09 -0.125 -0.01 -0.23 
GDP Growth (t-1) 0 -0.049 0.06 -0.081 -0.14 -0.202 
Log of GDP Growth (t-1) -0.23 -0.167 -0.39** -0.2 0.42 -0.679 
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 -0.002 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita 0.35 -0.289 0.22 -0.434 -0.14 -1.146 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP 0 0 0.00** 0 -0.00* 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1) -0.12 -0.165 -0.19 -0.261 0.28 -0.351 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1) 0.19 -0.153 0.23 -0.247 0.25 -0.289 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1) -0.84 -0.763 -1.22 -1.193 -0.94 -1.235 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1) -0.00* 0 -0.00* 0 0 0 
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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9.32 Appendix 32: The Impact of IMF programme implementation on expected years of schooling - male 
Dependent Variable Expected years schooling – Male  Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF programme (IMF programme) 
No of Obs: 253 
Wald chi² (68) = 11635.15 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = 0.05546 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
No of Obs: 79 
Wald chi² (32) = 1795.52 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho =1.000 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme 0.09 -0.521   0.76 -1.341 
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1) -170.02 0   0 0 
GDP per capita (t-1) 0 -0.01   0 -0.001 
Log of GDP per capita (t-1) -10.59 -90.801   0.37 -0.576 
GDP (t-1) 0 0   0 0 
Log of GDP (t-1) -4.1 -25.275   0.27 -0.271 
GDP Growth (t-1) 0.18 -0.141   0.1 -0.204 
Log of GDP Growth (t-1) -1 -0.734   -0.5 -1.02 
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1) 0 0   0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1) 0 0   0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita 10.52 -90.801   0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP 0 0   0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1) 4.15 -25.275   0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1) 0 0   0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1) 0 0   0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1) 0 0   0 0 
Implementation Levels (t-1) 0 -0.005   0 -0.009 
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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9.33 Appendix 33: The Impact of IMF programme design on expected years of schooling - male 
Dependent Variable Expected Years Schooling - Male Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF programme (IMF programme) 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
No of Obs: 79 
Wald chi² (32) = 620.24 
Prob > chi² = 0.00 
Rho = 1.000 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme     0.28 -1.409 
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1)     0 0 
GDP per capita (t-1)     0 -0.001 
Log of GDP per capita (t-1)     0.38 -0.579 
GDP (t-1)     0 0 
Log of GDP (t-1)     0.27 -0.266 
GDP Growth (t-1)     0.11 -0.201 
Log of GDP Growth (t-1)     -0.53 -1.013 
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1)     0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1)     0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita     0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP     0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1)     0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1)     0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1)     0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1)     0 0 
Ratio of QPC Conditions to SPC Conditions     0 -0.008 
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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9.34 Appendix 34: The Impact of IMF programme participation on the male / female ratio for primary enrolment  
Dependent Variable Male / Female ratio - Primary Enrolment Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF programme (IMF programme) 
No of Obs: 561 
Wald chi² (138) = 7327.21 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = 0.03874 
No of Obs: 365 
Wald chi² (88) = 3088.87 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = -0.45864 
No of Obs: 192 
Wald chi² (56) = 3271.82 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = 0.55424 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme 0.45 -0.435 1.05* -0.541 -0.5 -0.766 
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1) 4.18 -3.588 16.69* -9.193 -4.47 -8.854 
GDP per capita (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Log of GDP per capita (t-1) -0.37** -0.157 -0.49** -0.206 -0.34 -0.373 
GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Log of GDP (t-1) 0.08 -0.099 -0.02 -0.138 0.07 -0.311 
GDP Growth (t-1) 0.05 -0.037 0.05 -0.086 0.01 -0.06 
Log of GDP Growth (t-1) -0.31* -0.163 -0.42* -0.223 0.04 -0.464 
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 -0.001 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita 0.12 -0.324 0.35 -0.597 0.74 -0.703 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1) -0.15 -0.174 -0.78* -0.44 0.11 -0.375 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1) -0.01 -0.104 -0.01 -0.203 0.07 -0.172 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1) 0.43 -0.406 0.53 -0.694 -0.13 -0.77 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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9.35 Appendix 35: The Impact of IMF programme implementation on the male / female ratio for primary enrolment 
Dependent Variable Male / Female ratio - Primary Enrolment Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF programme (IMF programme) 
No of Obs: 192 
Wald chi² (56) = 3271.82 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = 0.55424 
No of Obs: 109 
Wald chi² (43) = 527.50 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = -1.000 
No of Obs: 80 
Wald chi² (31) = 1799.40  
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho =0.25339 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme 4.59** -2.059 11.10*** -4.2 0.82 -2.298 
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1) -1,440.43 0 -414.52*** -9.17 -321.68*** -5.812 
GDP per capita (t-1) 0 -0.003 0.01 -0.007 -1.43*** -0.456 
Log of GDP per capita (t-1) 48.40** -19.095 -64.30*** -14.718 0.47 -0.597 
GDP (t-1) 0.00*** 0 0 0 0 0 
Log of GDP (t-1) -82.63*** -5.342 -0.67 -0.441 0.13 -0.215 
GDP Growth (t-1) 0.04 -0.098 0.07 -0.196 0.03 -0.104 
Log of GDP Growth (t-1) 0.13 -0.368 0.02 -0.696 -0.04 -0.474 
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1) 0 -0.003 -0.01 -0.007 1.42*** -0.456 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita -48.59** -19.097 64.15*** -14.704 0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP -0.00*** 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1) 82.58*** -5.34 0 0 0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Implementation Levels (t-1) 0 -0.005 -0.01 -0.008 0.01 -0.008 
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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9.36 Appendix 36: The Impact of IMF programme design on the male / female ratio for primary enrolment 
Dependent Variable Male / Female ratio - Primary Enrolment Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF programme (IMF programme) 
No of Obs: 189 
Wald chi² (69) = 2687.06  
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = -0.84921 
No of Obs: 109 
Wald chi² (43) = 592.48 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = -1.000 
No of Obs: 80 
Wald chi² (31) = 1816.23 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = -0.04668 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme 5.04** -2.125 10.17*** -3.843 1.87 -2.552 
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1) -1,440.64 0.00 -433.41*** -8.984 -317.20*** -5.702 
GDP per capita (t-1) 0 -0.003 0.01 -0.006 -1.41*** -0.403 
Log of GDP per capita (t-1) 48.52** -19.172 -67.18*** -12.852 0.38 -0.591 
GDP (t-1) 0.00*** 0 0 0 0 0 
Log of GDP (t-1) -82.65*** -5.361 -0.77* -0.426 0.19 -0.209 
GDP Growth (t-1) 0.04 -0.1 0.08 -0.198 0.06 -0.126 
Log of GDP Growth (t-1) 0.11 -0.373 0.06 -0.7 -0.06 -0.525 
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1) 0 -0.003 -0.01 -0.006 1.40*** -0.403 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita -48.73** -19.174 67.05*** -12.838 0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP -0.00*** 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1) 82.62*** -5.359 0 0 0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ratio of QPC Conditions to SPC Conditions 0 -0.005 -0.01 -0.011 0.01 -0.007 
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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9.37 Appendix 37: The Impact of IMF programme participation on the male / female ratio for secondary enrolment 
Dependent Variable Male / Female ratio - Secondary Enrolment Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF programme (IMF programme) 
No of Obs: 511 
Wald chi² (134) = 14288.45 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = 0.14271 
No of Obs: 352 
Wald chi² (88) = 6449.46 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = -0.09703 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme -0.65 -0.686 -0.05 -0.82   
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1) 9.33** -4.116 18.71* -10.489   
GDP per capita (t-1) 0 0 0 0   
Log of GDP per capita (t-1) -0.27 -0.168 -0.39* -0.22   
GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0   
Log of GDP (t-1) 0.15 -0.117 -0.09 -0.147   
GDP Growth (t-1) 0.06 -0.038 -0.06 -0.108   
Log of GDP Growth (t-1) -0.41** -0.174 -0.29 -0.246   
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0   
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1) 0 0 0 0   
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita 0.11 -0.352 0.62 -0.677   
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP 0 0 0.00* 0   
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1) -0.36* -0.195 -0.95* -0.509   
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1) 0 -0.115 0.08 -0.236   
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1) 0.38 -0.453 0.53 -0.763   
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1) 0 0 0 0   
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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9.38 Appendix 38: The Impact of IMF programme implementation on the male / female ratio for secondary enrolment 
Dependent Variable Male / Female ratio - Secondary Enrolment Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF programme (IMF programme) 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
No of Obs: 98 
Wald chi² (42) = 944.80 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = -1.000 
No of Obs: 54 
Wald chi² (29) = 3199.07 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho =-0.00644 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme   19.22*** -6.317 0.82 -2.816 
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1)   -448.50*** -9.604 6.1 -560.044 
GDP per capita (t-1)   0.01 -0.008 0 -0.001 
Log of GDP per capita (t-1)   -69.23*** -16.724 0.38 -0.694 
GDP (t-1)   0 0 0 0 
Log of GDP (t-1)   -0.83* -0.477 0.32 -0.316 
GDP Growth (t-1)   0.05 -0.221 0.07 -0.136 
Log of GDP Growth (t-1)   0.17 -0.753 -0.39 -0.594 
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1)   0 0 0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1)   -0.01 -0.008 0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita   69.44*** -16.704 0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP   0 0 0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1)   0 0 0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1)   0 0 0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1)   0 0 0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1)   0 0 0 0 
Implementation Levels (t-1)   0 -0.009 0.02 -0.011 
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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9.39 Appendix 39: The Impact of IMF programme design on the male / female Ratio for secondary enrolment 
Dependent Variable Male / Female ratio - Secondary Enrolment Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF programme (IMF programme) 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
No of Obs: 98 
Wald chi² (42) = 1056.35 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = -1.000 
No of Obs: 54 
Wald chi² (29) = 3151.64 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = -0.28253 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme   18.02*** -5.774 1.81 -3.096 
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1)   -456.56*** -9.392 5.91 -358.289 
GDP per capita (t-1)   0.01 -0.008 0 -0.001 
Log of GDP per capita (t-1)   -70.51*** -16.896 0.33 -0.716 
GDP (t-1)   0 0 0 0 
Log of GDP (t-1)   -0.84* -0.457 0.34 -0.309 
GDP Growth (t-1)   0.06 -0.219 0.14 -0.185 
Log of GDP Growth (t-1)   0.18 -0.746 -0.55 -0.725 
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1)   0 0 0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1)   -0.01 -0.008 0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita   70.67*** -16.881 0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP   0 0 0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1)   0 0 0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1)   0 0 0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1)   0 0 0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1)   0 0 0 0 
Ratio of QPC Conditions to SPC Conditions   -0.01 -0.012 0.01 -0.009 
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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9.40 Appendix 40: The Impact of IMF programme participation on the male / female ratio for tertiary enrolment 
Dependent Variable Male / Female ratio - Tertiary Enrolment Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF programme (IMF programme) 
No of Obs: 475 
Wald chi² (124) = 23628.35 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = -0.13099 
No of Obs: 331 
Wald chi² (81) = 12551.23 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = -0.27378 
No of Obs: 143 
Wald chi² (51) = 10091.96 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho =0.42838 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme 1.97 -1.655 3.71* -1.97 -5.23 -3.321 
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1) 7.13* -4.173 17.72** -8.517 69.2 -73.377 
GDP per capita (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Log of GDP per capita (t-1) -0.34* -0.175 -0.41* -0.211 -0.06 -0.603 
GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Log of GDP (t-1) 0.14 -0.121 0.03 -0.147 2.25 -2.125 
GDP Growth (t-1) 0.06 -0.039 0.01 -0.105 -0.55 -0.51 
Log of GDP Growth (t-1) -0.34** -0.168 -0.39 -0.244 15.68 -13.23 
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 -0.001 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita 0.25 -0.344 0.33 -0.573 0.8 -0.949 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP 0 0 0.00* 0 0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1) -0.3 -0.195 -0.78** -0.398 -1.71 -2.145 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1) 0 -0.115 0.08 -0.246 0.74 -0.544 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1) 0.23 -0.49 -0.08 -0.973 -16.24 -13.25 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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9.41 Appendix 41: The Impact of IMF programme implementation on the male / female ratio for tertiary enrolment 
Dependent Variable Male / Female ratio - Tertiary Enrolment Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF programme (IMF programme) 
No of Obs: 147 
Wald chi² (62) = 2913.91 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = 2913.91 
No of Obs: 94 
Wald chi² (40) = 3308.27 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = -1.0000 
No of Obs: 53 
Wald chi² (29) = 2467.16  
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = 0.54467 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme 27.09** -13.579 22.27** -8.884 -3.31 -13.587 
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1) -362.35*** -3.473 -376.64*** -8.225 0 0 
GDP per capita (t-1) 0.01 -0.009 0.01 -0.006 0 -0.001 
Log of GDP per capita (t-1) -56.19*** -18.93 -58.35*** -12.812 0.68 -0.731 
GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Log of GDP (t-1) -0.05 -0.166 -0.64 -0.391 0.48* -0.294 
GDP Growth (t-1) 0.06 -0.112 0.15 -0.252 0.07 -0.146 
Log of GDP Growth (t-1) -0.11 -0.469 -0.78 -1.048 -0.29 -0.593 
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1) -0.01 -0.009 -0.01 -0.006 0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita 56.07*** -18.929 58.35*** -12.799 0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Implementation Levels (t-1) 0 -0.005 -0.01 -0.009 0.01 -0.011 
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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9.42 Appendix 42: The Impact of IMF programme design on the male / female ratio for tertiary enrolment 
Dependent Variable Male / Female ratio - Tertiary Enrolment Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF programme (IMF programme) 
No of Obs: 147 
Wald chi² (62) = 2487.27 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = -1.000 
No of Obs: 94 
Wald chi² (40) = 5219.31 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho =-1.000 
No of Obs: 53 
Wald chi² (29) = 2426.72 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = 0.59624 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme 29.63** -14.536 15.81** -6.692 -3.88 -18.965 
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1) -358.16*** -3.482 -413.85*** -10.311 0 0 
GDP per capita (t-1) 0.01 -0.009 0.01 -0.006 0 -0.001 
Log of GDP per capita (t-1) -55.53*** -18.93 -64.15*** -12.732 0.68 -0.743 
GDP (t-1) 0 0 0.00* 0 0 0 
Log of GDP (t-1) -0.03 -0.165 -0.90** -0.444 0.51* -0.29 
GDP Growth (t-1) 0.07 -0.114 0.2 -0.275 0.15 -0.193 
Log of GDP Growth (t-1) -0.13 -0.476 -0.86 -1.091 -0.46 -0.722 
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1) -0.01 -0.009 -0.01 -0.006 0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita 55.42*** -18.929 64.08*** -12.729 0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ratio of QPC Conditions to SPC Conditions 0 -0.006 -0.02 -0.014 0 -0.009 
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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9.43 Appendix 43: The Impact of IMF programme participation on primary school completion rates - female 
Dependent Variable Female Primary School Completion Rates Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF programme (IMF programme) 
No of Obs: 442 
Wald chi² (124) = 11172.99 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = -0.14425 
No of Obs: 282 
Wald chi² (79) = 6133.45 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = -0.62588 
No of Obs: 156 
Wald chi² (49) = 3338.92 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = 0.29990 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme 2.79** -1.12 4.37*** -1.297 0.69 -2.239 
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1) 6.13 -3.931 26.70** -12.826 -10.9 -22.028 
GDP per capita (t-1) 0 0 0 0 -0.01 -0.016 
Log of GDP per capita (t-1) -0.39** -0.166 -0.44** -0.209 3.89 -6.072 
GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Log of GDP (t-1) 0.11 -0.103 0.06 -0.148 -0.67 -1.32 
GDP Growth (t-1) 0.06 -0.054 0.03 -0.086 0.14 -0.149 
Log of GDP Growth (t-1) -0.38** -0.184 -0.39* -0.223 -0.47 -0.841 
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0.01 -0.016 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita 0.13 -0.353 1 -0.731 -2.9 -6.122 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1) -0.25 -0.188 -1.40** -0.632 1.19 -1.36 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1) -0.02 -0.152 0.04 -0.245 -0.21 -0.188 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1) 0.68 -0.571 0.6 -0.791 1.62 -1.098 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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9.44 Appendix 44: The impact of IMF programme implementation on female rates of primary school completion 
Dependent Variable Female Primary School Completion Rates Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF programme (IMF programme) 
No of Obs: 159 
Wald chi² (64) = 5341.66 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = 0.17475 
No of Obs: 94 
Wald chi² (41) = 3844.62 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = -0.82312 
No of Obs: 65 
Wald chi² (28) = 1701.77 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = 0.44942 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme 2.25 -3.627 4.9 -4.567 0.17 -4.949 
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1) -1,429.48 0 -514.53*** -16.344 -324.86*** -11.898 
GDP per capita (t-1) 0 -0.003 0.01 -0.013 -1.44** -0.585 
Log of GDP per capita (t-1) 47.85** -20.007 -79.05*** -29.981 0.99 -0.768 
GDP (t-1) 0.00*** 0 0 0 0 0 
Log of GDP (t-1) -82.06*** -5.571 -1.32* -0.79 0.52 -0.526 
GDP Growth (t-1) 0.05 -0.146 0.12 -0.267 -0.06 -0.115 
Log of GDP Growth (t-1) 0.27 -0.55 0.09 -0.864 0.94 -0.739 
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1) 0 -0.003 -0.01 -0.013 1.44** -0.585 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita -48.10** -20.009 79.63*** -29.956 0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP -0.00*** 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1) 81.92*** -5.569 0 0 0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Implementation Levels (t-1) 0.01 -0.006 -0.01 -0.011 0.02 -0.01 
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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9.45 Appendix 45: The impact of IMF programme design on female rates of primary school completion 
Dependent Variable Female Primary School Completion Rates Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF programme (IMF programme) 
No of Obs: 159 
Wald chi² (64) = 5361.81 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = 0.08777 
No of Obs: 94 
Wald chi² (41) = 4046.77 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = -0.49679 
No of Obs: 65 
Wald chi² (28) = 1667.38 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = 0.57675 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme 2.85 -3.603 2.74 -4.319 -1.06 -5.949 
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1) -1,430.68 0 -495.67*** -11.245 -324.08*** -8.544 
GDP per capita (t-1) 0 -0.003 0.01 -0.008 -1.44** -0.584 
Log of GDP per capita (t-1) 48.11** -19.554 -76.26*** -16.669 0.95 -0.766 
GDP (t-1) 0.00*** 0 0 0 0 0 
Log of GDP (t-1) -82.15*** -5.459 -1.12* -0.571 0.51 -0.326 
GDP Growth (t-1) 0.06 -0.147 0.09 -0.232 -0.06 -0.113 
Log of GDP Growth (t-1) 0.24 -0.553 0.19 -0.769 1.04 -0.72 
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1) 0 -0.003 -0.01 -0.008 1.43** -0.584 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita -48.34** -19.557 76.70*** -16.64 0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP -0.00*** 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1) 82.05*** -5.457 0 0 0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ratio of QPC Conditions to SPC Conditions 0.01 -0.006 0 -0.013 0 -0.009 
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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9.46 Appendix 46: The impact of IMF programme participation on male rates of primary school completion 
Dependent Variable Male rates of primary school completion Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF programme (IMF programme) 
No of Obs: 442 
Wald chi² (124) = 7446.08 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = -0.18369 
No of Obs: 282 
Wald chi² (79) = 4647.80 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = -0.65838 
No of Obs: 156 
Wald chi² (49) = 1949.16 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = 0.24299 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme 2.42** -1.13 5.00*** -1.23 -1.43 -2.405 
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1) 6.13 -3.931 26.70** -12.826 -10.9 -22.028 
GDP per capita (t-1) 0 0 0 0 -0.01 -0.016 
Log of GDP per capita (t-1) -0.39** -0.166 -0.44** -0.209 3.89 -6.072 
GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Log of GDP (t-1) 0.11 -0.103 0.06 -0.148 -0.67 -1.32 
GDP Growth (t-1) 0.06 -0.054 0.03 -0.086 0.14 -0.149 
Log of GDP Growth (t-1) -0.38** -0.184 -0.39* -0.223 -0.47 -0.841 
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0.01 -0.016 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita 0.13 -0.353 1 -0.731 -2.9 -6.122 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1) -0.25 -0.188 -1.40** -0.632 1.19 -1.36 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1) -0.02 -0.152 0.04 -0.245 -0.21 -0.188 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1) 0.68 -0.571 0.6 -0.791 1.62 -1.098 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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9.47 Appendix 47: The impact of IMF programme implementation on male rates of primary school completion 
Dependent Variable Male rates of primary school completion Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF programme (IMF programme) 
No of Obs: 159 
Wald chi² (64) = 2713.78 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = 0.40024 
No of Obs: 94 
Wald chi² (41) = 2551.34 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = -0.16466 
No of Obs: 65 
Wald chi² (28) = 901.77 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = 0.28562 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme -1.99 -4.158 -0.44 -4.749 -1.88 -5.638 
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1) -1,429.48 0.00 -514.53*** -16.344 -324.86*** -11.898 
GDP per capita (t-1) 0 -0.003 0.01 -0.013 -1.44** -0.585 
Log of GDP per capita (t-1) 47.85** -20.007 -79.05*** -29.981 0.99 -0.768 
GDP (t-1) 0.00*** 0 0 0 0 0 
Log of GDP (t-1) -82.06*** -5.571 -1.32* -0.79 0.52 -0.526 
GDP Growth (t-1) 0.05 -0.146 0.12 -0.267 -0.06 -0.115 
Log of GDP Growth (t-1) 0.27 -0.55 0.09 -0.864 0.94 -0.739 
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1) 0 -0.003 -0.01 -0.013 1.44** -0.585 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita -48.10** -20.009 79.63*** -29.956 0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP -0.00*** 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1) 81.92*** -5.569 0 0 0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Implementation Levels (t-1) 0.01 -0.006 -0.01 -0.011 0.02 -0.01 
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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9.48 Appendix 48: The impact of IMF programme design on male rates of primary school completion 
Dependent Variable Male rates of primary school completion Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF programme (IMF programme) 
No of Obs: 159 
Wald chi² (64) = 2723.94 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = 0.37025 
No of Obs: 94 
Wald chi² (41) = 2558.16 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = 0.08419 
No of Obs: 65 
Wald chi² (28) = 874.31 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = 0.64972 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme -1.76 -4.13 -1.97 -4.55 -5.39 -6.928 
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1) -1,430.68 0.00 -495.67*** -11.245 -324.08*** -8.544 
GDP per capita (t-1) 0 -0.003 0.01 -0.008 -1.44** -0.584 
Log of GDP per capita (t-1) 48.11** -19.554 -76.26*** -16.669 0.95 -0.766 
GDP (t-1) 0.00*** 0 0 0 0 0 
Log of GDP (t-1) -82.15*** -5.459 -1.12* -0.571 0.51 -0.326 
GDP Growth (t-1) 0.06 -0.147 0.09 -0.232 -0.06 -0.113 
Log of GDP Growth (t-1) 0.24 -0.553 0.19 -0.769 1.04 -0.72 
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1) 0 -0.003 -0.01 -0.008 1.43** -0.584 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita -48.34** -19.557 76.70*** -16.64 0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP -0.00*** 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1) 82.05*** -5.457 0 0 0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ratio of QPC Conditions to SPC Conditions 0.01 -0.006 0 -0.013 0 -0.009 
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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9.49 Appendix 49: The impact of IMF programme participation on progression to secondary education - Female 
Dependent Variable Progression to secondary education - Female Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF programme (IMF programme) 
No of Obs: 369 
Wald chi² (110) = 7455.64 
Prob > chi² = 0.00 
Rho = -0.28800 
No of Obs: 240 
Wald chi² (72) = 4068.54  
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = -0.29253 
No of Obs: 126 
Wald chi² (0) = .  
Prob > chi² = . 
Rho = -0.78765 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme 0.33 -1.115 1.54 -1.532 -1.53 0 
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1) 7.2 -4.999 19.01 -14.711 609.26 0 
GDP per capita (t-1) 0 0 0 0 -0.15 0 
Log of GDP per capita (t-1) -0.26 -0.186 -0.44* -0.244 96.23 0 
GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Log of GDP (t-1) 0.11 -0.116 0.04 -0.151 4.49 0 
GDP Growth (t-1) 0.07 -0.055 0 -0.093 2.94 0 
Log of GDP Growth (t-1) -0.42** -0.184 -0.36 -0.225 -12.2 0 
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0.15 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita -0.01 -0.442 0.92 -0.813 -97.94 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1) -0.24 -0.234 -1 -0.731 -3.89 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1) 0.2 -0.189 0.35 -0.381 -2.71 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1) -0.15 -0.68 -0.87 -1.558 12.29 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
 
 
 
261 
 
9.50 Appendix 50: The impact of IMF programme implementation on progression to secondary education - Female 
Dependent Variable Progression to secondary education - Female Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF programme (IMF programme) 
No of Obs: 129 
Wald chi² (0) = . 
Prob > chi² = . 
Rho = 0.42938 
No of Obs: 80 
Wald chi² (35) = 1328.11 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = 0.13215 
No of Obs: 49 
Wald chi² (27) = 1071.66 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = 0.83452 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme -8.63 0 -3.36 -11.937 -18.89*** -4.718 
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1) -4.48 0 -4.34 -616.881 0 0 
GDP per capita (t-1) 0 0 0 -0.023 0 -0.004 
Log of GDP per capita (t-1) -0.24 0 0.54 -0.83 0.37 -2.186 
GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Log of GDP (t-1) -0.17 0 -1.08 -0.952 0.49 -0.451 
GDP Growth (t-1) 0.28 0 0.41 -0.445 0.68 -0.572 
Log of GDP Growth (t-1) -0.63 0 -1.35 -1.79 -1.88 -2.177 
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0 -0.00* 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1) 0 0 0 -0.023   0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Implementation Levels (t-1) 0.01 0 -0.01 -0.013 0.04** -0.02 
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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9.51 Appendix 51: The impact of IMF programme design on progression to secondary education - Female 
Dependent Variable Progression to secondary education - Female Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF programme (IMF programme) 
No of Obs: 129 
Wald chi² (57) = 2198.53 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = -0.30577 
No of Obs: 80 
Wald chi² (35) = 1331.00 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = 0.01615 
No of Obs: 49 
Wald chi² (27) = 645.32 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho =-1.000 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme -2.23 -7.849 -2.26 -11.367 -6.59 -8.111 
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1) -4.2 -464.635 -4.24 -458.021 0 0 
GDP per capita (t-1) 0 -0.017 0 -0.017 0 -0.003 
Log of GDP per capita (t-1) -0.26 -0.411 0.42 -0.775 -1.86 -1.778 
GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Log of GDP (t-1) -0.13 -0.209 -0.9 -0.631 0.55 -0.407 
GDP Growth (t-1) 0.29 -0.189 0.36 -0.382 0.2 -0.411 
Log of GDP Growth (t-1) -0.65 -0.679 -1.19 -1.56 0.03 -1.621 
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0 -0.00** 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1) 0 -0.017 0 -0.017 0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ratio of QPC Conditions to SPC Conditions 0.01 -0.007 0 -0.015 0.03* -0.015 
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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9.52 Appendix 52: The impact of IMF programme participation on progression to secondary education - male 
Dependent Variable Progression to secondary education - Male Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF programme (IMF programme) 
No of Obs: 369 
Wald chi² (110) = 7199.85 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho =-0.26896 
No of Obs: 240 
Wald chi² (72) = 4420.73 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho =-0.25961 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme 1.1 -1.073 1.01 -1.417   
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1) 7.2 -4.999 19.01 -14.711   
GDP per capita (t-1) 0 0 0 0   
Log of GDP per capita (t-1) -0.26 -0.186 -0.44* -0.244   
GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0   
Log of GDP (t-1) 0.11 -0.116 0.04 -0.151   
GDP Growth (t-1) 0.07 -0.055 0 -0.093   
Log of GDP Growth (t-1) -0.42** -0.184 -0.36 -0.225   
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0   
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1) 0 0 0 0   
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita -0.01 -0.442 0.92 -0.813   
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP 0 0 0 0   
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1) -0.24 -0.234 -1 -0.731   
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1) 0.2 -0.189 0.35 -0.381   
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1) -0.15 -0.68 -0.87 -1.558   
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1) 0 0 0 0   
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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9.53 Appendix 53: The impact of IMF programme implementation on progression to secondary education - male 
Dependent Variable Progression to secondary education - Male Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF programme (IMF programme) 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
No of Obs: 80 
Wald chi² (35) = 1495.60 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho =0.01246 
No of Obs: 49 
Wald chi² (27) = 1240.24 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = 0.79055 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme   -2.31 -10.303 -15.87*** -4.439 
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1)   -4.34 -616.881 0 0 
GDP per capita (t-1)   0 -0.023 0 -0.004 
Log of GDP per capita (t-1)   0.54 -0.83 0.37 -2.186 
GDP (t-1)   0 0 0 0 
Log of GDP (t-1)   -1.08 -0.952 0.49 -0.451 
GDP Growth (t-1)   0.41 -0.445 0.68 -0.572 
Log of GDP Growth (t-1)   -1.35 -1.79 -1.88 -2.177 
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1)   0 0 -0.00* 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1)   0 -0.023 0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita   0 0 0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP   0 0 0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1)   0 0 0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1)   0 0 0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1)   0 0 0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1)   0 0 0 0 
Implementation Levels (t-1)   -0.01 -0.013 0.04** -0.02 
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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9.54 Appendix 54: The impact of IMF programme design on progression to secondary education - male 
Dependent Variable Progression to secondary education - Male Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF programme (IMF programme) 
No of Obs: 129 
Wald chi² (57) = 2368.93 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = 0.12231 
No of Obs: 80 
Wald chi² (35) = 1491.54 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = -0.12850 
No of Obs: 49 
Wald chi² (27) = 1057.58 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = -1.000 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme -4.08 -7.164 -1.16 -9.804 -7.28 -6.403 
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1) -4.2 -464.635 -4.24 -458.021 0 0 
GDP per capita (t-1) 0 -0.017 0 -0.017 0 -0.003 
Log of GDP per capita (t-1) -0.26 -0.411 0.42 -0.775 -1.86 -1.778 
GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Log of GDP (t-1) -0.13 -0.209 -0.9 -0.631 0.55 -0.407 
GDP Growth (t-1) 0.29 -0.189 0.36 -0.382 0.2 -0.411 
Log of GDP Growth (t-1) -0.65 -0.679 -1.19 -1.56 0.03 -1.621 
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0 -0.00** 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1) 0 -0.017 0 -0.017 0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ratio of QPC Conditions to SPC Conditions 0.01 -0.007 0 -0.015 0.03* -0.015 
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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9.55 Appendix 55: The impact of IMF programme participation on literacy rates - female 
Dependent Variable Progression to secondary education - Male Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF programme (IMF programme) 
No of Obs: 179 
Wald chi² (93) = 23656.55 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = -0.01696 
No of Obs: 122 
Wald chi² (57) = 27934.02 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = 0.0 
No of Obs: 66 
Wald chi² (42) = 8645.76 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = -0.28146 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme -0.29 -0.811 -0.01 -0.556 0.19 -1.276 
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1) 18.89** -8.876 19,357.52 0.00 219.93* -132.381 
GDP per capita (t-1) 0 0 -0.01 0 0 -0.005 
Log of GDP per capita (t-1) 0.15 -0.43 23.41 0 2.9 -5.179 
GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0  
Log of GDP (t-1) 0.05 -0.189 733.5 0 2.97  
GDP Growth (t-1) 0.01 -0.084 -963.62 0 -3.54  
Log of GDP Growth (t-1) -0.24 -0.415 925.52 0 29.32*  
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0  
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1) 0.00** -0.001 0.16 0 0.05  
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita -2.39** -1.15 -232.34 0 -29.16  
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP -0.00** 0 0 0 0  
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1) -0.05 -0.316 -716.61 0 -1.84  
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1) -0.07 -0.266 1,347.69 0.00 2.31  
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1) -0.78 -1.237 -3,380.59 0.00 -23.76  
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1) 0  0 0 0  
Ratio of QPC Conditions to SPC Conditions -0.29 -0.811 -0.01 -0.556 0.19 -1.276 
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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9.56 Appendix 56: The impact of IMF programme implementation on literacy rates - female 
Dependent Variable Progression to secondary education - Male Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF programme (IMF programme) 
No of Obs: 82 
Wald chi² (55) = 20572.78 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = 0.23361 
No of Obs: 55 
Wald chi² (39) = 16748.62 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = -1.000 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme -0.27 -1.694 3.67* -1.975   
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1) 50.22 0 1,935.01*** -114.534   
GDP per capita (t-1) -0.01 -1.26 -0.26*** -0.096   
Log of GDP per capita (t-1) 5.07 -226.385 310.06*** -24.775   
GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0   
Log of GDP (t-1) 0.25 -0.305 2.49 -3.14   
GDP Growth (t-1) -0.08 -0.285 1.93 -32.177   
Log of GDP Growth (t-1) -1.25 -1.392 -27.12 -181.741   
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0   
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1) 0.01 -1.26 0.28*** -0.073   
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita -8.05 -226.381 -323.6 0   
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP 0 0      
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1) -  -    
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1) -  -    
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1) -  -    
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1) -  -    
Ratio of QPC Conditions to SPC Conditions -0.04* -0.024 -0.39 -0.38   
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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9.57 Appendix 57: The impact of IMF programme design on literacy rates - female 
Dependent Variable Progression to secondary education - Male Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF programme (IMF programme) 
No of Obs: 82 
Wald chi² (55) =20649.28 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = 0.05331 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme 0.08 -1.668     
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1) 36.92 0     
GDP per capita (t-1) -0.01 -0.593     
Log of GDP per capita (t-1) 3.15      
GDP (t-1) 0 0     
Log of GDP (t-1) -0.06 -0.282     
GDP Growth (t-1) -0.11 -0.276     
Log of GDP Growth (t-1) -0.88 -1.244     
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1) 0 0     
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1) 0.01 -0.593     
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita -5.6 -106.51     
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP 0 0     
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1) -      
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1) -      
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1) -      
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1) -      
Ratio of QPC Conditions to SPC Conditions -0.01 -0.009     
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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9.58 Appendix 58: The impact of IMF programme participation on literacy rates - male 
Dependent Variable Progression to secondary education - Male Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF programme (IMF programme) 
No of Obs: 179 
Wald chi² (93) = 10541.45 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = -0.13052 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
No of Obs: 66 
Wald chi² (42) = 2613.79 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = -0.68213 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme -0.29 -0.811   0.19 -1.276 
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1) 18.89** -8.876   219.93* -132.381 
GDP per capita (t-1) 0 0   0 -0.005 
Log of GDP per capita (t-1) 0.15 -0.43   2.9 -5.179 
GDP (t-1) 0 0   0  
Log of GDP (t-1) 0.05 -0.189   2.97  
GDP Growth (t-1) 0.01 -0.084   -3.54  
Log of GDP Growth (t-1) -0.24 -0.415   29.32*  
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1) 0 0   0  
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1) 0.00** -0.001   0.05  
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita -2.39** -1.15   -29.16  
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP -0.00** 0   0  
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1) -0.05 -0.316   -1.84  
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1) -0.07 -0.266   2.31  
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1) -0.78 -1.237   -23.76  
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1) 0    0  
Ratio of QPC Conditions to SPC Conditions -0.29 -0.811   0.19 -1.276 
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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9.59 Appendix 59: The impact of IMF programme implementation on literacy rates - male 
Dependent Variable Progression to secondary education - Male Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF programme (IMF programme) 
No of Obs: 82 
Wald chi² (55) =5382.53 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = 0.18453 
No of Obs: 55 
Wald chi² (39) = 4081.59 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = -1.000 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme -0.27 -1.694 3.67* -1.975   
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1) 50.22 0 1,935.01*** -114.534   
GDP per capita (t-1) -0.01 -1.26 -0.26*** -0.096   
Log of GDP per capita (t-1) 5.07 -226.385 310.06*** -24.775   
GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0   
Log of GDP (t-1) 0.25 -0.305 2.49 -3.14   
GDP Growth (t-1) -0.08 -0.285 1.93 -32.177   
Log of GDP Growth (t-1) -1.25 -1.392 -27.12 -181.741   
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0   
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1) 0.01 -1.26 0.28*** -0.073   
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita -8.05 -226.381 -323.6 0   
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP 0 0      
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1) -  -    
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1) -  -    
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1) -  -    
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1) -  -    
Ratio of QPC Conditions to SPC Conditions -0.04* -0.024 -0.39 -0.38   
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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9.60 Appendix 60: The impact of IMF programme design on literacy rates - male 
Dependent Variable Progression to secondary education - Male Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF programme (IMF programme) 
No of Obs: 82 
Wald chi² (55) = 5374.95 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = -0.26292 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme 0.08 -1.668     
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1) 36.92 0     
GDP per capita (t-1) -0.01 -0.593     
Log of GDP per capita (t-1) 3.15      
GDP (t-1) 0 0     
Log of GDP (t-1) -0.06 -0.282     
GDP Growth (t-1) -0.11 -0.276     
Log of GDP Growth (t-1) -0.88 -1.244     
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1) 0 0     
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1) 0.01 -0.593     
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita -5.6 -106.51     
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP 0 0     
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1) -      
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1) -      
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1) -      
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1) -      
Ratio of QPC Conditions to SPC Conditions -0.01 -0.009     
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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9.61 Appendix 61: The impact of IMF programme participation on female labour force participation index 
Dependent Variable Female Labour Force Participation Index Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF programme (IMF programme) 
No of Obs: 1014 
Wald chi² (157) = 5165.56 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = 0.03538 
No of Obs: 601 
Wald chi² (100) = 2250.87 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = 0.08295 
No of Obs: 407 
Wald chi² (71) = 2247.79 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = -0.00882 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme -0.21 -0.72 -0.51 -0.96 -0.08 -1.18 
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1) 4.45* -2.404 3.82 -3.217 7.71 -6.885 
GDP per capita (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Log of GDP per capita (t-1) -0.35*** -0.107 -0.37*** -0.139 -0.22 -0.271 
GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Log of GDP (t-1) 0.1 -0.069 0.06 -0.09 0.41* -0.24 
GDP Growth (t-1) 0.05** -0.023 0.02 -0.066 0.05 -0.029 
Log of GDP Growth (t-1) -0.40*** -0.129 -0.38* -0.202 -0.31 -0.234 
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita 0.17 -0.202 -0.07 -0.279 0.61 -0.443 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1) -0.17 -0.112 -0.09 -0.152 -0.43 -0.293 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1) -0.04 -0.057 -0.02 -0.104 -0.01 -0.81 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1) 0.39 -0.256 0.46 -0.384 0.14 -0.412 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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9.62 Appendix 62: The impact of IMF programme implementation on female labour force participation index 
Dependent Variable Female Labour Force Participation Index Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF programme (IMF programme) 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
No of Obs: 86 
Wald chi² (0) = . 
Prob > chi² = . 
Rho = -0.46981 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme     6.29 -3.84 
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1)     -5341.11*** -4.346 
GDP per capita (t-1)     4.44*** -0.089 
Log of GDP per capita (t-1)     -1170.30** -4.059 
GDP (t-1)     0 0 
Log of GDP (t-1)     0.01 -0.174 
GDP Growth (t-1)     .003 -0.072 
Log of GDP Growth (t-1)     -0.18 0.337 
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1)     0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1)     -4.44*** -0.089 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita     -1170.68*** -4.076 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP     0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1)     0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1)     0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1)     0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1)     0 0 
Implementation Levels (t-1)     0 -0.006 
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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9.63 Appendix 63: The impact of IMF programme design on female labour force participation index 
Dependent Variable Female Labour Force Participation Index Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF programme (IMF programme) 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
No of Obs: 144 
Wald chi² (41) = 878.02 
Prob > chi² = 0.00 
Rho = -0.86776 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme     4.67 -3.42 
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1)     -5,402.02*** -4.345 
GDP per capita (t-1)     4.5*** 0 
Log of GDP per capita (t-1)     -1,184.20*** -4.065 
GDP (t-1)     0 0 
Log of GDP (t-1)     0.01 -0.171 
GDP Growth (t-1)     0.04 -0.071 
Log of GDP Growth (t-1)     -0.25 -0.339 
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1)     0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1)     -4.5*** -0.089 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita     1,184.50*** -4.081 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP     0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1)     0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1)     0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1)     0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1)     0 0 
Ratio of QPC Conditions to SPC Conditions     0.01** 0 
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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9.64 Appendix 64: The impact of IMF programme participation on male labour force participation index 
Dependent Variable Male Labour Force Participation Index Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF programme (IMF programme) 
No of Obs: 2019 
Wald chi² (158) = 6626.92 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = -0.04423 
No of Obs: 1231  
Wald chi² (101) = 4710.32 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho =-0.03452 
No of Obs: 780 
Wald chi² (80) = 1380.45 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho =-0.04206 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme 0.64 -0.459 0.65 -0.591 0.5 -0.762 
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1) 5.17*** -1.726 4.86** -2.46 1.82 -3.021 
GDP per capita (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Log of GDP per capita (t-1) -0.34*** -0.079 -0.33*** -0.104 -0.41*** -0.153 
GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0.00*** 0 
Log of GDP (t-1) 0.09* -0.048 0.04 -0.068 0.05 -0.084 
GDP Growth (t-1) 0.01 -0.018 0 -0.056 0.02 -0.021 
Log of GDP Growth (t-1) -0.22** -0.097 -0.24 -0.172 -0.15 -0.155 
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1) -0.00* 0 0 0 -0.00** 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita 0.09 -0.156 -0.12 -0.214 0.51* -0.295 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP 0 0 0.00* 0 -0.00** 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1) -0.16** -0.08 -0.1 -0.113 -0.12 -0.133 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1) -0.03 -0.04 0.03 -0.084 -0.07 -0.05 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1) 0.19 -0.183 0.01 -0.311 0.31 -0.267 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0.00* 0 
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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9.65 Appendix 65: The impact of IMF programme implementation on male labour force participation index 
Dependent Variable Male Labour Force Participation Index Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF programme (IMF programme) 
No of Obs: 759 
Wald chi² (98) = 2044.55 
Prob > chi² = 0.00 
Rho = 0.02186 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
No of Obs: 320 
Wald chi² (51) = 548.94 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho =-0.02099 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme 0.64 -2.208   0.16 -2.531 
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1) -12.03 -11.573   -3,433.35 0 
GDP per capita (t-1) 0 -0.001   2.98*** -0.834 
Log of GDP per capita (t-1) 1.27 -1.715   -841.78*** -227.668 
GDP (t-1) 0 0   0 0 
Log of GDP (t-1) -0.57 -0.397   22.04 -49.924 
GDP Growth (t-1) 4.97* -2.592   -2.81 -12.4 
Log of GDP Growth (t-1) -22.04** -11.184   10.25 -56.899 
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1) 0 0   0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1) 0 -0.001   -2.98*** -0.834 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita -1.52 -1.721   841.92*** -227.668 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP 0 0   0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1) 0.55 -0.402   -22.08 -49.924 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1) -4.99* -2.593   2.75 -12.4 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1) 22.02** -11.185   -10.09 -56.899 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1) 0 0   0 0 
Implementation Levels (t-1) 0 -0.002   0 -0.004 
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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9.66 Appendix 66: The impact of IMF programme design on male labour force participation index 
Dependent Variable Male Labour Force Participation Index Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF programme (IMF programme) 
No of Obs: 758 
Wald chi² (98) = 2040.78 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = 0.10119 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
No of Obs: 319 
Wald chi² (51) = 545.39  
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = 0.06835 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme -0.03 -2.214   -0.49 -2.566 
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1) -12.53 -11.492   -3,429.47*** -2.422 
GDP per capita (t-1) 0 -0.001   2.98*** -0.841 
Log of GDP per capita (t-1) 1.26 -1.692   -841.95*** -229.427 
GDP (t-1) 0 0   0 0 
Log of GDP (t-1) -0.59 -0.397   22.26 -50.306 
GDP Growth (t-1) 5.04** -2.547   -2.97 -12.529 
Log of GDP Growth (t-1) -22.37** -11.009   10.99 -57.472 
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1) 0 0   0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1) 0 -0.001   -2.98*** -0.841 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita -1.5 -1.698   842.06*** -229.427 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP 0 0   0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1) 0.56 -0.402   -22.28 -50.306 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1) -5.06** -2.548   2.92 -12.529 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1) 22.35** -11.01   -10.81 -57.472 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1) 0 0   0 0 
Ratio of QPC Conditions to SPC Conditions 0 -0.002   0 -0.004 
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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9.67 Appendix 67: The impact of IMF programme participation on female agricultural employment  
Dependent Variable Female Agricultural Employment Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF programme (IMF programme) 
No of Obs: 497 
Wald chi² (114) =19820.72  
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = 0.06983 
No of Obs: 403 
Wald chi² (86) = 74698.74 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = 0.01865 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme 0.65 -0.805 0.37 -0.339   
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1) 2.1 -5.194 -0.87 -6.159   
GDP per capita (t-1) 0 0 0 0   
Log of GDP per capita (t-1) -0.18 -0.217 -0.44* -0.242   
GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0   
Log of GDP (t-1) -0.06 -0.12 -0.04 -0.132   
GDP Growth (t-1) -0.08 -0.096 -0.1 -0.107   
Log of GDP Growth (t-1) -0.13 -0.238 -0.2 -0.25   
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0   
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1) 0 0 0 0   
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita 0.19 -0.414 0.04 -0.568   
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP 0 0 0 0   
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1) -0.07 -0.216 0.08 -0.256   
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1) 0.04 -0.141 0.11 -0.163   
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1) 0.17 -0.498 0.16 -0.578   
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1) 0 0 0 0   
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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9.68 Appendix 68: The impact of IMF programme implementation on female agricultural employment  
Dependent Variable Female Agricultural Employment Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF programme (IMF programme) 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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9.69 Appendix 69: The impact of IMF programme design on female agricultural employment  
Dependent Variable Female Agricultural Employment Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF programme (IMF programme) 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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9.70 Appendix 70: The impact of IMF programme participation on male agricultural employment  
Dependent Variable Male Agricultural Employment Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF programme (IMF programme) 
No of Obs: 497 
Wald chi² (114) = 32195.69 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = -0.03952 
No of Obs: 403 
Wald chi² (86) = 76470.74 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho =-0.07279 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme 0.83 -0.534 0.44 -0.311   
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1) 2.1 -5.194 -0.87 -6.159   
GDP per capita (t-1) 0 0 0 0   
Log of GDP per capita (t-1) -0.18 -0.217 -0.44* -0.242   
GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0   
Log of GDP (t-1) -0.06 -0.12 -0.04 -0.132   
GDP Growth (t-1) -0.08 -0.096 -0.1 -0.107   
Log of GDP Growth (t-1) -0.13 -0.238 -0.2 -0.25   
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0   
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1) 0 0 0 0   
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita 0.19 -0.414 0.04 -0.568   
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP 0 0 0 0   
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1) -0.07 -0.216 0.08 -0.256   
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1) 0.04 -0.141 0.11 -0.163   
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1) 0.17 -0.498 0.16 -0.578   
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1) 0 0 0 0   
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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9.71 Appendix 71: The impact of IMF programme implementation on male agricultural employment  
Dependent Variable Male Agricultural Employment Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF programme (IMF programme) 
No of Obs: 115 
Wald chi² (57) = 16585.43 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = 0.42004 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme -0.39 -4.774     
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1) 1.59 -4.407     
GDP per capita (t-1) 0 -0.018     
Log of GDP per capita (t-1) 0.87 -45.685     
GDP (t-1) 0 0     
Log of GDP (t-1) -0.15 -0.186     
GDP Growth (t-1) -0.04 -0.103     
Log of GDP Growth (t-1) 0.03 -0.438     
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1) 0 0     
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1) 0 -0.018     
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita -0.81 -45.685     
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP 0 0     
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1) -      
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1) -      
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1) -      
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1) -      
Implementation Levels (t-1) 0 -0.006     
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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9.72 Appendix 72: The impact of IMF programme design on male agricultural employment  
Dependent Variable Female Agricultural Employment Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF programme (IMF programme) 
No of Obs: 115 
Wald chi² (57) = 17341.69 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = -0.08969 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme 1.02 -5.025 2.05 0 2.05 0 
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1) 2.07 -4.35 2.33 0 2.33 0 
GDP per capita (t-1) 0 -0.018 0 0 0 0 
Log of GDP per capita (t-1) 0.94 -45.686 0.68 0 0.68 0 
GDP (t-1) 0  0 0 0 0 
Log of GDP (t-1) -0.14 -0.19 0.03 0 0.03 0 
GDP Growth (t-1) -0.04 -0.103 0.02 0 0.02 0 
Log of GDP Growth (t-1) 0.03 -0.438 -0.04 0 -0.04 0 
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1) 0 -0.018 0 0 0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita -0.88 -45.686 -1.01 0 -1.01 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1) -  -  -  
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1) -  -  -  
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1) -  -  -  
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1) -  -  -  
Ratio of QPC Conditions to SPC Conditions 0 -0.006 0 0 0 0 
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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9.73 Appendix 73: The impact of IMF programme participation on female industrial employment  
Dependent Variable Female Industrial Employment Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF programme (IMF programme) 
No of Obs: 497 
Wald chi² (114) = 6299.73  
Prob > chi² = 0.00 
Rho = -0.01015 
No of Obs: 403 
Wald chi² (86) = 7016.17 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = -0.01646 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme -0.96** -0.44 -0.53 -0.388 -6.84 0 
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1) 2.1 -5.194 -0.87 -6.159 1,127.21 0 
GDP per capita (t-1) 0 0 0 0 -0.04 0 
Log of GDP per capita (t-1) -0.18 -0.217 -0.44* -0.242 50.53 0 
GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Log of GDP (t-1) -0.06 -0.12 -0.04 -0.132 25.33 0 
GDP Growth (t-1) -0.08 -0.096 -0.1 -0.107 -15.63 0 
Log of GDP Growth (t-1) -0.13 -0.238 -0.2 -0.25 79.14 0 
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0.05 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita 0.19 -0.414 0.04 -0.568 -64.87 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1) -0.07 -0.216 0.08 -0.256 -31.23 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1) 0.04 -0.141 0.11 -0.163 12.84 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1) 0.17 -0.498 0.16 -0.578 -70.78 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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9.74 Appendix 74: The impact of IMF programme implementation on female industrial employment  
Dependent Variable Female Industrial Employment Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF programme (IMF programme) 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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9.75 Appendix 75: The impact of IMF programme design on female industrial employment  
Dependent Variable Female Industrial Employment Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF programme (IMF programme) 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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9.76 Appendix 76: The impact of IMF programme participation on male industrial employment  
Dependent Variable Male Industrial Employment Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF programme (IMF programme) 
No of Obs: 497 
Wald chi² (114) = 14631.08 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = 0.01092 
No of Obs: 403 
Wald chi² (86) = 14124.62 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = 0.04935 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme -0.51 -0.43 -0.55 -0.405   
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1) 2.1 -5.194 -0.87 -6.159   
GDP per capita (t-1) 0 0 0 0   
Log of GDP per capita (t-1) -0.18 -0.217 -0.44* -0.242   
GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0   
Log of GDP (t-1) -0.06 -0.12 -0.04 -0.132   
GDP Growth (t-1) -0.08 -0.096 -0.1 -0.107   
Log of GDP Growth (t-1) -0.13 -0.238 -0.2 -0.25   
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0   
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1) 0 0 0 0   
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita 0.19 -0.414 0.04 -0.568   
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP 0 0 0 0   
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1) -0.07 -0.216 0.08 -0.256   
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1) 0.04 -0.141 0.11 -0.163   
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1) 0.17 -0.498 0.16 -0.578   
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1) 0 0 0 0   
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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9.77 Appendix 77: The impact of IMF programme implementation on male industrial employment  
Dependent Variable Male Industrial Employment Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF programme (IMF programme) 
No of Obs: 115 
Wald chi² (57) = 5665.41 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = 0.49962 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme -1.11 -3.649     
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1) 1.59 -4.407     
GDP per capita (t-1) 0 -0.018     
Log of GDP per capita (t-1) 0.87 -45.685     
GDP (t-1) 0 0     
Log of GDP (t-1) -0.15 -0.186     
GDP Growth (t-1) -0.04 -0.103     
Log of GDP Growth (t-1) 0.03 -0.438     
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1) 0 0     
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1) 0 -0.018     
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita -0.81 -45.685     
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP 0 0     
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1) -      
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1) -      
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1) -      
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1) -      
Implementation Levels (t-1) 0 -0.006     
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
 
 
 
289 
 
9.78 Appendix 78: The impact of IMF programme design on male industrial employment  
Dependent Variable Male Industrial Employment Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF programme (IMF programme) 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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9.79 Appendix 79: The impact of IMF programme participation on female service employment  
Dependent Variable Female Service Employment Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF programme (IMF programme) 
No of Obs: 497 
Wald chi² (114) = 22622.01 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = -0.12786 
No of Obs: 403 
Wald chi² (86) = 23746.51 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = -0.13392 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme 0.84 -0.758 0.9 -0.63   
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1) 2.1 -5.194 -0.87 -6.159   
GDP per capita (t-1) 0 0 0 0   
Log of GDP per capita (t-1) -0.18 -0.217 -0.44* -0.242   
GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0   
Log of GDP (t-1) -0.06 -0.12 -0.04 -0.132   
GDP Growth (t-1) -0.08 -0.096 -0.1 -0.107   
Log of GDP Growth (t-1) -0.13 -0.238 -0.2 -0.25   
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0   
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1) 0 0 0 0   
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita 0.19 -0.414 0.04 -0.568   
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP 0 0 0 0   
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1) -0.07 -0.216 0.08 -0.256   
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1) 0.04 -0.141 0.11 -0.163   
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1) 0.17 -0.498 0.16 -0.578   
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1) 0 0 0 0   
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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9.80 Appendix 80: The impact of IMF programme implementation on female service employment  
Dependent Variable Female Service Employment Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF programme (IMF programme) 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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9.81 Appendix 81: The impact of IMF programme design on female service employment  
Dependent Variable Female Service Employment Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF programme (IMF programme) 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
No of Obs: 96 
Wald chi² (44) = 5708.83 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = -0.10156 
No of Obs: 0 
Wald chi² () = . 
Prob > chi² = . 
Rho = . 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme   -0.88 -7.341 -0.88 -7.341 
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1)   2.33 -5.304 2.33 -5.304 
GDP per capita (t-1)   0 -0.046 0 -0.046 
Log of GDP per capita (t-1)   0.68 -119.293 0.68 -119.293 
GDP (t-1)   0 0 0 0 
Log of GDP (t-1)   0.03 -0.234 0.03 -0.234 
GDP Growth (t-1)   0.02 -0.123 0.02 -0.123 
Log of GDP Growth (t-1)   -0.04 -0.52 -0.04 -0.52 
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1)   0 0 0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1)   0 -0.046 0 -0.046 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita   -1.01 -119.293 -1.01 -119.293 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP   0 0 0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1)   -  -  
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1)   -  -  
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1)   -  -  
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1)   -  -  
Ratio of QPC Conditions to SPC Conditions   0 0 0 0 
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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9.82 Appendix 82: The impact of IMF programme participation on male service employment  
Dependent Variable Male Service Employment Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF programme (IMF programme) 
No of Obs: 497 
Wald chi² (114) = 15290.01 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = -0.18207 
No of Obs: 403 
Wald chi² (96) = 16031.61 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = -0.30622 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme 0.66 -0.531 1.20*** -0.456   
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1) 2.1 -5.194 -0.87 -6.159   
GDP per capita (t-1) 0 0 0 0   
Log of GDP per capita (t-1) -0.18 -0.217 -0.44* -0.242   
GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0   
Log of GDP (t-1) -0.06 -0.12 -0.04 -0.132   
GDP Growth (t-1) -0.08 -0.096 -0.1 -0.107   
Log of GDP Growth (t-1) -0.13 -0.238 -0.2 -0.25   
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0   
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1) 0 0 0 0   
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita 0.19 -0.414 0.04 -0.568   
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP 0 0 0 0   
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1) -0.07 -0.216 0.08 -0.256   
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1) 0.04 -0.141 0.11 -0.163   
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1) 0.17 -0.498 0.16 -0.578   
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1) 0 0 0 0   
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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9.83 Appendix 83: The impact of IMF programme implementation on male service employment  
Dependent Variable Male Service Employment Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF programme (IMF programme) 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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9.84 Appendix 84: The impact of IMF programme design on male industrial employment  
Dependent Variable Male Service Employment Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF programme (IMF programme) 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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9.85 Appendix 85: The impact of IMF programme participation on female employment age 15-24 
Dependent Variable Female Employment age 15-24 Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF programme (IMF programme) 
No of Obs: 996 
Wald chi² (154) = 64728.38 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = -0.11279 
No of Obs: 586 
Wald chi² (97) = 21029.47 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = -0.17884 
No of Obs: 404 
Wald chi² (70) = 62394.39 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho =0.04037 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme -0.03 -0.33 0.29 -0.492 -0.76* -0.423 
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1) 4.93** -2.498 4.64 -3.507 7.61 -6.882 
GDP per capita (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Log of GDP per capita (t-1) -0.34*** -0.109 -0.34** -0.143 -0.2 -0.275 
GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Log of GDP (t-1) 0.09 -0.071 0.03 -0.097 0.40* -0.24 
GDP Growth (t-1) 0.05** -0.023 0.02 -0.066 0.05 -0.029 
Log of GDP Growth (t-1) -0.40*** -0.129 -0.40* -0.202 -0.3 -0.235 
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita 0.17 -0.204 -0.06 -0.288 0.59 -0.446 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1) -0.19 -0.118 -0.13 -0.171 -0.42 -0.293 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1) -0.04 -0.056 -0.04 -0.104 -0.01 -0.081 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1) 0.41 -0.255 0.53 -0.382 0.13 -0.413 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
 
 
 
297 
 
9.86 Appendix 86: The impact of IMF programme implementation on female employment age 15-24 
Dependent Variable Female Employment age 15-24 Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF programme (IMF programme) 
No of Obs: 346 
Wald chi² (87) = 24244.98 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = -0.04606 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
No of Obs: 114 
Wald chi² (41) = 52625.76 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = -0.79459 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme 0.16 -1.148   1.1 -0.971 
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1) -76.26 -363.205   -5,341.11*** -4.346 
GDP per capita (t-1) 0 -0.01   4.44*** -0.089 
Log of GDP per capita (t-1) 8.25 -82.359   -1,170.30*** -4.059 
GDP (t-1) 0 0   0 0 
Log of GDP (t-1) -8.08 -31.56   0.01 -0.174 
GDP Growth (t-1) -14.46 -24.144   0.03 -0.072 
Log of GDP Growth (t-1) 75.58 0   -0.18 -0.337 
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1) 0 0   0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1) 0 -0.01   -4.44*** -0.089 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita -8.46 -82.36   1,170.68*** -4.076 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP 0 0      
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1) 8.04 -31.56      
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1) 14.47 -24.145      
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1) -75.59*** -0.225      
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1) 0 0      
Implementation Levels (t-1) 0 -0.003   0 -0.006 
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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9.87 Appendix 87: The impact of IMF programme design on female employment age 15-24 
Dependent Variable Female Employment age 15-24 Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF programme (IMF programme) 
No of Obs: 345 
Wald chi² (87) = 24042.96 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = -0.02580 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
No of Obs: 143 
Wald chi² (41) = 53933.63 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = -0.28801 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme 0.09 -1.151   0.09 -0.843 
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1) -75.56 -363.889   -5,402.02*** -4.345 
GDP per capita (t-1) 0 -0.01   4.50*** -0.089 
Log of GDP per capita (t-1) 8.2 -83.22   -1,184.20*** -4.065 
GDP (t-1) 0 0   0 0 
Log of GDP (t-1) -8.04 -31.678   0.01 -0.171 
GDP Growth (t-1) -14.66 -24.218   0.04 -0.071 
Log of GDP Growth (t-1) 76.26 o   -0.25 -0.339 
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1) 0 o   0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1) 0 -0.01   -4.50*** -0.089 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita -8.42 -83.22   1,184.50*** -4.081 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP 0 0      
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1) 8.01 -31.678      
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1) 14.67 -24.219      
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1) -76.28*** -0.226      
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1) 0 0      
Ratio of QPC Conditions to SPC Conditions 0 -0.003   0.01** -0.006 
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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9.88 Appendix 88: The impact of IMF programme participation on female employment age 15-64 
Dependent Variable Female Employment age 15-64 Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF programme (IMF programme) 
No of Obs: 996 
Wald chi² (154) = 131875.55 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = 0.04012 
No of Obs: 586 
Wald chi² (97) = 33989.68 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho =-0.09116 
No of Obs: 404 
Wald chi² (70) = 164024.22 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho =0.18093 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme -0.39 -0.24 0.13 -0.344 -0.69** -0.289 
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1) 4.93** -2.498 4.64 -3.507 7.61 -6.882 
GDP per capita (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Log of GDP per capita (t-1) -0.34*** -0.109 -0.34** -0.143 -0.2 -0.275 
GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Log of GDP (t-1) 0.09 -0.071 0.03 -0.097 0.40* -0.24 
GDP Growth (t-1) 0.05** -0.023 0.02 -0.066 0.05 -0.029 
Log of GDP Growth (t-1) -0.40*** -0.129 -0.40* -0.202 -0.3 -0.235 
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita 0.17 -0.204 -0.06 -0.288 0.59 -0.446 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1) -0.19 -0.118 -0.13 -0.171 -0.42 -0.293 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1) -0.04 -0.056 -0.04 -0.104 -0.01 -0.081 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1) 0.41 -0.255 0.53 -0.382 0.13 -0.413 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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9.89 Appendix 89: The impact of IMF programme implementation on female employment age 15 - 64 
Dependent Variable Female Employment age 15-64 Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF programme (IMF programme) 
No of Obs: 346 
Wald chi² (87) = 46648.30 
Prob > chi² = 0.00 
Rho = 0.08820 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
No of Obs: 144 
Wald chi² (41) = 77280.43 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = -0.69087 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme -0.25 -0.814   1.01 -0.794 
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1) -76.26 -363.205   -5,341.11*** -4.346 
GDP per capita (t-1) 0 -0.01   4.44*** -0.089 
Log of GDP per capita (t-1) 8.25 -82.359   -1,170.30*** -4.059 
GDP (t-1) 0 0   0 0 
Log of GDP (t-1) -8.08 -31.56   0.01 -0.174 
GDP Growth (t-1) -14.46 -24.144   0.03 -0.072 
Log of GDP Growth (t-1) 75.58 0   -0.18 -0.337 
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1) 0 0   0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1) 0 -0.01   -4.44*** -0.089 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita -8.46 -82.36   1,170.68*** -4.076 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP 0 0      
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1) 8.04 -31.56      
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1) 14.47 -24.145      
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1) -75.59*** -0.225      
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1) 0 0      
Implementation Levels (t-1) 0 -0.003   0 -0.006 
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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9.90 Appendix 90: The impact of IMF programme design on female employment age 15 - 64 
Dependent Variable Female Employment age 15-64 Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF programme (IMF programme) 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
No of Obs: 143 
Wald chi² (41) = 76874.33 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = -0.27594 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme     0.35 -0.708 
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1)     -5,402.02*** -4.345 
GDP per capita (t-1)     4.50*** -0.089 
Log of GDP per capita (t-1)     -1,184.20*** -4.065 
GDP (t-1)     0 0 
Log of GDP (t-1)     0.01 -0.171 
GDP Growth (t-1)     0.04 -0.071 
Log of GDP Growth (t-1)     -0.25 -0.339 
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1)     0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1)     -4.50*** -0.089 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita     1,184.50*** -4.081 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP        
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1)        
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1)        
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1)        
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1)        
Ratio of QPC Conditions to SPC Conditions     0.01** -0.006 
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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9.91 Appendix 91: The impact of IMF programme participation on male employment age 15 - 24 
Dependent Variable Male Employment age 15-24 Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF programme (IMF programme) 
No of Obs: 996 
Wald chi² (154) = 36500.36 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = -0.06980 
No of Obs: 586 
Wald chi² (97) = 17327.14 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = -0.04788 
No of Obs: 404 
Wald chi² (70) = 25129.85  
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = -0.04762 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme -0.33 -0.358 -0.64 -0.534 -0.28 -0.445 
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1) 4.93** -2.498 4.64 -3.507 7.61 -6.882 
GDP per capita (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Log of GDP per capita (t-1) -0.34*** -0.109 -0.34** -0.143 -0.2 -0.275 
GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Log of GDP (t-1) 0.09 -0.071 0.03 -0.097 0.40* -0.24 
GDP Growth (t-1) 0.05** -0.023 0.02 -0.066 0.05 -0.029 
Log of GDP Growth (t-1) -0.40*** -0.129 -0.40* -0.202 -0.3 -0.235 
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita 0.17 -0.204 -0.06 -0.288 0.59 -0.446 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1) -0.19 -0.118 -0.13 -0.171 -0.42 -0.293 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1) -0.04 -0.056 -0.04 -0.104 -0.01 -0.081 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1) 0.41 -0.255 0.53 -0.382 0.13 -0.413 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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9.92 Appendix 92: The impact of IMF programme implementation on male employment age 15 - 24  
Dependent Variable Male Employment age 15-24 Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF programme (IMF programme) 
No of Obs: 346 
Wald chi² (87) = 11293.00 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = 0.07257 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
No of Obs: 144 
Wald chi² (41) = 25611.49 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = -0.58232 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme -0.33 -1.337   0.87 -0.893 
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1) -76.26 -363.205   -5,341.11*** -4.346 
GDP per capita (t-1) 0 -0.01   4.44*** -0.089 
Log of GDP per capita (t-1) 8.25 -82.359   -1,170.30*** -4.059 
GDP (t-1) 0 0   0 0 
Log of GDP (t-1) -8.08 -31.56   0.01 -0.174 
GDP Growth (t-1) -14.46 -24.144   0.03 -0.072 
Log of GDP Growth (t-1) 75.58 0   -0.18 -0.337 
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1) 0 0   0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1) 0 -0.01   -4.44*** -0.089 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita -8.46 -82.36   1,170.68*** -4.076 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP 0 0      
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1) 8.04 -31.56      
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1) 14.47 -24.145      
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1) -75.59*** -0.225      
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1) 0 0      
Implementation Levels (t-1) 0 -0.003   -0.006  
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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9.93 Appendix 93: The impact of IMF programme design on male employment age 15 - 24  
Dependent Variable Male Employment age 15-24 Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF programme (IMF programme) 
No of Obs: 345 
Wald chi² (87) = 11253.58 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = 0.07420 
No of Obs: 202 
Wald chi² (0) = .  
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = 0.64250 
No of Obs: 143 
Wald chi² (41) = 26012.43 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = -0.36181 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme -0.34 -1.342   0.47 -0.821 
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1) -75.56 -363.889   -5,402.02*** -4.345 
GDP per capita (t-1) 0 -0.01   4.50*** -0.089 
Log of GDP per capita (t-1) 8.2 -83.22   -1,184.20*** -4.065 
GDP (t-1) 0 0   0 0 
Log of GDP (t-1) -8.04 -31.678   0.01 -0.171 
GDP Growth (t-1) -14.66 -24.218   0.04 -0.071 
Log of GDP Growth (t-1) 76.26 0   -0.25 -0.339 
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1) 0 0   0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1) 0 -0.01   -4.50*** -0.089 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita -8.42 -83.22   1,184.50*** -4.081 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP 0 0      
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1) 8.01 -31.678      
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1) 14.67 -24.219      
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1) -76.28*** -0.226      
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1) 0 0      
Ratio of QPC Conditions to SPC Conditions 0 -0.003   0.01** -0.006 
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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9.94 Appendix 94: The impact of IMF programme participation on male employment age 15 - 64 
Dependent Variable Male Employment age 15-64 Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF programme (IMF programme) 
No of Obs:  996 
Wald chi² (154) = 34777.19 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = 0.00267 
No of Obs: 586 
Wald chi² (97) = 20003.10 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = -0.02408 
No of Obs: 404 
Wald chi² (70) = 19406.75 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = 0.04695 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme 0.87 -0.685 0.39 -0.911 0.75 -1.029 
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1) 4.93** -2.498 4.64 -3.507 7.61 -6.882 
GDP per capita (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Log of GDP per capita (t-1) -0.34*** -0.109 -0.34** -0.143 -0.2 -0.275 
GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Log of GDP (t-1) 0.09 -0.071 0.03 -0.097 0.40* -0.24 
GDP Growth (t-1) 0.05** -0.023 0.02 -0.066 0.05 -0.029 
Log of GDP Growth (t-1) -0.40*** -0.129 -0.40* -0.202 -0.3 -0.235 
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita 0.17 -0.204 -0.06 -0.288 0.59 -0.446 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1) -0.19 -0.118 -0.13 -0.171 -0.42 -0.293 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1) -0.04 -0.056 -0.04 -0.104 -0.01 -0.081 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1) 0.41 -0.255 0.53 -0.382 0.13 -0.413 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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9.95 Appendix 95: The impact of IMF programme implementation on male employment age 15 - 64 
Dependent Variable Male Employment age 15-64 Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF programme (IMF programme) 
No of Obs: 346 
Wald chi² (0) = . 
Prob > chi² = . 
Rho = 0.37155 
No of Obs: 202 
Wald chi² (0) = .  
Prob > chi² = . 
Rho = 0.85279 
No of Obs: 144 
Wald chi² (41) = 30694.13 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = -0.48634 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme 1.84 -3.046 5.58 -3.626 -0.14 -3.56 
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1) -76.26 -363.205 -100.98 0 -5,341.11*** -4.346 
GDP per capita (t-1) 0 -0.01 0 -0.025 4.44*** -0.089 
Log of GDP per capita (t-1) 8.25 -82.359 4.68 -146.135 -1,170.30*** -4.059 
GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Log of GDP (t-1) -8.08 -31.56 -6.15 -40.327 0.01 -0.174 
GDP Growth (t-1) -14.46 -24.144 -10.09 -284.066 0.03 -0.072 
Log of GDP Growth (t-1) 75.58 0 32.24 -1,144.24 -0.18 -0.337 
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1) 0 -0.01 0 -0.025 -4.44*** -0.089 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita -8.46 -82.36 -5.2 -146.136 1,170.68*** -4.076 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP 0 0 0 0    
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1) 8.04 -31.56 6.13 -40.326    
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1) 14.47 -24.145 10.09 -284.066    
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1) -75.59*** -0.225 -32.16 -1,144.24    
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1) 0 0 0 0    
Implementation Levels (t-1) 0 -0.003 0 -0.005 0 -0.006 
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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9.96 Appendix 96: The impact of IMF programme design on male employment age 15 - 64 
Dependent Variable Male Employment age 15-64 Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF programme (IMF programme) 
No of Obs: 345 
Wald chi² (0) = . 
Prob > chi² = . 
Rho = 0.37743 
No of Obs: 202 
Wald chi² (0) = . 
Prob > chi² = . 
Rho = 0.84756 
No of Obs: 143 
Wald chi² (41) = 31046.33 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = -0.05838 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme 1.9 -3.046 4.11 -3.41 0.63 -3.171 
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1) -75.56 -363.889 -104.15 0 -5,402.02*** -4.345 
GDP per capita (t-1) 0 -0.01 0 -0.025 4.50*** -0.089 
Log of GDP per capita (t-1) 8.2 -83.22 4.87 -146.38 -1,184.20*** -4.065 
GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Log of GDP (t-1) -8.04 -31.678 -6.43 -40.392 0.01 -0.171 
GDP Growth (t-1) -14.66 -24.218 -10.53 -284.121 0.04 -0.071 
Log of GDP Growth (t-1) 76.26 0 33.83 -1,144.42 -0.25 -0.339 
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1) 0 -0.01 0 -0.025 -4.50*** -0.089 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita -8.42 -83.22 -5.34 -146.381 1,184.50*** -4.081 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP 0 0 0 0    
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1) 8.01 -31.678 6.31 -40.392    
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1) 14.67 -24.219 10.52 -284.121    
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1) -76.28*** -0.226 -33.65 -1,144.42    
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1) 0 0 0 0    
Ratio of QPC Conditions to SPC Conditions 0 -0.003 -0.01* -0.005 0.01** -0.006 
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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9.97 Appendix 97: The impact of IMF programme participation on female labour force participation aged 15 plus  
Dependent Variable Female Labour force participation rate age 15plus Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF programme (IMF programme) 
No of Obs: 996 
Wald chi² (154) = 139633.24 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = 0.01166 
No of Obs: 586 
Wald chi² (90) = 34718.21 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho =-0.11522 
No of Obs: 404 
Wald chi² (70) = 171707.95 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = 0.16278 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme -0.33 -0.223 0.14 -0.32 -0.65** -0.277 
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1) 4.93** -2.498 4.64 -3.507 7.61 -6.882 
GDP per capita (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Log of GDP per capita (t-1) -0.34*** -0.109 -0.34** -0.143 -0.2 -0.275 
GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Log of GDP (t-1) 0.09 -0.071 0.03 -0.097 0.40* -0.24 
GDP Growth (t-1) 0.05** -0.023 0.02 -0.066 0.05 -0.029 
Log of GDP Growth (t-1) -0.40*** -0.129 -0.40* -0.202 -0.3 -0.235 
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita 0.17 -0.204 -0.06 -0.288 0.59 -0.446 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1) -0.19 -0.118 -0.13 -0.171 -0.42 -0.293 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1) -0.04 -0.056 -0.04 -0.104 -0.01 -0.081 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1) 0.41 -0.255 0.53 -0.382 0.13 -0.413 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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9.98 Appendix 98: The impact of IMF programme implementation on female labour force participation aged 15 plus  
Dependent Variable Female Labour force participation rate age 15plus Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF programme (IMF programme) 
No of Obs: 346 
Wald chi² (87) = 48966.13 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = 0.07913 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
No of Obs: 144 
Wald chi² (41) = 84676.60 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = -0.74001 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme -0.28 -0.805   1.01 -0.753 
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1) -76.26 -363.205   -5,341.11*** -4.346 
GDP per capita (t-1) 0 -0.01   4.44*** -0.089 
Log of GDP per capita (t-1) 8.25 -82.359   -1,170.30*** -4.059 
GDP (t-1) 0 0   0 0 
Log of GDP (t-1) -8.08 -31.56   0.01 -0.174 
GDP Growth (t-1) -14.46 -24.144   0.03 -0.072 
Log of GDP Growth (t-1) 75.58 0   -0.18 -0.337 
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1) 0 0   0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1) 0 -0.01   -4.44*** -0.089 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita -8.46 -82.36   1,170.68*** -4.076 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP 0 0      
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1) 8.04 -31.56      
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1) 14.47 -24.145      
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1) -75.59*** -0.225      
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1) 0 0      
Implementation Levels (t-1) 0 -0.003   0 -0.006 
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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9.99 Appendix 99: The impact of IMF programme design on female labour force participation aged 15 plus  
Dependent Variable Female Labour force participation rate age 15plus Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF programme (IMF programme) 
No of Obs: 345 
Wald chi² (87) = 48288.64 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = 0.09378 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
No of Obs: 143 
Wald chi² (41) = 84725.02  
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = -0.36063 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme -0.31 -0.808   0.41 -0.666 
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1) -75.56 -363.889   -5,402.02*** -4.345 
GDP per capita (t-1) 0 -0.01   4.50*** -0.089 
Log of GDP per capita (t-1) 8.2 -83.22   -1,184.20*** -4.065 
GDP (t-1) 0 0   0 0 
Log of GDP (t-1) -8.04 -31.678   0.01 -0.171 
GDP Growth (t-1) -14.66 -24.218   0.04 -0.071 
Log of GDP Growth (t-1) 76.26 0   -0.25 -0.339 
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1) 0 0   0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1) 0 -0.01   -4.50*** -0.089 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita -8.42 -83.22   1,184.50*** -4.081 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP 0 0      
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1) 8.01 -31.678      
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1) 14.67 -24.219      
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1) -76.28*** -0.226      
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1) 0 0      
Ratio of QPC Conditions to SPC Conditions 0 -0.003   0.01** -0.006 
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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9.100 Appendix 100: The impact of IMF programme participation on male labour force participation aged 15 plus  
Dependent Variable Male Labour force participation rate age 15plus Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF programme (IMF programme) 
No of Obs: 996 
Wald chi² (154) = 51182.60 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = -0.01157 
No of Obs: 586 
Wald chi² (97) = 30177.09 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = -0.02750 
No of Obs: 404 
Wald chi² (70) = 26751.68 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = 0.03859 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme -0.2 -0.184 -0.08 -0.243 -0.35 -0.257 
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1) 4.93** -2.498 4.64 -3.507 7.61 -6.882 
GDP per capita (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Log of GDP per capita (t-1) -0.34*** -0.109 -0.34** -0.143 -0.2 -0.275 
GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Log of GDP (t-1) 0.09 -0.071 0.03 -0.097 0.40* -0.24 
GDP Growth (t-1) 0.05** -0.023 0.02 -0.066 0.05 -0.029 
Log of GDP Growth (t-1) -0.40*** -0.129 -0.40* -0.202 -0.3 -0.235 
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita 0.17 -0.204 -0.06 -0.288 0.59 -0.446 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1) -0.19 -0.118 -0.13 -0.171 -0.42 -0.293 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1) -0.04 -0.056 -0.04 -0.104 -0.01 -0.081 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1) 0.41 -0.255 0.53 -0.382 0.13 -0.413 
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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9.101 Appendix 101: The impact of IMF programme implementation on male labour force participation aged 15 plus  
Dependent Variable Male Labour force participation rate age 15plus Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF programme (IMF programme) 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
No of Obs: 144 
Wald chi² (41) = 36373.69 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = -0.30331 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme     0.1 -0.405 
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1)     -5,341.11*** -4.346 
GDP per capita (t-1)     4.44*** -0.089 
Log of GDP per capita (t-1)     -1,170.30*** -4.059 
GDP (t-1)     0 0 
Log of GDP (t-1)     0.01 -0.174 
GDP Growth (t-1)     0.03 -0.072 
Log of GDP Growth (t-1)     -0.18 -0.337 
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1)     0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1)     -4.44*** -0.089 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita     1,170.68*** -4.076 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP        
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1)        
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1)        
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1)        
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1)        
Implementation Levels (t-1)     0 -0.006 
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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9.102 Appendix 102: The impact of IMF programme design on male labour force participation aged 15 plus  
Dependent Variable Male Labour force participation rate age 15plus Pooled Data Democracies Autocracies 
Independent Variable Participation in IMF programme (IMF programme) 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
Insufficient data for model to 
return results 
No of Obs: 143 
Wald chi² (41) = 36314.73 
Prob > chi² = 0.000 
Rho = 0.10816 
     
Variable Description Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Participation on an IMF programme     -0.21 -0.381 
Participation on an IMF programme (t-1)     -5,402.02*** -4.345 
GDP per capita (t-1)     4.50*** -0.089 
Log of GDP per capita (t-1)     -1,184.20*** -4.065 
GDP (t-1)     0 0 
Log of GDP (t-1)     0.01 -0.171 
GDP Growth (t-1)     0.04 -0.071 
Log of GDP Growth (t-1)     -0.25 -0.339 
Reserves as a percentage of GDP (t-1)     0 0 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Per capita (t-1)     -4.50*** -0.089 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Per capita     1,184.50*** -4.081 
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP        
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP (t-1)        
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * GDP Growth (t-1)        
Participation in IMF programmes (t-1) * Log of GDP Growth (t-1)        
Participation IMF programmes (t-1) * Total Reserves (t-1)        
Ratio of QPC Conditions to SPC Conditions     0.01** -0.006 
 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
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9.103 Appendix 103: List of countries in dataset 
Afghanistan Cameroon Ethiopia Ireland Mali Poland Syrian Arab Republic 
Albania Canada Finland Israel Malta Portugal Tajikistan 
Algeria Central African Republic France Italy Mauritania Puerto Rico Tanzania 
Angola Chad Gabon Jamaica Mauritius Qatar Thailand 
Argentina Chile Gambia, The Japan Mexico Romania Timor-Leste 
Armenia China Georgia Jordan Mongolia Russian Federation Togo 
Australia Colombia Germany Kazakhstan Montenegro Rwanda Trinidad and Tobago 
Austria Congo, Dem. Rep. Ghana Kenya Morocco Samoa Tunisia 
Azerbaijan Congo, Rep. Greece Korea, Dem. Rep. Mozambique Sao Tome and Principe Turkey 
Bahrain Costa Rica Greenland Korea, Rep. Myanmar Saudi Arabia Turkmenistan 
Bangladesh Cote d'Ivoire Grenada Kosovo Namibia Senegal Uganda 
Belarus Croatia Guam Kuwait Nepal Serbia Ukraine 
Belgium Cuba Guatemala Kyrgyz Republic Netherlands Sierra Leone United Arab Emirates 
Belize Cyprus Guinea Lao PDR New Zealand Singapore United Kingdom 
Benin Czech Republic Guinea-Bissau Latvia Nicaragua Slovak Republic United States 
Bhutan Denmark Guyana Lebanon Niger Slovenia Uruguay 
Bolivia Djibouti Haiti Lesotho Nigeria Somalia Uzbekistan 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Dominica Honduras Liberia Norway South Africa Venezuela, RB 
Botswana Dominican Republic Hong Kong SAR, China Libya Oman South Sudan Vietnam 
Brazil Ecuador Hungary Lithuania Pakistan Spain West Bank and Gaza 
Brunei Darussalam Egypt, Arab Rep. Iceland Macao SAR, China Panama Sri Lanka Yemen, Rep. 
Bulgaria El Salvador India Macedonia, FYR Papua New Guinea Sudan Zambia 
Burkina Faso Equatorial Guinea Indonesia Madagascar Paraguay Swaziland  
Burundi Eritrea Iran, Islamic Rep. Malawi Peru Sweden  
Cambodia Estonia Iraq Malaysia Philippines Switzerland  
 
 
 
315 
 
9.104 Appendix 104 Full List of 529 IMF programmes analysed with programme design ratio and implementation levels 
Region  Country Pgm 
No.  
% QPC 
Conditions 
Implemented 
% SPCPASB 
Conditions 
Implemented 
Total % 
Implemented 
Ratio QPC to 
SPCPASB 
conditions 
 Region  Country Pgm 
No. 
% of QPC 
Conditions 
Implemented 
% of SPCPASB 
Conditions 
Implemented 
Total % 
Implemented 
Ratio QPC 
to 
SPCPASB 
condition 
Asia Pac Afghanistan 570 69% 
 
69% 81.00  Asia Pac Lao PDR 17 100% 11% 50% 0.78 
Asia Pac Afghanistan 675 30% 
 
30% 30.00  Asia Pac Lao PDR 116 100% 7% 58% 1.20 
Europe Albania 1 50% 34% 43% 1.17  Asia Pac Lao PDR 193 50% 27% 44% 3.09 
Europe Albania 272 100% 52% 80% 1.33  Asia Pac Lao PDR 343 33% 
 
33% 156.00 
Europe Albania 316 67% 44% 60% 2.33  Asia Pac Lao PDR 345 
 
76% 76% 0.00 
Europe Albania 406 75% 33% 62% 2.22  Europe Latvia 18 67% 
 
67% 72.00 
Europe Albania 507 83% 
 
83% 42.00  Europe Latvia 71 75% 0% 69% 12.00 
Europe Albania 565 95% 
 
95% 44.00  Europe Latvia 175 100% 0% 96% 24.50 
Europe Albania 709 38% 
 
38% 69.00  Europe Latvia 252 86% 38% 79% 6.46 
Africa Algeria 77 80% 62% 76% 4.05  Europe Latvia 321 43% 44% 43% 7.78 
Africa Algeria 84 85% 79% 83% 2.95  Europe Latvia 400 60% 59% 60% 2.94 
Africa Algeria 117 67% 18% 55% 3.18  Europe Latvia 605 78% 
 
78% 64.00 
Africa Angola 623 53% 
 
53% 57.00  Africa Lesotho 98 100% 40% 91% 6.00 
Latin Am Argentina 119 79% 31% 72% 5.83  Africa Lesotho 165 67% 62% 66% 6.00 
Latin Am Argentina 145 50% 
 
50% 96.00  Africa Lesotho 221 17% 0% 15% 11.14 
Latin Am Argentina 281 67% 0% 51% 3.38  Africa Lesotho 354 58% 37% 54% 4.07 
Latin Am Argentina 328 67% 36% 59% 2.86  Africa Lesotho 641 81% 
 
81% 47.00 
Latin Am Argentina 508 38% 
 
38% 21.00  Africa Liberia 590 90% 
 
90% 97.00 
Latin Am Argentina 510 96% 
 
96% 35.00  Africa Liberia 693 51% 
 
51% 67.00 
CIS Armenia 92 60% 23% 48% 2.13  Europe Lithuania 19 67% 
 
67% 84.00 
CIS Armenia 142 100% 80% 96% 4.00  Europe Lithuania 121 97% 76% 96% 12.16 
CIS Armenia 215 100% 44% 88% 3.78  Europe Lithuania 333 100% 56% 86% 2.06 
CIS Armenia 284 100% 43% 76% 1.39  Europe Lithuania 404 100% 79% 96% 3.68 
CIS Armenia 376 82% 69% 76% 1.36  Europe Macedonia, FYR 110 100% 47% 91% 4.71 
CIS Armenia 557 90% 
 
90% 59.00  Europe Macedonia, FYR 216 50% 42% 48% 2.50 
CIS Armenia 602 0% 
 
0% 19.00  Europe Macedonia, FYR 249 0% 38% 5% 6.00 
CIS Armenia 611 36% 
 
36% 55.00  Europe Macedonia, FYR 373 0% 25% 2% 13.00 
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CIS Armenia 649 83% 
 
83% 41.00  Europe Macedonia, FYR 395 0% 25% 2% 13.00 
CIS Armenia 710 36% 
 
36% 44.00  Europe Macedonia, FYR 433 67% 70% 67% 3.30 
CIS Azerbaijan 159 83% 39% 67% 1.74  Europe Macedonia, FYR 562 67% 
 
67% 75.00 
CIS Azerbaijan 197 29% 35% 29% 6.65  Europe Macedonia, FYR 658 25% 
 
25% 4.00 
CIS Azerbaijan 198 60% 53% 58% 3.85  Africa Madagascar 209 100% 56% 90% 3.33 
CIS Azerbaijan 227 70% 50% 67% 6.00  Africa Madagascar 310 60% 60% 60% 2.50 
CIS Azerbaijan 291 43% 45% 43% 6.65  Africa Madagascar 359 55% 78% 60% 3.18 
CIS Azerbaijan 403 73% 56% 65% 1.22  Africa Madagascar 571 64% 
 
64% 36.00 
Asia Pac Bangladesh 511 73% 
 
73% 49.00  Africa Malawi 65 0% 40% 6% 6.00 
Asia Pac Bangladesh 682 73% 
 
73% 122.00  Africa Malawi 131 100% 73% 91% 2.00 
CIS Belarus 134 40% 6% 35% 6.39  Africa Malawi 229 50% 30% 43% 2.00 
CIS Belarus 608 84% 
 
84% 37.00  Africa Malawi 285 75% 50% 72% 8.33 
Africa Benin 73 50% 67% 55% 2.67  Africa Malawi 409 20% 42% 25% 3.75 
Africa Benin 106 100% 67% 93% 3.56  Africa Malawi 559 75% 
 
75% 52.00 
Africa Benin 107 100% 83% 98% 8.50  Africa Malawi 627 0% 
 
0% 9.00 
Africa Benin 201 100% 13% 83% 4.13  Africa Malawi 632 26% 
 
26% 27.00 
Africa Benin 286 60% 21% 52% 3.57  Africa Malawi 689 36% 
 
36% 66.00 
Africa Benin 335 57% 86% 65% 2.52  Africa Mali 20 100% 100% 100% 2.22 
Africa Benin 560 76% 
 
76% 42.00  Africa Mali 101 100% 44% 87% 3.33 
Africa Benin 647 70% 
 
70% 67.00  Africa Mali 102 100% 25% 84% 3.75 
Latin Am Bolivia 97 0% 33% 13% 1.56  Africa Mali 179 100% 38% 84% 3.00 
Latin Am Bolivia 176 50% 65% 53% 3.76  Africa Mali 208 33% 50% 37% 3.60 
Latin Am Bolivia 219 75% 67% 73% 4.33  Africa Mali 263 100% 42% 83% 2.33 
Latin Am Bolivia 260 67% 36% 58% 2.57  Africa Mali 309 67% 47% 55% 0.62 
Latin Am Bolivia 324 71% 61% 70% 5.06  Africa Mali 543 85% 
 
85% 27.00 
Latin Am Bolivia 410 0% 0% 0% 13.00  Africa Mali 593 87% 
 
87% 55.00 
Latin Am Bolivia 512 74% 
 
74% 66.00  Africa Mali 677 0% 
 
0% 17.00 
Europe Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
242 100% 63% 90% 2.55  Africa Mali 707 53% 
 
53% 36.00 
Europe Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
506 90% 
 
90% 59.00  Africa Mauritania 22 100% 45% 73% 1.00 
Europe Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
618 70% 
 
70% 56.00  Africa Mauritania 167 0% 50% 22% 1.29 
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Europe Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
692 66% 
 
66% 156.00  Africa Mauritania 168 50% 43% 48% 3.14 
Latin Am Brazil 308 1% 56% 10% 5.27  Africa Mauritania 169 0% 6% 3% 1.31 
Latin Am Brazil 401 75% 18% 68% 7.53  Africa Mauritania 250 0% 50% 13% 2.71 
Latin Am Brazil 513 97% 
 
97% 75.00  Africa Mauritania 313 83% 70% 77% 1.25 
Europe Bulgaria 80 25% 80% 33% 5.60  Africa Mauritania 525 0% 
 
0% 5.00 
Europe Bulgaria 181 0% 50% 2% 32.00  Africa Mauritania 574 59% 
 
59% 32.00 
Europe Bulgaria 202 100% 64% 92% 3.40  Africa Mauritania 634 83% 
 
83% 46.00 
Europe Bulgaria 294 75% 65% 72% 2.36  Latin Am Mexico 222 43% 
 
43% 70.00 
Europe Bulgaria 398 90% 50% 78% 2.20  Latin Am Mexico 300 71% 56% 69% 4.81 
Europe Bulgaria 549 92% 
 
92% 48.00  Asia Pac Mongolia 21 75% 96% 80% 3.50 
Africa Burkina Faso 3 
 
56% 56% 0  Asia Pac Mongolia 100 50% 27% 44% 3.09 
Africa Burkina Faso 105 100% 100% 100% 1.13  Asia Pac Mongolia 226 60% 45% 58% 5.23 
Africa Burkina Faso 120 100% 50% 90% 4.13  Asia Pac Mongolia 299 50% 39% 47% 3.33 
Africa Burkina Faso 230 100% 38% 78% 1.88  Asia Pac Mongolia 408 25% 37% 27% 4.15 
Africa Burkina Faso 231 50% 42% 47% 2.17  Asia Pac Mongolia 613 94% 
 
94% 49.00 
Africa Burkina Faso 287 100% 42% 77% 1.50  Africa Morocco 691 83% 
 
83% 6.00 
Africa Burkina Faso 301 70% 61% 67% 1.84  Africa Morocco 715 50% 
 
50% 6.00 
Africa Burkina Faso 514 85% 
 
85% 34.00  Africa Mozambique 114 0% 0% 0% 1.83 
Africa Burkina Faso 578 70% 
 
70% 47.00  Africa Mozambique 196 33% 71% 41% 4.07 
Africa Burkina Faso 645 80% 
 
80% 61.00  Africa Mozambique 261 67% 50% 63% 3.50 
Africa Burkina Faso 708 35% 
 
35% 34.00  Africa Mozambique 262 80% 56% 75% 3.89 
Africa Burundi 538 75% 
 
75% 40.00  Africa Mozambique 307 82% 48% 71% 2.30 
Africa Burundi 596 85% 
 
85% 65.00  Africa Mozambique 544 85% 
 
85% 40.00 
Africa Burundi 678 68% 
 
68% 76.00  Africa Mozambique 580 80% 
 
80% 51.00 
Asia Pac Cambodia 93 67% 42% 63% 5.00  Africa Mozambique 646 72% 
 
72% 50.00 
Asia Pac Cambodia 170 100% 20% 83% 3.60  Africa Mozambique 701 53% 
 
53% 53.00 
Asia Pac Cambodia 325 92% 75% 85% 1.40  Africa Mozambique 733 0% 
 
0% 7.00 
Africa Cameroon 35 29% 17% 28% 22.17  Asia Pac Nepal 49 100% 87% 92% 0.73 
Africa Cameroon 124 40% 20% 37% 6.33  Asia Pac Nepal 99 0% 0% 0% 2.80 
Africa Cameroon 251 100% 50% 85% 2.29  Asia Pac Nepal 526 91% 
 
91% 35.00 
Africa Cameroon 267 67% 33% 63% 8.00  Latin Am Nicaragua 72 0% 0% 0% 12.00 
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Africa Cameroon 314 60% 58% 60% 4.17  Latin Am Nicaragua 258 67% 61% 65% 2.04 
Africa Cameroon 351 11% 63% 30% 1.74  Latin Am Nicaragua 318 25% 61% 38% 1.78 
Africa Cameroon 563 84% 
 
84% 58.00  Latin Am Nicaragua 527 90% 
 
90% 83.00 
Africa Central 
African Rep. 
34 100% 50% 95% 10.00  Latin Am Nicaragua 586 73% 
 
73% 64.00 
Africa Central 
African Rep. 
264 100% 28% 74% 1.78  Africa Niger 28 75% 50% 73% 13.00 
Africa Central 
African Rep. 
346 0% 57% 8% 6.43  Africa Niger 239 67% 30% 59% 3.60 
Africa Central 
African Rep. 
575 69% 
 
69% 59.00  Africa Niger 246 40% 33% 39% 5.42 
Africa Central 
African Rep. 
686 0% 
 
0% 14.00  Africa Niger 282 0% 40% 6% 5.20 
Africa Chad 112 
 
50% 50% 0  Africa Niger 380 67% 73% 69% 2.03 
Africa Chad 128 50% 50% 50% 2.29  Africa Niger 551 80% 
 
80% 40.00 
Africa Chad 194 0% 33% 7% 3.56  Africa Niger 595 53% 
 
53% 38.00 
Africa Chad 259 33% 40% 34% 5.40  Africa Niger 681 40% 
 
40% 73.00 
Africa Chad 329 71% 62% 68% 2.22  Africa Nigeria 336 0% 0% 0% 15.00 
Africa Chad 553 0% 
 
0% 9.00  Africa Nigeria 581 77% 
 
77% 22.00 
Africa Chad 717 32% 
 
32% 25.00  Asia Pac Pakistan 23 60% 100% 61% 50.00 
Latin Am Colombia 323 64% 23% 56% 4.65  Asia Pac Pakistan 81 100% 67% 92% 3.33 
Latin Am Colombia 503 100% 
 
100% 45.00  Asia Pac Pakistan 83 57% 67% 58% 12.25 
Latin Am Colombia 555 100% 
 
100% 16.00  Asia Pac Pakistan 143 36% 50% 37% 15.71 
Africa Congo, Dem. 
Rep. 
419 14% 66% 34% 1.66  Asia Pac Pakistan 236 46% 39% 45% 6.27 
Africa Congo, Dem. 
Rep. 
625 61% 
 
61% 46.00  Asia Pac Pakistan 237 33% 16% 31% 6.95 
Africa Congo, Rep. 118 60% 30% 57% 8.00  Asia Pac Pakistan 290 29% 44% 30% 9.33 
Africa Congo, Rep. 206 0% 0% 0% 8.50  Asia Pac Pakistan 375 77% 65% 75% 4.20 
Africa Congo, Rep. 550 50% 
 
50% 36.00  Asia Pac Pakistan 377 81% 56% 74% 2.54 
Africa Congo, Rep. 607 71% 
 
71% 65.00  Asia Pac Pakistan 604 77% 
 
77% 56.00 
Latin Am Costa Rica 4 50% 0% 49% 34.00  Asia Pac Pakistan 703 56% 
 
56% 86.00 
Latin Am Costa Rica 137 67% 27% 62% 6.80  Latin Am Panama 178 100% 33% 88% 4.50 
Latin Am Costa Rica 614 88% 
 
88% 25.00  Latin Am Panama 243 42% 40% 41% 4.80 
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Africa Cote d'Ivoire 30 100% 44% 81% 2.00  Latin Am Panama 338 100% 0% 85% 5.83 
Africa Cote d'Ivoire 104 100% 31% 76% 1.88  Asia Pac Papua New 
Guinea 
129 54% 58% 54% 16.25 
Africa Cote d'Ivoire 204 25% 42% 28% 5.67  Asia Pac Papua New 
Guinea 
332 86% 80% 84% 2.39 
Africa Cote d'Ivoire 257 100% 42% 89% 4.50  Latin Am Paraguay 528 84% 
 
84% 58.00 
Africa Cote d'Ivoire 516 0% 
 
0% 13.00  Latin Am Paraguay 568 97% 
 
97% 60.00 
Africa Cote d'Ivoire 612 37% 
 
37% 43.00  Latin Am Peru 24 100% 83% 99% 20.00 
Africa Cote d'Ivoire 674 88% 
 
88% 86.00  Latin Am Peru 195 80% 
 
80% 100.00 
Europe Croatia 69 17% 44% 19% 12.00  Latin Am Peru 298 67% 14% 61% 8.57 
Europe Croatia 199 40% 17% 37% 6.25  Latin Am Peru 355 0% 
 
0% 40.00 
Europe Croatia 393 83% 88% 85% 3.23  Latin Am Peru 391 78% 50% 74% 5.50 
Europe Croatia 517 57% 
 
57% 28.00  Latin Am Peru 545 53% 
 
53% 34.00 
Europe Croatia 548 52% 
 
52% 54.00  Latin Am Peru 576 87% 
 
87% 55.00 
Europe Cyprus 698 67% 
 
67% 61.00  Asia Pac Philippines 61 90% 55% 85% 5.91 
Europe Czech Rep. 5 80% 
 
80% 65.00  Asia Pac Philippines 253 80% 67% 77% 3.75 
Africa Djibouti 144 57% 49% 56% 7.20  Europe Poland 25 100% 29% 85% 3.82 
Africa Djibouti 322 33% 52% 38% 2.73  Europe Poland 70 71% 0% 61% 5.83 
Africa Djibouti 598 66% 
 
66% 50.00  Europe Portugal 670 77% 
 
77% 47.00 
Latin Am Dominica 518 56% 
 
56% 39.00  Europe Romania 76 53% 33% 52% 11.25 
Latin Am Dominica 519 86% 
 
86% 59.00  Europe Romania 210 67% 25% 63% 11.00 
Latin Am Dominican 
Rep. 
6 100% 
 
100% 39.00  Europe Romania 320 43% 75% 47% 7.44 
Latin Am Dominican 
Rep. 
539 17% 
 
17% 29.00  Europe Romania 383 83% 63% 80% 4.44 
Latin Am Dominican 
Rep. 
552 67% 
 
67% 82.00  Europe Romania 531 23% 
 
23% 44.00 
Latin Am Dominican 
Rep. 
622 49% 
 
49% 53.00  Europe Romania 617 74% 
 
74% 54.00 
Latin Am Ecuador 39 100% 33% 87% 4.00  Europe Romania 662 78% 
 
78% 85.00 
Latin Am Ecuador 390 50% 60% 52% 5.00  Europe Romania 704 44% 
 
44% 45.00 
Latin Am Ecuador 509 13% 
 
13% 30.00  CIS Russian 
Federation 
160 100% 13% 88% 6.00 
Africa Egypt, Arab 
Rep. 
9 0% 30% 5% 5.20  CIS Russian 
Federation 
164 50% 53% 51% 2.46 
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Africa Egypt, Arab 
Rep. 
200 38% 61% 44% 2.81  CIS Russian 
Federation 
302 0% 31% 4% 5.85 
Latin Am El Salvador 15 83% 
 
83% 96.00  Africa Rwanda 288 100% 38% 79% 2.00 
Latin Am El Salvador 91 80% 
 
80% 70.00  Africa Rwanda 312 20% 71% 32% 3.39 
Latin Am El Salvador 220 86% 
 
86% 84.00  Africa Rwanda 421 44% 53% 46% 6.19 
Latin Am El Salvador 293 0% 
 
0% 48.00  Africa Rwanda 529 60% 
 
60% 63.00 
Latin Am El Salvador 609 0% 
 
0% 9.00  Africa Rwanda 569 64% 
 
64% 90.00 
Latin Am El Salvador 635 75% 
 
75% 32.00  Africa Rwanda 648 78% 
 
78% 73.00 
Latin Am Equatorial 
Guinea 
8 50% 18% 43% 3.27  Africa Rwanda 706 48% 
 
48% 44.00 
Latin Am Equatorial 
Guinea 
138 100% 88% 96% 2.25  Africa Sao Tome and 
Principe 
341 40% 60% 45% 2.80 
Europe Estonia 7 100% 
 
100% 84.00  Africa Sao Tome and 
Principe 
561 91% 
 
91% 47.00 
Europe Estonia 161 100% 
 
100% 60.00  Africa Sao Tome and 
Principe 
610 19% 
 
19% 32.00 
Europe Estonia 189 67% 25% 60% 4.88  Africa Sao Tome and 
Principe 
688 36% 
 
36% 39.00 
Europe Estonia 254 67% 38% 64% 9.00  Africa Sao Tome and 
Principe 
731 0% 
 
0% 26.00 
Europe Estonia 326 43% 67% 47% 4.33  Africa Senegal 27 60% 0% 58% 32.50 
Africa Ethiopia 10 
 
80% 80% 0  Africa Senegal 63 100% 53% 87% 2.67 
Africa Ethiopia 103 
 
86% 86% 0  Africa Senegal 149 100% 64% 94% 4.73 
Africa Ethiopia 113 
 
0% 0% 0  Africa Senegal 203 50% 50% 50% 4.80 
Africa Ethiopia 207 50% 42% 48% 3.33  Africa Senegal 277 67% 50% 62% 2.70 
Africa Ethiopia 289 0% 33% 10% 2.33  Africa Senegal 327 100% 28% 68% 1.24 
Africa Ethiopia 371 92% 83% 90% 2.89  Africa Senegal 399 67% 56% 63% 1.50 
Africa Ethiopia 629 94% 
 
94% 17.00  Africa Senegal 530 54% 
 
54% 41.00 
Africa Gabon 40 80% 100% 81% 16.25  Africa Senegal 587 64% 
 
64% 47.00 
Africa Gabon 162 67% 31% 61% 5.63  Africa Senegal 656 81% 
 
81% 89.00 
Africa Gabon 374 20% 40% 24% 4.29  Africa Senegal 729 27% 
 
27% 26.00 
Africa Gabon 540 92% 
 
92% 25.00  Europe Serbia 537 86% 
 
86% 111.00 
Africa Gabon 579 42% 
 
42% 45.00  Europe Serbia 606 89% 
 
89% 70.00 
Africa Gambia, The 270 50% 79% 55% 4.86  Europe Serbia 673 0% 
 
0% 17.00 
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Africa Gambia, The 343 80% 62% 76% 3.10  Europe Serbia 723 49% 
 
49% 63.00 
Africa Gambia, The 405 25% 39% 29% 2.67  Africa Sierra Leone 94 100% 
 
100% 34.00 
Africa Gambia, The 520 0% 
 
0% 8.00  Africa Sierra Leone 96 0% 25% 5% 4.25 
Africa Gambia, The 577 71% 
 
71% 66.00  Africa Sierra Leone 132 100% 
 
100% 36.00 
Africa Gambia, The 685 38% 
 
38% 37.00  Africa Sierra Leone 228 0% 56% 11% 4.22 
CIS Georgia 127 100% 43% 88% 3.62  Africa Sierra Leone 532 80% 
 
80% 87.00 
CIS Georgia 171 100% 53% 87% 2.67  Africa Sierra Leone 573 74% 
 
74% 80.00 
CIS Georgia 223 67% 44% 61% 3.38  Africa Sierra Leone 643 59% 
 
59% 41.00 
CIS Georgia 265 67% 65% 66% 2.85  Africa Sierra Leone 705 49% 
 
49% 55.00 
CIS Georgia 348 30% 50% 33% 5.71  Europe Slovak Republic 78 75% 
 
75% 60.00 
CIS Georgia 541 95% 
 
95% 58.00  Asia Pac Sri Lanka 356 83% 53% 75% 2.65 
CIS Georgia 597 79% 
 
79% 66.00  Asia Pac Sri Lanka 504 0% 
 
0% 13.00 
CIS Georgia 683 44% 
 
44% 25.00  Asia Pac Sri Lanka 620 79% 
 
79% 53.00 
CIS Georgia 716 23% 
 
23% 26.00  CIS Tajikistan 271 0% 61% 24% 1.57 
Africa Ghana 158 100% 50% 88% 3.17  CIS Tajikistan 305 38% 57% 41% 4.11 
Africa Ghana 280 80% 44% 75% 5.94  CIS Tajikistan 340 20% 52% 28% 2.93 
Africa Ghana 296 9% 59% 26% 1.99  CIS Tajikistan 502 97% 
 
97% 60.00 
Africa Ghana 521 80% 
 
80% 46.00  CIS Tajikistan 615 73% 
 
73% 71.00 
Africa Ghana 619 78% 
 
78% 67.00  Africa Tanzania 213 100% 27% 65% 1.08 
Africa Ghana 725 24% 
 
24% 34.00  Africa Tanzania 241 29% 8% 26% 5.83 
Europe Greece 638 57% 
 
57% 56.00  Africa Tanzania 311 67% 14% 52% 2.57 
Europe Greece 680 45% 
 
45% 92.00  Africa Tanzania 533 95% 
 
95% 37.00 
Latin Am Grenada 566 68% 
 
68% 40.00  Africa Tanzania 534 91% 
 
91% 32.00 
Latin Am Grenada 636 39% 
 
39% 18.00  Africa Tanzania 582 86% 
 
86% 43.00 
Latin Am Grenada 713 45% 
 
45% 38.00  Africa Tanzania 642 88% 
 
88% 33.00 
Latin Am Guatemala 522 25% 
 
25% 20.00  Africa Tanzania 687 76% 
 
76% 21.00 
Latin Am Guatemala 523 0% 
 
0% 19.00  Africa Tanzania 714 37% 
 
37% 27.00 
Latin Am Guatemala 616 92% 
 
92% 26.00  Asia Pac Thailand 255 1% 34% 4% 10.83 
Africa Guinea 240 100% 29% 81% 2.71  Africa Togo 85 33% 67% 38% 6.33 
Africa Guinea 283 100% 44% 84% 2.44  Africa Togo 150 50% 13% 44% 5.00 
Africa Guinea 416 67% 64% 66% 4.07  Africa Togo 592 72% 
 
72% 50.00 
Africa Guinea 417 25% 53% 31% 3.53  Africa Tunisia 699 72% 
 
72% 60.00 
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Africa Guinea 589 31% 
 
31% 32.00  Europe Turkey 75 86% 0% 84% 45.50 
Africa Guinea 679 63% 
 
63% 56.00  Europe Turkey 317 7% 68% 24% 2.62 
Africa Guinea-
Bissau 
123 0% 63% 10% 5.00  Europe Turkey 418 47% 47% 47% 2.64 
Africa Guinea-
Bissau 
174 50% 57% 52% 2.57  Europe Turkey 556 65% 
 
65% 110.00 
Africa Guinea-
Bissau 
224 0% 57% 24% 1.43  Africa Uganda 62 100% 36% 78% 1.86 
Africa Guinea-
Bissau 
434 0% 17% 2% 6.67  Africa Uganda 148 100% 50% 78% 1.30 
Africa Guinea-
Bissau 
637 53% 
 
53% 47.00  Africa Uganda 191 100% 67% 79% 0.62 
Africa Guinea-
Bissau 
730 0% 
 
0% 13.00  Africa Uganda 234 0% 33% 11% 2.17 
Africa Guyana 86 67% 36% 59% 3.00  Africa Uganda 278 50% 33% 44% 1.78 
Africa Guyana 156 100% 58% 76% 0.75  Africa Uganda 319 75% 52% 67% 1.94 
Africa Guyana 214 100% 67% 88% 1.87  Africa Uganda 501 67% 
 
67% 58.00 
Africa Guyana 268 50% 67% 57% 1.52  Africa Uganda 584 17% 
 
17% 18.00 
Africa Guyana 415 0% 25% 7% 2.81  Africa Uganda 585 76% 
 
76% 82.00 
Africa Guyana 426 33% 50% 38% 2.76  Africa Uganda 639 62% 
 
62% 61.00 
Latin Am Haiti 136 100% 22% 77% 2.33  Africa Uganda 702 57% 
 
57% 89.00 
Latin Am Haiti 218 50% 30% 44% 2.60  CIS Ukraine 95 40% 50% 42% 3.39 
Latin Am Haiti 572 82% 
 
82% 61.00  CIS Ukraine 185 100% 48% 93% 6.80 
Latin Am Haiti 651 79% 
 
79% 84.00  CIS Ukraine 273 36% 47% 37% 7.85 
Latin Am Haiti 727 0% 
 
0% 15.00  CIS Ukraine 274 35% 82% 52% 1.85 
Latin Am Honduras 11 100% 100% 100% 2.80  CIS Ukraine 546 0% 
 
0% 14.00 
Latin Am Honduras 111 25% 25% 25% 7.33  CIS Ukraine 599 32% 
 
32% 25.00 
Latin Am Honduras 306 38% 51% 41% 3.23  CIS Ukraine 652 27% 
 
27% 30.00 
Latin Am Honduras 542 63% 
 
63% 40.00  CIS Ukraine 711 38% 
 
38% 34.00 
Latin Am Honduras 591 0% 
 
0% 21.00  CIS Ukraine 724 0% 
 
0% 15.00 
Latin Am Honduras 654 45% 
 
45% 44.00  Latin Am Uruguay 188 100% 
 
100% 44.00 
Latin Am Honduras 720 21% 
 
21% 53.00  Latin Am Uruguay 225 100% 50% 96% 12.00 
Europe Hungary 13 67% 
 
67% 33.00  Latin Am Uruguay 292 60% 0% 54% 9.17 
Europe Hungary 146 70% 40% 67% 8.67  Latin Am Uruguay 339 100% 37% 89% 4.63 
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Europe Hungary 600 68% 
 
68% 34.00  Latin Am Uruguay 394 50% 52% 50% 3.88 
Europe Iceland 603 95% 
 
95% 58.00  Latin Am Uruguay 535 68% 
 
68% 56.00 
Asia Pac Indonesia 256 0% 47% 6% 6.42  Latin Am Uruguay 558 83% 
 
83% 42.00 
Asia Pac Indonesia 275 15% 42% 23% 2.53  CIS Uzbekistan 187 33% 44% 35% 6.00 
Asia Pac Indonesia 337 1% 22% 6% 3.60  Latin Am Venezuela, RB 217 83% 39% 78% 7.00 
Arab Iraq 564 70% 
 
70% 54.00  Asia Pac Vietnam 26 17% 86% 29% 4.71 
Arab Iraq 588 72% 
 
72% 43.00  Asia Pac Vietnam 166 33% 33% 33% 4.50 
Arab Iraq 633 54% 
 
54% 37.00  Asia Pac Vietnam 205 80% 43% 75% 6.43 
Europe Ireland 657 97% 
 
97% 37.00  Asia Pac Vietnam 368 38% 62% 42% 4.31 
Latin Am Jamaica 14 100% 88% 100% 24.38  Arab Yemen, Rep. 190 100% 50% 95% 8.31 
Latin Am Jamaica 631 60% 
 
60% 45.00  Arab Yemen, Rep. 232 59% 43% 55% 2.71 
Latin Am Jamaica 697 73% 
 
73% 145.00  Arab Yemen, Rep. 233 100% 59% 89% 2.59 
Arab Jordan 155 
 
37% 37% 0  Arab Yemen, Rep. 295 33% 43% 36% 2.94 
Arab Jordan 235 69% 100% 72% 12.07  Arab Yemen, Rep. 382 67% 30% 59% 3.60 
Arab Jordan 304 80% 56% 72% 2.12  Arab Yemen, Rep. 653 0% 
 
0% 9.00 
Arab Jordan 505 92% 
 
92% 38.00  Arab Yemen, Rep. 718 0% 
 
0% 11.00 
Arab Jordan 690 73% 
 
73% 78.00  Africa Zambia 172 50% 56% 51% 3.56 
CIS Kazakhstan 108 17% 54% 28% 2.36  Africa Zambia 173 50% 44% 49% 3.56 
CIS Kazakhstan 153 60% 60% 60% 6.00  Africa Zambia 297 0% 18% 2% 7.41 
CIS Kazakhstan 184 46% 74% 53% 3.36  Africa Zambia 344 67% 42% 61% 3.50 
CIS Kazakhstan 331 0% 33% 4% 6.67  Africa Zambia 407 44% 60% 48% 3.60 
Africa Kenya 27 67% 
 
67% 54.00  Africa Zambia 547 77% 
 
77% 57.00 
Africa Kenya 29 
 
80% 80% 0  Africa Zambia 594 73% 
 
73% 59.00 
Africa Kenya 157 100% 40% 83% 2.50  Africa Zimbabwe 122 29% 43% 31% 6.00 
Africa Kenya 347 0% 0% 0% 10.00  Africa Zimbabwe 130 0% 47% 27% 0.73 
Africa Kenya 524 71% 
 
71% 31.00  Africa Zimbabwe 140 0% 30% 11% 1.70 
Africa Kenya 661 84% 
 
84% 37.00  Africa Zimbabwe 266 0% 0% 0% 13.33 
Africa Kenya 722 44% 
 
44% 16.00  Africa Zimbabwe 303 0% 0% 0% 6.60 
Asia Pac Korea, Rep. 276 11% 58% 19% 4.75  
     
 
 
Europe Kosovo 650 0% 
 
0% 11.00  
     
 
 
Europe Kosovo 684 71% 
 
71% 41.00  
     
 
 
Europe Kosovo 732 36% 
 
36% 14.00  
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CIS Kyrgyz Rep. 16 50% 0% 45% 8.89  
     
 
 
CIS Kyrgyz Rep. 139 0% 40% 25% 0.60  
     
 
 
CIS Kyrgyz Rep. 154 50% 40% 47% 2.40  
     
 
 
CIS Kyrgyz Rep. 212 100% 30% 82% 2.80  
     
 
 
CIS Kyrgyz Rep. 269 67% 39% 59% 2.83  
     
 
 
CIS Kyrgyz Rep. 330 60% 41% 56% 3.70  
     
 
 
CIS Kyrgyz Rep. 362 89% 80% 86% 2.13  
     
 
 
CIS Kyrgyz Rep. 554 93% 
 
93% 72.00  
     
 
 
CIS Kyrgyz Rep. 628 38% 
 
38% 21.00  
     
 
 
CIS Kyrgyz Rep. 671 90% 
 
90% 49.00  
     
 
 
CIS Kyrgyz Rep. 726 24% 
 
24% 34.00  
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